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The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  investigate  the  role  of  the  Praetorian 
Guard  in  the  hundred  years  between  the  battle  of  Actium  and  the 
accession  of  Vespasian.  This  necessitates  not  only  a  consideration  of 
those  political  activities  which  the  Praetorians  undertook  at  the  behest 
of  their  emperors  but  also  an  examination  into-the  motivations  of  the 
guardsmen  themselves.  Moreover,  any  study  of,  the  Praetorian  Guard 
would  be  less  than  complete  without  an  account  of  the  development  of  the 
Praetorian  prefecture. 
The  historical  narrative  of  the  Julio-Claudian  years  reveals  four  areas 
of  Praetorian  prominence.  The  first,  and  most  important,  concerns 
the  way  in  which  Augustus  and  his  successors  deployed  their  Guard.  As 
a  military  force  the  contribution  of  the  Praetorians  was,  during  this 
time,  limited  to  occasional  forays  onto  the  battlefield  when  accompanying 
the  emperor,  such  as  Claudius  during  the  invasion  of  Britain,  or  a 
member  of  the  imperial  family,  like  Germanicus  when  he  was  campaigning 
in  Germany.  Augustus,  however,  did  not  retain  his  Praetorian  cohorts  as 
a  military  elite,  but  rather  as  internal  security  troops  to  guarantee 
the  new  system  of  government.  Their  numbers  were  large  enough  - 
9  cohorts  of  500  men  -  to  deter  conspirators.  In  this  preventive 
role  they  played  a  vital  part  at  times  of  succession.  Their  presence 
at  Augustus'  funeral  speaks  as  much  of  intimidation  as  of  ceremonial 
obligation.  But  the  Praetorians  were  not  just  a  passive  deterrent. 
They  acted  ruthlessly  against  the  emperor's  enemies.  Within  the 
imperial  family  alone  we  know  of  Praetorian  involvement  in  the  deaths  of 
Agrippa  Postumus,  Nero  Caesar,  Drusus  Caesar,  Agrippina  the  elder, 
Tiberius  Gemellus,  Britannicus  and  Octavia.  Praetorian  detachments 
were  responsible  for  the  executions  of,  among  others,  Avillius  Flaccus, 
the  former  prefect  of  Egypt,  during  Gaius'  principate,  and  Rubellius 
Plautus  who  had  incurred  Nero's  enmity.  It  would,  however,  be  quite 
wrong  to  view  the  Praetorians  as  solely  an  oppressive  force  like  the 
Gestapo  or  KGB.  The  historian's  skill  and  the  cruelty  of,  for  example, 
Octavia's  death  too  often  beguile  us.  We  should  not  ignore  Praetorian 
brutality  / brutality,  but  such  activities  were  but  a  small  part  of  the  Guard's 
duty.  They  also  kept  peace  in  Rome's  turbulent  theatres  and  were 
occasionally,  when  need  dictated,  sent  to  other  towns  in  Italy.  But, 
above  all,  we  must  never  forget  how  effective  they  were  in  protecting 
the  regime.  The  crushing  of  the  conspiracies  of  Messalina  in  AD.  48 
and  Piso  in  AD.  65  should  be  attributed,  in  large  measure,  to  the 
loyalty  of  the  Praetorians. 
The  second  area  of  Praetorian  activity  which  we  should  note  is  when 
they  intervened  in  the  political  process  with  a  more  obvious  self- 
interest  as  at  the  assassination  of  Gaius  in  AD.  41.  The  prospect 
of  a  restoration  of  the  Republic  held  little  attraction  for  the 
Praetorian  Guard.  And  so  Claudius  was  found  and  taken  to  the  security 
of  the  Praetorian  barracks,  where  he  promised  each  Praetorian  the  huge 
donative  of  15,000  sesterces  -a  ruinous  precedent.  The  impotent 
Senate  huffed  and  puffed  -  and  then  surrendered.  The  manner  of 
Claudius'  accession  was  of  immense  significance.  From  that  time 
Praetorian  endorsement  became,  for  a  new  princeps,  an  unavoidable 
constraint.  In  AD.  68  the  Praetorians  realised  that,  if  they  could 
make  emperors,  they  could  also  unmake  them.  Their  support  for  Galba 
at  that  time  indicates  both  Nero's  unpopularity  and  the  effectiveness 
of  Nymphidius'  false  promises.  Again,  their  replacement  of  Galba  by 
Otho  was  motivated,  above  all,  by  the  old  emperor's  refusal  to  pay  the 
donative  promised  in  his  name.  In  all  of  this  we  may  detect  a 
determination  among  the  Praetorians  to  maintain  their  privileges  and 
advantageous  terms  of  service. 
We  should,  however,  be  wary  of  viewing  the  Guard  as  a  politically 
homogeneous  force.  There  were  clear  differences  in  outlook  between, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  tribunes  and  the  centurions  and,  on  the  other,  the 
enlisted  men.  Hence  the  participation  of  some  Praetorian  officers  in 
the  conspiracies  of  AD.  41  and  AD.  65.  Even  among  the  guardsmen 
themselves  we  find  very  different  social  and  geographical  backgrounds. 
The  political,  even  politicised  voice  with  which  the  Praetorians  spoke 
in  AD.  69  can  easily  mislead  us.  Selfishness  and  the  preservation  of 
their  status  were  the  dominant  factors  behind  Praetorian  loyalty. 
Some  / Some  commentators  have  turned  the  focus  of  attention  on  a  third, 
distinctly  unattractive  aspect  of  the  Praetorians'  conduct  -  their 
alleged  indiscipline.  It  is  clear  that  for  much  of  AD.  69  the 
Praetorians  were  a  law  unto  themselves.  In  March  of  that  year  Otho's 
guardsmen  went  on  a  drunken  rampage  which  culminated  with  an  invasion  of 
the  imperial  palace.  They  also  mounted  surveillance  on  those  senators 
whom  they  suspected  of  being  Vitellian  sympathizers.  Their  behaviour 
on  campaign  was  characterized  by  the  same  chronic  disorderliness. 
Vitellius'  Praetorians,  recruited  in  large  part  from  the  German  legions, 
were  no  better.  They  must  bear  the  responsibility,  by  their  refusal  to 
allow  Vitellius  to  abdicate,  for  the  death  and  destruction  during  the 
Flavian  assault  on  Rome.  Elsewhere,  however,  evidence  of  Praetorian 
indiscipline  is  difficult  to  find.  We  should  perhaps  regard  such 
aberrant  conduct  as  the  inevitable  concomitant  of  their  occasional 
interventions  in  the  political  process.  This  is  not  to  excuse  anarchy, 
but  a  hundred  years  of  fidelity  to  a  succession  of  emperors  should  not 
be  defamed  because  of  a  few  isolated  incidents. 
Finally  let  us  consider  the  Praetorian  prefecture  established,  perhaps 
reluctantly,  by  Augustus  in  2BC.  Too  often  the  developing  importance 
of  the  post  is  ignored  as  we  are  mesmerized  by  the  accomplishments  of 
prefects  like  Seianus  and  Burrus.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  such 
men  enhanced  the  status  of  the  prefecture  by  their  tenure,  but  the 
office  was,  from  the  beginning,  a  post  of  great  potentiality.  It 
appears  to  have  had,  unlike  the  other  prefectures,  an  open-ended  remit 
encompassing  the  whole  area  of  imperial  security  rather  than  just 
command  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts,  important  as  that  was.  Hence  we 
find  the  prefect  involved  in  the  juridical  process  and  serving  on  the 
emperor's  consilium.  The  nature  of  the  office  necessitated  regular, 
perhaps  even  daily  contact  between  emperor  and  prefect.  This  in  turn 
led  to  familiarity  and  sometimes  friendship.  But  there  were  dangers 
too.  Imperial  suspicion,  the  harbinger  of  ruin,  was  all  too  easily 
aroused.  Seianus'  fall  in  AD.  31,  for  example,  certainly  underlines 
the  limitations  of  the  prefecture  and  the  dependence  of  holders  of  that 
post  on  the  emperor's  continuing  favour,  but  it  should  not  blind  us  to 
its  growing  prestige  and  expanding  role. ('U  A  1'  Dt 
THE  AUGUSTAN  GUARD  AND  ITS  PREDECESSORS 
The  Praetorian  Guard  of  Augustus  had  its  immediate  origins  in  the 
Praetorian  cohorts  of  the  civil  war  period,  although  its  antecedents 
stretched,  as  we  shall  see,  considerably  further  back  than  that. 
Augustus,  no  more  revolutionary  in  this  regard  than  in  any  other  of  his 
undertakings, 
1 
was,  as  Durry  has  pointed  out,  'heritier  d'une  longue 
tradition'. 
2 
But  here,  as  in  so  much  else,  his  genius  lay  in  the  skill 
with  which  he  adapted  an  institution  of  the  Republican  period  to  suit 
his  own  needs. 
It  had  been  an  established  practice,  long  before  the  civil  wars,  for 
Roman  generals,  while  on  active  service,  to  surround  themselves  with 
elite  bands  which  could  serve  either  as  a  bodyguard3  or  as  a  tactical 
reserve  capable  of  being  deployed  in  battle  whenever  and  wherever 
necessary.  Livy  tells  us  that  the  dictator  Postumius  at  the  battle 
of  Lake  Regillus,  in  496  BC.  surrounded  himself  with  picked  troops 
'praesidii  causa'. 
4 
We  also  know  from  Livy  that  Scipio  Africanus, 
when  in  Sicily  in  205  BC.,  had  a  personal  guard  of  three  hundred  sturdy 
young  men  who  were  awarded  horses  and  weapons. 
5 
Festus,  the  2nd  century 
epitomizer  of  Verrius  Flaccus,  specifically  uses  the  term  'praetoria 
cohors'  to  describe  Africanus'  bodyguard  which  he  alleges  was  chosen 
from  the  bravest  men  in  the  army  who  were  then  relieved  of  all  other 
duties  and  had  their  pay  increased  by  50%. 
6 
It  seems  more  likely, 
however,  that  the  cavalry  escorts  of  nobles  like  Africanus,  and  later 
Scipio  Aemilianus, 
7 
were  formed  mainly  from  their  own  clients  and 
friends.  It  was  Marius,  an  innovator  in  this  as  in  so  many  other 
aspects  / 2. 
aspects  of  army  organisation,  who  regularised  the  trend  among  Roman 
commanders  towards  the  use  of  bodyguards  by  creating  for  himself  a 
cavalry  escort,  membership  of  which  was  determined  by  military 
competence  rather  than  by  social  caste. 
8 
It  is  quite  clear,  however,  that  during  the  earlier  decades  of  the 
ist  century  BC.  the  term  Praetorian  cohort  was  not  used  in  an  exclusively 
military  context. 
9 
It  was  commonly  used  to  describe  the  staff  which  a 
provincial  governor  was  allowed  to  recruit  to  accompany  him  during  his 
tour  of  duty.  So  Cicero  writes  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  of  Verres  in 
Sicily 
10 
and  of  his  brother  Quintus  in  Greece, 
11 
and  derides  'Catiline's 
Praetorian  guard  of  pansies'. 
12 
We  find  a  similar  use  of  the  term  by 
the  poet  Catullus  who  spent  an  unprofitable  and  unpleasant  year  in  the 
Praetorian  cohort  of  Gaius  Memmius  in  Bithynia. 
13 
Cicero  applies  the  same  term  to  military  units,  writing  of  his  own 
Praetorian  cohort  which  fought  against  Parthian  and  Arabian  horsemen  in 
Cilicia14  and  of  that  of  Carbo  who  in  82  BC.  commanded  the  Marian  forces 
in  Cisalpine  Gaul. 
15 
The  term  is  also  used  with  a  similar,  though  more 
obvious,  military  implication  by  Sallust  who  tells  us  that  Marcus 
Petreius  commanded  the  Praetorian  cohort  of  Gaius  Antonius  against 
Catiline's  forces  at  the  battle  of  Pistoria, 
16 
and  by  Caesar  who 
encouraged  his  frightened  troops  during  the  campaign  against  Ariovistus 
by  threatening  to  leave  with  only  his  10th  legion  which  would  serve  him 
as  a  Praetorian  cohort. 
17 
Such  a  development  is,  of  course,  only 
natural  given  the  increasing  militarisation  during  the  last  30  years  of 
the  Republican  era. 
$ut  / 3. 
But  it  was  more  especially  in  the  wars  following  Caesar's  assassination 
that  the  use  of  Praetorian  cohorts  became  widespread  and  the  number  of 
such  units  greatly  increased.  There  were  obvious  tactical  advantages 
for  a  commander  in  having  readily  available  an  elite  force  of  this  kind. 
Nor  should  we  ignore  the  need  for  personal  protection  felt  by  men  for 
whom  it  would  have  been  unrealistic  not  to  take  precautions  against 
possible  assassination  at  the  hands  of  a  rival's  agents. 
18 
Both 
Antony  and  Octavian  felt  compelled  to  obtain  large  bodyguards  during 
this  period19  and  there  are  numerous  mentions,  by  Appian  especially, 
of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  of  both. 
20 
Indeed,  at  Mutina  these  cohorts 
actually  fought  against  each  other. 
21 
In  the  following  year  on  the 
very  day  of  the  battle  of  Philippi  a  convoy  under  the  command  of 
Domitius  Calvinus  which  was  bringing  Praetorian  cohorts  to  Octavian 
was  destroyed  in  the  Adriatic  by  Murcus  and  Ahenobarbus. 
22 
Despite 
the  absence  of  these  forces  from  the  battlefield  Antony  and  Octavian 
were  victorious  and  after  the  battle  organised  8,000  veterans  who 
wished  to  remain  soldiers  into  Praetorian  cohorts,  then  divided  these 
troops  equally  between  them. 
23 
Octavian's  cohorts  took  part  in  the 
campaign  against  Lucius  Antonius  in  Perusia.  After  Antony  landed  24 
at  Brundisium  in  40  BC.,  the  Praetorian  cohorts  on  both  sides  urged 
their  commanders  to  resolve  their  differences  without  fighting. 
25 
Their  petitions  were  successful  and  as  a  result  of  the  agreement  made 
at  this  time  Antony  married  Octavia  who  in  37  BC.  brought  him  from  her 
brother  2000  soldiers  selected  for  service  in  Praetorian  cohorts. 
26 
Antony  advertised  the  loyalty  of  his  Praetorian  cohorts,  three  of  whom 
were  involved  in  his  Parthian  expedition, 
27 
through  an  issue  of  coins. 
28 
He  similarly  honoured  a  special  duties  cohort  of  speculatores29  who 
provided  / 4. 
provided  an  inner  bodyguard  and  acted  as  scouts  and  perhaps  also  as 
executioners  and  assassins. 
30 
We  have  no  firm  evidence  as  to  the 
number  of  cohorts  Octavian  maintained  during  this  period,  although, 
according  to  Orosius, 
31 
he  put  five  on  board  ships  for  the  battle  of 
Actium. 
The  origins  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  which  fought  at  Actium  are 
reasonably  clear.  It  is  much  more  difficult,  however,  to  trace  the 
manner  in  which  those  cohorts  changed  from  the  warbands  of  a  military 
baron  into  an  internal  security  force  whose  principal  purpose  was  to 
guarantee  the  security  of  the  new  regime.  Dio  Cassius  provides  us  with 
a  certain  amount  of  information  (which  we  should  regard  warily)  on  the 
organisation  of  the  Praetorians  at  this  time.  From  our  other  sources 
we  have  only  snippets.  There  is  scant  literary  evidence  of  the 
Praetorians'  developing  political  role  during  the  Augustan  period. 
We  may  surmise,  for  example,  that  the  Praetorians  were  involved  in  the 
suppression  of  the  major  conspiracies  against  Augustus  -  those  of 
Varro  Murena  and  Fannius  Caepio  in  22  BC.  and  of  Iullus  Antonius  in 
2  BC.  -  but  we  cannot  cite  any  sources  to  support  such  suppositions. 
For  this  Tacitus  must  be  blamed.  His  determination  to  portray 
Tiberius  as  responsible  for  the  descent  of  the  principate  into  tyranny 
not  only  deprives  us  of  a  detailed  account  of  the  Augustan  principate 
but  also  fundamentally  misleads  us  as  to  its  nature  by  refusing  to 
acknowledge  the  developing  autocracy  under  Augustus.  But  such  an 
admission  is  vital  if  we  are  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the 
Praetorian  Guard  and  the  emperor.  We  know  that  the  Praetorian  cohorts 
of  AD.  14  were  a  very  different  force  from  their  predecessors  of  31  BC. 
as  / 5. 
as  regards  both  their  role  and  their  character.  These  changes  did  not 
happen  in  a  political  vacuum.  The  way  in  which  the  Praetorian  cohorts 
were  used  was  the  epitome  of  the  developing  principate. 
Augustus  felt  that  he  needed  to  keep  his  Praetorian  cohorts  after  the 
defeat  of  Antony  and  Cleopatra.  His  decision  to  retain  and  develop 
this  force  was  perhaps  a  less  conscious  one  than  Dio  Cassius  implies. 
32 
It  would,  in  fact,  have  been  more  surprising  had  he  disbanded  these 
cohorts  especially  given  the  difficult  political  and  economic 
situation  in  Italy  caused,  in  the  aftermath  of  Actium,  by  the  large- 
scale  demobilisation 
33 
and  confiscations  of  land  which  led  to  a  high 
level  of  banditry. 
34 
Besides,  although  no  single  rival  remained  to 
challenge  his  authority, 
35 
there  were  still  considerable  dangers  and 
serious  problems  to  be  overcome,  for  political  normality  was  not  the 
necessary  concomitant  of  military  victory  and,  in  any  case,  the 
disruptive  effects  of  the  civil  wars  had  led  to  a  situation  where  each 
man's  concept  of  such  normality  was  likely  to  be  highly  subjective. 
Moreover,  some  degree  of  senatorial  opposition  to  the  notion  of  the 
principate  could  be  taken  for  granted. 
36 
The  considerable  number  of 
executions  and  proscriptions  for  which  the  new  ruler  could  be  held 
responsible  was  not  likely  to  be  forgotten  or  forgiven. 
37 
To  counter 
such  threats  Augustus  clearly  needed  an  internal  security  force.  But 
he  had  the  perspicacity  to  realise  that  such  a  unit,  while  able  to  deter 
any  disaffected  senators  considering  conspiracy,  was  by  itself  unlikely 
to  help,  and  indeed  would  probably  obstruct,  the  national  reconciliation 
which  he  sought  to  encourage.  Such  was  the  dilemma  of  the  victor  of 
Actium.  He  had  no  wish  to  hide  behind  the  swords  of  his  bodyguard  like 
some  / 6. 
some  Greek  tyrant38  or  to  divide  the  nation  further  by  organising  his 
support  on  partisan  or  class  lines  like  Manlius, 
39 
Sulpicius40  or 
Sulla. 
41 
He  saw  quite  clearly  that  the  only  system  of  government  likely 
to  ensure  lasting  peace  was  one  based  on  the  support  of  all  sections  of 
society. 
42 
Furthermore  senatorial  support  was  not  a  luxury  which 
Augustus  might  cultivate  or  spurn  as  it  suited  him  for,  in  truth,  he 
could  not  rule  without  the  help  of  an  oligarchy. 
43 
And  so,  although  Augustus  retained  his  Praetorians  to  guarantee  his 
own  security  and  that  of  the  new  system  of  government,  they  were  merely 
one  component  in  the  larger  structure  of  state  which  he  was  attempting 
to  create.  He  could  not  allow  them  to  become  an  overtly  intimidatory 
force44  and  thereby  alienate  senatorial  support.  It  was,  as  Syme 
rightly  notes,  'inexpedient  for  Augustus  to  suppress  any  activity  that 
could  do  him  no  harm'. 
45 
To  this  end  he  chose  to  endure  the  catcalls 
of  the  arrogant  when  he  spoke  in  the  Senate46  and  to  release  the 
foolish  Gnaeus  Cornelius,  Pompey's  grandson,  who  had  become  involved 
in  a  plot  against  him. 
47 
Moreover,  if  the  sight  of  soldiers  on  the 
streets  of  the  capital  was  anathema  to  some  die-hards,  then  Augustus 
was  willing  to  indulge  their  sensitivities  to  the  extent  of  instructing 
his  Praetorians  to  wear  civilian  dress  while  guarding  his  palace.  His 
indulgence,  however,  was  not  limitless.  Beneath  their  togas  they  still 
carried  swords. 
48 
And  if  there  were  some  who  mistook  this  realism  for 
weakness,  the  fate  of  Varro  Murena  and  Fannius  Caepio  was  a  salutary 
reminder  of  the  Praetorian  iron  fist  that  lay  beneath  the  velvet  glove 
of  Augustus'  toleration. 
49 
It  / 7. 
It  is  often  assumed  on  the  evidence  of  Tacitus  that  Augustus 
organised  his  Praetorians  in  9  cohorts. 
50 
Since  the  normal  complement 
of  a  legion  was  10  cohorts,  this  choice  may  have  reflected  a  desire  on 
his  part  to  avoid  giving  the  impression  that  he  was  setting  up  an 
'imperial'  legion  based  in  or  near  Rome. 
51 
On  the  other  hand  it  may 
merely  be  a  reflection  of  the  number  of  Praetorian  cohorts,  both 
Antony's  and  his  own,  which  took  part  in  the  fighting  at  Actium. 
52 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  there  were  more  than  9  cohorts  during 
Augustus'  principate.  Tacitus'  figure  of  9  cohorts  indicates  the 
situation  under  Tiberius  in  AD.  23.  Epigraphic  evidence  shows 
12  cohorts  by  the  reign  of  Nero  -  an  increase  perhaps  initiated  by 
Gaius. 
53 
A  more  recent  discovery,  however,  suggests  that  there  may 
have  been  an  11th  cohort  under  Augustus  roC  Tiberius. 
54 
If  this 
change  was  made  by  Tiberius  after  AD.  23  then  we  are  right  to  assume 
that  there  were  9  cohorts  under  Augustus.  However,  the  more  natural 
interpretation  of  the  order  of  posts  on  the  inscription  is  that  the 
increase  was  made  by  Augustus  and  that  Tiberius  effected  a  reduction 
some  time  before  AD.  23.55 
There  has  been  much  debate  over  the  exact  size  of  these  cohorts.  Dio 
Cassius  writes  of  cohorts  of  1000  men  in  the  time  of  Augustus. 
56 
it 
seems  probable,  however,  that  these  numbers  reflect  the  situation 
during  his  own  early  life  under  the  Antonine  emperors.  From  Tacitus 
we  know  that  Vitellius,  after  the  death  of  Otho,  formed  a  new  Guard  of 
16  cohorts,  each  1000  strong. 
57 
Durry  believes  that  the  Praetorian 
cohorts  were  quingenary  in  the  Julio-Claudian  period  and  re-emphasises 
Tacitus'  statement  so  that  it  has  the  sense  non  seulement  on  enrolait 
seize  / 8. 
seize  cohortes  pretoriennes  et  quatre  urbaines,  mais  encore  chacune 
devait  avoir  1000  hommes. 
58 
This  thesis  failed,  however,  to 
convince  Passerini,  although  his  own  arguments  for  milliary  cohorts  are 
not  compelling. 
59- 
There  was  also  a  small  cavalry  detachment  used 
perhaps,  at  this  stage,  mainly  to  carry  messages. 
60 
Augustus'  original  Guard  consisted  of  veterans  of  the  civil  wars  but 
as  these  men  reached  the  end  of  their  service  and  were  settled  in 
colonies, 
61 
further  recruitment  became  necessary.  This  took  place 
almost  entirely  in  Italy, 
62 
reflecting  both  the  emphasis  found  in 
contemporary  literature  of  the  Augustan  principate  as  an  Italian 
triumph 
63 
and  Augustus'  own  determination  to  maintain  a  martial  spirit 
among  the  people  of  Italy. 
64 
Some  of  those  who  joined  the  Praetorians, 
and  not  just  at  officer  level, 
65 
may  have  originally  served  in  the 
urban  cohorts  which  Durry  suggests  were  a  cadet  force  for  the 
Praetorians,  though  it  would  be  unwise,  given  the  limited  epigraphic 
evidence,  to  suggest  that  service  in  the  urban  cohorts  was  necessary 
or  compulsory  for  a  soldier  hoping  to  enter  the  Guard. 
66 
There  were  advantages  and  privileges,  both  immediate  and  long-term,  for 
those  Italians  who  served  in  the  Praetorian  Guard.  According  to  Dio 
Cassius,  Augustus  in  13  BC.  enacted  that  the  Praetorians  should  be 
discharged  after  12  years  and  ordinary  legionaries  after  16.67  In 
AD.  5  these  lengths  of  service  were  extended  to  16  years  for  Praetorians 
and  20  years  for  those  in  the  legions,  who  were  also  expected  to  spend 
another  5  years  in  the  reserve. 
68 
This  provided  opportunities  for 
Praetorian  evocati  to  gain  promotion,  especially  into  the  senior 
legionary  I 9. 
legionary  centurionate. 
69 
Dio  also  alleges  that  Augustus'  first  act 
after  being  voted  extraordinary  powers  by  the  Senate  in  27  BC.  was  to 
pay  his  Praetorians  double  what  the  legionaries  received  'so  that  he 
might  be  strictly  guarded'. 
70 
However,  since  the  scale  of  gratuities 
given  by  Augustus  in  AD.  5  was  in  a  ratio  of  5  to  3,71  we  would 
probably  be  correct  in  assuming  that  this  was  the  figure  initially  as 
well.  We  should  also  note  that  in  the  will  of  Augustus  this  ratio 
was  doubled,  for  the  Praetorians  received  250  denarii  each  and  the 
legionaries  only  75.72  These  were  not  the  only  benefits  available  to 
the  Praetorians.  Soon  there  developed  that  pernicious  and  ruinous 
practice  whereby  each  new  emperor  secured  their  loyalty  with  a  very 
handsome  donative  which  could  be  equivalent  to  five  years'  pay. 
73 
The  Praetorians  were  not,  at  this  stage,  allocated  permanent  barracks 
and,  indeed,  Augustus  kept  only  3  cohorts  in  Rome  itself,  while  the 
rest  were  dispersed  in  towns  near  the  city. 
74 
One  of  the  reasons  for 
this  might  have  been  that  there  were  no  barracks  readily  available  in 
Rome  and  the  notoriously  parsimonious  Augustus  was  unwilling  to  spend 
money  constructing  such  a  facility.  However  it  is  also  clear  that 
Augustus  was  determined  to  avoid  offending  the  Senate  which  he  would 
have  done  had  he  allowed  too  many  soldiers,  whose  primary  loyalty  was 
to  him  personally,  to  be  stationed  in  Rome. 
75 
His  disposition  of  the 
cohorts  may  also  have  been  motivated  by  a  desire  to  ensure  that  they 
were,  as  far  as  possible,  kept  separate  from  one  another  and  possibly, 
by  rotation,  from  any  permanent  base  so  that,  if  the  loyalty  of  any 
particular  cohort  was  compromised,  then  the  sedition  was  unlikely  to 
spread  to  other  cohorts. 
The  / 10. 
The  existence  of  Augustus'  German  bodyguard  may  also  be  regarded  as  a 
precaution  against  the  possibility  of  Praetorian  sedition. 
76 
Since 
they  were  recruited,  unlike  the  Praetorians,  from  the  furthest 
territories  of  the  empire,  they  had  no  political  or  personal  ties  with 
anyone  in  Rome.  The  possession  of  two  guard  units,  performing 
possibly  similar  functions,  may  appear  to  have  been  an  unnecessary 
duplication  by  Augustus. 
77 
But  tyrannies,  even  benevolent  ones,  are 
rarely  monolithic.  It  was,  and  indeed  still  is,  common  practice 
among  authoritarian  rulers  to  promote,  as  much  from  instinct  as  the 
result  of  any  deliberate  policy,  a  rivalry  between  different  groups 
devoted  to  the  same  purpose.  This  system  of  multiplicity  should  not 
be  regarded  indicative  of  any  doubt  on  Augustus'  part  as  to  the  loyalty 
of  his  Praetorians,  or  indeed  the  Germans. 
78 
It  was  prudent  foresight, 
nothing  more. 
Augustus  did  not,  at  first,  appoint  an  overall  commander  for  his 
Praetorian  cohorts,  preferring  to  leave  each  cohort  under  the  control 
of  its  own  tribune. 
79 
He  may  have  wished  to  keep  himself  as  the  sole 
focus  of  Praetorian  loyalty  and,  indeed,  to  continue  a  system  which  had 
apparently  worked  well  enough  in  the  years  before  Actium.  More 
probably,  however,  we  should  link  Augustus'  failure  to  appoint  a 
prefect  with  the  Praetorians'  civilian  dress  and  lack  of  a  central 
barracks  and  conclude  that  he  did  not  want  his  Praetorians  to  be 
thought  of  as  a  single  unit  under  one  commander  to  avoid  offending 
senatorial  sensitivities. 
80 
It  was  not  until  2  BC.  that  Augustus 
relinquished  his  direct  control  over  the  Praetorians. 
81 
Syme  may  well 
be  correct  in  seeing  a  link  between  this  development  and  the  dangerous 
crisis  / 11. 
crisis  which  occurred  in  the  autumn  of  that  year  involving  Augustus' 
daughter,  Julia,  and,  among  others,  Iullus  Antonius,  consul  in  10  BC. 
and  former  proconsul  of  Asia. 
82 
Although  Julia's  life-style  and  the 
artistic  pretensions  of  the  arrogant  men  who  courted  her  favour83 
made  it  relatively  easy  for  the  authorities  to  portray  their  offences 
as  sexual  decadence, 
84 
a  more  proper  assessment  would  nevertheless 
suggest  that  'adultery  was  only  a  pretext  or  an  aggravation'. 
85 
It 
is  possible,  of  course,  that  the  investigation  of  a  sexual  scandal 
unearthed  more  serious  offences  of  a  political  nature.  But,  in  truth, 
the  rank  of  those  involved  and  their  previous  involvement  in  political 
activities  touching  even  Augustus'  own  arrangements  for  the  succession86 
meant  that  any  offence  on  their  part  had  political  implications.  We 
need  not  go  further  than  this,  despite  Pliny's  claims  of  a  plot  to 
murder  Augustus. 
87 
The  whole  episode,  which  culminated  in  the  exile 
of  his  only  daughter,  traumatised  the  ageing  princeps.  It  is 
arguable  that  it  was  an  awareness  of  the  limitations  of  his  own  powers 
which  led  him  to  see  the  need  for  a  new  level  of  authority  within  the 
Praetorian  corps.  His  anxiety  over  the  succession  and  his  desire  to 
protect  his  grandsons  may  have  caused  him  to  appreciate  the  dangers  of 
leaving  a  void  in  the  command  structure  of  such  an  important  military 
force.  And  so  it  is  possible  to  regard  the  appointment  of  prefects 
as  an  implicit  recognition  of  the  vital  role  which  the  Praetorians  were 
expected  to  play  in  ensuring  the  peaceful  transfer  of  power  on  Augustus' 
death. 
Augustus  entrusted  the  command  of  his  Praetorians  to  two  prefects, 
Quintus  Ostorius  Scapula  and  Publius  Salvius  Aper,  wary  perhaps  of 
placing  / 
r 12. 
placing  so  much  power  in  the  hands  of  one  man. 
88 
Durry,  following 
Mommsen,  writes  of  the  'ancient  republican  principle'  of 
'collegialite',  89 
but  there  is  little  evidence  in  this  case  to  justify 
such  an  assertion. 
90 
Egypt,  even  after  the  treason  of  Gallus, 
continued  to  be  governed  by  a  single  prefect  and,  even  although 
disloyalty  by  a  Praetorian  prefect  would  have  presented  Augustus  with 
a  more  immediate  and  greater  threat,  it  is  difficult  to  accept  that 
he  was  unable  to  find  one  man  of  whose  loyalty  he  was  certain. 
Besides,  this  whole  argument  that  Augustus  appointed  two  prefects  as 
a  safeguard  in  case  of  the  disloyalty  of  one  of  them  is,  to  some 
extent,  invalidated  by  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of  his  death  in  AD.  14 
there  was  a  single  prefect,  Lucius  Seius  Strabo. 
91 
Dessau  puts 
forward  another  explanation  as  to  why  there  were  originally  two 
prefects,  suggesting  that  one  was  in  charge  of  the  cohorts  in  Rome, 
while  the  other  supervised  those  outside. 
92 
We  could  perhaps 
develop  this  point  and  argue  that  one  prefect  served  on  the  emperor's 
staff  as  a  liaison  officer,  while  the  other  had  operational  command  of 
the  cohorts.  But  this  argument  too  is  confuted  by  the  existence  of  a 
single  prefect  later  in  Augustus'  principate.  It  may  be  more 
profitable  to  look  at  the  situation  which  existed  in  2  BC.  and  to 
assume  that  Augustus,  in  appointing  two  prefects,  was  acting  to 
resolve  an  immediate  problem  rather  than  in  anticipation  of  possible 
treachery  in  the  future.  -  We  have  already  seen  the  links  between  the 
creation  of  the  prefecture  and  the  threat  posed  by  Iullus  Antonius 
whose  aims  may  have  included  marriage  to  Julia  and  guardianship  over 
Augustus'  grandsons.  The  discovery  and  suppression  of  this  venture 
did  not  encourage  Augustus  to  recall  Tiberius,  but  it  perhaps  made  him 
aware  / 13. 
aware  of  the  need  to  take  active  measures  to  protect  the  interests  of 
each  of  his  grandsons  whom  he  may  have  intended  to  be  joint  rulers  on 
his  death. 
93 
Should  we  not  then  link  the  double  prefecture  to  this 
co-regency? 
Both  prefects  were  members  of  the  equestrian  order.  Durry  suggests 
that  the  achievements  of  Maecenas  so  impressed  Augustus  that  he  was 
moved  to  appoint  other  members  of  this  order  to  important  state 
positions. 
94 
It  is,  however,  quite  clear  that  Augustus,  although  he 
employed  a  number  of  equites  in  higher  military  posts  of  his  own 
creation,  did  not  establish  any  regular  pattern  of  promotion.  This 
is  not  to  argue  that  the  equestrian  connection  is  irrelevant  in  this 
matter.  Augustus  felt  able  to  tolerate  the  immense  power  of  the 
Praetorian  prefects  largely  because,  as  equites,  their  origins  excluded 
them  from  being  rivals  for  the  throne.  Over  200  years  were  to  pass 
until  a  Praetorian  prefect,  Macrinus,  became  emperor  and,  even  then, 
many  senators  were  offended  by  his  elevation. 
95 
Besides,  to  have 
entrusted  control  of  a  unit  as  large  as  the  Praetorian  Guard  to  a 
senator  for  any  considerable  length  of  time  would  possibly  have  been 
politically  dangerous,  especially  given  the  highly  combustible  mixture 
of  lingering  nostalgia  for  the  Republic  and  personal  ambition  which 
lurked  in  many  a  senator's  heart. 
96 
In  rejecting  the  concept  of  a 
senatorial  prefect,  Augustus  was,  perhaps  unconsciously,  attempting  to 
separate,  in  Italy  at  least,  the  administration  of  political  power  from 
that  of  military  power. 
97 
It  was  logical  for  Augustus  to  use  such  a  readily  available  unit  as  the 
Praetorians  / 14. 
Praetorians  for  those  new  tasks  which  became  necessary  as  political 
circumstances  changed  during  the  course  of  his  principate.  By  the 
time  of  Augustus'  death  they  were  undertaking  a  wide  range  of  duties. 
They  were  not  only  acting  as  a  bodyguard  unit  for  the  emperor  but  had 
become  heavily  involved  in  internal  security,  including  escorting  and 
watching  over  important  imperial  prisoners,  such  as  Julia,  Augustus' 
daughter,  Julia  the  Younger  and  Agrippa  Postumus,  who  had  fallen  from 
favour  and  could  not,  in  the  interests  both  of  dignity  and  of  security, 
be  left  unguarded. 
98 
The  Praetorians  combined  their  traditional 
ceremonial  duties  with  their  internal  security  role  by  their  escort  of 
Augustus'  body  back  to  Rome  from  Nola  in  AD.  14  and  by  their  presence 
at  his  funeral.  These  were  clearly  marks  of  respect  to  an  honoured 
leader,  but  they  can  also  be  regarded  as  attempts  to  intimidate  those 
who  did  not  support  the  principle  of  the  principate  or  Augustus' 
choice  of  successor  and  to  make  them  aware  of  the  strength  which  would 
confront  them  if  they  indulged  in  conspiracy. 
99 
Augustus  went  to  considerable  lengths  to  minimise  the  impact  of  the 
Praetorians  on  the  streets  of  Rome.  He  was  genuinely  eager  to  avoid 
the  impression  that  his  new  system  of  government  was  a  military  tyranny. 
100 
But  the  essentially  repressive  nature  of  the  principate  ensured  that 
the  policing  element  of  the  Praetorians'  duties  was  likely  to  increase. 
By  AD.  14  they  were  essentially  an  internal  security  force.  And,  as 
Augustus'  successors  grew  more  absolutist  and  became  less  tolerant  of 
dissent,.  to  whom  was  it  more  natural  for  them  to  turn  for  support  and 
help  in  stifling  freedom  than  to  their  Praetorians? /'V  ATITCT  TT 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  OF  TIBERIUS  -  AD.  14  TO  AD.  31 
Tiberius'  principate  is  notable  for  the  manner  in  which  the  role  of 
the  Praetorians  developed,  under  Seianus'  direction,  from  a  largely 
reactive  posture,  protecting  the  emperor  from  attack,  to  a  much  more 
aggressive  stance,  taking  pre-emptive  action  against  those  judged  to 
be  the  emperor's  enemies  before  any  direct  threat  to  the  emperor 
actually  manifested  itself.  We  saw  the  beginnings  of  this  development 
during  Augustus'  principate,  but  it  was  only  after  AD.  14  that  this  new 
role  became  more  clearly  defined.  The  impulse  for  such  a  change  can  be 
found,  in  part,  in  the  nature  of  the  principate  itself.  The  fiction, 
for  example,  that  the  Praetorian  cohorts  owed  their  allegiance  to  the 
state  rather  than  to  the  emperor  personally  deceived  no-one. 
1 
That 
the  principate  was,  in  essence,  a  tyranny  was  obvious  to  all.  In  the 
face  of  the  reality  of  the  Praetorians'  military  strength,  Tiberius' 
professions  of  his  wish  to  involve  the  Senate  more  in  the  process  of 
government  seemed  of  little  worth.  Another  factor  too  merits  our 
attention.  Part  of  the  explanation  for  the  changed  role  of  the 
Praetorians  can  be  attributed  to  the  temperament  of  Tiberius  himself. 
In  his  characterisation  of  that  emperor  Tacitus  gives  us  a  vicious, 
hypocritical  tyrant. 
2 
But  behind  the  outwardly  aloof  and  suspicious 
nature  one  may  detect  a  credulous  gullibility  -  for  a  manipulative 
prefect  an  exploitable  weakness'.  We  may  also  sense  in  Tiberius  a 
profound  and  complex  insecurity.  That  awareness  of  the  personal  risks 
of  his  position,  which  was  destined  to  become  a  constricting  obsession, 
can  be  discovered  even  at  the  beginning  of  his  principate  in  the 
prominent  / 16. 
prominent  escorts  which  accompanied  his  trips  to  the  forum  and  to  the 
Senate. 
3 
The  transference  of  power  was,  in  Rome  at  least,  smooth.  The  loyalty 
of  the  Praetorians  to  the  principate  was  rewarded  and  confirmed-by  the 
generous  donative  of  1000  sesterces  per  man  which  Augustus  had  provided 
in  his  will. 
4 
Even  before  the  reading  of  the  will  in  the  Senate, 
Tiberius  had  conspicuously  accepted  the  oath  of  loyalty  from  Seius 
Strabo,  "the  senior  Praetorian  prefect,  directly  after  the  oaths  of  the 
consuls. 
5 
He  had  also  given  the  watchword  to  the  tribune  in  charge 
of  the  Praetorian  cohort  on  duty  at  the  palace. 
6 
The  symbolic  nature 
of  such  actions  should'not  lead  us  to  underestimate  their  importance. 
They  were  much  more  than  ritual  gestures.  Praetorian  fidelity 
guaranteed  the  immediate  security  of  the  regime.  It  was,  in  the  final 
analysis,  the  javelins  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  which  ensured  that 
dissent  did  not  rise  above  the  level  of  private  diatribes  at  the  dinner 
parties  of  those  nobles  nostalgic  for  lost  privileges.  Hence  the  very 
public  profile  of  the  Guard  at  the  funeral  of  Augustus  -  professedly  a 
display  of  respect  for  a  distinguished  ruler,  but  judged  offensive  by  a 
senatorial  historian  who  saw  it  as  a  calculated  act  of  intimidation. 
7 
It  would,  however,  be  wrong  to  overstate  the  importance  of  the  Praetorians 
at  this  time.  It  is  noteworthy  that  at  the  same  time  as  Tiberius  was 
ensuring  the  loyalty  of  the  Guard,  he  was  also  sending  Praetorian 
s  eculatores  to  the  legions  'tam  uam  ade  to 
8 
Pqp  principatu'. 
Tiberius  did  not  owe  gratitude  to  any  particular  faction  with  regard 
to  the  succession.  The  material  interests  of  all  classes,  the 
bounties  / 17. 
bounties  of  internal  security  and  external  strength  and  the  intricate 
system  of  relationships  and  marriage  built  up  by  Augustus  combined  to 
ensure  the  continuance  of  the  principate.  Although  Tiberius  was,  like 
Augustus  before  him,  quick  to  acknowledge  the  value  of  the  Praetorian 
cohorts,  he  owed  them  no  special  debt  of  gratitude  for  his  succession. 
The  Guard's  support  was  only  one  of  many  pillars  on  which  Tiberius' 
principate  was  based. 
Tiberius'  accession  was  not,  however,  universally  acclaimed.  The 
legions  of  lower  Germany  were  restless.  An  alternative  candidate  was 
ready  to  hand  -  Germanicus,  son  of  Drusus  and,  on  his  mother's  side, 
grandson  of  Marcus  Antonius. 
9 
There  were  reasons  to  hope  that  he 
might  be  willing  to  lead  a  rebellion.  Of  these  the  most  cogent  was 
the  presence  with  him  in  Germany  of  his  wife  Agrippina,  Augustus' 
granddaughter  and  no  friend  of  Tiberius.  But  Germanicus,  a  tragic 
hero  to  Tacitus  but,  in  truth,  a  man  of  straw,  irresolute  and 
insensitive,  vacillated  claiming  loyalty  to  his  adoptive  father. 
10 
The  moment  was  lost.  How  the  Praetorians  would  have  reacted  had 
Germanicus  declared  an  interest  in  obtaining  the  principate  must  remain 
a  matter  of  speculation.  It  is,  however,  worth  noting  the  ecstatic 
reception  he  received  on  his  return  from  Germany  when  all  the  Praetorian 
cohorts,  in  blatant  contravention  of  their  orders,  went  out  from  Rome 
ll 
to  meet  him. 
A  more  positive  picture  of  the  Praetorians'  loyalty  to  their  emperor  is 
provided  by  their  conduct  during  the  mutiny  of  the  legions  in  Pannonia 
in  AD.  14.  It  may  well  be  that  Velleius  Paterculus  exaggerates  the 
danger  / 18. 
danger  of  this  disorder  to  heighten  the  prestige  of  Tiberius  for  his 
resolution  of  the  problem, 
12 
but  Tacitus'  account  of  the  incident 
suggests  that  its  potential  seriousness  should  not  be  underestimated. 
13 
To  ensure  the  effective  suppression  of  the  mutiny,  which  probably  had 
its  origins  in  the  discontent  felt  by  the  large  number  of  conscripts 
enrolled  in  the  army  during  the  uprisings  in  Pannonia  in  and  after 
AD.  6,  Tiberius  felt  it  necessary  to  despatch  to  Pannonia,  under  the 
command  of  his  son  Drusus,  two  reinforced  Praetorian  cohorts,  the 
Guard's  small  cavalry  detachment  and  a  picked  detachment,  probably  the 
cavalry,  of  the  German  Guard. 
14 
The  choice  of  these  troops  may,  in 
the  short  term  at  least,  have  exacerbated  the  problem,  since  Tacitus 
specifically  mentions  the  resentment  of  the  legionaries  towards  the 
Praetorians  and  the  envy  which  they  felt  for  the  higher  pay  and  shorter, 
more  comfortable  conditions  of  service  enjoyed  by  the  Guard. 
15 
We 
know,  at  any  rate,  that  after  Drusus'  initial  attempt  to  win  over  the 
mutineers  failed,  there  was  open  antagonism  between  the  two  groups. 
16 
A  change  of  tactics  was  required.  Drusus  mixed  conciliation,  allowing 
a  deputation  to  carry  their  grievances  to  Tiberius  in  Rome, 
17 
with 
ruthlessness.  Vibulenus  and  Percennius,  the  most  articulate  of  the 
mutineers,  were  executed  inside  Drusus'  tent. 
18 
Luck  too  favoured 
the  emperor's  son.  An  eclipse  of  the  moon  and  the  onset  of  bad 
weather  combined  to  ensure  the  collapse  of  the  mutineers'  spirit. 
19 
The  other  ringleaders  were  slaughtered  by  Praetorian  pickets  as  they 
tried  to  escape  from  the  camp. 
20 
The  killing  of  Roman  citizens  should 
not  distract  us.  What  impresses  is  the  willingness  of,  at  most,  1500 
Praetorians  to  challenge  successfully  a  mutiny  by  a  force  over  ten  times 
as  strong.  It  is,  indeed,  possible  to  argue  that  the  fidelity  of  the 
Praetorians  / 19. 
Praetorians  at  this  time  was  largely  responsible  for  preventing  the 
development  of  the  sort  of  chaos  which  was  to  follow  the  suicide  of 
Nero  fifty  years  later. 
Foreign  ventures,  however,  were  not,  despite  these  incidents  and  the 
involvement  of  two  cohorts  with  Germanicus  on  the-Weser  in  AD.  16,21 
a  common  experience  for  the  Praetorians.  The  maintenance  of  public 
security  in  Rome  could  only  be  guaranteed  by  the  presence  of  a  strong 
internal  security  force.  The  theatre  mobs  -  the  breeding  ground 
for  many  a  rabble-rouser 
22 
-  were  especially  disruptive. 
23 
Their 
hooliganism,  with  its  politically  dangerous  undertones,  was  an  affront 
and  challenge  to  orderly  government.  Tiberius  had  never,  as  a  soldier, 
shrunk  from  the  harshest  measures  to  maintain  discipline. 
24 
Civil 
disobedience  demanded  similar  sanctions.  Responsibility  for  the 
policing  of  the  theatres  and  suppressing  the  riots  was  given  to  the 
Praetorian  cohorts.  Although  the  operation  was  successful  -  the 
leaders  of  the  various  factions  were  expelled  from  the  city  -  it 
was  not  without  cost  to  the  Guard.  A  centurion  and  several  other 
soldiers  lost  their  lives,  while  a  tribune  was  wounded. 
25 
Such 
policing  duties  were  not  confined  to  Rome  as  Suetonius'  description 
of  the  crushing  of  a  riot  by  the  Praetorians  at  Pollentia  shows. 
26 
Other  duties  were  of  a  more  sinister  nature.  The  elimination  of  those 
judged  dangerous  to  the  emperor's  interests  is  a  notable  feature  of 
Tiberius'  principate.  Augustus  had  not  hesitated  to  act  ruthlessly 
against  his  political  enemies  when  he  felt  it  necessary.  Iullus 
Antonius'  fate  shows  us  that  much.  But  he  also  knew  the  value  of 
clemency.  / 20. 
clemency.  It  is  difficult,  on  the  other  hand,  to  imagine  Tiberius 
displaying  the  sort  of  compassion  which  his  predecessor  showed  to 
Gnaeus  Cornelius. 
27 
Vindictiveness  is  the  hallmark  of  the  reign  and 
of  an  emperor  increasingly  willing  to  use  the  Praetorians  to  imprison 
and  torture,  intimidate  and  murder  those  who  threatened  the  security 
of  his  regime.  Rank  was  no  guarantee  of  immunity.  Indeed  it  was 
the  prominence  of  his  victims  which  provoked  Tiberius'  suspicions. 
And  almost  inevitably  the  agents  of  his  persecution  were  the  Praetorians. 
It  was  certainly  a  Praetorian  centurion  who,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
reign,  executed  the  allegedly  depraved  and  unstable  Agrippa  Postumus 
on  the  island  of  Planasia,  to  where  he  had  been  exiled  in  AD.  7.28 
That  an  order  to  kill  Postumus  was  sent  to  the  tribune  in  charge  is  not 
disputed  -  Praetorian  officers  did  not  execute  princes  of  the  imperial 
family  without  proper  authority  -  but  the  source  of  that  order  is 
less  clear. 
29 
Tiberius,  or,  being  informed  of  the  youth's  death  by  his 
executioner,  denied  any  involvement  in  the  framing  of  the  order  and 
expressed  outrage.  Genuine  or  feigned?  Tacitus  is  predictably 
reluctant  to  absolve  Tiberius,  but  his  account  of  Sallustius  Crispus' 
reaction  to  the  prospect  of  an  investigation  into  the  matter  by  the 
Senate  implicitly  suggests  that  Tiberius  may  have  been  innocent. 
30 
The  significance  of  this  episode,  however,  lies  for  us  not  in  the 
reaction  of  Tiberius,  nor  even  in  the  death  of  Postumus,  but  in  the 
insight  which  it  permits  us  into  the  relationship  between  the  imperial 
court  and  the  Praetorian  Guard.  If  Tiberius  did  not  authorise 
Postumus'  execution,  if  Seianus  had  no  part  in  the  affair  -  and  we 
may  be  sure  that  Tacitus  would  have  recorded  the  smallest  hint  of 
suspicion  / 21. 
suspicion  against  the  prefect  --  then  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that 
the  Praetorian  Guard  was  not  a  monolithic  organisation  and  that  it 
mirrored,  especially  in  its  upper  reaches,  the  machiavellian  politics 
of  the  imperial  court. 
The  prince's  murder  was  an  ominous  prelude  of  what  was  to  follow.  In 
the  same  year  Sempronius  Gracchus  was  put  to  death.  One  of  Julia's 
lovers  and  allegedly  author  of  a  letter  sent  to  Augustus  under  Julia's 
name  which  listed  Tiberius'  faults,  he  had  been  exiled  to  a  small 
island  off  the  coast  of  North  Africa.  Tacitusediscounts  a  rumour  that 
the  executioners  were  sent  by  Lucius  Asprenas,  the  proconsul  of  Africa, 
31 
and  implies  that  they  were  Praetorians  from  Rome. 
Two  years  later  the  Praetorians  were  instrumental  in  bringing  about 
the  suicide  of  Marcus  Scribonius  Libo  Drusus  -  an  event,  according 
to  Tacitus,  of  prime  significance  in  the  development  of  the  Tiberian 
terror. 
32 
This  foolish  young  man  had  become  hopelessly  involved  in 
magic,  astrology  and  eastern  mysticism. 
33 
Tiberius,  however,  suspected 
that  these  were  a  cover  for  more  dangerous  intentions. 
34 
A  senatorial 
investigation  began.  When  Libo,  by  now  a  shambling  wreck,  returned 
home  during  an  adjournment,  he  found  his  house  surrounded  by  Praetorian 
guardsmen.  This  proved  the  final  straw  for  the  distraught  nobleman 
and,  in  a  panic,  he  took  his  own  life. 
35 
Garzetti  sees-the  young  man 
as  'a  victim  of  the  Senate's  search'foriopportunities  to  display:  ý_its 
zeal,  not  of  an  arbitrary  action  on  the 
36 
y  part  of  the  princeps'. 
But  such  an  interpretation  fails  to  address  the  question  of  why  the 
Praetorians  were  sent  to  Libo's  house.  Perhaps  Tiberius  regarded  Libo 
as  / 
I 22. 
as  a  threat  to  security?  But  that  is  scarcely  the  Libo  of  Tacitus. 
Arrest  would  seem  premature  since  the  trial  was  not  over.  Intimidation 
is  highly  probable.  I  suggest  that  Tiberius  sent  a  detachment  of 
Praetorians  with  orders  to  let  themselves  be  seen  and  heard  as  much  as 
possible  with  the  specific  objective  of  forcing  an  obviously  broken 
man  to  suicide.  The  Praetorians'  hands  were  bloody,  and  were  to  be 
bloodier  still  before  the  reign  ended. 
The  same  year  perhaps  saw  a  Praetorian  undercover  operation,  master- 
minded  by  the  regime's  Walsingham,  Sallustius  Crispus,  to  arrest 
Clemens,  the  former  slave  of  Agrippa  Postumus. 
37 
Because  he  was 
roughly  the  same  age  as  his  master  and  of  similar  appearance,  Clemens, 
operating  from  a  base  in  Gaul,  was  able  to  pass  himself  off  as  Agrippa 
and  attracted  considerable  support. 
38 
Although  the  threat  posed  by 
Clemens  can  be  judged  retrospectively  to  have  been  slight,  it  was 
certainly  viewed  more  seriously  at  the  time.  Our  sources  agree  that 
Clemens  was  kidnapped  by  agents  who  pretended  to  support  him,  then 
taken  to  Tiberius'  palace  where  he  was  tortured  and  put  to  death. 
39 
If  his  kidnappers  were  Praetorians,  we  have  the  first,  though  by  no 
means  the  last,  example  of  members  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  acting 
as  agents  provocateurs. 
40 
A  Praetorian  escort,  although  ostensibly  a  mark  of  honour,  frequently 
had  a  more  sinister  purpose.  When  Gnaeus  Calpurnius  Piso  left  the 
Senate,  knowing  that,  whatever  the  truth  about  the  death  of  Germanicus, 
he  could  not  escape  the  charge  of  re-entering  his  province  without 
permission,  he  was  accompanied  by  a  Praetorian  officer  -  vario  rumore 
custos  saluti  an  mortis  exactor  sequeretur. 
41 
Piso's  suicide  can 
leave  / 23. 
leave  us  in  no  doubt  as  to  the  officer's  purpose. 
42 
The  principal  victims  of  such  utilization  of  the  Praetorians  were 
undoubtedly  Agrippina  and  her  sons.  The  reasons  are  manifest.  We 
have  already  noted  the  adulation  which  Germanicus  received  from  the 
Praetorian  cohorts  on  his  return  from  Germany.  Death  did  not  diminish 
his  popularity.  The  return  of  his  ashes  to  Rome  in  AD.  20  produced  a 
shock  wave  of  emotion  and  grief  among  the  people  and  widespread 
sympathy  for  Agrippina. 
43 
Tiberius  had  not  failed  to  anticipate  this. 
The  two  cohorts  of  the  Guard  sent  to  Brundisium  to  accompany  Germanicus' 
ashes  to  Rome  were  also  able  to  ensure  that  Agrippina's  rash  tongue  was 
not  allowed  to  inflame  the  considerable  number  of  friends  and  adherents 
who  had  gone  south  from  Rome  to  pay  their  respects  to  her. 
44 
Yet 
Tiberius  was  uneasy.  He  recognised  and  feared  Agrippina's  ambitions 
and  manipulative  skills  and  was  determined  that  she  should  not  be 
allowed  to  attract  that  devotion  which  the  Praetorians  had  accorded  to 
her  husband. 
45 
Hence  a  two-fold  strategy  -  firstly  to  ensure  that  the  Praetorians 
were  not  seduced  to  the  cause  of  Agrippina,  then  to  deploy  those  same 
Praetorians  as  part  of  a  broader  campaign  aimed  at  eliminating  her 
political  power-base.  Tiberius'  decision  to  allow  Seianus  to 
concentrate  the  Praetorian  cohorts  perhaps  reflects  his  anxiety  over 
the  extent  of  support  for  Agrippina  within  the  Guard. 
46 
Dissent  could 
less  easily  be-concealed  in  the  new  barracks  on  the  Viminal  hill  than 
in  the  dispersed  billets  where  the  Praetorians  had  previously  lived. 
47 
Centurions  and  tribunes  suspected  of  disaffection  were  gradually 
replaced  / 24. 
replaced  by  men  personally  vetted  by  Seianus. 
48 
With  the  loyalty  of 
the  Praetorians  assured,  Tiberius  was  able  to  move  to  the  offensive. 
The  senators  were  invited  to  a  demonstration  of  the  Praetorians' 
parade  ground  skills.  The  purpose  of  the  exercise  was  not,  of  course, 
to  solicit  the  senators'  admiration  for  the  Guard's  expertise  in  drill, 
but  rather  to  intimidate  them  and  remind  them  of  the  real  source  of 
power  in  Rome. 
49 
It  was  undoubtedly  effective.  As  Agrippina's 
support  disintegrated  under  this  and  other  pressures,  more  direct 
action  was  taken  against  her  and  her  sons,  Nero  Caesar  and  Drusus 
Caesar. 
50 
Praetorians  followed  them  everywhere  and  took  care  not  to 
be  inconspicuous  in  their  surveillance. 
51 
Tiberius  intended  that 
Germanicus'  widow  and  sons  should  recognise  whose  net  was  closing  round 
them  and  in  that  recognition  to  feel  terror. 
If,  however,  such  tactics  were  intended  to  provoke  Agrippina  into  some 
desperate  response,  they  were  manifestly  unstccessful.  There  was  no 
flight  to  the  German  legions,  despite  the  best  efforts  of  Seianus' 
agents. 
52 
Tiberius  tired  of  the  game,  and  Livia's  death  removed 
whatever  protection  she  could  provide  for  Agrippina.  53 
Dissimulation 
was  laid  aside,  revealing  more  nakedly  the  hatred  of  the  emperor  for 
his  step-daughter.  A  letter  denouncing  Agrippina  and  Nero  was  sent 
from  Capreae.  The  Senate  initially  hesitated  but,  after  a  second 
letter,  was  forced,  chastened,  to  act.  Agrippina  and  Nero  were 
condemned  and  arrested. 
54 
A  Praetorian  escort  moved  the  prisoners 
from  their  place  of  confinement  in  Rome  to  the  islands  of  Pandateria 
and  Pontia  in  closed  litters  with  their  wrists  and  ankles  fettered  and 
even  prevented  anyone  from  stopping  to  watch  the  litters  passing. 
55 
After  / 25. 
After  the  humiliation  came  the  torment.  -Tiberius  was  unforgiving  in 
his  hatred  and  the  agents  of  his  viciousness  were  the  Praetorians, 
several  of  whom  undertook,  without  apparent  qualms,  the  step  from  jailer 
to  torturer  and  executioner.  A  Praetorian  centurion,  acting  on 
Tiberius'  orders,  beat  Agrippina  so  severely  that  she  lost  an  eye. 
It  was  probably  Praetorians  too  who  tried  unsuccessfully  to  force-feed 
her  after  she  started  to  refuse  food. 
56 
Fate  was  hardly  kinder  to 
her  eldest  son.  He  committed  suicide  after  a  Praetorian  executioner 
showed  him  the  noose  with  which  he  was  to  be  hanged  and  the  hooks  for 
dragging  his  body  to  Rome. 
57 
Drusus  Caesar  too  was  to  die  horribly. 
In  AD.  30  he  was  persuaded  to  leave  the  relative  safety  of  Capreae  and 
come  to  Rome. 
58 
There  he  was  imprisoned  in  a  cellar  in  the  palace  and 
brutally  tortured  by  Attius,  a  Praetorian  centurion.  He  died  in 
particularly  gruesome  circumstances  in  AD.  33.59 
It  would,  however,  be  misleading  to  assume,  despite  such  horrors  and 
cruelties,  that  a  reign  of  terror  existed  during  these  years.  Tacitus, 
of  course,  is  eager  to  imply  that  the  climate  of  fear  was  pervasive  and 
widespread.  Such  a  scenario  concurs  nicely  with  his  characterisation 
of  both  Tiberius  and  Seianus. 
60 
But  a  less  biased  appraisal  suggests 
the  emperor's  victims  were  largely  confined  to  the  highest  class  of 
Roman  society  and  were,  moreover,  relatively  few  in  number.  The 
domination  of  Seianus,  if  we  may  rightly  use  such  a  term,  was  no  golden 
age,  but  neither  was  it  the  despotic  tyranny  which  Tacitus  paints  for 
us.  Furthermore,  it  seems  probable  that  the  number  of  soldiers 
involved  in  the  infliction  of  these  indignities  and,  ultimately,  in  the 
execution  of  such  high-ranking  prisoners  was  also  small.  Individual 
ambition  / 26. 
ambition  combined  with  an  absence  of  moral  scruples  were  the  qualities 
which  dictated  the  choice  for  such  duty.  We  may  with  some  certainty 
conclude  that  there  was  no  deliberate  policy  of  exposing  Praetorian 
guardsmen  to  service  of  this  kind  in  order  to  brutalize  them. 
Indeed  the  preoccupation  of  our  sources  with  such  discreditable  and 
ignominious  activities  should  not  allow  us  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  the  main  duties  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  remained  to  guarantee 
the  stability  of  the  government  and  the  continuation  of  the  regime  and 
together  with  the  German  Guard,  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  emperor. 
We  have  mixed  evidence  on  Tiberius'  attitude  to  the  necessary  presence 
of  a  Praetorian  cohort.  On  those  occasions  when  he  felt  confident  and 
in  control  of  a  situation,  he  was  happy  that  his  Praetorians  should 
adopt  a  low  profile  and  remain  in  the  background.  When  he  went  to 
court,  at  his  mother's  insistence,  to  lend  moral  support  to  Urgulania, 
her  friend,  he  ordered  his  escort  to  follow  him  at  a  distance. 
61 
When  he  visited  sick  friends,  it  was  his  practice  to  go  into  their  rooms 
without  his  guards. 
62 
It  seems,  therefore,  reasonable  to  conclude  that 
when  Tiberius  was  among  those  whom  he  trusted,  or  when  it  was 
politically  expedient  for  him  to  be  seen  to  be  trusting  and  unafraid, 
he  was  prepared  to  dismiss  his  Praetorian  escort,  or  at  least  reduce 
its  normal  prominence.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  earlier  part  of 
his  principate  before  senile  timidity  began  to  affect  him. 
Even  here,  however,  it  is  possible  to  detect  a  repugnance  of  physical 
contact  -  an  attitude  which  demanded  a  high  degree  of  vigilance  on 
the  part  of  his  Praetorian  guardsmen.  Our  sources  tell  us  that 
Quintus  Haterius,  hoping  to  placate  Tiberius  after  making  an  injudicious 
remark  / 27. 
remark  in  the  Senate,  grasped  the  emperor's  knees  causing  him  to  fall 
and  was  almost  killed  by  the  guards. 
63 
That  unfortunate  fisherman, 
who  climbed  up  the  cliffs  at  Capreae  to  present  his  emperor  with  his 
prize  catch  of  a  giant  mullet  could  well  testify  to  Tiberius'  love  of 
seclusion.  The  Praetorians,  on  Tiberius'  orders,  rubbed  his  face 
first  with  mullet,  then  with  a  crab. 
64 
It  is  no  surprise  to  find 
that  later  in  his  reign,  in  AD.  28,  when  dedicating  temples  in 
Campania,  Tiberius  ordered  Praetorian  detachments  to  be  posted  in  the 
towns  of  the  region  in  order  to  prevent  crowds. 
65 
By  this  time,  of 
course,  he  had  retired  to  Capreae  and  an  obsession  with  privacy  and 
protection  dominated  his  life. 
In  return  for  this  protection,  Tiberius'  reactions  to  the  failures  and 
mistakes  of  individual  members  of  the  Guard  appear  rather  harsh.  A 
soldier  who  stole  a  peacock  from  the  imperial  aviary  was  put  to  death. 
A  centurion  who  led  Tiberius'  litter  into  the  middle  of  a  bramble 
thicket  was  beaten  on  the  spot  till  he  was  almost  dead. 
66 
We  should 
not,  perhaps,  read  too  much  into  these  incidents;  contemporary 
military  discipline  was,  as  a  rule,  harsh  and  sometimes  brutal.  Yet 
one  cannot  help  but  feel  that,  especially  after  he  took  up  residence 
on  Capreae,  the  bonds  between  Tiberius  and  his  Praetorians  had  somehow 
loosened  a  little. 
There  are  several  factors  which  may  explain  the  increasing  isolation 
of  the  emperor  from  his  Guard.  Firstly,  it  was  simply  not  in 
Tiberius'  nature  to  indulge  his  Praetorian  cohorts  or  to  flatter  their 
vanity,  as  Claudius  was  to  do  later,  by  regularly  acknowledging  their 
worth  / 28. 
worth  and  importance. 
67 
Ever-conscious  of  the  dignity  of  his  position, 
he  expected  and  demanded  loyalty  from  his  guardsmen;  he  certainly  felt 
no  need  to  court  it.  At  the  same  time  he  remained  arrogantly 
indifferent  to  the  strains  which  his  own  character,  introverted  and 
unforgiving,  might  be  placing  on  his  relationship  with  the  Praetorians. 
If  he  feared  plots,  it  was  the  plots  of  Agrippina  and  the  dissident 
nobility.  The  possibility  of  Praetorian  involvement  in  any  conspiracy 
does  not  appear  to  have  occurred  to  him  until  AD.  31.  This  assumption 
of  loyalty  allowed  the  emperor  to  devote  himself  to  his  main  priority  - 
the  effective  operation  of  the  principate. 
Which  leads  us  to  a  second  point.  The  workload  thereby  imposed  rendered 
quite  impossible  any  direct  control  by  the  emperor  over  the  Praetorian 
cohorts.  This  was,  of  course,  nothing  new.  Augustus  had  implicitly 
accepted,  by  his  appointment  of  prefects  in  2  BC.,  the  limitations  on 
his  capacity  to  undertake  personal  supervision  of  the  Guard. 
68 
Necessity  produced  the  prefecture  and  its  wise  creator,  aware  of  its 
dangerous  potentiality,  chose  as  his  prefects  men  who  were  not  only 
trustworthy  and,  occasionally,  distinguished,  but  also  dependent  and 
controllable.  Honourable  service  was  rewarded  handsomely  but  never 
excessively.  The  prefecture  of  Lucius  Aelius  Seianus  was  to  change 
all  of  this. 
Seianus  rose  from  a  notable  background.  His  father  was  Lucius  Seius 
Strabo,  head  of  the  equestrian  order,  and  his  brother,  cousins  and 
uncle  were  consuls. 
69 
His  youth  was  spent  in  close  contact  with  the 
great  and  powerful.  He  probably  accompanied  Gaius  Caesar  to  the  east 
in  1  BC.  and  may  have  met  Tiberius  when  he  crossed  from  Rhodes  to  abase 
himself  / 29. 
himself  before  Gaius. 
70 
Perhaps  he  was  shrewd  enough  to  accord  to 
the  exile  in  his  humiliation  a  respect  which  Julia's  son  neither  felt 
for  his  step-father  nor,  along  with  the  rest  of  his  arrogant  entourage, 
cared  to  feign.  If  so,  it  was  a  momentous  calculation.  Seianus' 
elevation  was  conspicuous  and  rapid.  By  AD.  14,  when  he  accompanied 
Drusus  to  Pannonia,  he  was  joint  prefect  with  his  father.  71 
The 
following  year  he  became  sole  prefect  when  Strabo  was  promoted  to  the 
72 
prefecture  of  Egypt.  His  influence  over  Tiberius  grew  steadily  for 
he  understood  the  emperor's  prejudices  and  maliciously  encouraged  them, 
especially  his  hatred  towards  Agrippina. 
73 
Invaluable  too  was  his 
help  during  the  Pisonian  affair. 
74 
A  grateful  Tiberius  allowed  Seianus  to  build  a  barracks  beyond  the 
Viminal  hill  and  to  assemble  within  its  walls  all  nine  Praetorian 
cohorts. 
75  If  we  follow  Syme  in  dating  this  development  to  AD.  20, 
it  is  clearly  possible  to  link  it  with  the  threat  posed  to  the 
stability  of  the  regime  by  the  return  of  Agrippina  from  the  east  and 
her  popularity  both  within  the  Senate  and  among  the  wider  populace  of 
Rome.  76  Indeed  Tacitus  pictures  Seianus  candidly  telling  the  emperor 
that,  since  the  new  arrangements  would  allow  the  Praetorians  to  project 
a  collective  menace  in  a  manner  quite  impossible  while  they  remained  in 
scattered  billets,  the  people  of  Rome  would  be  able  to  be  controlled 
and  intimidated  more  easily. 
77 
In  truth,  however,  the  improvement  in 
efficiency  and  discipline  likely  to  ensue  from  the  move  was  perhaps 
the  determining  factor. 
78 
It  was  this  change  which  more  than  any  other  ensured  that  the 
Praetorians  / 30. 
Praetorians  were  able  to  achieve  their  later  dominant  position  in 
Roman  political  life.  Although  they  were  still  a  relatively  minor 
element  within  the  power  structure  that  was  the  principate,  the  move 
provided  the  Praetorian  cohorts  with  a  sense  of  unity.  The  camp 
became  the  focal  point  of  Praetorian  power.  Here  emperors  were  made 
and  unmade.  Here  the  principates  of  Claudius  and  Otho  were  born, 
here  the  hopes  of  Nero  and  Galba  died.  Here  too  the  presumptious 
Nymphidius  Sabinus  paid  the  price  for  his  imperial  ambitions  by  his 
squalid  death  in  a  corner  of  a  barrack-room.  Seianus  made  all  of 
this  possible  through  his  creation  of  the  first  unified  military 
force  permanently  based  in  Rome  and  for  this  he  may  deservedly  be 
called  'le  vrai  fondateur  du  pretoire,  legitimant  ainsi  cet  enfant 
79 
d'Auguste  jusque-la  cache  et  mal  reconnu'. 
He  remained  the  favourite  of  an  emperor  deluded  and  perhaps  infatuated. 
80 
With  Tiberius'  support  and  blessing  the  prefect,  now  publicly  termed 
'socius  laborum',  developed  the  scope  of  his  patronage. 
81 
Seianus  was 
not  the  man  to  spurn  such  an  opportunity.  Juvenal's  claim  that  he 
controlled  high  military  appointments  may  be  a  shameless  exaggeration, 
but  the  political  advancement  of  his  friends  and  relations  was  certainly 
within  his  gift. 
82 
Extravagant  honours  were  granted. 
83 
The  prefect's 
statue  was  installed  in  the  theatre  of  Pompey  after  his  successful 
deployment.  of  the  Praetorians  during  a  fire  there. 
84 
The  fate  of 
Cremutius  Cordus  served  as  a  potent  discouragement  to  indiscreet  or 
garrulous  critics  of  such  indulgences. 
85 
But  Seianus'  ambitions  were  greater  still.  He  had  plans  both  personal 
and  dynastic.  His  daughter  was  betrothed  to  the  son  of  Claudius  and, 
after  / 31. 
after  that  unfortunate's  death,  another  match  was  arranged  -  less 
grand  perhaps,  but,  to  an  ageing  princeps,  of  greater  mena,  C  e-  to 
the  son  of  Lentulus  Gaetulicus  who,  in  AD.  29,  took  command  of  the 
legions  of  Upper  Germany. 
86 
With  the  dignity  of  his  posterity  now 
assured,  Seianus  could  devote  himself  to  more  immediate  aspirations. 
He  had  seduced  Livilla,  the  wife  of  Drusus. 
87 
The  latter's  death 
advanced  his  hopes  of  an  entry  through  marriage  into  the  imperial 
family. 
88 
The  princess  was  willing,  the  princeps  less  so.  The 
request  was  refused  though,  to  soften  the  blow,  there  was  a  hint  of 
future  advancement. 
89 
It  was  no  empty  promise.  In  the  course  of 
AD.  31  the  prefect  became  betrothed  to  a  member  of  the  imperial 
family.  Logic  suggests  Livilla,  but  the  evidence  of  a  later 
historian  speaks  for  Julia,  Livilla's  daughter,  and,  since  the 
previous  year,  the  widow  of  Nero  Caesar. 
90 
At  the  height  of  his  career  Seianus  enjoyed  immense  power  and 
influence. 
91 
Yet  all  of  that,  even  his  very  tenure  of  the  prefecture, 
derived  from  and  was  dependent  on  the  trust  and  friendship  of  Tiberius. 
The  support  which  nobles  like  Gaetulicus  were  willing  to  provide  for 
Seianus  was  opportunistic  and  qualified.  It  was  expedient  to  court 
the  prefect  who  could  help  their  careers,  but  it  was  as  the  emperor's 
loyal  servant  that  they  courted  him. 
92 
He  was  their  partner  not  their 
patron,  their  collaborator  rather  than  their  leader. 
93 
And  for  some, 
perhaps  not  a  few,  of  these  nobles  a  mask  of  specious  admiration  was  a 
suitable  device  to  conceal  their  own  disdainful  misgivings  over  the 
prefect's  power.  Tacitus'  description  of  Seianus  as  a  'municipalis 
adulter'94  is  a  cry  of  indignant  outrage  which  reflects  the  prejudice 
of  / 32. 
of  much  of  the  senatorial  class  towards  the  advancement  of  the 
equestrian  favourite.  The  structure  of  power  which  Seianus  had 
created  around  him  was  superficially  impressive  and  soundly-based. 
In  truth,  a  house  built  on  sand. 
The  prefect  was  not  unaware  of  this  envy.  Shrewdly  he  tried  to  turn 
it  to  his  advantage.  In  a  letter  to  Tiberius  he  claimed  that  the 
considerable  enmity  which  he  had  provoked  was  a  direct  consequence  of 
his  actions  on  the  emperor's  behalf. 
95 
At  best,  a  questionable 
assertion.  But  Tiberius  believed  it,  or  feigned  belief.  Seianus' 
enemies  were  not,  however,  dcterred.  During  the  crisis  over  the 
charges  against  Agrippina  and  Nero  he  was  attacked  openly  in  letters 
'sub  nominibus  consularium  fictae'. 
96 
But  frontal  assaults  on  the 
prefect  were  doomed  to  failure  on  the  rock  of  the  emperor's  support 
for  his  favourite.  Indeed,  the  deliberate  provocation  of  such 
hostility  is  the  hallmark  of  Seianus'  technique. 
97 
For  the 
slandering  of  Tiberius'  minister  could  easily  be  represented, 
especially  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  emperor  to  Capreae  in  AD.  27, 
as  an  attack  upon  Tiberius  himself. 
The  failure  of  such  methods  necessitated  a  new  kind  of  approach.  And 
a  more  subtle  proponent.  Asinius  Gallus,  eminent  and  cunning,  took 
the  lead  in  proposing  most  of  the  important  honours  conferred  on 
Seianus  on  the  occasion  of  his  designation  as  consul  with  Tiberius 
himself  as  his  colleague.  His  apparent  friendship  with  the  prefect 
provided  the  justification.  But  Gallus'  zeal  to  be  one  of  the  envoys 
to  congratulate  the  emperor  roused  Seianus'  suspicions.  He  immediately 
complained  / 33. 
complained  to  Tiberius  that  the  proposals  of  Gallus  were  intended  to 
foment  trouble  between  the  emperor  and  himself.  Tiberius,  no  friend 
of  Gallus,  was  receptive  to  this  allegation.  And  so,  a  pleasurable 
duplicity.  Gallus  dined  with  the  emperor  on  Capreae,  while  in  the 
Senate  an  imperial  letter  denounced  the  legate  for  his  jealousy  of 
Tiberius'  friendship  with  Seianus. 
98 
At  the  time  the  bond  uniting 
princeps  and  prefect  must  have  seemed  unassailable.  But  the  very 
i 
vehemence  with  which  Tiberius  defended  his  protege+  suggests  an 
uncertainty.  The  seeds  of  doubt  were  starting  to  take  root  in  that 
suspicious  mind. 
Perhaps  Seianus  sensed  the  emperor's  uneasiness.  He  claimed  a 
constituency  -  that  of  the  urban  plebs  -  and  put  himself  forward 
as  their  champion.  Precedents  -  Marius,  Agrippa  and,  from  the  dim 
mists  of  history,  Servius  Tullius  -  were  sought  and  advertised. 
99 
Assemblies,  later  condemned  as  'improbae',  were  staged  on  the  Aventine 
to  provide  the  prefect's  consulship  with  the  popular  support  which  he 
always  seemed  to  lack. 
100 
But  here  lay  great  danger.  Tiberius  was 
no  popularis.  He  had  little  sympathy  for  the  urban  proletariat. 
His  heroes  were  not  Tiberius  or  Gaius  Gracchus,  but  their  killers, 
Mucius  Scaevola  and  Opimius.  Clear  evidence  of  the  trouble  which  the 
Roman  mob  could  cause  had  been  provided  by  the  demonstrations  in  favour 
of  Agrippina  and  Nero  in  AD.  29.101  Tiberius  had  no  wish  to  stir  up 
this  hornets'  nest.  Seianus'  calls  for  plebeian  solidarity  were 
potentially  destabilising.  They  were  also  unauthorised.  And  an 
independent  prefect  with  political  ambitions  could  not  be  tolerated. 
Tiberius  / 34. 
Tiberius  himself  claimed  that  he  punished  Seianus  when  he  found  out 
that  the  prefect  was  plotting  against  the  children  of  Germanicus. 
102 
Even  the  shallow  Suetonius  saw  the  flaw  in  this  argument.  The  fall 
of  Seianus  did  not  bring  the  release  either  of  Agrippina  or  of  Drusus. 
But  this  is  hardly  surprising.  Their  offences  were  not  nullified  by 
the  prefect's  ruin.  We  may  surmise  that  Seianus  exceeded  his 
instructions  by  encompassing  Nero's  death.  It  is  more  likely, 
however,  that  the  offence  which  prompted  the  emperor  to  act  was 
Seianus'  moves  against  Gaius,  the  youngest  of  Germanicus'  sons. 
Josephus  tells  us  of  a  letter  written  by  Antonia,  the  emperor's 
sister-in-law,  outlining  Seianus'  misdeeds. 
103 
Certainly  the  young 
prince  was  called  from  his  grandmother's  house  to  Capreae  and  safety 
sometime  after  his  eighteenth  birthday  on  the  31st  of  August  AD.  30.104 
It  is  not  too  fanciful  to  infer  a  link  between  Antonia's  letter  and  the 
emperor's  summons. 
But  if  we  accept  that  Tiberius  became  suspicious  of  his  prefect  in  AD.  30, 
are  we  not  then  compelled  to  view  their  joint  consulship  as  a  ploy  by  the 
emperor  to  lull  Seianus  into  a  false  sense  of  security? 
105 
Although 
such  a  thesis  may,  at  first  sight,  seem  far-fetched,  deviousness  of  just 
this  sort  is  widely  attributed  to  Tiberius.  We  know,  for  example, 
that  he  made  Scribonius  Libo  a  praetor  and  invited  him  to  dinner  as  he 
planned  his  destruction. 
106 
On  the  other  hand,  perhaps  this 
interpretation  merely  rationalises  the  emperor's  tendency  towards 
vacillation  -a  failing  aggravated  by  age.  By  the  following  year, 
however,  the  messages  from  Capreae  had  become  distinctly  ambiguous. 






But  the  signs  of  imperial  displeasure  were  also  more 
evident.  The  unusual  timing  of  the  emperor's  resignation  from  the 
joint  consulship, 
108 
his  refusal  to  let  Seianus  visit  Campania, 
109 
the  conspicuous  advancement  of  Gaius, 
110 
and  the  ban  on  sacrifices 
to  anyone  living 
ill 
-  all  of  these  gave  hope  to  the  prefect's 
enemies  and  provoked  disquiet  among  his  friends. 
112 
A  still  clearer 
indication  followed.  Tiberius,  keen  to  distance  himself  from  any 
involvement  in  the  death  of  Nero,  omitted  Seianus'  titles  in  his  letter 
to  the  Senate  on  the  affair. 
113 
The  prefect,  provoked  by  this  cat  and 
mouse  game,  tried  to  re-assert  his  authority  within  Rome.  His  agents 
brought  an  indictment  against  Lucius  Arruntius,  an  inveterate  enemy. 
The  quashing  of  the  case,  which  Dio  Cassius  attributes  to  Tiberius, 
provided  clear  evidence  to  all  that  Seianus'  star  was  on  the  wane. 
114 
Seianus  had  five  months'  grace  after  he  was  forced  to  give  up  his 
consulship. 
115 
Tiberius  had  cause  to  hesitate.  The  Praetorians 
were  widely  held  to  be  under  Seianus'  control  and  so,  for  the  emperor's 
purposes,  unreliable. 
116 
Plans  had  to  be  laid,  thoroughly  and 
secretly.  The  consequences  of  failure  were  not  ignored.  A  ship  was 
made  ready  at  Capreae  to  carry  Tiberius  to  the  east,  probably  to  Syria 
where  Aelius  Lamia,  the  governor,  had  refused  to  display  Seianus' 
statue  beside  that  of  the  emperor. 
117 
An  agent  was  found  to  command  the  operation  -  Quintus  Naevius  Cordus 
Sutorius  Macro,  a  former  prefect  of  the  Vigiles  from  Alba  Fucens. 
118 
Capable,  ruthless  and  ambitious  he  was  the  man  for  the  hour.  His  role 
was  vital  to  the  success  of  the  entire  enterprise. 
119 
Firstly,  he  had 
to  / 36. 
to  detach  the  Praetorians  from  Seianus  and  get  them  back  to  their  barracks. 
This  was  effected  more  easily  than  might  have  been  anticipated.  The 
prefect's  escort,  on  being  shown  the  emperor's  warrant  which  Macro  carried, 
promptly  abandoned  Seianus. 
120 
Their  compliance  may  be  seen  as  an 
instinctive  reaction  to  orders  from  above.  It  is  also  possible  that 
Macro,  at  one  stage  in  his  career,  had  held  a  tribunate  in  the  Guard  and 
was  known  personally  by  the  soldiers.  Secondly,  it  was  vital  that 
Seianus  did  not  become  suspicious  while  he  was  still  in  a  position  to 
send  for  help  from  the  Praetorian  camp.  So  Macro  lied,  perhaps  on 
Tiberius'  instructions.  He  told  Seianus  that  he  was  about  to  be  granted 
tribunician  power. 
121 
A  shrewd  deception,  willingly  believed  by  the 
ambitious  prefect.  Once  inside  the  temple  of  Apollo  where  the  Senate 
was  meeting,  his  denunciation  could  safely  be  left  to  the  consul,  Memmius 
Regulus,  and  his  arrest  to  Graecinus  Laco  and  the  Vigiles  who  had  taken 
up  positions  around  the  temple. 
122 
The  third  part  of  the  plan  demanded 
that  Macro  should  follow  Seianus'  escort  back  to  the  Praetorian  camp 
to  ensure  that  the  action  against  the  prefect  was  presented  to  all  the 
cohorts  as  a  fait  accompli  and  to  prevent  any  Praetorian  counter-coup 
in  his  favour. 
123 
Here  lay  real  risk.  Many  of  the  tribunes  and 
centurions  owed  their  promotion  to  Seianus'  patronage. 
124 
It  was 
unclear  how  they  would  react  to  news  of  the  prefect's 
d  ti  `l  fl.  There 
was,  however,  one  certainty  of  which  the  emperor  and  his  fellow 
conspirators  were  fully  aware.  If  the  Praetorian  cohorts  decided  to 
make  a  united  effort  to  rescue  Seianus,  the  Vigiles  could  not  withstand 
them  and  the  coup  would  fail.  Hence  Macro's  promise  of  rewards  -  the 
carrot  to  balance  the  stick  of  his  imperial  warrant. 
125 
It  was 
bribery,  blatant  and  shameful.  But  it  worked.  Greed  and  dynastic 
loyalty  / 37. 
loyalty  combined  to  deny  the  prefect  the  help  which  he  might  have 
expected.  And  while  the  Praetorians  did  nothing,  Regulus  was 
prompting  a  circumspect  Senate  to  action. 
126 
The  stunned  Seianus  was  dragged  off  to  prison,  utterly  rejected.  The 
contrast  between  his  former  glory  and  his  hopeless  plight  at  this  time 
is  recorded  by  Dio. 
127 
Gone  are  the  escorts,  crowns,  elaborate 
togas  and  sacrifices;  in  their  place  prison,  bonds,  blows  and  finally 
death.  The  Senate,  after  checking  that  no  Praetorian  counter-attack 
was  imminent, 
128 
condemned  him  during  a  second  meeting  later  on  the 
same  day  in  the  temple  of  Concord.  History  forbadedelay. 
129 
By 
evening  the  prefect  had  been  strangled.  His  body  was  left  for  three 
days  on  the  Gemonian  Steps  for  the  mob  to  abuse. 
130 
Tiberius  omitted  in  his  letter  to  the  Senate  any  firm  accusation  that 
Seianus  was  plotting  to  murder  him.  But  the  prefect's  speedy 
execution  allowed  the  emperor  to  encourage  the  belief  that  such  a  plot 
had  existed  and  to  portray  himself  as  a  helpless  victim. 
131 
Who  was 
there  to  gainsay  this  restructuring  of  history?  Not  the  urban  plebs 
who  had  been  quick  to  show  how  little  love  they  had  for  the  wrecker  of 
Germanicus'  family. 
132 
And  certainly  not  the  senators  who  had  already 
made  haste  to  distance  themselves  from  the  prefect  even  before  Regulus 
had  finished  reading  the  emperor's  letter. 
133 
This  conspicuous 
repudiation  of  a  fallen  vizier  may  be  understandable.  Expediency 
dictates  loyalties  at  such  a  time. 
But  the  emperor's  version  of  events  attracted  a  wider  credibility. 
Josephus  tells  us  categorically  that  there  was  a  great  conspiracy  by 
Seianus  / 38. 
Seianus,  supported  by  most  of  the  senators  and  a  section  of  the 
army. 
134 
Suetonius  also  depicts  Seianus  as  a  revolutionary  plotter 
and  writes  of  the  crushing  of  the  conspiracy. 
135 
Tacitus'  account 
of  this  period  is  sorely  missed.  However  his  description  of  the  fate 
of  the  prefect's  associates  in  the  aftermath  of  his  execution  is 
instructive.  He  tells  us  how  P.  Vitellius  felt  compelled  to  kill 
himself  after  he  was  accused  of  a  readiness  to  provide  Seianus  with 
funds  for  'res  novae'. 
136 
Similar  accusations  and  their  diverse 
outcomes  are  mentioned  elsewhere  by  the  same  historian. 
137 
The 
assumption  must  be  that  Tacitus  believed  that  there  was  a  conspiracy 
by  the  prefect.  Dio  Cassius,  on  the  other  hand,  is  wary  about 
alleged  conspiracies. 
138 
Indeed  he  states  in  two  places  that  Seianus 
did  not  form  a  conspiracy  in  AD.  31.139  He  may,  however,  have  been 
influenced  in  his  approach  to  Seianus'  fall  by  the  ruin,  in  AD.  205, 
of  Fulvius  Plautianus,  Septimius  Severus'  Praetorian  prefect.  He 
specifically  draws  the  parallel. 
140 
Since  he  knew  that  Plautianus 
was  the  victim  of  a  G'K  EV  LJ  PI  ral 
,  it  is  arguable  that  he  may 
not  have  given  fair  consideration  to  any  evidence  which  suggested 
that  Seianus  had  conspired. 
141 
Did  the  prefect  in  fact  conspire? 
142 
1  think  not.  He  is  alleged  to 
have  regretted  not  acting  while  he  held  the  consulship. 
143 
Afterwards,  in  his  final  few  months,  he  may  have  tried  in  desperation 
to  rally  his  partisans.  Hence  the  'novissimum  consilium'  to  which 
Marcus  Terentius  alludes. 
144 
This  reference  may  suggest  that  Seianus 
did  indulge  in  some  hopeless  intriguing.  But  there  is  more  in 
Terentius'  speech  which  merits  our  attention.  He  admits  his  friendship 
with  / 39. 
f 
with  Seianus,  but  denies  any  involvement'in  a  plot.  It  may  be  argued, 
of  course,  that  such  a  denial  is  predictable  and  indicative  of 
nothing  more  than  Terentius'  cunning.  But  his  apologia  is  convincing. 
And,  if  Seianus  did  not  include  a  man  like  Terentius  who  openly 
advertised  his  friendship  with  the  prefect,  then  any  circle  of 
conspirators  must  have  been  very  small. 
We  may  also  wonder  what  this  alleged  conspiracy  hoped  to  achieve. 
The  idea  that  the  removal  of  Tiberius  was  the  aim  is  ludicrous. 
The  emperor's  survival  provided  a  better  guarantee  of  Seianus' 
continuing  advancement  than  that  loose  alliance  of  opportunists  who 
had  attached  themselves  to  his  coat-tails  as  he  rose.  Terentius 
tells  the  Senate  candidly  that  he  courted  Seianus  because  the  prefect 
enjoyed  the  emperor's  favour.  Such  men,  and  the  majority  of  Seianus' 
partisans  were  just  such  men,  do  not  make  revolutions.  '  They  seek  to 
use  the  system,  not  replace  it.  Seianus  did  not  conspire,  not  only 
because  he  was  confident  of  the  emperor's  friendship,  at  least  until 
the  middle  of  AD.  31,  but  also  because  he  was  wholly  aware  that  any 
such  plot  was  unlikely  to  succeed.  The  only  plot  was  the  emperor's 
plot,  the  first  victim  his  friend  and  prefect. 
In  retrospect  it  is  clear  that  Seianus'  rise  was  just  an  episode,  the 
result  of  his  loyalty  as  Praetorian  prefect,  witN  involving  any  attempt 
to  break  the  traditional  framework  of  the  aristocratic  state. 
145 
Indeed,  Seianus  was  eager  to  become  part  of  that  dominant  oligarchy 
rather  than  to  supplant  it  with  a  more  absolutist  regime.  And  if  his 
rise  showed  the  potential  rewards  to  which  the  holder  of  the  Praetorian 
prefecture  / 40. 
prefecture  could  aspire,  his  fall  proved  only  too  clearly  the 
limitations  of  that  post. 
As  for  the  Praetorians  themselves,  they  must  despite  the  bribes 
which  Tiberius  felt  compelled  to  offer  them, 
146 
have  been  aware  that 
their  emperor  had  felt  that  they  were  not  loyal  enough  to  be  entrusted 
with  the  arrest  of  Seianus.  Fides,  ut  anima,  unde  abiit  eo  numquam 
redit. 
147 
The  bonds  of  mutual  dependency  which  united  emperor  and 
Guard  may  not  have  been  completely  broken,  but  they  had  certainly 
been  loosened.  A  period  of  conspicuous  loyalty  by  both  parties  was 
now  necessary.  But  a  dangerous,  even  ruinous,  precedent  had  been 
created.  Praetorian  favour  was  now  seen  to  be  a  marketable 
commodity.  And  it  must  surely  have  occurred  to  the  Praetorians 
that,  if  they  could  get  a  thousand  denarii  for  doing  nothing,  still 
greater  prizes  might  be  gained  by  action. CHAPTER  III- 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  SEIANUS  TO 
THE  ASSASSINATION  OF  GAIUS 
The  downfall  of  Seianus  was  the  beginning  of  a  period  of  unremitting 
vileness  in  the  conduct  of  affairs  of  state.  The  Praetorian  prefect 
was  himself  but  the  first  to  die.  In  the  days  after  the  18th  of 
October,  and  perhaps  even  up  to  December  when  Seianus'  younger 
children  were  executed  in  sickening  circumstances, 
1 
Rome  witnessed  a 
witch-hunt  in  which  a  number  of  the  prefect's  family  and  friends  were 
put  to  death. 
2 
We  may  here  detect  Tiberius'  vindictive  hand.  He 
remained  implacably  malevolent  towards  those  accused  of  friendship 
with  the  prefect. 
3 
Tacitus  writes  of  an  'immensa  strages'  in  AD.  33 
of  all  those,  including  women  and  children,  still  held  in  custody  on 
the  charge  of  complicity  with  Seianus. 
4 
The  emperor  had  shown  by  his 
action  against  Seianus  how  much  value  should  be  attached  to  former 
friendships.  His  lead  was  followed.  Past  loyalties  were  expediently 
renounced,  old  enmities  viciously  recalled  as  the  prefect's  associates 
vied  to  accuse  each  other  of  treason.  Suicides  were  common,  motivated 
5 
as  often  by  desperation  as  by  any  sense  of  guilt. 
6 
Moreover  it  would 
be  naive  to  assume  that  the  organisers  of  the  coup,  Tiberius  and 
perhaps  Gaius,  or  their  agents  Macro  and  Laco,  were  above  using  the 
opportunity  provided  by  it  to  eliminate  some  of  their  personal  enemies 
who  had  little  or  no  connection  with  Seianus. 
7 
And  what  of  the  Guard  itself  during  this  bloodbath?  Although  Macro 
had  prevented  the  Praetorians  from  launching  a  counter-coup  to  rescue 
Seianus,  he  was  not  able  to  restrain  them  completely.  They  went  on 
the  / 42. 
the  rampage,  burning  and  plundering  in  anger,  according  to  Dio  Cassius, 
that  the  Vigiles  had  been  preferred  to  themselves. 
8 
Logic  suggests 
that  the  targets  of  this  rage  were  Seianus'  family  and  friends  and  that 
the  motivation  was  a  desire  by  the  Praetorians  to  provide  proof  to  the 
emperor  of  their  zealous  loyalty. 
9 
However  a  wise  historian  should  be 
wary  of  attributing  logic  to  soldiers  under  stress.  The  Praetorians' 
actions  at  this  time  may  well  have  been  limited  to  a  disorganised 
participation  in  the  general  looting  and  crime  common  on  such  occasions. 
After  this  lapse,  however,  the  Praetorians  assessed  their  situation  with 
soldierly  realism.  Seianus  was  dead  and  they  held  the  rewards  for  the 
neutrality  which  had  permitted  his  demise. 
10 
There  could  be  little 
profit  in  further  disruption.  In  truth  there  was  no  alternative  to 
the  sedulous  service  which  they  gave  to  Tiberius  during  the  remaining 
six  years  of  his  principate.  We  know  that  they  lined  the  banks  of 
the  Tiber  when  the  emperor  sailed  up  as  far  as  the  pleasure  grounds 
near  Julius  Caesar's  artificial  lake  and  escorted  him  during  his  apparently 
capricious  odyssey  to  numerous  villas  through  Campania. 
11 
They  also 
played  their  part  in  the  further  persecution  of  Seianus'  adherents. 
At  the  end  of  AD.  32  a  Praetorian  centurion  led  a  detachment  of  men  to 
the  area  around  Rhegium  to  bring  back  Rubrius  Fabatus  who  was  allegedly 
trying  to  flee  to  the  Parthians  to  avoid  a  charge  of  conspiracy. 
12 
Tiberius  may  not  have  inspired  devotion.  Indeed  it  seems  probable 
that,  even  allowing  for  rotation  of  service,  only  a  very  limited 
number  of  Praetorians  actually  saw  him  during  his  seclusion  on  Capreae 
and  on  his  jaunts  to  the  mainland.  But  the  Guard  needed  an  emperor 
and  Seianus'  fate  stood  as  an  intimidating  confirmation  of  Tiberius' 
undisputed  / 43. 
undisputed  tenure  of  that  office. 
But  Rome  held  little  attraction  for  Tiberius.  He  was,  however, 
anxious  to  maintain  the  fiction  that  circumstances  rather  than  his 
own  desires  prevented  his  return. 
13 
To  this  end  he  made  much  of  the 
alleged  threat  to  his  security  posed  by  the  remnants  of  Seianus' 
party. 
14 
It  was  an  elaborate  charade  which  deceived  at  least  one 
senator.  Togonius  Gallus  suggested  that  Tiberius  choose  a  number 
of  senators,  twenty  of  whom,  chosen  by  lot,  would  provide  a  guard 
for  the  emperor  in  the  Senate. 
15 
Tiberius  was  not  displeased  but  he 
preferred  to  ask  that  Macro  together  with  some  tribunes  and  centurions 
of  the  Guard  escort  him  in  the  Senate. 
16 
Other  senators  may  have 
understood  Tiberius'  duplicity  better.  But  conformity  was  the  only 
guarantee  of  survival.  Dio  Cassius  records  no  dissent  from  the 
resolution  which  allowed  the  Praetorians  to  search  senators  for  hidden 
weapons  as  they  entered  the  senate-house. 
'7 
Tiberius  may,  as  Dio  Cassius  alleges,  have  been  eager  to  assure  the 
Guard  of  his  good-will  towards  them. 
is 
But  it  was  not  disinterested 
generosity.  He  was  determined  to  retain  in  his  own  hands  control  over 
the  allocation  of  benefits  to  the  Praetorians  and  to  remain  the  focus 
of  their  gratitude.  Hence  his  unrelenting  wrath  when  Junius  Gallio 
proposed  that  the  Praetorians  should,  on  completing  their  service, 
have  the  right  to  sit  in  the  fourteen  rows  of  the  theatre  reserved  for 
the  equites.  The  fury  of  Tiberius'  response  arguably  reflects  his  own 
uncertainty  over  the  loyalty  of  the  Praetorians.  Gallio  was  accused 
of  usurping  the  emperor's  prerogative  and  branded  a  'satelles  Seiani'  - 
a  damning  charge.  The  Senate  understood  their  duty  and  expelled  Gallio 
from/ 44. 
from  membership. 
19 
f 
And  so  to  Macro!  His  skill  in  ensuring  the  success  of  the  action 
against  Seianus  earned  him  the  Praetorian  prefecture  which  he  was  to 
hold  for  the  next  seven  years. 
20 
We  know  his  full  name,  Quintus 
Naevius  Cordus  Sutorius  Macro,  from  two  commemorative  plaques  found 
at  the  amphitheatre  of  his  native  Alba  Fucens  which  he  left  to  the 
townspeople  in  his  will.  The  same  inscriptions  tell  us  that  he  had 
been  prefect  of  the  Vigiles. 
21 
It  was  perhaps  at  this  stage  of  his 
career  that  Tiberius  saw  the  possibility  of  using  him  to  counter  the 
ambitions  of  Seianus. 
22 
But  we  know  nothing  of  Macro's  activities 
between  his  tenure  of  this  prefecture  and  his  appointment  to  the 
Praetorian  prefecture. 
23 
De  Visscher  suggests  that  Macro  had  been 
'l'oeil  de  Capri'  at  Rome  for  some  time  before  October  AD.  31.24 
The  character  of  Macro  remains  something  of  an  enigma.  Tacitus 
describes  him  as  worse  than  Seianus  at  inflicting  criminal  damage  on 
the  state. 
25 
Dio  Cassius  portrays  him  as  a  torturer  and  extractor  of 
confessions  during  the  purge  which  followed  Seianus'  death. 
26 
Both 
of  these  historians  allege  that  Macro  persuaded  his  wife,  Ennia,  to 
seduce  Gaius  as  a  means  of  gaining  a  greater  hold  over  the  young 
prince. 
27 
The  prefect  stands  accused  of  brutal  crimes  against  the 
state,  of  the  relentless  persecution  of  individuals  and  of  a  ruthless 
ambition  unhindered  by  moral  considerations.  Such  allegations  are 
damning.  Whether  they  are  justified  is  distinctly  less  clear.  If 
we  examine  these  charges  more  carefully,  we  find  that  Tacitus  not  only 
misrepresents  Macro's  actions  but  also  distorts  his  motives. 
Let  / 45. 
Let  us  consider  firstly  the  involvement  of  the  new  prefect  in  torture. 
We  have  already  noted  that  he  took  part  in  interrogations  after  the 
death  of  Seianus.  In  addition  to  this  Tacitus  tells  us  that  suspicions 
existed  during  the  prosecution  in  AD.  37  of  Albucilla  and  her  alleged 
lovers,  including  Lucius  Arruntius,  that  the  evidence  against  them  had 
been  fabricated  by  Macro.  To  support  this  claim  he  cites  the  absence 
of  the  usual  accompanying  letter  from  the  emperor  to  the  Senate  and 
Macro's  direction  of  the  questioning  and  torture  of  slaves. 
28 
The 
implication  is  that  the  presence  of  the  Praetorian  prefect  was 
exceptional  and  indicative  of  a  deepor  corruption.  Tigellinus' 
participation  in  the  torture  of  suspects  shows  that  attendance  on  such 
occasions  was  not  limited  to  one  particular  prefect. 
29 
Moreover, 
surely,  given  the  seriousness  of  the  charge  against  Albucilla) 
impietas  in  principem,  the  absence  of  the  prefect  during  the 
questioning-would  have  been  more  surprising?  Tacitus  adduces  a 
personal  motivation  for  Macro's  involvement  -  his  hatred  of  Arruntius. 
A  less  subjective  interpretation  of  the  prefect's  conduct  suggests 
itself.  The  interrogation  of  witnesses  in  cases  touching  upon  the 
emperor's  security  and  dignity  was  the  perceived  duty  of  the 
Praetorian  prefect.  Tacitus  provides  us  with  a  vindictive  scoundrel. 
A  more  likely  assessment  reveals  a  conscientious  champion  of  the 
imperial  interest. 
But  what  of  Macro  the  pimp  whom  Tacitus  claims  put  his  wife  into 
Gaius'  bed?  It  is  not  disputed  that  Gaius  and  Ennia  were  lovers. 
More  open  to  question  is  Macro's  role  in  the  affair.  Philo  states 
categorically  that  the  prefect  was  unaware  of  his  wife's  infidelity. 
In  / 46. 
In  this  account  and  that  of  Suetonius  it  is  Gaius  who  takes  the 
initiative  in  the  seduction  to  ensure  Ennia's  help  in  persuading  her 
husband  to  support  his  imperial  aspirations. 
30 
This  explanation  of 
Gaius'  motive,  however,  does  not  persuade.  The  seduction  of  a  man's 
wife  seems  a  particularly  perverse  method  of'winning  his  favour. 
31 
Besides,  Macro  had  already  been  acting  in  the  prince's  interest  for 
several  years.  Indeed  it  may  not  be  going  too  far  to  suggest  that 
Macro  believed  that  his  own  survival  depended  on  Gaius  obtaining  the 
principate.  A  more  convincing  interpretation  must  be  sought. 
Perhaps  the  intrigue  was  of  a  purely  sexual  nature.  If  so,  it  was 
a  potentially  dangerous  divertissement;  or  perhaps,  if  Gaius  had 
an  ulterior  motive,  the  person  whose  backing  he  was  indirectly 
seeking  was  not  Ennia's  husband,  but  her  father  Thrasyllus,  Tiberius' 
favourite  astrologer. 
32 
We  know  that  in  AD.  36  Thrasyllus  assured 
Tiberius  that  he  would  live  for  ten  more  years. 
33 
This  prediction 
may  have  influenced  the  emperor's  decision  not  to  accelerate  the 
advancement  of  Tiberius  Gemellus,  his  grandson  -  an  oversight  which 
worked  to  Gaius'  considerable  benefit. 
34 
The  acceptance  of  this 
thesis  must  lead  us  to  the  reasonable  conclusion  that  Tacitus' 
allegation  is  without  substance. 
As  to  those  crimes  to  which  Tacitus  makes  Lucius  Arruntius  allude  we 
may  note  Macro's  involvement  in  the  suicides  of  Mamercus  Scaurus  in 
AD.  34  and  Fulcinius  Trio  in  AD.  35.35  In  truth,  however,  it  is 
clear  that  both  men  had  been  living  on  borrowed  time  since  Seianus' 
fall  and  that  Tiberius'  relentless  persecution  of  the  prefect's 
friends  was  probably  the  real  reason  for  their  deaths.  The  scandal 
of  Albucilla  was  linked  through  her  husband  to  the  alleged  conspiracy 
of  / 47. 
of  Seianus36  -a  serious  enough  consideration  even  six  years  after 
the  prefect's  ruin. 
37 
But  the  principal  target  of  the  action  can 
hardly  have  been  Albucilla.  The  key  to  understanding  Macro's  motives 
lies,  not  in  the  past,  but  in  the  future.  Tiberius'  death  could  not 
be  long  delayed.  The  issue  of  the  succession  was  vital,  and  unresolved. 
The  emperor's  doubts  over  the  suitability  of  Gaius  to  follow  him  had 
never  been  wholly  allayed. 
38 
This  hesitation  had  been  noted  by  a 
powerful  coalition  headed  by  Lucius  Arruntius  which  perhaps  hoped  to 
set  Gnaeus  Domitius  Ahenobarbus  on  the  throne  after  Tiberius'  death. 
Such  aspirations  were  a  direct  threat  to  the  accession  of  Gaius. 
Here  lies  the  reason  for  Macro's  action.  By  accusing  these  men  of 
having  been  Albucilla's  lovers  and  by  associating  them  in  the  charge 
against  her  he  could  place  the  coalition  on  the  defensive  and  safeguard 
the  position  of  his  protege. 
39 
Macro  was,  in  general,  highly  protective  of  Gaius  with  regard  to  both 
his  personal  safety  and  his  morals.  Philo  tells  us  that  he  woke  him 
up  if  he  fell  asleep  at  banquets  and  restrained  his  urge  for  theatrical 
excess. 
40 
Such  devotion  did  not  always  please  Tiberius 
41 
though  the 
prefect  was  able  to  cite  his  role  in  the  downfall  of  Seianus  as  proof 
of  his  loyalty.  42 
But  none  of  this  should  mislead  us.  Macro's 
support  for  Gaius  was  undertaken  with  a  keen  eye  to  his  own  advantage. 
He  had  a  shrewd  understanding  of  how  to  extract  the  greatest  political 
benefit  for  himself  out  of  any  situation.  We  know  from  Dio  Cassius 
that  he  sensibly  declined  the  considerable  rewards  which  the  Senate 
voted  him  after  Seianus'  execution. 
43 
A  similar  circumspection  can 
be  found  in  the  preferential  treatment  which  he  accorded  to  Herod 
Agrippa  / 48. 
Agrippa,  after  he  had  been  arrested  for'suggesting  that  it  was  time 
for  Tiberius  to  retire  in  favour  of  Gaius.  That  unsavoury  and 
frequently  indigent  princeling,  for  whom  the  imperial  family  had  such 
a  fascinated  regard,  was,  although  chained  to  a  Praetorian  centurion, 
permitted  certain  comforts  denied  to  his  fellow  prisoners. 
44 
The 
extension  of  such  privileges  to  a  friend  of  Gaius  suggests  a 
readiness  on  Macro's  part  to  disobey,  or  at  least  amend,  Tiberius' 
orders  when  he  saw  the  opportunity  to  gain  future  favour  by  doing  so. 
His  loyalty  to  Gaius  was  perhaps  also  shaped  by  a  realistic  assessment 
of  his  own  position  and  a  recognition  that  his  hold  over  the  Guard  was 
unlikely  to  remain  firm  against  the  will  of  a  child  of  Germanicus. 
Tiberius  died  in  his  villa  at  Misenum  on  the  16th  of  March  AD.  37.45 
The  precise  cause  of  his  death  remains  unclear.  There  were  wild 
rumours  of  poison  and  of  strangulation. 
46 
Speculation  is  the  frequent 
concomitant  of  a  tyrant's  end.  Tacitus  unsurprisingly  implicates  Macro. 
But  the  picture  which  he  paints  of  the  prefect  ordering  the  suffocation 
of  the  emperor  under  a  pile  of  bed-clothes  seems  improbable  and 
unconvincing. 
47 
The  evidence  points  to  a  more  prosaic  demise. 
Tacitus  writes  of  Tiberius'  failing  respiration  and  a  stoppage  in  his 
breathing. 
48 
Suetonius  mentions  a  pain  in  the  emperor's  side  and  the 
onset  of  a  fever  after  exposure  to  a  draught. 
49 
He  also  indicates 
that  a  deterioration  in  his  condition  prevented  him  from  returning  to 
Capreae. 
50 
All  three  of  our  main  sources  tell  us  that  Tiberius 
stopped  breathing  before  apparently  recovering. 
51 
Finally,  we  know 
from  Seneca  who  wrote  his  account  within  four  years  of  Tiberius'  death 
that  the  emperor  collapsed  and  died  after  he  tried  to  get  out  of  bed  on 
his  own. 
52 
All  of  this  suggests  that  Tiberius  died  not  at  the  hands 
of  / 49. 
of  Macro  but  of  bronchial  pneumonia  which  developed  into  pleurisy. 
53 
Macro  may  not  have  murdered  Tiberius  but  his  support  for  Gaius  at  the 
time  of  the  old  emperor's  death  was  invaluable.  Indeed  the 
smoothness  of  the  succession  was  largely  due  to  the  prefect's  initiative. 
He  despatched  couriers  to  the  legions,  perhaps  even  before  Tiberius' 
death. 
54 
He  may  also  have  hailed  Gaius  as  imperator  and  ensured  that 
the  naval  units  at  Misenum  and  those  Praetorian  detachments  on  the 
Campanian  mainland  did  likewise. 
55 
It  was  the  prefect  who  read  out 
Tiberius'  will  to  the  Senate.  His  presence  was  perhaps  the  decisive 
factor  in  persuading  the  Senate  to  declare  the  will,  which  named  Gaius 
and  Tiberius  Gemellus  as  joint-heirs,  void  due  to  Tiberius'  insanity. 
Gaius  was  voted  all  the  powers  associated  with  the  principate. 
56 
At  first  Gaius  relied  heavily  on  his  prefect  for  support  and  advice. 
He  is  alleged  to  have  refused  to  see  even  Antonia,  his  grandmother, 
except  in  Macro's  presence. 
57 
The  prefect  also  provided  help  of  a 
more  sinister  kind.  It  was  he  who  organised  the  death  of  Tiberius 
Gemellus.  His  agents  were  a  Praetorian  tribune  and  centurion  who 
forced  the  prince  to  suicide. 
58 
But  Gaius'  debt  to  Macro  was 
becoming  increasingly  offensive  and  intolerable  to  his  heightened 
sense  of  imperial  dignity.  Philo  tells  us  that  Gaius  grew  weary  of 
the  prefect's  admonitions.  Certainly  the  emperor  made  evident  his 
distaste  for  the  prefect's  company.  He  instructed  his  friends  not  to 
smile  when  Macro  appeared.  He  contrasted  publicly  his  own 
distinguished  ancestry  with  that  of  the  prefect.  This  clearly  speaks 
of  estrangement. 
59 
Since  / 50. 
Since  imperial  disfavour  frequently  had  fatal  repercussions,  Macro's 
enforced  suicide  would  hardly  surprise  us  were  it  not  for  our  knowledge 
of  his  designation,  in  AD.  38,  as  prefect  of  Egypt  in  succession  to 
Avillius  Flaccus. 
60 
We  must  assume  that  this  promotion  was  either  a 
ruse,  like  the  honours  given  to  Seianus  seven  years  earlier,  to  lull 
Macro  into  a  false  sense  of  security,  or  that  it  was  a  genuine  advancement 
for  the  prefect  and  that,  between  the  appointment  and  his  departure  for 
Egypt,  a  ruinous  rift  occurred  in  his  relationship  with  Gaius.  Neither 
interpretation  is  particularly  attractive,  Gaius  was  widely  popular  in 
AD.  38  and  there  would  have  been  little  need,  if  he  wished  to  remove 
Macro,  to  indulge  in  such  an  elaborate  and  dangerous  deception.  It 
may  well  be,  however,  that  the  emperor  felt  that  the  strength  of  Macro's 
power-base  within  the  Guard  demanded  that  his  elimination  be  delayed 
until  his  direct  link  with  the  Praetorians  had  been  broken.  As  to  the 
suggestion  that  the  rupture  occurred  after  his  designation  as  prefect 
of  Egypt,  we  have  no  indication  from  our  sources  of  any  activity  on 
Macro's  part  at  this  time  which  would  require  an  immediate  response 
from  the  emperor.  We  do,  however,  have  epigraphic  evidence  which  may 
point  to  the  involvement  of  Isidorus,  the  Alexandrian  anti-semite*,  in 
Macro's  ruin. 
61 
It  would,  moreover,  he  unwise  to  ignore  what  Philo 
tells  us  about  the  influence  of  the  Egyptians  of  Gaius'  household, 
N 
especially  Helicon  whom  he  describes  as  '(fir'  "TV"  M(drgf(o!  LQ'?  b 
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It  seems  possible,  therefore,  that  Macro's  fall  was  engineered,  for 
political  reasons  on  which  we  can  only  speculate,  by  those  Alexandrian 
nationalists  close  to  Gaius  who  perhaps  used  as  their  pretext  the 
friendship  of  Macro  with  Avillius  Flaccus,  his  predecessor  in  Egypt  and 
a/ 51. 
a  known  partisan  of  Tiberius  Gemellus. 
63 
It  is  not  wholly  clear  whether  the  prefecture  was  split  between  two 
appointees  immediately  after  Macro's  death.  Dio  Cassius  mentions  the 
presence  of  only  one  prefect  at  Drusilla's  funeral. 
64 
We  know  that 
there  were  two  prefects  in  AD.  40,  two  years  later. 
65 
One  of  these 
was  almost  certainly  Marcus  Arrencinus  Clemens  whom  Tacitus  . claims  was 
an  outstanding  appointment. 
66  It  may  well  be  that  only  one  prefect 
was  appointed  after  Macro's  suicide  but  that  a  second  was  introduced 
later,  perhaps  in  the  autumn  of  AD.  39  before  Gaius  set  off  for  Germany. 
As  for  the  Praetorians  themselves,  they  were  delighted  by  the  accession 
of  Gaius.  Their  devotion  to  the  house  of  Germanicus  had  a  rather 
mystical  quality  about  it.  Gaius  knew  the  importance  of  cultivating 
such  loyalty.  He  visited  the  Praetorian  camp  with  a  retinue  of 
senators  and  presented  each  soldier  with  1000  sesterces  as  a  donative 
from  himself  in  addition  to  the  1000  sesterces  which  Tiberius  had  left 
them  in  his  will. 
67 
It  was  perhaps  at  this  time  that  the  Praetorians 
received  those  specially-struck  bronze  coins  which  bear  the  legend 
'adlocutio  cohortium'  and  show  Gaius  addressing  the  assembled  guardsmen. 
68 
Under  Augustus  and  Tiberius  the  Praetorians  had  never  hesitated  to  take 
the  most  drastic  action  against  those  individuals  or  groups  which  threatened 
the  security  of  the  emperor.  Their  remorseless  and  unquestioning 
commitment  to  the  regime  was  to  characterise  much  of  Gaius'  principate. 
Philo  provides  us  with  an  insight  into  the  operational  consequences  of 
such  fealty  in  his  account  of  the  detention,  exile  and  execution  of 
Aulus  Avillius  Flaccus,  prefect  of  Egypt  since  AD.  32.  He  was  arrested 
on  / 52. 
on  an  unknown  charge  by  Bassus,  a  Praetorian  centurion,  who  had  been 
sent  out  from  Italy  by  Gaius. 
69 
Praetorians  may  also  have  been  involved 
in  escorting  Flaccus  to  Andros,  the  Greek  island  chosen  as  his  place  of 
exile.  It  is  noteworthy,  though  scarcely  surprising,  given  the 
increasing  number  of  those  exiled  on  imperial  orders,  that  this  escort 
did  not  stay  on  the  island  with  their  prisoner  but  merely  introduced 
him  to  the  popular  assembly  of  the  Andrians  and  called  on  them  to 
witness  the  arrival  of  an  exile. 
70 
After  Gaius  decided  that  Andros 
was  too  pleasant  a  spot  for  a  treacherous  ex-prefect,  Praetorian 
executioners  were  despatched  to  put  him  to  death  -  an  action  which 
Philo  tells  us  they  carried  out  with  horrifying  butchery  and 
questionable  competence. 
71 
Whether  Gaius  had  at  this  time  reached  that  state  of  pathological 
madness  which  allegedly  characterised  the  closing  period  of  his 
principate  is  unclear. 
72 
It  is  reasonable,  however,  to  assume  that 
the  Praetorians  were  aware  of  the  emperor's  declining  mental  condition 
as  reflected  in  his  exhibitions  of  dancing  and  acting  and  in  his  habit 
of  dressing  as  a  god. 
73 
Nevertheless  the  Praetorians  remained  loyal 
to  Gaius  for  another  two  and  a  half  years  and,  even  then,  the  plot 
against  him  did  not  involve  the  whole 
PrCkQ'taL  C-01  TS,  but  only  a  small 
group  of  officers.  Why  such  persistent  fidelity?  Perhaps  because 
of  their  oath  of  loyalty.  Perhaps  also  because  of  Gaius'  status  as 
a  son  of  Germanicus.  One  should  never,  however,  underestimate  the 
mercenary  motivation  of  soldiers.  Gaius'  generosity  towards  the 
Praetorians  and  his  role  as  a  guarantor  of  their  future  employment 
were  probably  more  important  factors  in  ensuring  their  loyalty.  As 
we  have  seen,  even  the  removal  of  their  prefect  did  not  threaten  the 
Praetorians'  / 53. 
Praetorians'  unique  relationship  with  the  emperor.  They  may  have 
become  murderers  rather  than  soldiers,  as  Cassius  Chaerea  claimed, 
but  the  mass  of  the  Praetorians  were  less  fastidious  in  such  matters 
and,  provided  Gaius  made  no  move  to  curtail  their  privileges,  their 
loyalty  was  guaranteed. 
74 
Gaius  had  never  been  slow  to  utilise  his  Guard  as  an  instrument  of 
repression  although  his  motives  in  doing  so  may  have  been  at  least 
initially,  less  base  than  Dio  Cassius  suggests. 
75 
However  the  death 
of  Drusilla,  at  whose  funeral  the  Praetorians  played  a  prominent  part, 
liberated  Gaius  of  the  only  influence  capable  of  restraining  his  more 
violent  impulses  and  wilder  flights  of  fancy. 
76 
If  our  sources  may 
be  believed,  something  very  close  to  a  reign  of  terror  developed  in 
Rome  with  random  arrests  on  the  flimsiest  of  pretexts  and  the  public 
humiliation  of  potential  dissidents. 
77 
As  the  emperor's  agents  in 
this  intimidation  the  Praetorians  did  their  duty  whether  it  involved 
provoking  a  deadly  panic  among  a  crowd  whose  noise  as  they  waited  for 
free  tickets  for  the  theatre  had  disturbed  the  imperial  rest  or 
stripping  and  whipping  a  quaestor  accused  of  conspiracy. 
78 
But  the  Praetorians  were  more  than  just  Gaius'  bullyboys.  They 
enhanced  the  dignity  of  an  emperor  obsessed  with  grandiose  and 
ostentatious  spectacle.  They  were  the  rock  on  which  his  vainglorious 
pretensions  were  built  -  the  solid  support  for  his  exhibitionist 
posturings.  To  this  end  they  took  part  in  the  parade,  during  the 
spring  of  AD.  39,  over  the  bridge  which  Gaius  had  built  from  Puteoli 
to  Misenum. 
79 
To  many  of  the  Praetorians  the  parade  and  the  drunken 
party  which  followed  it  must  have  seemed  a  jolly  jape,  a  fine  example 
of  / 54. 
10 
of  the  ttýja?  pt  of  which  their  emperor  was  so  proud. 
80 
Many 
of  the  Praetorian  officers,  however,  may  have  taken  a  less  indulgent 
view  of  such  megalomania. 
81 
Hardly  less  degrading  and  humiliating  was  the  Praetorians'  experience 
during  Gaius'  expedition  to  Gaul  and  Germany. 
82 
The  pace  of  the 
march  northwards,  during  which  approximately  966  miles  were  covered 
in  46  days,  was  so  rapid  and  so  exhausting  that  the  Praetorians  were 
forced  to  use  pack-animals  for  their  standards. 
83 
More  farce 
followed  when  they  eventually  reached  Germany.  The  Praetorian 
cavalry  accompanied  Gaius  as  he  dashed  around  warding  off  fictitious 
attacks  and  capturing  imaginary  enemies. 
84 
Melodrama,  however, 
sometimes  gave  way  to  real  tragedy.  In  Germany,  Marcus  Aemilius 
Lepidus,  who  had  been  the  husband  of  one  of  Gaius'  sisters,  Drusilla, 
and  was  now  the  lover  of  another,  Agrippina,  was  decapitated  by  the 
axe  of  the  Praetorian  tribune,  Dexter,  Gaius'  favourite  executioner. 
Here  may  be  the  consequences  of  failed  conspiracy  between  Lepidus  and 
Lentulus  Gaetulicus,  the  powerful  commander  of  the  legions  in  upper 
Germany  who  was  also  put  to  death  at  this  time. 
85 
The  whole  episode 
illustrates  well  the  extent  to  which  Gaius  relied  on  the  Praetorians 
for  his  protection  and  security.  This  dependency  did  not  go  unnoticed 
by  some  malcontents  within  the  Praetorian  officer  corps  who  saw  in  it 
an  opportunity  to  exact  retribution  for  past  insults  and  rid  Rome  of 
a  tyrant. 
The  suppression  of  Gaetulicus'  plot  served  only  to  increase  Gaius' 
paranoia.  The  declarations  of  thanksgiving  which  greeted  the  emperor's 
return  / 55. 
return  to  Rome  were  soon  forgotten  as  he  used  the  Praetorians  to 
unleash  a  new  and  widespread  terror  on  the  city. 
86 
Fresh 
conspiracies  were  detected  and  crushed, 
87 
women  tortured, 
88 
force 
used  to  impose  unpopular  and  sometimes  ludicrous  taxes  on  the 
populace. 
89 
Protesters  were  ruthlessly  dealt  with. 
90 
As  the 
antipathy  of  the  urban  plebs  towards  Gaius  grew,  the  swords  of  the 
Praetorians  became  more  patently  the  sole  support  of  his  principate. 
91 
It  is  an  indication  of  Gaius'  madness  that,  instead  of  cherishing  his 
Guard  at  this  time,  he  chose  to  give  them  orders  and  duties  that  were 
increasingly  infantile  and  humiliating.  They  were  sent  into  the 
streets  to  ensure  that  the  sleep  of  Incitatus,  the  emperor's  favourite 
horse,  was  not  disturbed. 
92 
They  were  forced  to  admire  Milonia 
Caesonia,  Gaius'  fourth  wife,  as  she  rode  beside  him  dressed  in  a 
military  cloak  and  helmet  and  carrying  a  shield. 
93 
A  Praetorian 
centurion  was  sent  by  Gaius  to  order  a  knight  who  had  made  a  noise 
during  a  performance  by  Mnester  to  take  a  pointless  message  to 
Mauretania. 
94 
Such  needless  insensitivity  offended  the  Praetorians 
and  convinced  some  that  only  the  emperor's  death  would  bring  to  an 
end  a  situation  which  was  widely  regarded  as  unbearable. 
95 
Everyone  was  now  suspect,  to  the  extent  that  Gaius  felt  that  he  needed 
an  armed  guard  of  Praetorians  in  the  Senate. 
96 
Even  the  prefects  fell 
under  suspicion  after  the  vengeful  accusation  of  Betilienus  Bassus' 
father  against  them. 
97 
This  predictably  produced  further  melodramatic 
posturing  from  Gaius.  More  ominously  he  began  to  try  to  stir  up 
trouble  between  the  prefects  who  recognised  in  Gaius'  suspicions  a 
threat  to  their  very  lives. 
98 
Josephus  rightly  points  out  that  it 
was  / 56. 
was  fear  of  an  uncertain  future  as  much  as  a  desire  to  avenge  past 
wrongs  that  persuaded  many  if  not  to  join,  at  least  not  to  prevent 
the  coup  against  Gaius. 
99 
The  initiator  and  organiser  of  the  plot,  Cassius  Chaerea,  had, 
however,  more  personal  motives  for  acting  against  his  emperor.  Gaius 
had  persistently  humiliated  the  tribune  who  had  come  to  the  Praetorian 
Guard  after  a  long  career  in  the  legions. 
100 
Chaerea  was  pompous, 
aloof  and,  because  of  his  soft  voice,  open  to  charges  of  being  a 
homosexual. 
101 
Gaius  with  his  love  of  immature  pranks  was  not  the 
man  to  ignore  such  vulnerabilities".  The  tribune  was  given  obscene 
and  salacious  passwords  which  he  was  compelled  as  officer  of  the 
watch  to  pass  on  to  his  subordinates. 
102 
It  was  a  pleasure  which 
was  to  cost  Gaius  dearly.  For  Chaerea  understood  that  there  could 
be  no  end  to  his  degradation  while  the  emperor  lived.  Not  only  was 
his  tribunate  an  ongoing  humiliation  but  his  prospects  of  obtaining  a 
worthwhile  post  at  the  end  of  his  period  of  service  lay  in  ruins. 
And  so  out  of  his  desperation  was  born  a  deadly  conspiracy. 
There  is,  however,  another  interpretation  of  Chaerea's  motives  which 
reflects  much  less  well  on  the  tribune.  He  had,  by  his  own  admission, 
been  deeply  involved  in  the  torture  and  general  terror  which 
characterised  the  last  year  of  Gaius'  principate.  He  may  well  have 
judged  that  only  by  killing  Gaius  could  he  escape  the  opprobrium  which 
such  collaboration  merited.  Indeed,  his  reluctance  to  seize  several 
favourable  opportunities  to  kill  the  emperor  because  they  would  have 
meant  the  sacrifice  of  his  own  life  suggests  that  Chaerea's  thirst 
for  / 57. 
for  vengeance  was  definitely  limited  and  'qualified  by  his  desire  for 
survival. 
103 
Chaerea  first  sought  the  support  of  Clemens.  But  the  prefect  was 
too  shrewd  to  commit  himself  beyond  platitudinous  sympathy. 
104 
He  had  more  luck,  however,  with  his  fellow-tribunes19  but  he  was 
eager  that  the  coup  should  be  more  broadly-based  than  the  officer 
corps  of  the  Guard.  He  therefore  approached  Lucius  Annius 
Vinicianus  whom  he  believed  represented  the  interests  of  the  Senate. 
106 
Chaerea  wanted  swift  action.  He  was  worried  that  Clemens  might 
decide  that  his  own  advantage  would  be  better  served  by  revealing  the 
conspiracy  to  Gaius.  Knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  plot  had, 
moreover,  become  dangerously  widespread. 
107 
Delay  could  only 
increase  the  possibility  of  detection. 
108 
A  final  factor  prompting 
Chaerea  towards  early  action  was  Gaius'  plans  to  tour  Egypt. 
109 
The  day  chosen  for  the  murder  of  Gaius  was  the  24th  of  January  AD.  41 
during  the  festival  of  the  Ludi  Palatini. 
110 
On  that  day  Gaius, 
after  some  persuading  by  Asprenas,  left  the  theatre  by  the  covered 
route  to  the  palace. 
ill 
According  to  Suetonius  and  Dio  Cassius, 
the  emperor  believed  that  he  was  to  meet  a  group  of  ncble  boys  frcm 
Ionia  who  were  to  appear  at  the  festival. 
112 
Josephus  maintains 
that  he  was  taking  a  shortcut  to  the  palace  baths. 
113 
In  the  tunnel 
was  waiting  Chaerea  together  with  at  least  two  other  Praetorian 
tribunes,  Cornelius  Sabinus  and  Aquila.  Suetonius  gives  us  two 
versions  of  the  actual  killing,  according  to  one  of  which  Chaerea  aimed 
the  first  blow  at  Gaius'  neck,  while  in  the  other  Sabinus  struck  first 
and  / 58. 
and  broke  Gaius'  jawbone. 
114 
Both  Suetonius  and  Dio  Cassius  agree 
that  the  other  conspirators  then  ran  forward  to  wound  the  emperor. 
115 
In  the  account  of  Josephus,  Chaerea  stopped  Gaius,  asked  him  for  the 
watchword  and  then  struck  him,  whereupon  Sabinus  knocked  him  to  his 
knees  before  Aquila  delivered  the  fatal  blow. 
116 
The  assassination  was  followed  by  a  period  of  chaotic  bloodiness. 
Sabinus,  the  Thracian  gladiator  in  charge  of  the  German  Guard, 
completely  lost  control  of  his  men. 
117 
A  similar  loss  of  discipline 
began  to  affect  the  Praetorian  cohort  on  duty. 
118 
There  was  for  a 
time  the  distinct  possibility  of  a  wholesale  ruassacre.  Indeed  it 
was  only  with  difficulty  that  Chaerea  was  able  to  re-establish  some 
order. 
119 
To  his  relief  Vinicianus  was  found  unharmed.  The  senator 
was  brought  to  Clemens  who,  in  a  tardy  gesture  of  commitment  to  the 
conspiracy,  judged  it  expedient  to  release  him. 
120 
The  conspirators,  deluded  by  their  own  prejudices  in  thinking  that, 
in  murdering  a  tyrant,  they  had  eradicated  a  tyranny,  boasted 
publicly  of  their  part  in  the  assassination,  confident  that  Rome's 
destiny  was  in  their  hands. 
121 
Some,  notably  Vinicianus,  had  their 
own  ambitions  in  which  the  Praetorians  might  have  a  part  to  play; 
122 
but  the  majority  shared  the  simple  and  naive  belief  that  the  death  of 
Gaius  would  by  itself  usher  in  a  new  republican  golden  age.  They  had 
assumed,  if  in  truth  they  had  seriously  considered  the  question,  that 
the  Praetorian  Guard  would  react  to  the  assassination  of  Gaius  with  no 
greater  disruption  than  they  had  shown  after  the  death  of  Seianus  ten 
years  before. 
123 
It  was  to  prove  a  ruinous  miscalculation.  In  the 
castra  / 59. 
castra  praetoria  there  were  11  cohorts  who  were  wholly  aware  that  the 
continuance  of  their  privileged  existence  demanded  a  new  emperor. 
Even  within  Chaerea's  own  cohort  there  were  men  who,  amidst  the 
confusion  following  the  emperor's  murder,  understood  that  there  could 
be  no  place  in  the  new  republican  Utopia  for  a  Praetorian  Guard. 
124 
It  is  possible  that,  if  the  Praetorians  had  known  at  this  time  of 
Vinicianus'  aspirations,  they  would  have  supported  him.  But  this 
is  perhaps  to  underestimate  their  loyalty  to  the  dynasty. 
125 
The  previous  ten  years  had,  however,  seen  the  male  line  of  the 
ruling  house  all  but  annihilated  through  the  pitiless  vindictiveness 
of  Tiberius  and  Gaius.  Who  then  was  left  to  provide  a  focus  for  the 
Praetorians'  loyalty?  Behind  a  curtain  in  the  imperial  palace  hid  a 
man  whose  life  had  been  a  long  catalogue  of  humiliations.  He  was  of 
unprepossessing  appearance  and  widely  considered  to  be  an  imbecile. 
126 
But  he  was  the  brother  of  Germanicus.  And  for  the  Praetorians  this 
in  itself  made  him  worthy  of  their  allegiance. 
127 Ci4AATFR  TV  . 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  OF  CLAUDIUS 
The  tyrant's  death  was  not  enough  for  Chaerea.  In  a  shameful  and 
unnecessary  act  of  butchery  Gaius'  wife,  Caesonia,  and  his  daughter, 
Drusilla,  were  put  to  death.  The  commission  of  this  atrocity  was 
entrusted  to  a  Praetorian  tribune,  Julius  Lupus. 
1 
He  was  picked  to 
carry  out  this  distasteful  task  for  several  reasons.  Firstly, 
Chaerea  was  not  so  well  supplied  with  ruthless  lieutenants  that  he 
could  afford  to  be  discriminating.  Secondly,  and,  in  its  immediate 
context,  more  importantly,  those  in  charge  of  the  conspiracy  hoped 
that,  by  choosing  Lupus,  they  would  compromise  Marcus  Arrecinus 
Clemens,  one  of  the  Praetorian  prefects,  to  whom  Lupus  was  closely 
related. 
2 
They  need  not  have  taken  so  much  trouble,  for  Clemens,  by 
his  encouragement  of  Chaerea,  by  his  obloquy  of  tyranny  and  by  his 
collusion  with  conspirators  after  the  assassination,  had  already 
hopelessly  implicated  himself  in  the  plot  and  left  himself  open  to 
allegations  of,  at  best,  dereliction  of  duty  and,  at  worst,  outright 
treachery  made,  perhaps  even  more  reprehensible  by  his  hypocritical 
willingness  to  encourage,  but  not  participate  in,  the  conspiracy. 
3 
Lupus,  conscious  that  support  for  the  murders  which  he  was  about  to 
commit  was  by  no  means  unanimous4  and  surely  aware  of  the  opprobrium 
likely  to  attach  itself  to  such  an  act,  steeled  himself  with  the 
knowledge  that  he  was  acting  for  his  country5  and,  after  finding 
Caesonia  weeping  over  Gaius'  body,  killed  both  her  and  Drusilla,  her 
daughter,  with  a  taciturn  cold-bloodedness. 
6 
Meanwhile,  the  Senate,  at  the  instigation  of  the  consuls,  Cn.  Sentius 
Saturninus  / 61. 
Saturninus  and  Q.  Pomponius  Secundus,  acted,  in  the  immediate  aftermath 
of  the  killing,  with  uncharacteristic  determination  and  authority.  A 
meeting  was  called  on  the  Capitol,  which  was  more  easily  defended  than 
the  Curia. 
7 
A  considerable  sum  of  money  was  moved  to  the  same  place 






and  melodramatic  posturing 
11 
were  the  order  of  the  day. 
There  was  much  emphasis  on  the  glory  of  tyrannicide  and  on  the  need  to 
restore  the  republic. 
12 
Almost  inevitably  the  watchword  'Libertas' 
was  given  to  Cassius  Chaerea  who,  although  normally  unloved  and  unloving, 
was  allegedly  enjoying  a  brief  Indian  summer  of  popularity,  and  had 
control  of  the  limited  military  forces,  mainly  the  urban  cohorts,  which 
had  placed  themselves  at  the  Senate's  disposal. 
13 
Yet,  despite  Sentius'  rhetorical  skill14  and  Chaerea's  organisational 
ability, 
15 
the  Senate's  position  was  clearly  untenable  from  the  start. 
As  Momigliano  writes,  'when  we  look  for  the  political  programme  that 
underlay  the  vague  appeals  to  a  better  order,  we  find  that  no  such 
programme  existed'. 
16 
For  all  the  brave  talk  of  liberty  and  of 
restoring  the  republic,  what  many  senators  really  wanted  was  a  revival 
of  the  senatorial  oligarchy  which  had  been  discredited,  at  least  as  far 
as  fitness  for  government  was  concerned,  over  one  hundred  years  before. 
Such  selfish  aims,  however  prettified,  were  unlikely  to  win  the  approval 
of  other  elements  of  Roman  society,  even  those  who  were  less  than  whole- 
hearted  in  their  support  for  the  imperial  system. 
Neither  the  people,  whose  support  was,  from  the  Senate's  point  of  view, 
of  no  great  importance,  nor  the  army,  whose  backing  was  vital,  was 
likely  / 62. 
likely  to  welcome  an  aristocratic  government. 
17 
Shrewder  minds  in 
the  Senate,  of  course,  realised  this. 
18 
But  nowhere  was  it  more 
clearly  recognised  and  nowhere  was  the  opposition  to  it  more  sharply 
focused  or  more  concretely  organised  than  among  the  Praetorian  cohorts. 
The  consuls,  realising  the  dangers  inherent  in  allowing  the  temporarily 
stunned  Praetorians  to  roam  without  control  through  the  city,  ordered 
those  in  the  city  to  return  to  their  camp  and  stay  there.  To 
encourage  this,  they  held  out  the  promise  of  rewards. 
19 
Their  fears 
about  possible  plundering  were,  especially  after  the  reaction  of  the 
German  Guard  tG  the  assassination,  understandable  and  undoubtedly 
genuine,  and  yet  their  anxieties  may  well  also  have  had  their  origins 
in  the  threat  to  their  own  position  which  would  arise  if  the  Praetorians 
were  to  make  common  cause  with  the  people  who  had  failed  singularly  to 
understand  the  role  which  they  were  expected  to  play  in  this  matter  and, 
after  a  meeting  in  the  forum,  were,  to  the  annoyance  and  embarrassment 
of  the  Senate,  eager  to  mount  a  full  investigation  into  Gaius'  murder. 
20 
The  consuls,  however,  knew  how  to  deal  with  popular  unrest.  The  people, 
who,  without  weapons,  were  hardly  a  threat  to  the  senatorial  position, 
were  peremptorily  dismissed  to  their  homes  and  a  curfew  brought  into 
force. 
21 
The  Praetorians,  however,  paid  little  heed  to  the  Senate's 
directive.  They  had  already  committed  themselves  elsewhere.  Those 
cohorts  in  the  Viminal  camp  had  held  a  meeting 
22 
where  they  had  decided 
that  they  had  no  confidence  whatsoever  in  a  government  of  a  senatorial 
oligarchy. 
23 
They  wanted  an  emperor  not  only  as  'a  guarantor  of  their 
continued  employment' 
24 
yment'  (for  how,  even  allowing  for  the  consuls' 
promises, 
25 
could  an  Imperial  Guard  exist  without  an  emperor?  ),  but  also 
perhaps  / 63. 
perhaps  because  they,  as  the  military  voice  of  middle-class  Italy, 
26 
knew  well  the  benefits  and  privileges  which  they  had  gained  under  the 
empire  and  how  those  might  be  curtailed  by  the  rapacity  of  an 
aristocratic  government. 
Once  they  had  rejected  oligarchy,  it  only  remained  for  the  Praetorians 
to  decide  to  whom  they  should  give  their  support  and  backing  as 
princeps.  They  needed  to  act  quickly,  for  they  feared  that  if  they 
delayed  too  long,  the  Senate  might  put  forward  a  candidate  of  its  own 
who,  if  he  gained  the  principate  without  Praetorian  support,  would  not 
be  beholden  to  them  in  any  way. 
27 
And  so  they  chose  Claudius.  They 
did  so  for  several  reasons.  Firstly  and  most  importantly,  he  was 
Germanicus'  brother  and  Germanicus'  name  was  still,  even  more  than 
twenty  years  after  his  death,  a  talisman  in  the  Roman  world. 
28 
The 
Praetorians  were  also  keenly  aware  of  the  value  of  their  support  and 
were  hopeful  that  Claudius  would  follow  the  precedent  of  Gaius29  and 
offer  them  a  generous  donative. 
30 
We  should  not,  moreover,  ignore 
the  possibility  that  the  Praetorians,  whose  continued  existence 
served  to  counter  any  senatorial  threat  to  the  emperor,  found  Claudius 
attractive  as  a  potential  princeps  both  because  of  the  antipathy, 
indeed  contempt,  which  his  aristocratic  peers  felt  towards  him, 
31 
and 
also  because  of  his  close  links  with  the  equites32  -a  class  to 
which  many  of  the  Praetorians  aspired. 
This  must  lead  us  to  consider  what  role  the  Praetorians  envisaged  for 
Claudius  if  he  became  princeps.  It  has  been  argued  that  the 
Praetorians  had  no  interest  in  whatever  qualities  Claudius  possessed, 
but  / 64. 
but  chose  him,  because  of  his  family  connections,  as  a  mere  figurehead, 
possibly  to  front  a  Praetorian  dictatorship. 
33 
This  view  is  not 
supported  by  Josephus  who  tells  us,  quite  clearly,  that  one  of  the 
reasons  why  the  Praetorians  gave  their  support  to  Claudius  was  because 
of  their  respect  for  him  as  a  man  of  learning. 
34 
Can  we  really 
believe  that  the  Praetorians  were  so  stupid  as  to  entrust  their  future 
to  a  shallow  nonentity? 
35 
They  had  much  to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain 
by  lending  their  support  to  a  malleable  puppet  who,  as  they  must 
surely  have  realised,  would,  after  the  crisis  of  the  accession  was 
over,  be  exposed  to  the  pressure  of  individuals  and  groups  who  had 
little  cause  to  love  the  Praetorians. 
The  identity  of  those  who  took  the  initiative  in  promoting  Claudius' 
candidature  at  this  time  must  remain  the  subject  of  speculation.  Was 
the  support  for  him  a  spontaneous  display  of  loyalty  towards  the 
dynasty  by  the  Guard  as  a  whole?  Did  those  tribunes  and  centurions 
excluded  from  Chaerea's  circle  of  conspirators  provide  the  resolution 
behind  this  counter-coup?  What  role  did  Clemens  and  his  colleague 
play? 
36 
How  did  Rufrius  Pollio  come  to  be  appointed  prefect? 
37 
Is 
it  reasonable  to  suggest  that  the  Praetorians,  far  from  controlling 
events,  were  themselves  being  manipulated  by  some  hidden  hand,  perhaps 
even  by  Claudius  himself? 
38 
Whatever  influences  led  the  Praetorians  to  their  decision  it  is  clear 
that,  once  they  had  committed  themselves  to  Claudius,  they  acted 
forcefully  and  with  determination.  They  believed,  with  some  reason, 
that,  if  their  choice  became  known  to  those  on  the  Capitol  before  they 
could  / 65. 
could  find  Claudius,  his  life  would  be  in  danger  from  a  senatorial 
murder  squad.  A  detachment  was  despatched  to  the  centre  of  the  city 
to  search  for  Claudius.  In  fact,  the  object  of  their  quest  was 
already  in  Praetorian  hands.  He  had  been  found  hiding  in  the  palace 
39 
by  a  private  soldier  named  Gratus. 
40. 
Despite  the  assertion  by  our 
sources  that  this  was  a  chance  discovery  it  is  possible  that  Gratus 
and  the  rest  of  Chaerea's  cohort  were,  in  fact,  looking  for  Claudius, 
having  concluded,  independently  of  their  fellow-soldiers  in  the  camp, 
that  the  best  interests  of  the  Praetorian  Guard  would  be  served  by 
taking  Claudius  into  protective  custody. 
41 
We  should  not  doubt  that  Claudius  was  genuinely  terrified.  He  ran 
the  risk  of  being  killed  either,  as  a  member  of  the  imperial  family, 
by  the  conspirators  or,  as  a  senator,  by  vengeful  Germans  whose 
treatment  of  Asprenas  he  had  already  witnessed. 
42 
He  was  reassured 
by  Gratus43  and  conducted  from  the  palace  with  some  difficulty,  due 
partly  to  his  excitement 
44 
and,  partly  to  his  physical  handicaps, 
45 
through  a  confusion  of  civilians,  who  obstructed  his  progress  in  the 
mistaken  belief  that  he  was  under  arrest. 
46 
Near  the  public 
treasury  the  two  groups  of  Praetorians,  those  who  had  found  Claudius 
and  those  from  the  camp,  met. 
47 
There  was  a  move  to  proclaim  him 
emperor  there  and  then. 
48 
It  was,  however,  judged  expedient  to 
proceed  with  haste  to  the  safety  of  the  Praetorian  camp. 
49 
The  news  of  Claudius'  survival  spread  quickly  through  the  city.  A 
stunned  Senate,  whose  very  willingness  to  negotiate  should  have 
encouraged  the  Praetorians,  sent  to  the  Praetorian  camp  as  envoys  two 
tribunes  / 66. 
tribunes  of  the  people,  Veranius  and  Brocchus.  50 
These  men,  who 
immediately  understood  the  significance  of  the  large  number  of  troops 
now  backing  Claudius, 
51 
forgot  about  their  instructions  to  demand 
that  Claudius  surrender  or,  if  necessary,  to  hold  out  before  him  the 
prospect  of  vague  future  honours 
52 
and,  after  falling  on  their  knees 
and  urging  him  to  avoid  civil  war,  offered  him  the  throne  if  he  was 
willing  to  recognise,  as  a  senatorial  right,  their  prerogative  of 
bestowing  it  on  him. 
53 
Claudius,  either  through  excitement  or  cunning,  dissembled  and 
procrastinated  -a  wises  move,  for  time  was  undoubtedly  on  his  side, 
since  the  Praetorians  had  an  unanimity  of  purpose  which  the  senatorial 
side  clearly  lacked. 
54 
He  had  no  desire,  nor  was  it  in  his  interest, 
to  humiliate  the  senators,  but  he  was  determined  that  they  should 
recognise  the  reality  of  the  situation  and  be  made  aware  that  he  was 
not  prepared  to  hold  the  principate  as  a  mere  pensioner  of  the  Senate. 
55 
Claudius'  confidence  was  further  increased  by  the  presence  in  the 
Praetorian  camp  of  the  Jewish  prince,  Herod  Agrippa,  a  man  whose  penchant 
for  duplicity  and  intrigue  had  rarely  found  such  a  stage  on  which  to 
perform. 
56 
He  was  sent  by  Claudius,  who  had  been  encouraged  by  the  words  of 
Veranius  and  Brocchus,  to  the  Senate  with  two  separate  messages,  the 
first  extremely  conciliatory,  the  second  much  less  so. 
57 
After 
sending  the  second  message,  Claudius,  who  realised  that  the  situation 
called  for  action  as  well  as  words,  addressed  the  assembled  Praetorians, 
allowed  them  to  hail  him  as  emperor  and  promised  them  a  donative  of 
15,000  sesterces  each. 
58 
Some  commentators  have  tried  to  justify  the 
size  / 67. 
size  of  this  donative,  for  it  seems  an  extremely  generous  piece  of 
largesse,  perhaps  even  the  product  of  weakness,  and  does  not  quite  fit 
the  modern  view  of  Claudius  as  a  more  decisive  leader  than  our  ancient 
sources  have  indicated.  They  have  stressed  the  need  to  outbid  the 
Senate,  who  had  already  offered  the  Praetorians  a  reward, 
59 
the 
obligation  on  Claudius  to  'make  up  for  the  missing  testamentary 
donative  of  Gaius'60  and  the  numerous  historical  precedents. 
61 
All 
these  arguments  are  undoubtedly  valid  and  indeed,  in  the  unique 
circumstances  after  Gaius'  murder,  Claudius  may  have  felt  that  he  had 
enough  difficulties  without  questioning  the  demands,  however  excessive 
and  extravagant  they  might  have  seemed  to  him  personally,  of  his 
principal  supporters.  In  truth,  while  it  may  be  wrong  to  call  this 
donative  bribery, 
62 
it  was  unquestionably  a  piece  of  bad  judgement  on 
Claudius'  part, 
63 
for  he  gave  to  the  soldiers  'that  fatal  sense  of 
their  own  strength  and  of  the  weakness  of  the  civil  authority'64  which 
.  Augustus  and  Tiberius  had  worked  so  hard  to  diminish.  His  successors 
were  also,  as  a  result  of  his  liberality  compelled  to  match  or  exceed 
the  level  of  his  donative  and  against  some  of  them  the  charge  of  buying 
the  loyalty  of  the  troops  is  less  easy  to  refute. 
65 
He  also  destroyed, 





Brutus  and  Cassius, 
68 
the  fiscal  sanity  which 
Augustus  had  brought  to  the  financing  of  the  army. 
69 
However  we  should 
be  careful  not  to  overstate  the  case  against  Claudius  or  condemn  him  too 
readily,  for  it  remains  a  fact  that,  once  the  Praetorians  had  received 
their  donative,  they  remained  fiercely  loyal  to  him  throughout  his 
principate.  Nor  did  they  regard  the  generosity  of  this  donative  as 
giving  them  licence  to  extend  their  activities  into  those  areas  of 
political  / 68. 
political  decision-making  which  were  the  preserve  of  the  emperor. 
On  the  25th  of  January  those  high  hopes  which  the  senators  had  held  on 
the  previous  day  were  succeeded  by  a  keen  awareness  of  the  reality  of 
the  situation.  No  more  than  one  hundred  of  them  attended  a  pre-dawn 
meeting,  called  by  the  consuls,  in  the  temple  of  Jupiter  Victor. 
70 
They  were  immediately  urged  by  the  soldiers  still  supporting  them  to 
choose  one  of  their  own  number  as  an  alternative  emperor  to  Claudius.  71 
This  was  to  prove  a  vain  exercise,  since  both  the  people  and  the 
Praetorians  were  now  wholly  committed  to  the  continuation  of  the 
Julio-Claudian  dynasty. 
72 
The  names  of  several  distinguished  senators, 
some  of  whom  were  absent,  were  considered. 
73 
The  eagerness  of  Marcus 
Vinicius,  Gaius'  brother-in-law,  to  gain  the  principate  was  matched  by 
that  of  the  consuls  to  deny  it  to  him. 
74 
Valerius  Asiaticus,  who  could 
count  himself  lucky  to  be  alive  after  his  audacious  behaviour  during 
the  rioting  following  upon  Gaius'  murder75  and  who,  despite  his  known 
friendship  with  Gaius, 
76 
was  alleged  to  be  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
plot, 
77 
was  also  a  contender.  His  candidature  was  opposed  by  Lucius 
Annius  Vinicianus  who  had  certainly  been  closely  involved  in  the 
conspiracy78  and  may  well  have  had  imperial  ambitions. 
79 
Yet,  even  as  they  argued,  the  prospect  of  power  was  slipping,  almost 
by  the  hour,  ever  more  inexorably  away  from  them.  For  into  the 
Praetorian  camp  were  streaming  troops  of  all  sorts  and  of  no  sorts,  some 
motivated  by  loyalty  of  differing  kinds,  others  by  expediency  and 
opportunism,  from  the  fleet  at  Misenum,  from  the  Vigiles'  billets  and, 
more  ominously,  from  the  gladiatorial  schools. 
80 
The  senators  found 
themselves  / 69. 
themselves  pressured,  on  the  one  side,  by.  the  urban  cohorts,  who  were 
desperately  demanding  an  emperor,  any  emperor,  on  whom  they  could 
bestow  the  small  gift  of  their  support,  and,  on  the  other  side,  by 
Chaerea  and  his  fellow  conspirators,  who  had  not  murdered  one  tyrant 
to  replace  him  with  another,  and  who  knew  that  the  urban  cohorts' 
demands  were  but  the  first  step  in  a  process  which  would  end, 
inevitably,  in  the  recognition  of  Claudius  as  princeps  and,  equally 
inevitably,  in  their  own  deaths. 
81 
Chaerea,  reminiscent  in  his  intransigence  of  some  figure  from  a  Greek 
tragedy,  fatally  misjudged  the  mood  of  the  troops  and  began  to  harangue 
them,  demanding  that  they  bring  him  Claudius'  head. 
82 
Such  hectoring 
was  not  to  the  taste  of  the  troops  who  knew  that  they  were  overmatched 
and  perhaps  were  also  reluctant,  as  they  claimed, 
83 
to  face  their 
fellow  soldiers  in  battle.  They  promptly  abandoned  the  senatorial 
cause  and  made  their  way  to  the  Praetorian  camp  to  swear  allegiance  to 
Claudius. 
84 
The  conspirators,  now  isolated  and  doomed,  turned  bitterly  upon  each 
other.  Sabinus  accused  Chaerea,  who  had  learned  too  late  the  value 
of  compromise,  of  delivering  his  country  to  a  slave  government. 
85 
When  there  was  no  more  left  to  say,  they  did  what  they  had  to  do  and 
took  their  own  via  dolorosa  to  the  Praetorian  camp.  Their  treatment 
there,  at  the  hands  of  the  guardsmen,  was  predictably  rough,  for  the 
Praetorians  were  incensed  at  the  Senate's  machinations  and  were  ready 
to  give  vent  to  their  innate  anti-senatorial  prejudices.  The  consul, 
Quintus  Pomponius,  regarded  by  the  Praetorians  as  particularly 
culpable,  was  fortunate  to  escape  with  his  life. 
86 
Another  senator, 
Aponius  / 70. 
Aponius  Saturninus,  was  actually  wounded. 
Q7 
The  situation  was 
deteriorating  rapidly  and  could  have  resulted  in  a  wholesale 
massacre  had  not  Agrippa,  according  to  Josephus,  chosen  to  play  the 
role  of  deliverer  and  urged  Claudius  to  intervene. 
88 
Claudius  summoned  the  Senate  to  the  Palatine,  to  where  he  was  now 
escorted  by  a  Praetorian  detachment  under  conditions  of  the  strictest 
security.  The  crowd,  though  it  was  undoubtedly  friendly,  was  brutally 
pushed  back. 
89 
Chaerea  and  Sabinus,  now  an  embarrassment  to  those  who 
had  so  recently  lauded  their  every  action,  were  there  too,  with  their 
hopes  or  regrets,  although  Rufrius  Pollio,  the  newly  appointed  prefect, 
took  considerable  care  to  keep  them  well  away  from  Claudius. 
90 
The 
result  of  the  vote  taken  on  the  fate  of  Chaerea  was  strongly  for  his 
execution. 
91 
The  senators  were  eager  to  please  their  new  emperor  and 
knew  in  this  instance  what  was  required  of  them.  Lupus,  the  butcher 
of  Caesonia  and  the  infant  Drusilla,  died  with  him  and  the  knowledge 
that  he  had  acted  in  the  public  interest  was  of  little  comfort  to  him 
for,  unlike  Chaerea,  he  died  badly,  or  so  our  historian  tells  us. 
92 
Sabinus,  regarding  Claudius'  unexpected  clemency  as  an  unbearable 
mortification,  committed  suicide  a  few  days  later,  and  with  his  death 
the  conspiracy  was  undeniably  ended. 
93 
The  loyalty  which  the  Praetorians,  for  whatever  reasons,  had  shown  to 
him  during  this  'perilous  and  awkward  interregnum' 
94 
impressed  itself 
indelibly  on  Claudius'  memory  and,  because,  perhaps,  of  the  rejections 
and  humiliations  which  he  had  suffered  previously,  he  believed  such 
fidelity  was  worthy  of  the  most  conspicuous  recognition.  He  chose  to 
have  / 71. 
have  issued  two  sets  of  coins  stressing  the  bonds  between  the 
Praetorians  and  himself,  one  set  bearing  the  legend  IMPER(ATOR) 
RECEPT(US),  the  other  PRAETOR(IANI)  RECEPT(I  IN  FIDEM)95.  It  is 
clear  that  what  is  reflected  by  these  issues  is  not  merely  the  debt 
of  Claudius  to  the  Praetorians,  but  rather  the  mutuality  of  the  bonds 
uniting  them,  'the  comradely  spirit  between  emperor  and  soldiers  and 
the  mutual  recognition  of  each  other's  power'. 
96 
It  is  unthinkable 
that  even  the  inexperienced  Claudius  could  have  failed  to  be  aware  of 
the  necessity  of  maintaining  between  the  various  factions,  both  within 
the  court  and  within  the  larger  empire,  a  balance  not  only  in  actual 
power  but  also  in  perceived  power  as  reflected  by  honours  and  gifts. 
Had  Claudius  really  been  acknowledging  his  dependence  on  the 
Praetorians  in  these  issues,  he  would  have  run  the  risk  of  antagonising, 
quite  unnecessarily,  both  the  nobility  and  the  rest  of  the  army.  We 
would  do  better,  therefore,  to  regard  these  coins  as  advertising  the 
'fides',  a  virtue  particularly  important  to  Claudius, 
97 
which  existed 
between  the  emperor  and  his  Guard. 
There  were  other  ways  in  which  Claudius  reciprocated  the  Praetorians' 
loyalty  to  him.  In  AD.  46  he  wrote  to  the  Anauni  and  other  tribes 
attributed  to  Tridentum  in  northern  Italy  granting  them  the  Roman 
citizenship  which  they  had  illegally  usurped. 
98 
One  of  his  reasons 
for  doing  this  was  because  members  of  the  tribe  were  serving,  both  as 
private  soldiers  and  officers  in  the  Praetorian  guard.  It  may  well 
be  that  he  had  been  influenced  by  petitions  from  these  men. 
99 
Claudius  returned  to  the  Praetorian  camp  every  year  on  the  24th  of 
January,  ostensibly  to  commemorate  his  accession  by  a  small  donative100 
and  / 72. 
and  to  provide  a  gladiatorial  show  for  the"Praetorians, 
101 
but 
perhaps  also  to  relive  the  exhilaration  of  these  two  days,  to  remember 
the  loyalties  of  the  past  and  guarantee  those  of  the  future. 
102 
The 
Praetorian  camp  was  to  Claudius  much  more  than  the  barracks  of  his 
bodyguard.  It  was  a  place  redolent  of  triumph  and  success  to  where 
he  returned  at  the  most  glorious  moments  of  his  life,  to  show  his 
infant  son,  Britannicus,  to  the  troops, 
103 
to  celebrate  his  triumph 
over  Caratacus, 
104 
and,  in  the  following  year,  to  present  a  donative 
on  the  occasion  of  Nero's  assumption  of  the  toga  virilis. 
105 
it 
was  also  a  place  of  sanctuary  to  where  he  retired  at  the  nadir  of  his 
life,  in  AD.  48,  during  the  crisis  of  Messalina's  marriage  to  Gaius 
Silius,  to  reveal  the  depths  of  his  despair  to  the  assembled 
Praetorians. 
106 
The  circumstances  of  his  accession  made  it  inevitable  that  Claudius 
should  be  especially  aware  of  the  dangers  of  assassination  and  of  the 
need  for  high-profile  security  measures  to  prevent  such  attempts.  We 
have  already  seen  the  almost  hysterical  reaction  of  the  Praetorians 
during  his  journey  from  the  camp  to  the  Palatine  on  the  25th  of  January. 
Once  the  unique  conditions  of  that  period  had  passed,  Claudius  tried  to 
allow  the  Roman  people  that  accessibility  which  was  so  vital  to  his 
role  as  princeps. 
107 
He  sat  on  a  tribunal  in  the  Forum,  lived,  so  Dio 
Cassius  alleges,  as  a  private  citizen  in  Neapolis  and  mingled  freely 
with  the  people  who  regarded  themselves  as  his  best  protectors. 
108 
But  it  is  clear  that  under  Claudius  there  continued,  despite  his  best 
intentions,  'that  steady  isolation  of  the  emperor  and  detachment  from 
the  collective  institutions  of  Rome'109  which  was  partly  due  to  security 
considerations  / 73. 
considerations,  the  almost  inevitable  concomitant  of  tyranny. 
110 
He  accepted,  perhaps  even  welcomed,  for  he  did  not  relish  physical 
contact,  those  security  measures  which  the  Praetorians  felt  were 
necessary  for  his  protection. 
ill 
The  effectiveness  of  this  tight 
security  is  evidenced  by  the  arrest  in  AD.  47  of  Gaius  Nonius, 
an  eques,  who  was  caught  near  the  emperor  with  a  concealed  sword. 
112 
Despite  the  fact  that  he  knew  that  the  nobility  would  find  such 
measures  offensive,  he  instructed  his  Praetorian  security  detachments 
to  search  both  his  visitors  and  the  hcuses  of  those  whom  he  himself 
intended  to  visit. 
113 
He  had  guards  in  attendance  at  his  banquets 
both  in  uniform  and  as  waiters. 
114 
Like  his  predecessors,  he 
requested  and  was  granted  permission  to  bring  a  personal  guard  of 
Praetorian  tribunes  into  the  Senate. 
115 
Although  he  was  always 
careful  to  show  respect  for  members  of  the  Senate,  he  was  equally 
careful,  bearing  in  mind  the  fate  of  Gaius,  to  take  precautions  to 
limit  the  opportunities  for  contact  between  the  Praetorians  and  them. 
The  officer  corps  of  the  Praetorian  guard  was  forbidden  to  visit  the 
homes  of  senators. 
116 
His  determination  to  protect  himself  is 
reflected  in  the  harsh  Homeric  watchword  -  'revenge  on  those  who 
struck  first'  -  which  he  frequently  gave  to  the  Praetorian  tribunes 
responsible  for  his  security. 
117 
As  well  as  the  preventive  security  measures  outlined  above,  the 
Praetorians  pursued  a  more  aggressive  policy  against  those  whom  they 
considered  a  threat  to  the  emperor.  That  they  did  this  with  Claudius' 
blessing  and  so  with  a  degree  of  immunity  is  clear  from  the  chilling 
manner  in  which  Claudius  condones  the  murder  of  an  ex-consul  by  a 





Praetorian  involvement;  either  direct,  as  in  the 
killing  of  Claudius'  son-in-law,  Gnaeus  Pompeius119  or  indirect,  as 
in  the  enforced  suicide  of  Lollia  Paulina, 
120 
is  clear.  Nevertheless 
it  would  be  a  gross  overstatement  to  imagine  that  Rome  was  subjected 
during  Claudius'  principate  to  a  Praetorian-inspired  terror. 
121 
Dissidence  was  crushed  and,  where  necessary,  ruthlessly  crushed,  but 
circumspection,  which  mcst  senators  and  equites  had  learned  through 
bitter  experience,  was  usually  a  guarantee  of  survival.  There  were, 
however,  occasions  on  which  political  necessity  demanded  firm 
Praetorian  action.  They  were  heavily  involved  in-the  operation  which 
led  to  the  execution,  in  AD.  47,  of  Valerius  Asiaticus  whose  prominence 
and  ambitions  made  him  undeniably  dangerous.  After  resigning  his 
consulship  early  the  previous  year,  he  planned,  sc  it  was  alleged,  to 
visit  both  his  native  Gaul  and  the  legions  in  Germany  with  revolt  in 
mind. 
122 
It  is  to  these  charges,  rather  than  to  those  involving 
either  adultery  with  Poppaea  Sabina  or  homosexuality, 
123 
that  we  should 
look  to  understand  the  need  for  the  swiftness  and  thoroughness  of  the 
operation  which  the  Praetorian  prefect,  Rufrius  Crispinus,  directed 
and  which  led  to  the  arrest  of  Asiaticus  at  Baiae. 
124 
We  may  also 
detect  a  less  competent  Praetorian  presence  at  Asiaticus'  trial  where 
a  soldier  who  had  allegedly  been  involved  in  the  conspiracy  pointed  out 
the  wrong  bald-headed  man  when  asked  to  identify  Asiaticus. 
125 
Despite  such  hiccups,  the  aim  of  the  whole  operation,  the  removal  of 
Asiaticus,  was  successfully  achieved  and  Crispinus  was  awarded  one 
million  sesterces  and  the  insignia  of  a  praetor  by  the  Senate. 
126 
Apart  from  such  internal  security  operations,  the  normal  ceremonial 
duties  / 75. 
duties  and  the  provision  of  guards  for  members  of  the  imperial  family, 
127 
Claudius  encouraged  the  Praetorians  to  participate  in  the  special, 
prestigious  displays  which  he  used  to  advertise  the  successes  of  his 
reign.  On  such  occasions  Claudius  loved,  understandably  in  view  of 
his  brother's  career,  to  put  on  a  military  cloak  and  play  the  general. 
128 
The  Praetorians  were  present,  fully  armed,  in  front  of  their  camp  at  the 
129 
celebrations  which  culminated  in  the  freeing  of  Caratacus.  One  of 
the  prefects,  together  with  some  tribunes,  gave  a  demonstration  of  the 
skill  of  the  Praetorian  cavalry,  when  they  hunted  panthers  in  the 
Circus  Maximus. 
130 
Suetonius  also  tells  us  of  mock  battles  on  the 
Campus  Martius  and  a  representation  of  Caratacus'  surrender  in  which 
the  Praetorians  took  part. 
131 
The  most  glamorous  event  of  this  sort  was  undoubtedly  the  celebrations, 
in  AD.  52,  at  the  opening  of  a  tunnel  from  the  Fucine  lake  through 
Monte  Salviano  to  the  river  Liris,  aimed  at  controlling  the  level  of 
the  lake. 
132 
Claudius  was  particularly  proud  of  this  achievement, 
for  both  Julius  Caesar  and  Augustus,  had  ccnsidered,  then  abandoned, 
the  idea. 
33 
A  naval  battle  was  planned  on  the  lake  and,  although 
the  size  of  the  event  is  disputed, 
134 
it  is  clear  that  a  large  part  of 
the  Praetorian  ccrps,  cavalry  as  well  as  infantry,  was  positioned  on 
barricaded  rafts  to  prevent  the  actual  combatants  from  escaping  or 
threatening  the  lives  of  the  spectators  in  the  specially-built 
grandstands. 
135 
Although  the  heavy  Praetorian  presence  guaranteed  the 
safety  of  those  watching,  the  celebrations,  perhaps  because  of  the 
understandable  lack  of  enthusiasm  among  the  participants,  proved  less 
than  successful. 
136 
It  / 76. 
It  was  the  need  to  acquire  slaves  for  this  huge  project  which  was 
allegedly  one  of  the  factors  which  led  Claudius  to  sanction  the 
invasion  of  Britain  in  AD.  43.137  There  were,  of  course,  other  more 
ccmpelling  motives,  including  Claudius'  desire  to  emulate  his 
brother  Germanicus  and  gain  military  glory. 
138 
What  is  clear  is  that 
Aulus  Plautius,  the  Roman  ccmmander,  after  fighting  his  way  across 
the  Medway,  halted  at  the  Thames  until  Claudius  himself  could  arrive. 
We  may  suppose  that  this  had  been  arranged  beforehand  so  that  the 
emperor,  by  his  presence,  might  encourage  the  army  which  was  faced 
with  stiffening  resistance. 
139 
Claudius  was  accompanied  on  his  slow 
outward  journey  through  Gaul  by  one  of  the  prefects,  Rufrius  Pollio, 
and  several  cohorts  of  Praetorians,  *as  well  as  a  large  number  of 
senators. 
140 
The  other  prefect,  Catonius  Justus,  remained  with  the 
other  cohorts  in  Rome,  the  control  of  which  was  left  in  the  loyal 
hands  of  Lucius  Vitellius  during  the  six  months  of  Claudius'  absence. 
141 
The  successful  crossing  of  the  Thames  was  followed  by  the  capture  of 
Camulodunum  and,  after  a  stay  of  only  sixteen  days,  a  triumphant 
return  to  Rome. 
142 
Claudius  was  generous,  as  always,  to  those  who  had  shared  the  dangers 
and  discomforts  of  that  expedition  with  him.  The  Praetorians  received 
their  share  of  the  honours.  The  prefect,  Rufrius  Pollio,  was  granted 
a  bust  and,  when  he  accompanied  Claudius,  a  seat  in  the  Senate,  although 
we  should  note  that  Claudius  was  careful  to  quote  an  Augustan  precedent 
for  his  action. 
143 
Nor  were  the  less  senior  soldiers  ignored  by  their 
emperor  at  this  time.  Marcus  Vettius  Valens,  who  served  in  the  8th 
Praetorian  cohort,  won  a  gold  crown,  as  well  as  the  more  common  torcs, 
arm-bands  / 77. 
arm-bands  and  discs,  and,  by  doing  so,  enhanced  his  future  career 
prospects. 
144 
Catonius  Justus  was  less  fortunate,  for  he  was  executed,  allegedly 
because  of  his  intention  of  reporting  to  the  emperor  Messalina's 
many  infidelities  during  the  six  months  of  Claudius'  absence. 
145 
Rufrius  Pollio's  aggrandizement  was  of  no  great  duration,  since  he 
too  was  executed. 
146 
They  were  replaced  by  Rufrius  Crispinus  and 
Lusius  Geta  who,  although  they  were  by  no  means  creatures  of  Messalina, 
understood  from  the  fate  of  their  predecessors  with  what  circumspection 
the  empress's  extra-marital  activities  should  be  treated. 
147 
It  was  Messalina  who  in  AD.  48  provoked  the  greatest  crisis  of 
Claudius'  principate.  She  took  part  in  a  marriage  ceremony  with  Gaius 
Silius,  the  consul-designate,  while  the  emperor  was  in  Ostia 
sacrificing  for  the  safety  of  the  corn  fleet. 
148 
The  motivation  for 
this  union  has  never  been  adequately  explained.  Messalina's  promiscuity, 
Silius'  ambitions,  even  the  performance  of  a  Bacchic  rite  have  been 
adduced  as  reasons. 
149 
But  none  by  itself  convinces. 
150 
The 
questions,  however,  to  which  we  must  address  ourselves  are  whether 
the  marriage  was  part  of  an  attempted  coup  and  what  role  the 
Praetorians  played  in  the  whole  affair. 
It  is  clear  that  the  marriage  was  an  element  in  a  wider  conspiracy. 
Messalina  and  Silius  could  hardly  have  hoped  to  survive  without  taking 
action  against  Claudius.  Their  marriage  was  a  public  declaration  to 
the  Senate  and  people  of  their  judgement  that  the  emperor  was  too 
incompetent  to  rule.  Claudius'  tenure  of  the  principate  was  in 
immediate  / 78. 
immediate  danger.  The  threat  would  soon'have  extended  to  his  very 
life.  We  can  detect  the  outline  of  the  conspirators'  plan;  firstly 
the  marriage,  next  the  murder  of  Claudius,  and  finally  the  adoption 
of  Britannicus  by  Silius.  The  military  muscle  for  the  coup  was 
perhaps  to  have  come  from  the  Vigiles  and  the  gladiatorial  school. 
151 
Our  sources  mention  no  active  Praetorian  involvement  in  the  conspiracy. 
It  seems  probable,  however,  that  the  Praetorian  prefects  were  aware, 
to  some  extent,  of  what  was  happening,  but  preferred  to  continue  to 
exercise  with  regard  to  Messalina's  activities  that  discretion  which 
had  served  them  so  well  in  the  past.  The  failure  of  Lusius  Geta,  one 
of  these  prefects,  to  report  the  treasonable  activities  which  were  now 
taking  place  in  Rome  was  matched  by  his  failure,  when  interviewed,  to 
convince  the  emperor  of  his'reliability  and  competence  to  suppress  the 
conspiracy.  Since  his  main  responsibility  was  undoubtedly  the 
protection  of  the  emperor's  person  and  since  his  inexcusable,  if 
understandable,  dereliction  of  duty  had  now  put  the  emperor's  life 
at  risk,  he  was,  not  surprisingly,  removed  from  his  command  which  was 
entrusted  temporarily,  for  one  day  only,  to  Narcissus,  who  was  both 
loyal  to  his  emperor  and  motivated,  by  personal  hatred  of  Messalina 
and  Silius,  towards  vigorous  action. 
152 
A  detachment  of  Praetorians  was  despatched  to  bring  to  an  end  the 
wedding  celebrations  which  had  degenerated  into  a  bacchanalian  revel. 
153 
By  the  time  Claudius  returned  to  Rome,  the  conspiracy  was  over. 
Narcissus  skilfully  guided  the  emperor  to  the  safe  harbour  of  the 
Praetorian  camp,  where  Claudius,  who  had  fallen  into  that  state  of 
torpor  associated  with  delayed  shock,  was  able  to'utter  only  a  few 
incoherent  / 79. 
incoherent  words  asking  his  soldiers  to  kill  him  if  he  ever  thought 
of  marriage  again. 
154 
Despite  the  emperor's  hesitancy,  the 
Praetorians  loudly  proclaimed  their  loyalty  and  demanded  the 
punishment  of  the  guilty.  Silius  and  9  others  were  executed. 
But  Narcissus  had  to  press  Claudius  to  obtain  sanction  for  the 
execution  of  Mnester  who  had  been  Messalina's  lover  and  a  member 
of  her  inner  circle  for  many  years. 
156 
Such  vacillation  boded  ill 
for  the  freedmen  who  were  aware,  as  was  Messalina,  that  the  longer 
her  execution  was  delayed  the  greater  were  her  chances  of  survival 
and  rehabilitation. 
157 
When  Claudius  announced  that  he  would  see 
'the  poor  woman'  on  the  next  day,  Narcissus  decided  that  he  could  wait 
no  longer  and  ordered  the  tribune  and  centurions  on  duty  to  proceed 
to  the  gardens  of  Lucullus  and  execute  the  empress. 
158 
Although 
he  had  Claudius'  warrant  appointing  him  to  command  of  the  Guard, 
and  although  the  Praetorians'  loyalty  to  Claudius  was  beyond  dispute, 
Narcissus  was  anxious  enough  to  take  two  extra  precautions.  He  told 
the  officers  that  the  orders  had  come  directly  from  the  emperor.  He 
also  sent  ahead  another  freedman,  Euodus,  as  'custos  et  exactor 
mortis',  a  sort  of  political  commissar,  to  ensure  that  the  execution 
was  properly  carried  out.  He  need  not  have  worried.  The  ruthless 
and  silent  professionalism  with  which  the  Praetorian  officers 
completed  their  mission  provides  a  strong  contrast  with  the  boorish 
scurrility  of  the  freedman.  The  tribune,  unable  to  suffer  Messalina's 
dithering  and  her  feeble  attempts  at  suicide,  finished  her  off  with  a 
single  blow. 
159 
Claudius  was  perhaps  grateful  for  the  initiative  shown  by  Narcissus 
who  was  voted  the  insignia  of  the  quaestorship  by  the  senate. 
160 
The  / 80. 
The  inadequacies  of  Lusius  Geta  were  judged  charitably  and,  indeed, 
his  survival  of  the  purge  immediately  following  the  suppression  of 
the  conspiracy  and  his  subsequent  tenure  of  the  prefecture  of 
Egypt  would  suggest  that  his  sins,  however  culpable,  were  those  of 
omission  rather  than  commission. 
161 
The  coup  itself  must  be  judged 
a  most  miserable  fiasco.  One  important  reason  for  this  was,  of 
course,  the  apparent  failure  of  the  conspirators  to  solicit 
Praetorian  support.  It  was  only  the  involvement  of  the  Guard  which 
could  have  guaranteed  that  degree  of  pitilessness  necessary  for 
success.  Moreover,  none  of  the  plotters  appears  to  have  understood 
the  principal  lesson  of  the  events  surrounding  Claudius'  accession  - 
that  control  of  the  Praetorian  camp  was  vital  for  the  successful 
outcome  of  any  attempt  to  seize  power. 
Claudius  forgot  what  he  had  said  to  the  Praetorians  in  his  humiliation 
and  remarried  the  following  year. 
162 
His  new  bride  was  his  niece 
Agrippina.  She  determined  to  win  the  support  of  as  many  Praetorian 
officers  as  possible  for  her  main  aim,  the  promotion  of  her  own  son, 
Lucius  Domitius  Ahenobarbus, 
163 
over  Claudius'  son,  Britannicus. 
164 
There  were  many  willing  to  listen  to  her,  especially  those  who  had 
been  involved  in  the  execution  of  Messalina  and  recognised  only  too 
well  what  the  consequences  of  that  action  would  be  for  them  if  her 
son  Britannicus  gained  the  principate. 
165 
Others  will  have  understood 
the  significance  of  the  betrothal,  in  AD.  49,  of  Lucius  Domitius  to  his 
cousin  Octavia, 
166 
and  of  the  adoption  by  Claudius  of  Lucius  Domitius 
on  the  25th  of  February  of  the  following  year,  when  he  became,  by  law 
of  the  Roman  people,  Tiberius  Claudius  Nero  Caesar. 
167 
In  AD.  51, 
at  the  celebrations  associated  with  his  assumption  of  the  toga 
virilis  / 81. 
virilis,  Nero  led  the  Praetorian  cavalry  In  parade.  The  contrast 
between  the  magnificently-attired  Nero  and  Britannicus,  in  his  boy's 
toga,  can  have  left  those  Praetorians  still  wavering  in  no  doubt  as 
to  which  of  them  was  the  heir  to  the  principate. 
168 
Agrippina,  however,  believing  that  anything  less  than  total  domination 
was  weakness,  determined  to  remove  from  the  Guard  those  tribunes  and 
centurions  who  were  still  unresponsive  to  her  overtures  and  whom  she 
suspected  of  residual  loyalty  to  Britannicus. 
169 
She  argued  that 
factionalism  was  dangerously  rife  in  the  Guard,  though  she  was,  no 
doubt,  careful  to  omit  that  much  of  it  was  due  to  her  machinations. 
170 
Claudius,  now  weary  of  ruling,  yet  anxious,  as  ever,  in-matters 
pertaining  to  his  personal  security,  accepted  her  arguments  that 
Lusius  Geta  and  Rufrius  Crispinus  were  no  longer  suitable  commanders 
and  cannot  have  failed  to  admire  her  suggested  means  of  removing  them. 
171 
They  were  promoted  and  honoured,  and,  if  they  had  less  direct  influence 
within  the  imperial  court,  Lusius  Geta  was,  no  doubt,  consoled  by  his 
prefecture  of  Egypt,  while  Rufrius  Crispinus  gained  consular  insignia 
and  the  opportunity  to  spend  more  time  with  his  beautiful  young  wife. 
172 
Claudius,  who  might  have  cited  the  careers  of  Seianus  and  Macro  as 
examples  of  the  dangers  inherent  in  appointing  a  single  prefect, 
nevertheless  agreed  with  Agrippina's  suggestion  that  discipline  would 
be  stricter  if  the  Praetorians  were  under  the  direction  of  one  man  of 
proven  reliability.  And,  of  course,  Agrippina  knew  of  just  such  a 
man.  So,  in  AD.  51,  Sextus  Afranius  Burrus  became  sole  prefect  of 
the  Praetorian  guard. 
173 
He  was  a  Narbonensian  from  Vasio  who  had 
been  a  military  tribune  and  a  procurator  of  the  private  property  of 
Livia  / 82. 
Livia,  Tiberius  and  Claudius. 
174 
He  was  aware,  though  not 
obsequiously  so,  to  whom  he  owed  his  appointment  and  for  what 
purpose  he  had  been  given  the  prefecture. 
175 
Claudius  died  on  the  13th  of  October  AD.  54.176  Agrippina's 
involvement  is,  not  unexpectedly,  suggested  by  our  sources, 
although  it  is  by  no  means  accepted  by  all  modern  commentators. 
177 
The  omens  of  his  death,  at  least  two  of  which  are  reported  to  have 
occurred  in  the  Praetorian  camp,  had  been  many  and  varied. 
178 
So,  although  there  was  grief,  there  was  little  surprise  at  the  news 
of  his  death.  The  delay  at  announcing  the  news  and  the  increased 
level  of  security  were  common  measures  at  such  times  and  less 
sinister  than  Tacitus  suggests. 
179 
At  midday  Nero  emerged  from  the  palace  accompanied  by  Burrus  at 
whose  instigation  the  cohort  on  duty  raised  a  cheer.  The  fact  that 
some  of  the  soldiers  enquired  about  the  whereabouts  of  Britannicus 
suggests  that  Agrippina's  purge  had  been  less  than  complete  and  that 
under  Burrus  the  reins  of  control  were  not  held  unnecessarily 
tightly. 
180 
But  Britannicus  was  nowhere  to  be  seen 
181 
and  the 
Praetorians  were  ever  realists.  Nero  was  carried  in  a  litter  to  the 
camp  to  be  hailed  as  emperor. 
182 
As  the  triumphant  cries  of  the  Praetorians  rang  in  his  ears,  Nero 
must  surely,  at  that  moment,  have  known  beyond  doubt  that  the 
principate  was  his,  for,  although  the  approval  of  the  Senate  was 
gratifying  and  the  blessing  of  the  people  gladdening,  it  was 
unquestionably  / 83. 
unquestionably  the  Praetorians  with  their  swords  who  pointed  the  path 
which  the  others  had  to  follow.  And  it  may  well  have  occurred  to 
the  cheering  Praetorians  that  the  prerogative  which  they  had  seized, 
through  necessity,  almost  fourteen  years  before  at  the  time  of 
Claudius'  accession  had,  by  Nero's  display  of  deference  in  visiting 
the  camp,  become  institutionalised.  Praetorian  endorsement 
appeared  to  be,  for  a  new  princeps,  not  a  desirable  luxury  but  an 
unavoidable  constraint. CHAPTER  V 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  OF  NERO 
The  cheers  with  which  the  Praetorians  greeted  Nero's  accession'  were, 
although  conventional  on  such  occasions,  nevertheless  sincere  and 
heart-felt,  for  the  new  emperor  was  the  grandson  of  Germanicus  who,  in 
the  hagiology  of  the  Praetorians,  occupied  a  most  honoured  position. 
2 
However  their  commitment  to  Nero,  although,  at  this  stage,  beyond 
doubt,  was  not  granted  unconditionally.  The  Praetorians  were 
hopeful,  especially  after  the  donative  which  Nero  had  given  them, 
3 
that  the  mutuality  of  the  bonds  between  the  emperor  and  the  Guard 
which  had  characterised  the  reign  of  Claudius  would  continue  and 
perhaps  even  increase.  But  in  this  Nero  was  to  disappoint  them. 
Although  he  presented  them  with  an  occasional  donative,  granted  them 
a  free  monthly  grain  allowance  and  publicised  their  services  to  him 
on  his  coinage  after  AD.  64,4  there  was  clearly,  as  the  reign  progressed, 
a  growing  estrangement  between  Nero  and  a  number  of  Praetorian 
tribunes  and  centurions. 
5 
In  the  end  the  entire  Guard  deserted  him. 
In  AD.  54,  however,  the  new  emperor  enjoyed  widespread  support  among 
the  Praetorians.  There  may  have  been  some  dissidence  -  Britannicus 
was  not  without  his  supporters  -  but  it  was  of  a  passive  nature. 
Much  of  the  credit  for  the  smoothness  with  which  the  change  of 
emperor  occurred  was  due  to  the  skills  of  Sextus  Afranius  Burrus,  the 
Praetorian  prefect.  Indeed  his  contribution  at  this  time  may  have 
been  recognised  by  the  award  of  consular  insignia.  6 
Before  the 
year  was  out,  however,  Burrus,  together  with  Seneca,  with  whom  he 
worked  closely, 
7 
had  to  face  up  to  the  problems  caused  by  Agrippina 
who  / 85. 
who  was  determined  to  maintain  the  power  which  she  had  enjoyed  in  the 
last  years  of  Claudius'  principate. 
8 
This  impending  trial  of 
strength  may  well  have  caused  the  prefect  certain  misgivings.  He  was 
on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma  as  to  which  of  the  two  -  mother  or  son  - 
was  more  deserving  of  his  loyalty.  Although  his  appointment  to  the 
prefecture  was,  to  a  large  degree,  Agrippina's  gift,  his  continuing 
tenure  of  that  post  was  dependent  on  Nero's  favour.  His  resolution 
of  this  predicament  provides  us  with  an  insight  not  only  into  the 
role  of  the  Praetorian  prefect  within  the  imperial  court  but  also 
into  the  manner  in  which  the  Praetorians,  both  individually  and 
collectively,  were  used  by  the  emperor  to  reflect  the  vagaries  of  his 
favour. 
At  first  Nero  chose  to  advertise  conspicuously  his  affection  for  his 
mother  -  through  the  Guard  among  other  ways.  To  the  tribune  of 
the  watch  he  gave  the  password  'optima  matrum'. 
9 
Agrippina's 
Praetorian  bodyguard  was  supplemented  by  a  detachment  of  Germans. 
10 
Yet  behind  this  facade  of  loving  respect  a  growing  split  was  developing 
between  the  emperor,  who  was  determined  to  limit  his  mother's  power  and 
destroy  that  of  Pallas,  her  most  prominent  protege, 
11 
and  Agrippina, 
whose  reckless  aggressiveness  was  politically  embarrassing  and 
increasingly  offensive  to  Burrus  and  Seneca. 
12 
The  prefect,  quick 
to  realise  where  his  own  interest  lay,  did  not  intervene  to  save 
Pallas  when  he  was  dismissed  from  his  position  as  financial  secretary 
early  in  AD.  55.13  Agrippina  felt  that  Burrus,  by  omitting  to  act 
in  what  she  perceived  to  be  her  interest,  had  betrayed  her  and  she 
reacted  accordingly. 
14 
Her  temper,  never  easily  controlled,  erupted 
in  a  flood  of  venomous  insults  against  Seneca  and  Burrus  whose 
withered  / 86. 
withered  hand  she  mocked. 
15 
She  was  unable,  however,  to  affect  the 
prefect's  standing  with  Nero  which  had  perhaps  been  enhanced  by  the 
advice  which  he  had  given  leading  to  the  appointment  of  Gnaeus 
Domitius  Corbulo  in  Armenia. 
16 
In  her  frustration  Agrippina 
threatened  to  take  Britannicus  to  the  Praetorian  camp  and  speak,  as 
the  daughter  of  Germanicus,  to  the  cohorts  there. 
'7 
In  saying  this, 
she  probably  hoped  to  demonstrate  the  extent  of  her  power  to  Nero  and 
so  inti4 
18 
te  him  into  doing  as  she  wished.  Nero  however  took  the 
threat  seriously  with  fatal  consequences  for  the  unfortunate 
Britannicus. 
19 
The  alarmed  emperor  approached  Julius  Pollio,  the  tribune  of  the 
4th  Praetorian  cohort,  who  had  in  his  custody  the  infamous  poisoner 
Locusta.  After  an  unsuccessful  first  attempt  at  poisoning 
Britannicus,  both  tribune  and  murderess  were  stimulated  by  Nero's 
angry  threats  to  produce  a  more  effective  poison. 
20 
This  was 
given  to  the  young  prince  in  water  which  was  added  to  a  hot  drink 
which  his  taster  had  already  tested.  The  official  cause  of  his 
death  was  given  as  an  epileptic  fit,  but  poisoning  was  widely 
suspected. 
21 
It  seems  unlikely  that  Burrus  had  foreknowledge  of 
the  murder  plan  or  of  his  subordinate's  participation.  Indeed,  Pollio 
may  have  become  involved  only  because  Locusta  was  in  his  custody,  but 
this,  of  course,  raises  the  question  of  why  he,  a  Praetorian  tribune, 
was  given  the  responsibility  of  overseeing  the  detention  of  a 
condemned  prisoner  -  hardly  a  normal  duty. 
Agrippina,  who  was  present  at  the  meal,  was,  according  to  Tacitus, 
panic-striken  by  Britannicus'  death,  perhaps  conscious  of  her  own 
culpability  / 87. 
culpability  in  the  affair. 
22 
Her  self-confidence  was  not,  however, 
undermined  by  this  setback.  She  paid  attention  to  Octavia, 
23 
Nero's  estranged  wife,  and  Rubellius  Plautus 
24 
who  was,  like  Nero, 
the  great-great-grandson  of  Augustus.  She  began  to  collect  funds 
25 
- 
an  essential  prerequisite  of  any  coup  attempt26  -  and,  most 
ominously  of  all  from  Nero's  point  of  view,  she  received  visits  from 
tribunes  and  centurions  of  the  Guard. 
27 
The  emperor's  suspicions 
of  Burrus  resurfaced.  Was  he  still  the  loyal  client  of  Agrippina? 
Perhaps  her  harsh  insults  of  his  physical  handicap  were  only  the 
product  of  a  momentary  frustration  in  a  woman  used  to  getting  her 
own  way  in  everything.  Or,  even  worse,  perhaps  they  were  a  ploy 
designed  to  lull  him  into  a  false  sense  of  security.  Of  Burrus' 
feelings  the  emperor  could  not  be  certain;  of  his  mother's  he  had 
no  doubt.  Her  bodyguards  were  immediately  withdrawn  in  case  they 
were  seduced  by  her  claims  to  revolution  and  also  to  give  to  the 
public  a  clear  sign  of  his  displeasure  with  her. 
28 
She  was  moved 
from  the  palace  to  the  house  of  Antonia,  her  grandmother,  where 
Nero  visited  her  only  in  the  company  of  trusted  Praetorian  centurions. 
29 
His  suspicions  of  Burrus  came  to  a  head  when  the  actor  Paris,  acting 
on  behalf  of  Junia  Silana  and  Domitia, 
30 
both  personal  enemies  of 
Agrippina, 
31 
interrupted  a  nocturnal  feast,  at  which  Nero,  Burrus  and 
Seneca  were  all  present,  to  accuse  Agrippina  of  encouraging  Rubellius 
Plautus  to  revolution. 
32 
The  emperor's  first  reaction,  influenced, 
no  doubt,  by  his  intake  of  wine,  was  to  have  Agrippina  executed  and  to 
remove  Burrus,  whose  failure  to  detect  the  plot  he  regarded  as  proof 
of  disloyalty,  from  the  command  of  the  Guard. 
33 
According  to  the 
historian  / 88. 
historian  Fabius  Rusticus,  Nero  actually-drafted  a  letter  appointing 
Gaius  Caecina  Tuscus,  son  of  Nero's  foster-mother,  and,  at  this  time, 
judicial  adviser  to  the  prefect  of  Egypt,  to  the  command  of  the 
Praetorian  cohorts. 
34 
Burrus,  however,  who  was  rather  more  than  the 
simple,  upright  soldier  portrayed  by  Tacitus,  handled  an  extremely 
difficult  situation  with  considerable  aplomb,  for  he  not  only  saved 
himself  by  saying  what  he  knew  that  Nero  wanted  to  hear  in  the 
drunken,  heated  atmosphere  of  that  night  -  namely  that  Agrippina 
would  die  if  she  was  guilty  -  but  he  also,  by  ensuring  that  she 
was  given  an  opportunity  to  answer  the  charges  and  that  he  was  put  in 
charge  of  questioning  her,  was  able  to  save  Agrippina. 
35 
In  the  cold  light  of  the  following  dawn  Nero's  anxieties  over  Burrus' 
loyalty  returned  and  he  decided  to  send  several  imperial  freedmen 
along  with  Burrus  and  Seneca  to  ensure  that  the  interrogation  was 
conducted  properly  and  thoroughly. 
36 
Burrus,  however)had  too  much 
experience  of  court  politics  to  be  caught  so  easily.  After 
informing  Agrippina  of  the  charges  against  her  and  giving  her  the 
names  of  her  accusers,  he  asked  her  with  a  threatening  expression, 
simulated  perhaps  for  the  benefit  of  the  imperial  freedmen,  for  her 
comments  which  were  characteristically  aggressive  and  compelling. 
37 
The  case  against  her  fell  apart  and  her  accusers,  with  the  exception 
of  Paris,  an  imperial  favourite,  were  punished.  Furthermore  Nero 
felt  compelled  to  allow  her  to  nominate  four  of  her  supporters, 
including  Faenius  Rufus,  a  future  commander  of  the  Praetorian  Guard, 
to  important  political  posts. 
38 
If  / I 
FIG.  1-  Relief  showing  Praetorian  guardsmen.  The  figure  in  the 
centre  with  the  gorgon's  head  on  his  breastplate  was  probably 
an  officer. Iýý 
1ý 
ý  ri 
ý.  ý  a  ry 
ký 
Vif?  tý 
:ý 
n 
FIG.  2-  Two  coins  issued  by  Mark  Antony,  one  (a)  honouring 
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FIG.  3-  Praetorian  guardsmen  in  civilian  dress  :  from  a  frieze  of 
circa  A.  D.  83-5  found  under  the  Palazzo  della  Cancelleria  ,  Rome. r 
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FIG.  4-  Map  of  Imperial  Rome,  showing  the  location  of  the 
castra  praetoria 
. 
The  defensive  wall  into  which  it  was 
incorporated  was  not  built  until  the  late  third  century  under  the 
Emperor  Aurelian. FIG.  5-  Gaius  addresses  the  assembled  Praetorians. FIG.  6-  Claudius  emphasises  the  bonds  between  the 
Praetorians  and  himself  :  (a)  depicts  the  shrine  within  the  castra 
praetoria  ;  the  image  of  Fides  is  seated  opposite  a  military 
standard:  (b)  shows  Claudius  clasping  hands  with  a  Praetorian 
holding  an  eagle  standard. (a) 
FIG.  7-  Nero  courts  Praetorian  support.  (a)  may  show  Nero 
with  the  Praetorian  canal  ry  :  (b)  is  of  a  more  traditional  type  with 
Nero 
,  acompanied  by  a  Praetorian  prefect,  addressing  the 
Guard. 
.  --  lw-ý, Itl 
FIG.  8-  An  inscription 
S"vanus  who 
the 
tribune  of  the  12th  Praetonan 
Pisonian  conspiracy  of  A.  D.  65. FIG.  9-  An  attempt  by  the  Vitellians  to  subvert  the  loyalty  of 
Otho's  Praetorians  by  promoting  the  mutual  bonds 
,  the  FIDES 
of  the  legend 
,  of  the  Rhine  legions  and  the  Praetorian  Guard. 89. 
If  we  examine  the  motives  behind  Burrus''actions  on  this  occasion,  it 
is  obvious  that  they  were  partly  due  to  the  personal  ties  between 
himself  and  Agrippina,  to  whom  he  clearly  retained  much  more  than  a 
vestigial  loyalty. 
39 
There  is,  however,  another,  less  altruistic 
explanation  of  Burrus'  behaviour.  The  maintenance  of  his  own  and 
Seneca's  position  in  Nero's  court  depended,  in  part,  on  Agrippina's 
survival.  As  Griffin  points  out  'Nero  would  only  heed  them  while  he 
saw  them  as  a  refuge  from  his  mother.  Onceshe  was  gone,  the  full 
scope  of  his  power  would  become  clear  to  him,  nor  would  he  ever  lack 
people  to  remind  him  of  it.  '40  Burrus  may  have  believed  that  it  was 
a  necessary  condition  of  his  own  tenure  of  power  to  play  off  Nero's 
fears  against  Agrippina's  intrigues. 
Such  a  policy  inevitably  left  Burrus  himself  vulnerable  to  charges  of 
supporting  Agrippina.  That  woman's  enemies,  noting  the  apparent 
impregnability  of  her  own  position  after  the  fiasco  of  the  previous 
attempt  to  accuse  her  of  planning  revolution,  decided  instead  to 
attack  her  indirectly  by  accusing  Burrus,  together  with  Pallas,  of 
plotting  to  put  on  the  imperial  throne  Faustus  Cornelius  Sulla  who 
had  been  consul  in  AD.  52,  was  married  to  Antonia,  Claudius's 
daughter,  and  as  such,  was  much  distrusted  by  Nero. 
41 
It  has  been 
suggested  that  the  main  target  of  this  accusation  was  Pallas,  that  a 
charge  of  treason  was  used  to  circumvent  the  emperor's  prohibition  of 
malfeasance  suits  against  the  former  financial  secretary  and  that 
'Burrus  was  involved  in  connection  with  his  past  career  in  the 
management  of  imperial  property'. 
42 
Is  it  not,  however,  more 
probable  that  the  accusation  was  related  to  the  funds  allegedly 
collected  by  Agrippina  prior  to  Paris'  delation?  In  any  event,  at 
the  / 90. 
the  trial,  which  was  conducted  before  Nero  and  his  consilium  rather 
than  in  the  senate,  Burrus  was  allegedly  allowed  to  sit  as  an 
assessor  and  the  charge  was  easily  refuted. 
43 
Following  these  incidents  Nero  and  Agrippina  appear  to  have  reached 
a  modus  vivendi  of  sorts.  Their  relationship  did  not  apparently 
deteriorate  further  over  the  next  few  years.  We  may  perhaps  detect 
Burrus'  hand  here.  By  AD.  58,  however,  Nero  had  fallen  under  the 
baleful  influence  of  Poppaea  Sabina,  who  dared  him  to  break  free  of 
his  mother's  authority. 
44 
The  emperor,  in  frustration,  considered 
matricide  the  only  means  of  resolving  a  situation  which  had  now  become 
intolerable  for  him. 
45 
It  must  remain  a  matter  of  conjecture  whether  Burrus  knew  of  the 
murder  plot  before  he  was  summoned  along  with  Seneca  to  Nero's  villa 
at  Baiae  in  the  aftermath  of  Anicetus'  farcical  attempt  to  drown 
Agrippina  in  the  Bay,  of  Naples  and  her  subsequent  escape. 
46 
Tacitus 
himself  delivers  no  judgement  on  this  matter:  incertum  experiens  an 
et  ante  gnaros. 
47 
It  is  also  unclear  whether  Burrus  and  Seneca  were 
with  the  emperor  at  Baiae  or  were  summoned  from  Rome. 
48 
The  problem 
which  they  had  to  address  was  that  Anicetus'  failure  had  excluded  the 
possibility  of  another  'accident'  to  Agrippina.  Matricide  and  the 
concomitant  opprobrium  could  not  be  avoided.  What  was  to  be  decided 
was  not  whether  Agrippina  should  die,  but  rather  the  manner  of  her 
death,  the  agents  of  that  murder,  and  how  it  might  best  be  represented 
as  justifiable.  By  his  involvement  in  these  decisions  Burrus  stands 
revealed  as  rather  more  than  an  accessory  before  the  fact.  49 
It  / 91. 
It  has  traditionally  been  assumed  that  Nero  sent  for  Burrus  to  ask 
if  the  Praetorians  would  kill  Agrippina  and  that  Burrus  refused  to 
sanction  Praetorian  involvement,  citing  as  justification  the  devotion 
of  the  Guard  to  the  entire  imperial  house,  especially  the  family  of 
Germanicus. 
50 
But  there  are  certain  difficulties  in  this 
interpretation.  Firstly,  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  any  of  the 
Praetorian  cohorts  were  with  Nero  in  the  area  of  Baiae  at  this  time. 
51 
Secondly,  if  Nero  had  really  wanted  Praetorian  participation  in  the 
murder,  he  could  surely  have  found  another  ruthless  and,  ambitious 
tribune  like  Julius  Pollio  without  asking  Burrus.  Finally  we  should 
note  that  in  Tacitus'  account  it  is  Seneca  not  Nero  who  asks  Burrus 
whether  the  Praetorians  should  become  involved  in  the  affair. 
52 
Perhaps  we  should  ask  exactly  what  Nero  required  of  his  Guard  at  this 
time.  I  suggest  that  what  Nero  wanted  to  ask  Burrus  was  how  the 
Praetorians  would  react  to  the  murder  of  Agrippina  and  whether  they 
would  remain  loyal  to  him. 
53 
Yet  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  ask 
this,  for  he  knew  that  between  an  emperor  and  his  Guard  there  must 
always  exist  the  appearance,  however  illusory  and  spurious,  of  total 
loyalty.  Where  once  the  slightest  hint  of  doubt  is  allowed  to 
intrude  into  that  close  relationship,  the  thought  is  quickly  overtaken 
by  the  deed  and  all  is  lost.  It  was  Seneca  who,  realising  the  young 
emperor's  predicament,  then  turned  to  Burrus  and  asked  whether  the 
Praetorians  would  kill  Agrippina. 
54 
If  we  accept  that  he  may  have 
been  speaking  elliptically,  then  the  possibility  exists  that,  by 
saying  what  he  did,  he  may  well  have  been  answering  the  question  which 
Nero  was  afraid  to  ask  and  indicating  that  there  was  no  question  of 
Praetorian  action  against  Nero.  We  should  also  note  the  ambiguity 
of  / 92. 
of  Burrus'  reply  in  which  he  assured  Nero  of  the  Praetorians' 
neutrality.  Although  at  one  level  he  was  clearly  replying  to 
Seneca's  question  and  stating  that  the  Praetorians  would  not  become 
involved  in  the  murder  of  Agrippina,  at  another  level  he  was  giving 
Nero  licence  to  use  his  own  murder  squad  from  the  fleet  at  Misenum 
without  fear  of  Praetorian  intervention  on  Agrippina's  behalf. 
55 
If  we  accept  this  interpretation  of  Burrus'  behaviour  on  that  night, 
does  he  become  any  less  'despicable'? 
56 
Are  he  and  Seneca  any  less 
'accomplices' 
57 
in  the  plan  to  murder  Agrippina?  We  would, 
however,  perhaps  do  better  to  regard  them  as  realists,  for  the  truth 
is,  as  they  both  understood,  that  Agrippina  was  doomed  from  the 
moment  Nero  decided  to  kill  her.  There  could  be,  despite  Agrippina's 
alleged  hopes,  no  reconciliation  between  Nero  and  his  mother.  The 
deed,  once  begun,  had  to  be  brought  to  a  conclusion.  Burrus  and 
Seneca  were  'making  the  best  of  a  bad  situation  which  they  had  no 
opportunity  to  prevent.  '58  Once  the  murder  had  been  committed, 
Burrus  urged  the  tribunes  and  centurions  of  the  Guard  to  attend  Nero 
and  offer  him  effusive  congratulations  on  his  'escape'  from  the 
attempt  of  Agerinus,  Agrippina's  freedman,  to  murder  him.  Burrus 
was  eager  both  to  encourage  the  emperor  to  regard  the  Praetorians 
favourably  and  also  to  remind  him  by  whose  sanction  the  murder  had 
been  committed. 
We  should  not  allow  Tacitus'  fascination  with  the  intrigues  of  the 
imperial  court  to  divert  us  from  the  fact  that  during  this  period 
the  Praetorians  continued  to  perform  conscientiously  their  more 
mundane  duties.  In  AD.  54  Nero  abandoned  the  practice  of  having  a 
Praetorian  / 93. 
Praetorian  cohort  police  the  theatre.  According  to  Tacitus,  the 
action  was  primarily  motivated  by  Nero's  libertarian  desire  to  give 
the  people  of  Rome  a  greater  degree  of  freedom,  although  it  may 
also  have  been  because  he  was  afraid  of  exposing  the  soldiers  to 
corrupting  influences. 
60 
It  was  a  brave,  though  ultimately 
unsuccessful,  experiment  since  the  following  year  after  serious 
disturbances  the  Praetorians  were  ordered  back  into  the  theatre. 
61 
Suetonius  mentions  the  involvement  of  tribunes,  presumably 
Praetorian  tribunes,  in  the  bodyguard  which  Nero  thought  it  wise  to 
take  with  him  on  his  nocturnal  roamings  through  the  less  reputable 
areas  of  Rome  after  he  had  been  beaten  up  by  Julius  Montanus.  It 
seems  more  probable,  however,  that  this  bodyguard  consisted  of 
detachments  from  the  German  Guard  as  well  as  gladiators. 
62 
The 
Praetorians  also  became  involved  in  at  least  one  policing  action 
outside  Rome.  In  AD.  58  a  Praetorian  cohort  accompanied  two 
senatorial  brothers,  Scribonius  Rufus  and  Scribonius  Proculus,  to 
Puteoli  on  the  bay  of  Naples  to  suppress  small-scale  popular 
violence  against  members  of  the  town  senate.  A  few  of  the  ring- 
leaders  of  the  trouble  were  put  to  death  by  the  Praetorians  and 
order  was  restored. 
63 
This  must,  however,  have  been  an  unusual 
assignment.  We  hear  of  no  similar  policy  after  the  riot  at  the 
amphitheatre  in  Pompeii. 
64 
Indeed,  in  the  incident  in  Puteoli  we 
should  note  that  a  commissioner  was  sent  first  and  that  the 
Praetorians  were  despatched  only  after  he  asked  for  them. 
After  Agrippina's  death  the  Praetorians  found  themselves  involved  in 
Nero's  attempts  to  promote  himself  as  an  artist. 
65 
Burrus  ordered 
one  / 94. 
.  one  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  to  attend  the  Iuvenalia  in  AD.  59  at 
which  Nero,  accompanying  himself  on  the  lyre,  sang  poems  of  his  own 
composition. 
66 
Groups  of  soldiers,  possibly  Praetorians,  were 
also  present  at  Nero's  first  public  performance  in  AD.  64  in  Naples. 
67 
In  the  summer  of  the  following  year  Nero  decided,  despite  a  senatorial 
attempt  to  forestall  this  by  offering  him  the  crowns  for  singing  and 
oratory,  to  appear  at  the  second  Neroneia. 
68 
This  time  the 
Praetorians  played  a  more  active  part  in  the  proceedings  with 
Tigellinus  and  Nymphidius  Sabinus,  the  then  Praetorian  prefects, 
carrying  the  emperor's  lyre, 
69 
while  a  detachment  of  Praetorians 
intimidated  the  audience  and  compelled  them  to  applaul. 
70 
We  should  not  underestimate  the  disgust  which  was  provoked  especially 
among  the  officer  corps  not  only  by  the  spectacle  of  the  emperor 
himself  appearing  on  stage,  but  also  by  the  atmosphere  of  effeteness 
and  theatricality  which  surrounded  his  appearance.  The  Praetorians 
themselves  were  always  liable  to  be  stigmatised,  albeit  unjustly,  as 
parade-ground  soldiers  by  the  legions  on  the  frontiers, 
71 
but  one  can 
easily  appreciate  the  antipathy  and  repugnance  which  they,  as  soldiers, 
felt  for  the  Augustiani,  Nero's  fan  club,  with  their  pomaded  hair  and 
elaborate  clapping  rhythms. 
72 
Even  at  the  Iuvenalia  Burrus  had  found 
it  difficult  to  conceal  his  distaste. 
73 
It  may  well  have  been  Nero's 
first  public  appearance  in  Naples  which  appalled  the  Praetorian 
tribune,  Subrius  Flavus,  so  much  that  he  wanted,  in  the  interests  of 
symbolism,  to  kill  Nero  while  he  was  singing  on  the  stage. 
74 
It 
was  certainly  one  of  the  reasons  which  led  that  tribune  to  participate 
in  the  Pisonian  conspiracy  of  AD.  65.75  Three  years  later  another 
tribune  Antonius  Honoratus,  speaking  to  the  assembled  Praetorians  at 
the  / 95. 
the  time  of  Nymphidius  Sabinus'  attempted  usurpation  of  the  imperial 
throne,  mentioned  the  sense  of  shame  that  the  Praetorians  felt  at 
Nero's  public  performances  as  a  musician  and  a  tragic  actor. 
76 
By  the  time  he  returned  from  Greece  in  AD.  68  a  clear  rift  had 
developed  in  Nero's  relationship  with  the  Guard.  As  he  entered  Rome 
in  triumph,  it  was  the  Augustiani  rather  than  the  Praetorians  who 
accompanied  his  chariot. 
77 
It  was,  as  Griffin  writes,  'the  triumph 
of  an  artist'. 
78 
It  was  also,  however,  a  triumph  dearly  bought  for 
in  achieving  it  he  had  seriously  offended  the  Praetorians.  That 
was  an  insult  which  they  were  to  remember. 
It  is  widely  held  that  the  influence  of  Burrus  declined  in  the  years 
between  the  murder  of  Agrippina  and  his  own  death  in  AD.  62.99 
Certainly  the  perception  of  an  estrangement  between  emperor  and  prefect 
was  strong  enough  to  allow  some  credence  to  be  given  to  the  allegation 
that  Nero  poisoned  him. 
80 
It  seems  probable,  however,  that  the  cause 
of  Burrus'  death  was  cancer,  possibly  of  the  larynx.  81 
The 
difficulty  in  speaking  caused  by  such  an  illness  could  also  explain 
the  brevity  of  Burrus'  reply  when  Nero  visited  him  on  his  death-bed. 
There  is  no  need  to  regard  Burrus'  last  words  as  'a  reproachful 
contrast  with  the  emperor's  diseased  soul'. 
82 
Burrus  remained  despite 
Tigellinus'  later  aspersions,  the  loyal  servant  of  Nero  until  his 
death. 
83 
The  view  of  Gillis  that  'in  a  showdown  between  Nero  and  Burrus... 
Burrus'  men  would  have  supported  him'84  does  not  seem  to  me  at  all 
convincing.  The  fate  of  Seianus  and  Macro,  not  to  mention  Rufrius 
Pollio  and  Catonius  Justus,  provided  an  explicit  education  to  any 
Praetorian  prefect  on  the  danger  of  believing  that  his  power  rested 
on  anything  other  than  the  imperial  benediction.  Secondly,  while 
Burrus'  / 96. 
Burrus'  survival  and  promotion  in  an  imperial  court  notorious  for 
its  intrigues  suggest  that  he  possessed  a  greater  awareness  of  the 
political  realities  of  his  time  than  our  sources  have  allowed, 
85 
there  is  nothing  in  any  of  these  sources  to  indicate  that  he  ever 
contemplated  using  the  Praetorian  cohorts  against  Nero.  He  was, 
as  Seneca  claimed  a  'vir  egregius  et  tibi  principi  natus'. 
86 
After  Burrus'  death,  Nero,  ignoring  the  argument  for  a  single  prefect 
which  his  mother  had  put  forward  in  AD.  51,  appointed  two  men, 
Ofonius  Tigellinus,  a  former  commander  of  the  Vigiles,  and  Faenius 
Rufus,  formerly  in  charge  of  the  corn  supply,  to  be  joint  commanders 
of  the  Praetorian  cohorts. 
87 
It  may  well  have  been  that  Nero  felt 
that  the  power  which  tenure  of  the  Praetorian  prefecture  conferred 
was  too  great  to  be  granted  to  a  single  man.  On  the  other  hand, 
Nero  may  have  appointed  these  two  men  in  an  attempt  to  create  a 
balance  in  the  influence  of  the  different  factions  within  his  court. 
It  is  also  possible,  but  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  this,  that, 
although  they  were  joint  prefects,  Tigellinus  and  Faenius  Rufus  had 
as  prefects  separate  functions,  the  one  liaising  with  the  imperial 
court,  while  the  other  organised  the  cohorts  in  the  Viminal  camp. 
From  almost  all  our  sources  the  picture  which  we  have  of  Tigellinus 
is  of  a  man  irretrievably  evil.  In  AD.  62  he  played  upon  Nero's 
growing  paranoia  to  bring  about  the  deaths  of  Cornelius  Sulla  Felix 
and  Rubellius  Plautus. 
88 
Four  years  later  he  brought  about  the 
deaths  of  Gaius  Petronius,  of  whose  influence  with  Nero  he  was 
jealous, 
89 
and  a  senator,  Minucius  Thermus,  one  of  whose  freedmen 
had  / 97. 
had  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  bringing  damaging  charges  against  him. 
90 
He  was  a  torturer  of  women,  of  Pythias,  Octavia's  maid  in  AD.  6291  and 
possibly  also  of  Epicharis  in  AD.  65  during  the  Pisonian  plot. 
92 
He 
denigrated  his  colleague  Rufus  to  such  an  extent  that  he  was  driven  in 
desperation  into  the  conspiracy  of  AD.  65.93  After  the  same 
conspiracy  he  accepted  bribes  to  let  some  of  the  accused  go  free. 
94 
He  is  alleged  to  have  allowed  one  of  his  properties  on  the  Aemilian 
hill  to  have  been  set  on  fire  deliberately  during  the  catastrophe  in 
Rome  in  AD.  64,95  and  he  may  have  organised  the  fearful  deaths  of  the 
Christian  scapegoats  in  the  aftermath  of  that  fire. 
96 
He  acted  as 
a  panderer  to  Nero's  increasingly  degenerate  sexual  tastes, 
organising  the  orgy  at  the  Pool  of  Agrippa  in  AD.  6497  and  giving  away 
Sporus  during  Nero's  'marriage'  to  his  catamite  in  Greece  in  AD.  67.98 
He  allowed  the  wills  of  condemned  men  to  be  verified  only  if,  like 
Annaeus  Mela  in  AD.  66,  they  made  a  substantial  bequest  to  him. 
99 
He  extorted  one  million  sesterces  from  Larcius,  a  Lydian,  in  AD.  68  in 
return  for  allowing  him  his  life. 
100 
We  may  rightly  see  his  hand  in 
the  action  against  Thrasea  Paetus  in  AD.  66,  for  the  prosecutor, 
Cossutianus  Capito,  was  his  son-in-law,  and,  indeed,  it  was  through 
Tigellinus'  influence  that  in  AD.  62  that  rogue  had  been  brought 
back  from  exile  and  restored  to  his  senatorial  rank. 
101 
According 
to  Plutarch,  after  Nero's  death  in  AD.  68  Tigellinus  was  the  most 
hated  man  in  Rome  and  his  exemption  from  punishment  was  widely 
considered  scandalous  and  discreditable  to  the  new  regime. 
102 
None 
of  our  sources  attempt  to  exculpate  Tigellinus.  Even  Dio  Cassius' 
view  of  him  as  a  mere  appendage  of  Nero  during  the  Greek  tour  in  AD.  67 
is  not  an  attempt  to  exonerate  the  prefect,  but  rather  intended  to 
suggest  that,  as  he  constantly  accompanied  Nero,  his  crimes  were  not 
separable  / 98. 
separable  from  the  emperor's,  as  were  those  of  Polyclitus  at  Rome 
and  Calvia  Crispinilla  in  Greece. 
103 
Some  modern  commentators  have  accepted  this  picture  unchallengingly. 
104 
Others,  however,  have  tried,  if  not  to  rehabilitate  Tigellinus,  to 
present  a  more  balanced  view  of  him,  by  emphasising  the  restrictions 
on  his  power  and  the  prejudicial  characterisation  of  him  by  Tacitus 
and  by  questioning  the  innocence  of  at  least  some  of  his  victims. 
It  is  certainly  true  that,  like  all  Praetorian  prefects,  Tigellinus' 
power  was  dependent  on  the  emperor's  grace  and  favour. 
105 
And 
whether  or  not  Tigellinus  was  a  mere  'factotum', 
106 
it  is  clear  that 
because  of  his  lower  social  standing  he  had  less  room  for  manoeuvre 
in  his  relationship  with  Nero  than  Burrus  had. 
107 
His  participation 
in  Nero's  entertainments  may  well  have  been  voluntary,  for  he  led  a 
highly  active  sex-life, 
108 
but  it  was  also  a  means  to  ensure  the 
emperor's  continuing  favour. 
109 
Although  our  evidence  for  any 
political  programme  initiated  by  Burrus  and  Seneca  is  limited  and  has 
been  the  subject  of  much  debate,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  their 
ability  to  manipulate  Nero  in  such  matters  was  greater  than  that  of 
Tigellinus. 
110 
Besides  it  is  quite  certain  that  Nero  listened  to 
other  advisers,  'superior  in  public  station  and  some  superior  in 
talent'. 
ill 
So  we  may  reasonably  accept  the  representation  of  the 
Praetorian  prefect,  presumably  Tigellinus,  in  the  Octavia,  where  his 
role  is  that  of  a  subordinate  carrying  out  rather  than  initiating  or 
provoking  the  emperor's  orders. 
112 
It  is  also  evident  that  in  their  characterisation  of  Tigellinus  our 
sources  / 99. 
sources  have,  for  differing  reasons,  chosen  to  exaggerate  his  role  and 
influence  in  Nero's  court.  Tacitus  has  a  distinct  tendency  to  allow 
his  perception  of  someone's  role  to  influence  his  characterisation  of 
that  person.  His  love  of  antitheses,  of  good  versus  bad,  also 
affects  the  way  in  which  he  represents  people. 
113 
Both  of  these 
factors  undoubtedly  have  a  bearing  on  his  portrayal  of  Tigellinus  who, 
in  the  Annals,  plays  'an  evil  role  as  a  second  Seianus'114  and  'is 
the  open,  disgraceful  and  dramatic  supplanter  of  Seneca'. 
115 
To  achieve  this  effect,  Tacitus  underplays  the  role  of  Seneca  in 
unsavoury  incidents  like  the  murder  of  Britannicus, 
116 
and  at  the  same 
time  magnifies  Tigellinus'  involvement  in  the  deaths  of  Rubellius 
Plautus  and  Cornelius  Sulla  Felix. 
117 
The  assumed  innocence  of  Sulla 
and  Plautus  has  been  rightly  questioned. 
118 
We  should  note  that  Nero 
refrained  from  executing  Sulla  in  AD.  55  and  again  in  AD.  59,  being 
content  on  the  second  occasion  with  sending  him  to  comfortable  exile 
in  Massilia. 
119 
Again,  in  the  case  of  Plautus,  Nero  avoided  putting 
him  to  death  in  AD.  55  when  Agrippina  was  accused  of  planning  his 
elevation  and  ordered  his  withdrawal  from  Rome  to  his  family  estates 
in  Asia  only  in  AD.  60  when,  according  even  to  Tacitus,  he  was  being 
widely  promoted  as  a  possible  successor  to  Nero. 
120 
Tacitus  is  keen 
to  portray  both  of  these  men  as  innocent  victims  in  AD.  62,  but  there 
may  be  some  validity  in  Tigellinus'  argument  that  both  men  had  built 
up  considerable  local  support  in  Gaul  and  Asia  and  may  have  been  in 
contact  with,  in  Sulla's  case,  the  armies  in  Germany  and,  in  Plautus' 
case,  Corbulo's  powerful  army  group  in  Syria  and  Armenia. 
121 
It  is, 
therefore,  possible  to  argue  that  Tigellinus  was  less  culpable  in  some 
respects  than  our  sources  have  indicated.  This  is  not  to  deny  that 
the  man  was  a  villain.  The  extravagant  gifts  which,  in  desperation, 
he  / 100. 
he  bestowed  on  Titus  Vinius'  daughter  in"AD.  68  were,  no  doubt,  the 
fruits  of  his  extortion. 
122 
He  may  well  have  been  a  torturer, 
although  it  is  strange  that  Tacitus,  who  would  surely  have  passed 
over  no  opportunity  to  blacken  his  name,  fails  to  mention  him  by 
name  as  participating  either  in  the  persecution  of  the  Christians  in 
AD.  64123  or  in  the  torture  of  Epicharis  in  AD.  65.124  The  truth, 
of  course,  is  that  Tigellinus'  spiritual  home  was  Tammany  Hall  rather 
than  Dachau.  We  may,  therefore,  conclude  with  some  degree  of 
confidence  that,  while  Tigellinus  was  corrupt  in  a  corrupt  court,  his 
Jcumcd 
political  power  was  considerably  less  than  has  been 
aand 
his  activities 
in  this  regard  were  those  of  a  venal  subordinate. 
From  Tacitus'  narrative  we  can  learn  much  about  the  methods  used  by 
Praetorian  execution  squads.  In  the  case  of  Rubellius  Plautus  a 
centurion  was  despatched  to  Asia  with  sixty  men.  The  large  number 
of  soldiers  involved  can  be  explained  by  their  purpose  which  was  to 
intimate  the  condemned  man  into  committing  suicide  or,  at  worst, 
accepting  execution  passively.  In  Plautus'  case  the  authorities  may 
have  rightly  suspected  that  he  had  been  informed  of  the  imminent 
arrival  of  the  Praetorians  and  the  number  of  soldiers  was  greater  than 
usual  in  anticipation  of  possible  resistance.  We  should  also  note 
that,  as  in  the  execution  of  Messalina  fourteen  years  earlier,  an 
imperial  freedman,  in  this  case  Pelago,  was  sent  along  to  play  the 
role  of  political  commissar.  Plautus  was  killed  by  the  Praetorian 
centurion  with  a  blow  on  the  neck. 
125 
Three  years  later  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Pisonian  conspiracy  similar  tactics  were  employed 
against  Seneca.  His  country  house  outside  Rome  was  surrounded  by  a 
company  / 101. 
company  of  soldiers  while  the  Praetorian  tribune  went  into  the  house 
to  question  Seneca.  A  Praetorian  centurion  was  later  sent  to 
announce  to  the  victim  that  he  was  to  commit  suicide. 
126 
Later  that 
year  the  house  of  Lucius  Antistius  Vetus,  the  father-in-law  of 
Rubellius  Plautus,  was  also  surrounded,  although  on  this  occasion  more 
discreetly,  before  the  death  sentence  was  passed  on  him. 
127 
On 
occasions  when  the  victim  actively  resisted,  the  killing  could  be  a 
very  unpleasant  affair.  It  was  only  after  a  fierce  struggle  that, 
in  AD.  65,  at  Bari,  a  Praetorian  centurion  was  able  to  kill  Lucius 
Junius  Silanus. 
128 
The  execution  of  Octavia  on  Pandateria  in  AD.  62 
was  a  messy,  horrible  business.  After  refusing  the  order  to  commit 
suicide,  she  was  bound,  her  veins  were  opened  and  she  was  finally 
suffocated  in  a  vapour  bath. 
129 
The  effect  of  such  killings  on  the 
morale  of  the  Praetorians  must  remain  a  matter  of  conjecture, 
although  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  Praetorian  tribune,  Subrius  Flavus, 
cited  Octavia's  murder  as  one  of  his  reasons  for  participating  in  the 
Pisonian  conspiracy- 
130 
Nero  may  well  have  sensed  this  discontent,  for  in  AD.  64  he  chose  to 
emphasise  his  links  with  the  Praetorians  on  two  separate  issues  of 
coins. 
131 
One  coin  shows  Nero  exercising  with  the  Praetorian 
cavalry  with  the  legend  DECURSIO. 
132 
On  the  other  coin,  inscribed 
ADLOCUT(10)  COH(ORTIUM),  the  emperor  is  addressing  the  Praetorian 
cohorts  accompanied  by  one  of  the  prefects,  Tigellinus  or  Faenius 
Rufus. 
133 
If  these  issues  were  an  attempt  by  Nero  to  placate  the 
Guard  and  forestall  a  coup,  they  were  unsuccessful,  for  a  sense  of 
disgruntlement  was  leading  several  members  of  the  Praetorian  officer 
corps  / 102. 
corps  into  a  conspiracy  to  kill  Nero  and  replace  him  with  Gaius 
Calpurnius  Piso. 
134 
Before  turning  to  the  plot  itself  we  might  profitably  examine  the 
reasons  for  the  participation  of  the  Praetorians.  Some  of  these 
reasons  have  already  been  discussed.  Nero's  growing  obsession  with 
his  musical  talents  and  his  clear  intention  to  perform  publicly  in 
Rome  at  the  second  Neronia  later  in  the  year  appalled  many  officers. 
The  murder  of  Agrippina  six  years  before  was  still  considered  an 
abomination  by  some.  Others  had  actually  witnessed  Octavia's 
nightmarish  end  in  AD.  62.  Finally,  Nero's  role  in  and  his  behaviour 
during  the  great  fire  of  the  previous  year  were  the  subject  of  many 
damaging  rumours. 
Faenius  Rufus  gave  his  blessing  to  the  coup  although  his  involvement 
was  characterised  by  less  than  total  enthusiasm  and  by  considerable 
circumspection. 
135 
His  motives  for  lending  his  support  to  the  plot 
were  somewhat  different  from  those  of  his  officers.  We  should, 
however,  be  rightly  suspicious  of  Tacitus'  claim  that  Tigellinus' 
references  to  Faenius  Rufus  as  Agrippina's  lover  drove  him  in  the 
plot. 
136 
Nero  was  well  aware  of  how  close  Rufus  had  previously  been 
to  Agrippina  when  he  appointed  him  in  AD.  62.  Furthermore,  it  is 
difficult  to  believe  that  Tigellinus  would  have  accused  his  colleague 
of  an  offence  for  which  he  had  himself  been  exiled  twenty-six  years 
before.  Can  we  really  accept  that  he  would  have  been  so  foolish  as 
to  expose  himself  to  the  inevitable  counter-charges? 
137 
Faenius 
Rufus  clearly  felt  threatened,  but  this  was  the  result,  not  of  one 
particular  / 103. 
particular  calumny,  but  of  a  whole  campaign  of  innuendo  and 
insinuation  not  concerned  principally  with  his  past  transgressions, 
such  as  they  were,  but  with  possible  perfidy  in  the  future. 
There  seems  little  evidence  to  suggest  the  existence  among  the 
Praetorian  plotters  of  any  of  the  residual  republicanism  which 
affected  their  predecessors  in  AD.  41.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
probable  that  the  Praetorian  officer  corps  of  AD.  65  approved  of  the 
principate  as  an  essential  focus  for  the  loyalty  of  the  Roman  world 
and,  indeed,  regarded  such  a  system  as  the  only  practical  method  of 
government.  Yet  there  can  be  no  denying  the-bitterness  and 
disillusionment  into  which  the  Neronian  regime  had  plunged  many  of 
the  centurions  and  tribunes  of  the  Guard.  Close  proximity  to  the 
regime's  manipulators  of  power  had  revealed  to  them  that  there  was 
no  single  coordinated  leadership  from  the  emperor,  but  instead 
continual  wranglings  about  precedence  among  a  plethora  of  powerful 
freedmen  whom  Nero  tried  to  ride  on  a  long  rein  in  order  to  maintain 
his  own  position  as  supreme  autocrat. 
138 
And  in  Nero  himself  they 
found,  instead  of  a  worthy  recipient  of  their  loyalty,  a  disinterested 
egoist. 
It  is  evident  from  Tacitus  that  there  was  more  than  one  plot  and  that 
it  was  only  really  with  the  involvement  of  Faenius  Rufus  that  the 
Praetorian  officers,  led  by  the  tribune  Subrius  Flavus  and  the 
centurion  Sulpicius  Asper,  felt  confident  enough  to  engage  in  the 
detailed  operational  planning  necessary  for  a  serious  assassination 
attempt. 
139 
Without  this  Praetorian  participation  the  plot  would 
never  have  passed  beyond  the  stage  of  embittered  and  frustrated 
complainings  / 104. 
complainings  at  late-night  drinking  parties,  for  the  conspirators 
were,  as  might  be  imagined,  not  a  homogeneous  group. 
140 
This  was 
to  prove  one  of  several  fatal  flaws  in  the  plot  which  involved  the 
assassination  of  Nero  when  he  was  attending  the  Circus  during  the 
Cerialia  festival141  and  the  transport  of  Piso  by  Faenius  Rufus  from 
the  temple  of  Ceres  to  the  Praetorian  camp  where  he  was  to  be  hailed 
142 
as  emperor. 
The  most  serious  weakness  in  the  plan  was  the  calibre  of  the  civilian 
conspirators.  With  a  few  notable  exceptions  they  were  a  motley  crew 
of  the  hopeless  and  the  humiliated  -  frustrated  poets, 
143 
alcoholic  degenerates144  and,  sadly  and  inevitably,  a  romantic 
republican. 
145 
Despite  the  fact  that  they  had,  through  Claudius 
Senecio,  access  to  the  deliberations  of  Nero's  inner  circle  of  friends, 
this  group  inspired  little  confidence  among  the  Praetorians  who 
subsequently  gave  them  as  little  information  as  possible  about  the 
actual  plot. 
146 
The  necessary  precaution  almost  led  to  disaster 
when  Epicharis,  allegedly  the  mistress  of  Seneca's  brother,  Annaeus 
Mela,  decided,  apparently  on  her  own  initiative,  to  approach  Volusius 
Proculus,  a  navarchus  in  the  fleet  at  Misenum,  who  was  known  to  be 
embittered  by  his  failure  to  gain  promotion  despite  his  participation 
in  the  murder  of  Agrippina.  Epicharis,  however,  had  seriously 
misjudged  either  the  sailor's  loyalty  to  Nero  or  her  own  powers  of 
persuasion,  and  was  arrested  after  Proculus  reported  her  overtures. 
147 
The  manner  of  her  detention,  at  least  initially,  may  possibly 
indicate  some  sort  of  support  for  the  conspirators  at  the  highest  level 
within  Nero's  court.  For  although  she  was  imprisoned,  she  remained 
apparently  / 105. 
apparently  unharmed  until  after  the  wholesale  confessions  following 
Milichus'  delation. 
148 
More  importantly,  her  arrest  prevented 
Volusius  Proculus  from  infiltrating  the  conspiracy  and  was,  therefore, 
of  some  benefit  to  the  plotters.  It  is  easy,  and  possibly  correct, 
to  suggest  that  this  whole  incident  indicates  only  the  lack  of 
sophistication  with  regard  to  security  measures  of  those  around  Nero. 
Yet  there  is  clear  evidence  of  undercover  operations  and  the  use  of 
agents  provocateurs  during  Tiberius'  reign. 
149 
Why  were  such 
techniques  not  employed  in  AD.  65?  The  complicity  of  someone  in 
Nero's  closest  circle  must  remain  a  possibility. 
If,  however,  one  man  can  be  blamed  for  the  failure  of  the  whole  plot, 
it  must  be  Flavius  Scaevinus.  On  the  day  before  the  planned 
assassination  he  returned  home,  possibly  drunk,  from  a  meeting  with 
Antonius  Natalis,  a  fellow  plotter,  and  began  to  make  ostentatious 
preparations  for  the  coup. 
150 
The  making  ready  of  bandages  and  the 
sharpening  of  a  dagger  would  have  aroused  suspicion  in  even  duller 
brains  than  those  of  his  freedman  Milichus  who,  sensing  profit  in 
betrayal,  reported  what  he  knew  to  Epaphroditus,  Nero's  libertus  a 
libellis. 
151 
Scaevinus  was  arrested  along  with  Natalis  and,  after 
initial  denials,  both  men  broke  down  under  threat  of  torture. 
152 
What  followed  was  an  unseemly  race  among  the  civilian  conspirators 
to  inform,  in  the  hope-of  immunity,  on  as  many  of  their  colleagues 
as  possible  and  to  tell  everything  that  they  knew  about  the  conspiracy. 
153 
Fortunately  for  the  Praetorians,  most  of  them  knew  very  little. 
Almost  equally  disastrous  to  the  enterprise  was  the  character  of  its 
figure-head  / 106. 
figurehead,  Gaius  Calpurnius  Piso.  He  was  handsome,  aristocratic 
and,  when  in  his  cups,  a  pleasing  companion. 
154 
But  he  did  not 
'parade  a  forbidding  morality' 
155 
and,  in  his  theatrical  ambitions, 
he  rivalled  Nero.  He  was,  in  fact,  as  Syme  claims,  'an  inoffensive 
Nero'. 
156 
We  should,  however,  probably  discount  the  story  that 
Subrius  Flavus  intended  to  kill  him  and  give  the  empire  to  Seneca 
after  the  coup. 
157 
He  also  displayed  a  timid  indecisiveness  which, 
in  the-early  days  of  the  conspiracy,  allowed  to  pass  a  golden 
opportunity  to  kill  the  unguarded  Nero  at  Baiae. 
158 
During  the 
coup  itself  he  again  displayed  this  innate  hesitancy,  when  he 
refused  his  friends'  pleas  to  go  from  the  temple  of  Ceres,  where  he 
had  been  waiting,  to  the  Forum  to  appeal  to  the  people  or  to  the 
Praetorian  camp  to  address  the  cohorts. 
159 
By  this  time,  however,  the  conspiracy  had  already  fallen  apart. 
The  civilian  element  had  largely  been  arrested,  there  were  large 
numbers  of  the  German  Guard  and  the  Praetorian  Guard  loyal  to  Nero 
on  the  streets160  and,  most  decisively,  those  Praetorians  involved, 
not  least  Faenius  Rufus,  had  already  decided  that  their  cause  was 
lost  and  that  their  main  hope  of  safety  now  lay  in  conspicuously 
displaying  their  loyalty  to  Nero  and  in  removing  all  witnesses  of 
their  involvement  in  the  plot. 
161 
And  so  the  tribune  Statius 
Proxumus  executed  his  fellow  plotter,  Plautius  Lateranus,  who  would 
have  been  able  to  incriminate  many  Praetorians  had  he  wished  to  do 
so,  and  whose  hasty  removal  was  judged  essential  to  the  survival  of 
the  Praetorian  conspirators. 
162 
Gavius  Silvanus,  tribune  of  the 
12th  Praetorian  cohort, 
163 
who  was  deeply  involved  in  the  plot, 
164 
was  / 107. 
was  sent  to  question  Seneca165  and,  after  reporting  to  Nero  and 
Tigellinus,  returned,  with  Faenius  Rufus'  blessing,  with  an 
execution  order  for  the  former  minister. 
166 
Time,  however,  was 
running  out  for  the  Praetorians  in  their  attempts  to  avoid  detection 
and  Faenius  Rufus'  murderous  attempts  to  save  himself  were  doomed  to 
failure. 
167 
Nero  already  suspected  Praetorian  involvement  and  not 
just  at  officer  level. 
168 
And  so,  when  Scaevinus  named  Faenius 
Rufus  as  a  participant  in  the  plot  and  this  was  confirmed  by  the  other 
prisoners  who  were  naturally  desperate  both  to  ingratiate  themselves 
with  their  captors  and  to  involve  the  disloyal  prefect  in  their 
downfall,  he  was  immediately  arrested. 
169 
It  was  not  long  before 
the  other  Praetorian  plotters  were  also  detained.  Subrius  Flavus, 
in  many  ways  Chaerea  reborn,  spoke  bravely  both  to  the  emperor  and 
to  his  executioner,  another  tribune,  Veianius  Niger,  before  he 
died. 
170 
The  centurions  involved,  Sulpicius  Asper,  Maximus  Scaurus 
and  Venetus  Paulus,  also  died  well, 
171 
in  contrast  to  Faenius  Rufus 
who  died  with  the  same  pusillanimity  as  he  had  lived. 
172 
The  extent 
of  Praetorian  disloyalty  alarmed  Nero  and  he  thought  it  expedient  to 
encourage  the  loyalty  of  the  Guard  with  a  generous  donative  and  a 
free  corn  allowance. 
173 
He  also  took  firmer  action.  Besides 
Subrius  Flavus,  four  Praetorian  tribunes  were  dismissed. 
174 
Gavius 
Silvanus  and  Statius  Proxumus  were  surprisingly  spared,  perhaps  'for 
co-operating  in  the  punishment  of  their  fellow  conspirators' 
175 
or 
possibly  because  Nero  deemed  it  unwise  to  indulge  in  too  extensive 
a  purge  among  the  officer  corps  of  the  Guard.  Both  men,  however, 
understanding-the  significance  of  the  emperor's  mercy,  chose  to 
commit  suicide. 
176 
Nero  / 108. 
Nero  and  Tigellinus  seized  the  opportunity  during  the  coup  and  its 
aftermath  to  rid  themselves  of  some  personal  enemies.  So  the 
consul  Vestinus,  whom  Nero  hated,  found  himself  compelled  by  the 
Praetorian  tribune  Gerellanus  and  a  cohort  of  soldiers  to  kill 
himself. 
177 
A  former  prefect,  Rufrius  Crispinus,  was  at  this  time 
expelled  only  to  be  put  to  death  the  following  year. 
178 
Even  to 
have  been  a  friend  of  a  conspirator  was  enough  to  get  one  exiled. 
179 
There  were,  of  course,  generous  rewards  for  those  who  had  helped 
suppress  the  coup.  Nero  thought  highly  enough  of  Tigellinus  to  grant 
him  triumphal  decorations  and  to  allow  statues  of  him  to  be  set  up  in 
the  Forum  and  the  palace.  His  esteem  for  his  prefect  did  not,  never- 
theless,  extend  so  far  as  to  permit  him  to  occupy  the  post  without  a 
colleague.  And  so  he  appointed,  as  joint  prefect  with  Tigellinus, 
Nymphidius  Sabinus  whose  role  in  crushing  the  conspiracy  was  held  to 
have  been  notable  enough  to  merit  the  award  of  consular  insignia. 
180 
One  consequence  of  the  coup  may  have  been  an  acceleration  in  the 
promotion  of  easterners  within  the  Guard.  We  know  that  Lucius 
Antonius  Naso  from  Heliopolis  in  Syria  was  decorated  by.  Nero  and 
promoted  to  command  the  9th  Praetorian  cohort. 
181 
Perhaps  Antonius 
Taurus,  who,  like  Naso,  was  dismissed  as  an  unrepentant  Neronian 
from  his  Praetorian  tribunate  by  Galba  in  AD.  68,  was  promoted  at  the 
same  time. 
182 
Indeed,  it  is  possible  that  the  advancement  of 
easterners  was  not  just  a  consequence  of  the  conspiracy  but  a 
contributory  cause  and  that  those  tribunes  and  centurions  who 
participated  were  motivated  to  do  so  by  the  fear  that  they,  as  Italians, 
were  / 109. 
were  losing  their  privileged  position  within  the  Guard. 
183 
Certainly  Gerellanus,  who  was  already  a  Praetorian  tribune  before 
the  coup,  may  have  had  eastern  connections. 
184 
Perhaps  it  was  his 
loyalty  at  this  time  which  led  to  the  promotion  of  other  easterners. 
It  is  probably  wiser,  however,  to  regard  this  development  as  part  of 
the  larger  preferment  given  to  easterners  with  the  administration 
generally. 
185 
What  is  particularly  significant  about  the  Praetorian  role  in  this 
conspiracy  is  Nero's  perception  that  the  discontent  affected  many 
more  than  the  officer  corps. 
186 
We  may  see  here  unsubstantiated 
paranoia  rather  than  justifiable  prescience.  But  in  such  matters 
today's  perception,  however,  misplaced,  is  often  tomorrow's 
reality.  Nero's  doubts  over  their  loyalty  could  only  serve  to 
encourage  the  disillusionment  of  the  Praetorians.  He  was  losing 
his  hold  on  the  very  soul  of  the  Guard  and,  although,  in  the  absence 
of  any  alternative,  the  Praetorians  were  unlikely  to  initiate  any 
action  to  depose  him,  they  were  also,  after  this  time,  less  inclined 
to  oppose  those  who  might  wish  to  do  so. 
187 
The  following  year,  AD.  66,  saw  the  Praetorians  involved  in  two  very 
different,  though  equally  high-profile,  operations  on  Nero's  behalf. 
They  were  present  in  full  dress  uniform  at  the  magnificent 
culmination  of  Tiridates'  financially  ruinous  visit  to  Italy  when  he 
did  obeisance  in  the  Forum  before  Nero. 
188 
They  played  a  more 
sinister  role  in  the  prosecution  by  Cossutianus  Capito,  Tigellinus' 
son-in-law,  of  Thrasea  Paetus,  long  hated  by  Nero,  and  Barea  Soranus.  189 
As  / 110. 
As  the  senators  entered  the  temple  of  Venus  Genetrix  to  listen  to  the 
charges,  the  Praetorians  were  intimidatingly  conspicuous.  There 
were  two  cohorts,  fully-armed,  around  the  temple,  the  usual 
detachment  in  civilian  dress  on  the  approaches  to  the  building  as 
well  as  other  companies  in  all  the  main  public  areas  of  the  city. 
Their  very  presence,  quite  apart  from  their  frightening  appearance 
and  open  threats,  overawed  the  senators,  as  it  was  meant  to  do,  so 
that,  even  before  Cossutianus  Capito  and  Epirius  Marcellus  began 
their  diatribes,  Paetus'  fate  was  sealed.  The  clear  message  which 
the  Praetorians  delivered  that  day  for  Nero  was  that  senatorial 
dissidence,  however  passive,  would  not  be  tolerated  and  that 
recognition  of  that  fact  was  a  prerequisite  of  survival. 
190 
Nero  believed  that  by  this  operation  he  had  muted  his  domestic 
opponents  and  that  it  was  safe  for  him  to  undertake  the  tour  of 
Greece  which  he  had  thought  it  advisable  to  postpone  two  years 
before. 
191 
If  the  Vinician  conspiracy  at  Beneventum  disabused  him 
of  the  notion  that  the  senatorial  opposition  had  been  completely 
demoralised,  he  did  not  allow  it  to  divert  him  from  his  greatest 
ambition,  to  display  his  artistic  talents  in  Greece  before  what  he 
was  certain  would  be  appreciative  audiences. 
192 
He  departed  for 
Greece  on  the  25th  of  September,  AD.  66,  accompanied  by  Tigellinus 
and  a  detachment  of  Praetorians. 
193 
It  is  probable,  however,  that 
Nero  regarded  the  Augustiani  as  more  essential  travelling  companions 
than  the  members  of  the  Guard. 
194 
This  perhaps  reflects  Nero's 
rapidly  diminishing  hold  on  political  reality. 
195 
It  may  be  appropriate  at  this  time  to  consider  the  personality  of 
Nymphidius  / 111. 
Nymphidius  Sabinus,  especially  given  the  vital  role  which  he  was  to 
play  in  Nero's  fall.  He  claimed  to  be  the  illegitimate  son  of  the 
emperor  Gaius  whom  he  resembled  in  physique  and  appearance. 
196 
He 
may  have  served  as  commander  of  an  auxiliary  cavalry  regiment  in 
Pannonia. 
197 
He  was  certainly  in  Rome  in  AD.  65  during  the  Pisonian 
conspiracy  in  the  suppression  of  which  he  distinguished  himself. 
198 
His  rise  mirrors  that  of  others  of  eastern  origin  who  succeeded  to  the 
large  equestrian  prefectures  in  the  later  part  of  Nero's  reign. 
199 
The  absence  of  Nero  and  Tigellinus  in  Greece  between  September  of 
AD.  66  and  the  early  months  of  AD.  68  left  him  in  sole  charge  of  the 
Praetorian  cohorts  in  Rome.  He  may  well  have  seized  this  opportunity 
'to  achieve  the  control  of  the  Guard  he  was  soon  to  demonstrate'. 
200 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  nothing  to  suggest  that,  until  the  final 
days  of  the  reign,  he  was  other  than  a  loyal  Neronian  and,  as  we 
shall  see,  even  then  his  conduct  was  perhaps  less  perfidious  than  has 
been  suggested. 
201 
By  the  time  Nero  returned  to  Italy  in  early  AD.  68  in  deference  to 
Helius'  desperate  pleas,  there  were  few  sections  of  Roman  society 
which  he  had  not  succeeded  in  antagonising. 
202 
The  Senate,  the 
provincial  armies  and  even  the,  people,  whose  support  Nero  clearly 
cherished  most,  had  reasons  for  resentment  and  bitterness. 
203 
All 
of  this  was  rather  misleadingly  masked  by  the  hysteria  which  greeted 
Nero  on  his  triumphal  entry  into  Rome. 
204 
How  widespread  discontent  was  among  the  Praetorians  at  this  stage, 
after  Nero's  return  but  before  the  battle  of  Vesontio  is  unclear. 
In  the  earlier  part  of  the  reign  the  Praetorians  had  been  quite 
prepared  / 112. 
prepared  to  carry  out  unpopular  orders  and  incur  public  disdain,  as 
at  the  execution  of  Pedanius  Secundus'  slaves  in  AD.  61  or  during  the 
riots  on  Octavia's  behalf  the  following  year. 
205 
But  the  situation 
had  changed  in  several  important  ways.  Nero  was  now  more  isolated 
than  ever  before  from  the  actuality  around  him,  partly  due  to  his 
own  artistic  obsessions  and  partly  due  to  the  machinations  of  his 
freedmen. 
206 
Given  this  situation,  it  is  evident  that  the  outcome  of 
an  imperial  order  was  often  the  product  of  chance. 
207 
Such  weakness 
and  lack  of  firm  control  at  the  centre  are  unlikely  to  have  inspired 
much  confidence  among  the  Praetorians.  It  is  also'possible  that 
those  detachments  which  were  in  Greece  with  Nero  may  have  been 
alienated  by  the  hard  labouring  tasks  which  the  emperor  imposed  on 
them  in  connection  with  his  plan  to  dig  a  canal  through  the  Isthmus 
joining  the  Saronic  and  Corinthian  Gulfs. 
208 
They  will  also  have 
brought  back  reports  of  Nero's  disgusting  conduct,  both  private  and 
public,  during  his  time  in  Greece. 
209 
And  they  will  have  found  an 
eager  audience  for  their  scandals  among  those  cohorts  who  had  stayed 
in  Rome  protecting  the  interests  of  an  emperor  who  was  now  reluctant, 
for  fear  of  damaging  his  voice,  even  to  address  them. 
210 
Tacitus  claims  that  Nero  was  driven  from  his  throne  by  messages  and 
rumours  rather  than  by  arms. 
211 
It  has  been  suggested  that  he  could 
have  avoided  this  had  he  acted  more  decisively. 
212 
But  while  the 
situation  certainly  called  for  a  dramatic  and  impressive  gesture, 
Nero  chose  to  indulge  his  passion  for  showy  melodrama.  As  reality 
forced  its  way  into  his  fantasy  world,  his  responses  were  predictably 
theatrical  ranging  from  studied  indifference  on  hearing  of  Vindex's 
revolt, 
213 
through  contrived  hysteria 
214 
on  receiving  reports  of  Galba's 
rebellion  / 113. 
rebellion, 
215 
until,  after  Vesontio  and  the  defection  of  the  German 
legions, 
216 
he  returned  once  again  to  the  safety  of  his  megalomanic 
dreams  in  which  he  envisaged  himself  as  prefect  of  Egypt. 
217 
And  what  of  the  Praetorians  in  this  crisis?  Nymphidius  Sabinus  was 
no  more  prescient  than  many  others  in  his  certainty  that  Nero  was 
doomed. 
218 
It  was  vital  for  him  to  be  seen  to  be  acting  against 
Nero's  interest  at  this  time,  for  perhaps,  as  Brunt  has  suggested, 
his  'one  hope  of  expiating  his  own  crimes  was  to  give  Nero  the  final 
push  and  earn  the  gratitude  of  Galba'. 
219 
So  in  Galba's  name, 
though  without  his  sanction,  Nymphidius  Sahinus  offered  each 
Praetorian  30,000  sesterces  to  break  their  oath  of  loyalty  to  Nero 
and  to  declare  for  Galba. 
220 
This  treason  was  understood  and 
welcomed  by  the  Guard. 
221 
Bishop  credits  Tigellinus  with  the  rapid 
mobilisation  of  the  army  in  North  Italy. 
222 
If  this  was  the  case, 
it  was  his  last  action  for  Nero,  for  he  was  incurably  ill,  possibly 
with  syphilis,  and  was  possibly  relieved  to  obey  Nymphidius  Sabinus' 
instructions  to  lay  down  his  sword. 
223 
Besides  he  had  had  the  fore- 
sight  and,  during  his  years  of  power,  the  opportunity  to  prepare  for 
such  a  crisis.  He  had  put  Titus  Vinius,  Galba's  principal  adviser, 
into  his  debt. 
224 
And  so  it  was  with  some  confidence  that  he 
retired  to  enjoy  the  company  of  his  mistresses  and  the  fruits  of  his 
blackmail. 
As  the  army  in  north  Italy  fell  apart  and  news  reached  Rome  of 
further  revolts,  Nero  seriously  considered  fleeing  to  Egypt, 
225 
a 
country  by  which  he  had  always  been  fascinated226  and  where  he  was 
confident  / 114. 
confident,  possibly  erroneously,  of  receiving  a  loyal  welcome. 
227 
However,  at  a  meeting  in  the  Servilian  gardens  his  attempts  to 
persuade  the  tribunes  and  centurions  of  the  Guard  to  accompany  him 
in  flight  resulted  in  humiliating  failure  and  the  disdainful 
suggestion  that  he  consider  suicide. 
228 
He  retired  in  despair  and, 
when  he  awoke  at  mid-night,  made  the  ominous  discovery  that  the 
Praetorian  cohort  which  should  have  been  on  duty  had  disappeared.  229 
Even  Nero  now  recognised  the  hopelessness  of  his  situation  but, 
despite  his  talk  of  suicide  and  some  typical  histrionic  posturing,  he 
could  not  yet  bring  himself  to  end  his  life. 
230 
And  so  in  the  early 
hours  of  June  the  9th 
231 
he  fled  on  horseback  with  only  four 
attendants  to  the  villa  of  his  freedman  Phaon,  having  made  a 
pitiable  attempt  to  disguise  himself. 
232 
As  he  passed  the 
Praetorian  camp  he  heard  with  what  bitterness  we  can  only  imagine  the 
soldiers  inside  hailing  Galba  as  emperor. 
233 
Farce  overtook  pathos 
as  a  former  Praetorian  guardsman  recognised  the  fugitive  and  greeted 
him. 
234 
At  the  villa  there  was  more  intolerable  delay 
235 
and  the 
final  tragic  affectation,  'qualis  artifex  pereo', 
236 
until  he  heard 
that  the  Senate  had  decreed  that  he  should  be  flogged  to  death. 
237 
With  no  options  left  and  the  sounds  of  a  search-party  from  the 
Praetorian  cavalry  drawing  ever  closer,  he  finally  with  the  aid  of 
his  freedman  Epaphroditus  stabbed  himself  in  his  throat. 
238 
His  final  words,  addressed  to  a  Praetorian  centurion  who  was  trying 
to  stem  the  flow  of  blood  from  his  wound,  were  a  bitter  reproach  on 
the  Guard's  loyalty. 
239 
Such  a  rebuke  was  unwarranted  and  unjust, 
for  it  was  Nero  himself  who,  by  his  failure  to  appreciate  the 
reciprocal  / 115. 
reciprocal  nature  of  loyalty,  made  the  defection 
certain  and  inevitable.  Galba  was  acceptable  ti 
only  as  a  guarantor  of  their  future  employment. 
him  as  they  had  once  loved  Nero.  The  sad  truth 
loyalty  was  not  won  by  Galba's  virtues,  but  lost 
vices. 
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4 CHAPTER  VI- 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  NERO  TO 
THE  ACCESSION  OF  VESPASIAN 
The  Praetorian  Guard  had  been  unswervingly  loyal  to  the  Julio-Claudian 
dynasty  until  the  very  end  of  Nero's  reign.  The  Praetorians  had  been 
induced  to  desert  him  only  by  the  lies  of  Nymphidius  Sabinus, 
faithlessly  told  and  faithlessly  heard,  that  Nero  had  already  sailed 
away  to  Egypt  and,  more  importantly,  by  his  promise  of  a  donative  of 
30,000  sesterces  per  man 
1 
if  they  declared  for  Galba.  Even  then 
many  had  felt  ambivalently,  or  so  they  later  claimed,  over  their 
abandonment  of  Nero. 
2 
Within  a  short  time  a  sense  of  collective 
guilt,  which  was  not  to  be  ultimately  exorcised  for  18  months,  began 
to  consume  the  Praetorians.  They  started  to  rationalise  their 
desertion,  partly  accepting  the  official  version,  as  expounded  by 
Nymphidius  Sabinus  and  later,  in  desperation,  by  Gaius  Calpurnius 
Piso  Licinianus, 
3 
that  Nero  had  abandoned  them.  But  they  also,  as 
is  clear  from  the  speech  of  Antonius  Honoratus, 
4 
began  to  seek  scape- 
goats  in  Nero's  Praetorian  prefects,  Tigellinus,  universally  detested, 
quite  apart  from  his  many  vices,  as  a  'desertor  ac  proditor', 
5 
and 
more  especially,  Nymphidius  Sabinus  who  bore  the  greater 
responsibility  for  Nero's  fall. 
6 
At  first,  in  the  period  immediately  following  Nero's  suicide, 
Nymphidius  enjoyed  considerable  popularity  among  the  Praetorians 
largely  because  of  the  promised  donative. 
7 
In  the  absence  of  Galba, 
who  was  still  far  away  in  Spain,  he  usurped  the  role  of  Galba's 
plenipotentiary  in  Rome,  flaunting  his  power  more  ostentatiously  than 
any  prefect  since  Seianus.  He  sought  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the 
people  / 117. 
people  by  delivering  into  their  hands  Spiculus  and  Aponius,  two  of 
the  worst  of  Nero's  creatures.  He  was  courted  by  powerful  members 
of  the  Senate  whom  he,  in  turn,  entertained  at  banquets  in  the 
emperor's  name.  He  removed  the  broken  and  sick  Tigellinus  from 
office  and  initiated  a  campaign  to  send  a  deputation  to  Galba 
demanding  that  he  be  made  prefect  for  life  without  a  colleague. 
a 
Sometimes  his  ambition  was  even  less  well  clothed  as  can  be  seen  from 
his  vaunting  of  his  allegedly  imperial  ancestry  and  the  inclusion  in 
his  entourage,  which  looked  less  like  a  prefect's  staff  than  an 
imperial  court,  of  Sporus,  Nero's  catamite.  His  behaviour  led  many 
to  assume  that  he  aspired  not  to  the  sole  prefecture  of  the  Guard,  as 
he  claimed,  but  to  the  principate  itself. 
9 
Nemesis  was  not  far  distant.  Galba,  who  did  not  lack  information 
from  Rome,  could  not  be  induced  either  by  Nymphidius'  gifts  or  his 
scaremongering  to  retain  him  as  prefect. 
10 
The  failure  of  Gellianus, 
whom  Nymphidius  had  sent  to  Spain  to  press  his  case  with  the  emperor, 
11 
was  signalled  by  Galba's  appointment  of  Cornelius  Laco  as  prefect  of 
the  Guard. 
12 
Nymphidius  rightly  viewed  the  imposition  of  a  joint 
prefect  as  the  first  step  in  a  process  which  would  inevitably  end,  in  kis 
dismissal.  Desperation  now  forced  him  to  change  his  tactics. 
13 
Rumours  were  deliberately  encouraged  to  the  effect  that  Galba  was  the 
aged  pawn  of  devious  and  vicious  advisers. 
14 
Which,  in  truth,  he 
was.  Revolution  was  openly  discussed  and  in  the  fool's  paradise  of 
Nymphidius'  circle  the  prospects  for  success  were  judged  to  be  good. 
Those  like  Clodius  Macer,  who  suggested  that  support  for  such  a  coup 
might  be  limited,  were  ignored. 
15 
A  plan  of  sorts  was  hatched,  its 
only  / 118. 
only  virtue  its  simplicity.  Nymphidius  was  to  go  to  the 
Praetorian  camp  at  midnight  with  his  supporters  and  read  to  the 
Praetorians  a  speech  written  for  him  by  Cingonius  Varro,  the  consul 
designate. 
16 
It  was  hoped  that  the  Praetorians  would  then 
renounce  their  allegiance  to  Galba  and  espouse  the  cause  of 
Nymphidius. 
17 
In  truth,  it  was  a  hope  born  of  fantasy,  for  Rome 
was  not  yet  ready  for  a  Praetorian  emperor. 
18 
The  plan  was  betrayed, 
unsurprisingly.  There  could  be  profit  for  some  in  Nymphidius' 
hopelessness.  When  he  reached  the  camp,  he  found  that  on  the  orders 
of  the  tribune  on  duty,  Antonius  Honoratus,  the  gates  had  been  shut. 
The  walls  were  lined  with  grimfaced  Guardsmen  who  saw  in  the 
ko 
suppression  of  the  coup'an  opportunity  both  impress  Galba  with  their 
loyalty  and  to  salve  their  consciences  by  avenging  Nero's  death. 
19 
Nymphidius,  understanding-the  ruination  of  his  plans,  joined  the 
Praetorians  on  the  walls  in  shouting  pro-Galban  slogans.  The 
dissimulation  was  transparent.  Honoratus,  who  had  no  intention  of 
allowing  Nymphidius  to  leave  alive,  ordered  the  gates  to  be  opened. 
The  prefect  entered,  aware  perhaps  of  the  doom  which  awaited  him. 
No  sooner  had  the  gates  closed  than  Nymphidius'  band  was  attacked. 
The  shield  of  Septimius,  one  of  his  supporters,  took  the  force  of  a 
spear  aimed  at  the  prefect.  But  the  reprieve  was  temporary.  He 
was  chased  into  a  barrack-room  where  he  was  finally  killed. 
20 
The  Praetorians,  believing  that  their  desertion  of  Nero  had  been 
balanced  by  their  murder  of  Nymphidius,  looked  forward  in  keen 
anticipation  to  the  arrival  of  Galba  who  would,  they  were  confident, 
now  pay  them  the  donative  promised  in  his  name.  They  were  to  be 
bitterly  / 119. 
bitterly  disillusioned.  Galba  valued  firm  discipline  over 
expediency. 
21 
His  assertion  that  he  levied,  not  bought  soldiers 
22 
was  for  him,  despite  its  obvious  theatricality,  a  tenet  of  faith 
which  he  was  certainly  not  prepared  to  compromise  for  'the  petted 
creatures  of  Tigellinus  and  Nymphidius'. 
23 
He  did  not  waver  in  this 
refusal  until,  perhaps  the  very  end, 
24 
ignoring  even  the  golden  opportunity 
offered  by  the  adoption  of  Piso  at  the  Praetorian  camp  on  the  10th  of 
January  AD.  69  to  make  a  gesture  in  this  direction. 
25 
This  issue  was 
to  remain  throughout  his  principate  a  source  of  discontent  and 
resentment  among  the  Praetorians  who  regarded  Galba's  unwillingness  to 
pay  the  donative  not  only  as  a  breach  of  faith  but,  more  fundamentally, 
as  a  failure  to  acknowledge  the  pre-eminent  role,  especially  at  the 
accession  of  an  emperor,  which  they  had  enjoyed  since  AD.  41.26 
Equally  disastrous  to  Galba's  relationship  with  the  Praetorians  was 
his  reluctance  to  forgive  those  whom  he  suspected  of  involvement  in 
Nymphidius'  coup.  He  could  not  be  persuaded  to  confine  his  purge  to 
Nymphidius'fellow-conspirators,  who  were,  in  large  degree,  from 
outside  the  Guard,  but  chose  instead  to  extend  it  to  include  all  the 
prefect's  associates  which,  by  the  very  nature  of  his  duties,  encompassed 
the  entire  officer  corps  of  the  Guard. 
27 
In  an  atmosphere  in  which 
guilt  by  association,  and  indeed  even  by  proximity,  was  assumed  and 
innocence  had  to  be  proved,  many  centurions  and  tribunes  came  to  feel 
that  an  emperor  so  ready  to  impugn  their  honour  did  not  deserve  their 
loyalty. 
We  know  that  two  Praetorian  tribunes,  Antonius  Naso  and  Antonius 
Taurus,  were  dismissed  from  their  posts  by  Galba. 
28 
The  precise 
reason  / 120. 
reason  for  their  dismissal  must  remain  ä  matter  of  conjecture. 
There  is  no  direct  evidence  to  suggest  that  they  were  linked  to 
Nymphidius'  attempted  coup.  Tacitus  indeed  mentions  their 
dismissals  among  a  number  of  measures  taken  by  Galba  after  Piso's 
adoption  on  the  10th  of  January  AD.  69.  Are  we  to  assume  that  they 
were  removed  because  of  their  Vitellian  sympathies?  This  seems 
unlikely,  especially  in  view  of  the  subsequent  career  of  Antonius 
Naso  who  was  given  a  primipilary  post  in  legio  XIV  Gemina  by 
Otho. 
29 
Had  they  then  favoured  the  adoption  of  Otho  rather  than 
Piso  more  enthusiastically  than  was  judged  proper?  This  must  be 
seriously  considered,  although  we  should  note  that  Titus  Vinius, 
the  most  prominent  advocate  of  Otho's  adoption,  managed  to  survive 
without  any  apparent  threat  to  his  position  or,  as  far  as  we  know, 
his  influence. 
30 
Is  it  possible  that  they  were  suspected  of 
involvement  in  the  initial  stages  of  Otho's  coup?  But  this  would 
run  counter  to  the  accounts  of  our  sources  which  suggest  that  the 
coup,  when  it  did  occur,  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  Galba  and 
Laco. 
31 
Both  Pflaum  and  Jalabert  suggest  that  Antonius  Naso,  who 
had  enjoyed  a  series  of  rapid  promotions  to  his  Praetorian  tribunate 
during  the  final  years  of  Nero's  principate,  was  dismissed  because 
of  'son  attachement 
N  la  dynastie  julio-claudienne'. 
32 
However 
Tacitus'  dating  of  the  dismissals  tends  to  militate  against  this 
argument,  for  it  seems  improbable  that  the  notoriously  severe  Galba 
would  have  tolerated  Neronian  loyalists  in  the  Guard  for  so  long. 
Furthermore  such  a  view  is  explicitly  contradicted  by  Suetonius  who 
tells  us  that  none  of  the  Praetorian  tribunes  and  centurions, 
whatever  loyalty  they  may  have  previously  felt,  were  willing  to 
accompany  / 121. 
accompany  Nero  on  his  planned  flight  to  Egypt. 
33 
1  suggest  that 
a  preferable  explanation  would  be  to  link  the  dismissals  of  these 
tribunes,  both  of  whom  were  from  the  Roman  colony  of  Heliopolis  in 
Syria, 
34 
with  Galba's  disbanding  of  the  German  Guard 
35 
and  view  such 
actions  as  an  attempt  by  Galba  to  purge  the  Rome  garrison  of  non- 
Italian  elements.  Such  a  purge  could  have  been  prompted  by  a  desire 
on  the  part  of  a  conservative  emperor  to  re-establish  the  dominance 
of  Italians,  which  had,  perhaps,  been  threatened  during  the  final 
years  of  Nero's  principate,  within  the  officer  corps  of  the  Guard. 
On  the  other  hand,  Tacitus'  dating  suggests  a  more  specific  motiva- 
tion.  Is  it  possible  that  Galba  was  attempting  by  his  actions  to 
promote  the  concept  of  the  Guard  as  an  Italian  national  force  and  to 
portray  himself,  an  Italian  emperor  threatened  by  the  legions  of 
Germany,  as  the  natural  focus  of  Praetorian  fidelity. 
36 
Whatever  the  reasons  for  the  dismissals  of  Antonius  Naso  and  Antonius 
Taurus,  it  is  quite  clear  that  Galba  had  by  January  of  AD.  69 
forfeited  the  loyalty  of  many  Praetorians,  officers  and  men  alike. 
Some  were  disappointed  in  their  hopes  of  a  donative,  while  others 
were  anxious  over  the  effects  of  future  purges.  Many,  accustomed 
to  Nero's  open  contempt  for  the  Senate,  will  have  reacted  with 
dismay  to  the  favour  and  apparent  respect  which  Galba  accorded  to 
that  bo4y! 
37 
Yet  the  emperor  was  not  without  his  supporters,  and 
such  dissent  as  existed  was  expressed  in  furtive  complaints  and  a 
sullen  broodiness.  Any  thoughts  of  conspiracy  were,  before  the 
10th  of  January,  confined  to  the  darker  fantasies  of  the  more 
embittered  Praetorians.  Yet  the  tinder  was  ready;  all  that  was 
lacking  / 122. 
lacking  was  a  spark  to  set  it  ablaze.  'Marcus  Salvius  Otho  was  to 
provide  that  spark. 
38 
Otho,  desperate  to  become  the  old  emperor's  heir,  worked  hard  to 
ingratiate  himself  with  the  Praetorians,  implicitly  acknowledging  how 
vital  their  support  would  be  with  regard  to  the  succession.  While 
accompanying  Galba  from  Spain,  he  took  care  to  appear  affable  to  the 
Praetorian  cohort  which  escorted  the  emperor  on  that  journey. 
39 
In 
Rome  his  continuing  concern  for  the  Praetorians  contrasted  sharply 
with  Galba's  attitude  which  fluctuated  between  studied  indifference 
and  overt  suspicion.  He  took  the  trouble  to  learn  the  names  of 
individual  Praetorians40  and  lost  no  opportunity  to  encourage  the 
fond  reminiscences  of  the  older  soldiers  over  the  halcyon  days  of 
Nero's  principate. 
41 
He  used  his  influence  with  the  emperor  and  the 
powerful  members  of  his  court  to  help  some  win  promotion. 
42 
So 
eager  was  he  to  win  popularity  that  he  was  prepared  to  increase  his 
already  huge  debts 
43 
so  that  he  might  have  money  to  lend  to  needy 
Praetorians. 
44 
He  was  especially  attentive  to  the  needs  of  the 
inner  bodyguard,  the  speculatores,  to  the  extent  of  buying  a  farm 
for  one  of  that  unit,  Cocceius  Proculus,  who  had  become  involved  in 
a  dispute  with  his  neighbour  over  boundaries. 
45 
By  such  actions 
and  by  his  deliberately  ambiguous  statements  about  Galba, 
46 
Otho 
clearly  left  himself  open  to  charges  of  subversion  which  might  have 
been  laid  against  him  had  Cornelius  Laco,  the  Praetorian  prefect, 
been  more  attentive  to  his  duty  and  less  obsessed  with  surpassing 
his  rival,  Vinius,  in  influence  with  Galba. 
The  adoption  of  Piso  Licinianus  placed  Otho  in  a  hopeless  position 
and  / 123. 
and  forced  him  to  make  common  cause  with  the  still  influential 
remnants  of  Tigellinus'  clique, 
47 
one  of  whom,  Maevius  Pudens,  had 
already,  perhaps  on  his  own  initiative,  begun  a  more  sinister 
subversion  of  the  Praetorians  by  presenting  100  sesterces  to  all  the 
members  of  the  cohort  which  escorted  Galba  whenever  he  dined  with 
Otho. 
48 
Otho's  freedman,  Onomastus,  commissioned  two  of  the  inner 
bodyguard,  Barbius  Proculus  and  Veturius,  to  foster  the  dissent  and 
disaffection  which  already  existed  not  only  in  the  Praetorian  Guard49 
but  also  among  the  legionary  and  auxiliary  detachments  temporarily 
based  in  the  environs  of  Rome. 
50 
Although  many  were  aware  that  a 
coup  was  imminent  and  were  sympathetic  to  its  aims,  the  active 
conspirators  numbered  only  twenty-three. 
51 
When,  on  the  15th  of 
January,  Otho  left  Galba  sacrificing  at  the  temple  of  Apollo  and 
met  this  group  at  the  Golden  Milestone,  he  was  dismayed  at  the 
paucity  of  support. 
52 
Despite  his  apparent  reluctance,  Otho  was 
placed  in  a  litter  and  carried  to  the  Praetorian  camp. 
53 
By  the  time 
he  reached  the  camp  he  had  around  50  men  with  him. 
54 
It  was  at 
this  stage  that  Nymphidius'  plot  had  fallen  apart,  but  that,  of 
course,  was  before  the  Praetorians  had  practical  experience  of  Galba's 
concept  of  discipline.  Nor  was  the  tribune  on  duty,  Julius 
Martialis,  disposed  to  act  as  vigorously  in  his  emperor's  interests 
as  Antonius  Honoratus  had  been. 
55 
Those  tribunes  most  loyal  to 
Galba  were,  in  fact,  with  the  emperor  at  the  temple  of  Apollo  and 
in  their  absence  none  of  the  other  tribunes  or  centurions  were 
prepared  to  take  the  lead  in  suppressing  the  coup. 
When  rumours  of  what  was  happening  reached  Galba,  he  reacted  with 
commendable  / 124. 
commendable  decisiveness.  Piso  addressed  the  Praetorian  cohort  on 
duty56  and  their  response  to  his  plea  for  loyalty  was  not  unfavourable, 
although  the  remaining  speculatores  had  by  now  disappeared.  57 
Three  Praetorian  tribunes,  Cetrius  Severus,  Subrius  Dexter  and 
Pompeius  Longinus  were  despatched  to  the  camp  to  discover  the  extent 
of  the  mutiny  and  to  assess  whether  it  might  yet  be  crushed. 
58 
Piso  was  to  follow  once  the  situation  became  clearer. 
59 
Help  was 
also  sought  from  the  Illyrian  and  German  detachments  in  the 
Vipsanian  Colonnade  and  the  Hall  of  Liberty. 
60 
Galba's  unpopularity 
ensured  the  failure  of  these  counter-measures.  Pompeius  Longinus, 
a  close  frie,  id  of  the  emperor  was  beaten  up  at  the  Praetorian  camp 
and  his  two  colleagues  imprisoned. 
61 
Piso,  hearing  the  roars  of 
support  with  which  the  soldiers  in  the  Praetorian  camp  greeted  Otho's 
speech,  decided  to  turn  back  to  the  city. 
62 
Although  the  detachment 
from  the  German  legions  was  eager  to  help  Galba,  none  of  the  other 
units  were  prepared  to  listen  to  his  envoys. 
63 
The  soldiers  of 
Legio  I  Adiutrix  were,  as  expected,  violently  hostile  to  Galba64 
who  now  had  the  support  only  of  the  fickle  Roman  mob  and  of  his 
immediate  entourage,  the  principal  members  of  which,  Laco  and  Vinius, 
continued  to  the  end  that  bitter  squabbling  in  which  they  had 
indulged,  to  their  emperor's  ruin,  throughout  his  principate. 
65 
After  putting  on  a  breastplate,  Galba  left  his  palace,  pausing  only 
to  rebuke  Julius  Atticus,  a  member  of  his  inner  bodyguard,  who  now 
claimed,  mischievously  and  maliciously,  to  have  killed  Otho. 
66 
It 
was  the  last  reprimand  of  the  old  disciplinarian.  Already,  in  the 
Praetorian  camp,  his  statue  had  been  overturned67  and  the  soldiers, 
Praetorians  / 125. 
Praetorians  and  legionaries  alike,  galvanised  by  Otho's  rhetoric 
and  intoxicated  by  their  own  boldness,  were  heading  towards  the 
centre  of  Rome  with  but  one  thought  in  their  minds  -  to  kill 
Galba. 
68 
When  the  first  cavalrymen  appeared,  Atilius  Vergilio, 
the  standard-bearer  of  the  cohort  escorting  Galba,  tore  the 
emperor's  portrait  from  the  standard  and  threw  it  to  the  ground. 
69 
The  mob,  so  vociferous  in  their  cries  for  Otho's  head  shortly 
before,  melted  away. 
7° 
Galba,  his  litter  overturned,  was 
butchered  in  the  Forum  near  the  Lacus  Curtius.  71 
Vinius  died, 
despite  his  claims  to  have  known  about  the  conspiracy,  a  short 
distance  away  in  front  of  the  temple  of  Julius  Caesar. 
72 
The 
bravery  of  a  Praetorian  centurion,  Sempronius  Densus,  allowed 
Piso  to  find  a  temporary  sanctuary  in  the  temple  of  Vesta. 
73 
But 
the  rebels  had  little  time  for  religious  niceties.  He  was  dragged 
out  and  murdered  near  the  door  of  the  temple. 
74 
The  heads  of  t%e 
victims  were  placed  on  poles  beside  the  Praetorian  and  legionary 
standards. 
75 
So  began  Otho's  principate,  born  in  blood. 
The  new  emperor's  first  task  was  to  reimpose  some  form  of  discipline 
on  the  Praetorians.  But  he  had,  by  encouraging  them  to  break  their 
oath  of  loyalty  to  Galba,  created  a  monster  of  greater  potency  than 
he  realised  and  he  was  never  able  throughout  his  principate  to  gain 
complete  control  over  the  Guard. 
76 
This  was,  in  large  degree,  due 
to  the  different  perceptions  of  the  Praetorians  and  of  Otho  as  to 
the  exact  nature  of  the  relationship  between  them.  The  Praetorians 
believed  that  it  was  due  to  their  efforts  that  Otho  had  become 
princeps.  They  were  also  convinced  that  his  continuing  tenure  of 
the  principate  was  dependent  on  their  vigilance  against  senatorial 
conspiracies.  / 126. 
conspiracies. 
For  Otho  the  issue  was  rather  more  complex.  He  could  not  deny  the 
importance  of  Praetorian  support  both  in  his  accession  and  as  the 
bulwark  of  his  principate.  Neither  did  he  wish  to  deny  this,  for 
it  suited  him  to  be  able  to  portray  himself  in  the  Senate  not  as 
the  instigator  of  a  bloody  conspiracy,  but  as  the  reluctant 
beneficiary  of  a  violence  which  he  personally  abhorred. 
77 
He 
acknowledged  his  debt  to  the  Praetorians  by  allowing  them  to  choose 
their  own  prefects  and  by  approving  a  change,  which  they  demanded, 
to  the  system  of  buying  furloughs  from  centurions. 
78 
Thereafter 
he  began  to  distance  himself  somewhat  from  them,  for  he  knew  that, 
if  the  Praetorians  were  perceived  to  be  dictating  the  direction  of 
his  principate,  the  consequences  were  likely  to  be  ruinous  to  his 
attempts  to  win  genuine  support  within  the  Senate. 
79. 
But  the  achievement  of  such  a  balance  needed  both  time  and  the  absence 
of  external  pressure.  Neither  of  these  was  granted  to  Otho.  From 
the  very  beginning  of  his  principate  he  had  to  contend  with  a 
propaganda  onslaught  by  the  Vitellians  which  was  both  vigorous  and 
subtle.  Fabius  Valens  wrote  to  the  Praetorian  and  urban  cohorts, 
pointing  out  the  imbalance  in  strength  between  the  German  legions  and 
themselves  and  suggesting,  with  his  tongue  firmly  in  his  cheek,  that 
precedence  should  be  given  to  Vitellius'  claims  since  the  rebellion 
of  the  German  legions  occurred  before  the  conspiracy  which  led  to 
Otho's  accession. 
80 
The  Vitellians  also  issued  a  'military'  group 
of  anonymous  denarii,  bearing  on  the  reverse  the  inscriptions  FIDES 
PRAETORIANORUM  / 127. 
PRAETORIANORUM  and  CONCORDIA  PRAETORIANORUM. 
81 
The  purpose  of 
these  issues,  which  omitted  all  reference  to  Vitellius,  was,  in 
part,  to  invoke  a  spirit  of  unity  between  the  legions  and  the 
Praetorians  and  to  influence  the  Praetorians  to  desert  Otho  and  join 
the  German  legions. 
82 
But,  in  reality,  the  Vitellians  had  little 
doubt  about  the  extent  of  the  Praetorians'  commitment  to  the 
Othonian  cause.  We  know  that  they  were  determined  not  to  allow 
the  Praetorian  contingent  of  an  Othonian  embassy  to  Germany  to 
communicate  in  any  way  with  the  legionaries. 
83 
We  may  therefore 
detect  a  more  subtle  motive  behind  their  production  of  such  coinage. 
For  the  Vitellians,  realising  the  futility  of  any  attempt  to  seduce 
the  Praetorians  from  their  loyalty  to  Otho,  may  have  regarded  these 
issues  as  a  device  with  which  to  convince  the  Praetorians  that  there 
were  those  with  Vitellian  sympathies  even  within  their  own  corps. 
In  this  way  they  could  destabilise  the  regime  by  increasing  the 
amount  of  suspicion  felt  generally  throughout  Rome  and  especially 
between  the  Praetorians  and  their  centurions  and  tribunes. 
84 
This  brooding  suspicion  erupted  into  fatal  violence  in  early  March 
during  a  misguided  attempt  by  Varius  Crispinus,  a  Praetorian  tribune, 
using  troops  of  the  17th  urban  cohort  from  Ostia, 
85 
to  remove  a  large 
amount  of  weapons  from  the  armoury  of  the  Praetorian  camp. 
86 
The 
intended  destination  of  these  weapons  remains  unclear,  though  it  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  move  was  connected  with  the  general 
mobilisation  which  Otho  had  ordered. 
87 
Crispinus'  decision  to  carry 
out  his  mission  late  at  night  was,  given  the  pervasive  atmosphere  of 
suspicion  among  the  Praetorians,  foolish  in  the  extreme.  The 
Praetorians  / 128. 
Praetorians,  many  of  whom  had  taken  drink,  were  quick  to  see  in 
Crispinus'  midnight  manoeuvres  the  beginning  of  the  sort  of 
conspiracy,  involving  their  own  officers  and  forces  controlled  by 
the  Senate,  which  they  had  long  feared.  Their  reaction  was 
predictably  violent.  Crispinus  and  some  centurions  were  killed  at 
the  camp.  Then,  as  they  had  done  seven  weeks  earlier,  the 
Praetorians  galloped  towards  Rome,  to  save  their  emperor  from  the 
plot  which  they  imagined  was  about  to  engulf  him.  The  banquet  at 
which  Otho  was  entertaining  many  senators  and  their  wives  broke  up 
in  confusion  as  Otho  sent  the  Praetorian  prefects  to  try,  at  least, 
to  delay  the  rampaging  troops. 
88 
That  they  were  partly  successful 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  most  of  Otho's  guests  managed  to  get  away 
unharmed.  By  the  time  the  Praetorians  actually  burst  into  the 
palace,  their  intended  victims  were  gone  and  they  exorcised  their 
rage  by  wounding  Julius  Martialis,  the  Praetorian  tribune,  who  for 
the  second  time  in  two  months  found  himself  the  object  of  his  men's 
fury,  and  Vitellius  Saturninus,  probably  the  commander  of  Legio  I 
Adiutrix. 
89 
There  was  much  verbal  abuse  of  the  other  tribunes  and 
centurions  present  and  it  was  only  after  Otho  himself  spoke  to  the 
rioters  that  they  reluctantly  returned  to  their  camp. 
90 
On  the  following  day  Licinius  Proculus  and  Plotius  Firmus,  the 
prefects,  each  in  his  own  way,  harangued  the  troops  for  their 
misconduct.  But  they  were  also  careful  to  defuse  the  Praetorians' 
anger  by  announcing  that  a  donative  of  5000  sesterces  was  to  be  paid 
to  each  soldier. 
91 
When  Otho  eventually  entered  the  camp,  he  was 
immediately  surrounded  by  tribunes  and  centurions  protesting  over 
the  / 129. 
the  lack  of  discipline  among  the  Praetorians. 
92 
Otho  was  aware, 
as  his  speech  clearly  shows,  of  the  limits  of  his  power  when  dealing 
with  the  Praetorians.  His  words  were  specifically  devised  to 
offend  no-one.  Although  he  ordered  the  execution  of  two  of  the 
ringleaders  and  made  much  of  the  virtues  of  strict  discipline, 
93 
he  could  not  afford  to  alienate  his  main  source  of  support  and  he 
chose  to  attribute  the  entire  incident  to  the  "nimia  pietas"  of  the 
Praetorians. 
94 
The  more  extreme  of  the  Praetorians  were  now 
convinced  not  only  that  their  actions  of  the  previous  night  had  been 
vindicated  by  Otho's  words,  but  also  that  the  emperor,  despite  his 
fulsome  praise  of  the  Senate,  had  given  his  tacit  approval  to  the 
clandestine  surveillance  of  the  activities  of  senators  whom  they 
suspected  of  sympathising  with  Vitellius. 
95 
Every  action  of  Otho's  generals,  Suetonius  Paulinus,  Marius  Celsus, 
Annius  Gallus  and  Vestricius  Spurinna  was  judged  by  the  Praetorians 
in  the  light  of  these  suspicions.  Caution  was  interpreted  as 
cowardice,  the  avoidance  of  recklessness  as  treachery.  Nor  were 
the  Praetorians  slow  to  voice  such  suspicions  to  Otho  himself96 
who,  pressured  in  this  way,  began  to  rely  less  on  his  experienced 
commanders  than  on  Ti4anus,  his  brother  and,  disastrously,  on 
r 
Licinius  Proculus,  one  of  the  Praetorian  prefects,  an  inveterate 
intriguer,  whose  military  experience  was  limited  to  policing  and 
parade-ground  activities97  and  who  was  to  add  his  own  particular 
brand  of  incompetent  leadership  to  an  army  in  which  indiscipline 
was  already  endemic. 
This  / 130. 
This  anarchy  dogged  the  naval  expeditionary  force  which  Otho  sent 
to  Liguria  in  the  hope  that  its  presence  would  force  Fabius  Valens 
to  split  his  forces. 
98 
However,  the  main  activities  of  these 
soldiers,  which  included  a  contingent  from  the  Praetorian  Guard,  as 
they  sailed  north,  were  plunder  and  murder. 
99 
When  one  of  their 
commanders,  Aemilius  Pacensis,  a  loyal  supporter  of  Otho,  tried  to 
stop  such  excesses,  they  imprisoned  him. 
100 
If  this  venture  was 
later  considered  a  success,  it  can  only  be  because  it  turned  out  to 
be  less  than  the  total  failure  it  initially  promised  to  be. 
101 
The  situation  was  little  better  in  the  main  Othonian  army  which  had 
moved  northwards  to  defend  the  line  of  the  river  Po.  The  belief 
that  Spurinna  and  even  their  own  officers  were  not  acting  with  the 
necessary  vigour  led  the  3  Praetorian  cohorts  at  Placentia  to 
advance  from  their  secure  base  into  a  dangerously  exposed  position102 
before  distaste  for  the  work  involved  in  building  defensive 
fortifications, 
103 
allied  to  a  realisation  of  the  likely  consequences 
if  Caecina's  legions  caught  them  in  such  a  weak  position,  allowed 
wiser  counsels  to  prevail  and  the  cohorts  meekly  followed  Spurinna 
back  to  Placentia. 
104 
Even  success  on  the  battlefield,  if  it  was  less  than  total,  was  not 
enough  for  some  in  Otho's  army.  Martius  Macer,  who  commanded  a 
detachment  of  gladiators  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Po  opposite 
Cremona,  was  denounced  as  a  traitor  when  he  withdrew  his  puny  force 
which  had  routed  some  Vitellian  auxiliaries  in  a  raid  on  the  northern 
bank  of  the  river  rather  than  recklessly  permit  it  to  face  the  might 
of  Caecina's  legions. 
105 
If  victory  was  so  judged,  there  could 
be  / 131. 
be  little  doubt  how  the  Praetorians  would  react  in  the  face  of 
defeat.  Their  response  to  the  loss  of  the  battle  of  Bedriacum 
where  they  had  fought  bravely  was  predictably  violent.  In  their 
despair  and  confusion  they  attributed  this  defeat  to  high-level 
treachery106  and  were  with  difficulty  restrained  from  massacring 
the  members  of  the  Senate  at  Brixellum  and  Mutina. 
107 
The  defeat  at  Bedriacum  and  the  collapse  of  the  Othonian  cause 
found  his  Praetorians  scattered  throughout  northern  Italy. 
Vitellius  was  eager  to  disarm  and  disband  them,  for,  fully-armed 
and  believing  that  victory  had  been  snatched  from  them  by  deceit, 
they  were  clearly  dangerous. 
108 
Any  doubts  he  may  have  had  over 
the  wisdom  of  this  move  were  dispelled  by  a  riot  in  Turin  during 
which  two  Praetorian  cohorts  joined  with  units  of  the  14th  legion 
against  some  Batavian  auxiliaries  of  Vitellius. 
109 
It  was  clear 
that  a  wholesale  purge  was  unavoidable.  Yet  it  was  in  Vitellius' 
interest  to  ensure  that  the  process  was  free  of  bloodshed.  There 
were  some  executions  but,  at  least  as  far  as  the  Praetorians  were 
concerned,  they  affected  only  those  who  had  claimed  rewards  for 
their  roles  in  the  murder  of  Galba. 
110 
The  terms  which  the  new 
emperor  offered  to  Otho's  Praetorians  were  not  ungenerous.  They 
received  honourable  discharges  and  retained  their  right  to  an 
allocation  of  land  or  a  money  payment  in  lieu. 
ill 
Some  may  have 
settled  in  the  district  around  Forum  Julii  or  possibly  at  Aquileia. 
112 
Unfortunately  for  Vitellius  the  process  of  demobilisation  had  scarcely 
been  completed  when  in  August  the  news  of  the  Flavian  revolt  offered 
the  resentful  Praetorians  an  opportunity  for  revenge  which  they  were 
quick  to  seize. 
113 
Vitellius  / 132. 
Vitellius  himself  was  not  a  brave  man  and  felt  the  need  to  be  well 
guarded  at  all  times.  He  could  hardly  be  seen  among  the  crowd  of 
his  bodyguards  as  he  climbed  the  Capitol. 
114 
When  Helvidius 
Priscus  spoke  out  against  him  in  the  Senate,  he  immediately  summoned 
the  Praetorian  tribunes  to  his  side. 
115 
But  Vitellius'  personal 
fears  over  his  security  were  not  the  main  reason  for  his  re-organisation 
of  the  Praetorian  Guard. 
116 
The  uncertain  military  outlook  certainly 
played  a  part.  The  most  important  factor,  however,  was  the  expecta- 
tion  of  Vitellius'  soldiers  that  they  had  merited  promotion  to  the 
Praetorian  or  urban  cohorts.  As  Fabia  puts  it,  'Vitellius  ne 
choisit  pas  ses  pretoriens,  il  se  les  laissa  imposer'. 
117 
To 
accommodate  the  large  numbers  who  volunteered  for  service  in  the 
Rome  garrison,  both  the  number  of  cohorts  and  their  effective  were 
increased.  16  Praetorian  cohorts  were  established,  each  1000 
strong. 
118 
Suetonius  indicates  that  the  old  cohorts  were 
completely  disbanded. 
119 
If  we  accept  this,  we  have  to  assume  that 
up  to  20,000  men  -  Tacitus'  figure  -  were  removed  from  those 
legions  with  Vitellius  in  Rome. 
120 
If  Vitellius'  army  was  60,000 
strong,  as  Garzetti  estimates,  when  he  entered  Rome,  then  it  is 
possible  that  20,000  men  could  have  been  transferred  to  the  Rome 
militia  without  destroying  the  combat  effectiveness  of  the  legions. 
121 
But  60,000  seems  an  enormous  figure.  There  were  8  legions  on  the 
Rhine  of  which  Vitellius  brought  3  complete,  and  vexillationes  from 
the  rest  and  from  those  in  Britain  -  hardly  more  than  30,000  at 
most,  probably  fewer.  We  should,  therefore,  take  some  care  over 
Tacitus'  large  figures.  Keppie  rightly  points  out  that,  if  20,000 
men  were  withdrawn  from  Vitellius'  legions,  they  'would  have  all  but 
ceased  to  exist  as  fighting  formations  which  clearly  was  not  the 
122 
case'. 133. 
Vitellius'  Praetorians  did  not  participate  in  the  second  battle  of 
Bedriacum,  where  their  experience  and  enthusiasm  for  their  emperor's 
cause  were  sorely  missed.  But  it  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event. 
There  were  clearly  reasons  why  Vitellius  did  not  commit  his 
Praetorians  at  this  stage  in  the  campaign.  He  may  have  had 
suspicions  as  to  the  loyalty  of  his  own  generals,  justifiably  in 
the  case  of  Caecina, 
123 
less  excusably  as  regards  Fabius  Valens  who, 
somewhat  surprisingly,  shared  Vitellius'  disinclination  to  send  the 
Praetorians  away  from  Rome  and  to  the  battlefront. 
124 
The  dubious 
loyalty  of  the  fleet  at  Misenum  may  have  been  a  factor  in  this 
decision. 
125 
But  surely  the  main  cause  of  the  emperor's  reluctance 
to  permit  his  Praetorians  to  leave  Rome  was  his  fear,  shared  by  the 
soldiers  themselves,  that  there  existed  within  Rome  a  Flavian  fifth 
column  whose  treacherous  intentions  were  thwarted  only  because  of 
the  presence  of  the  Praetorians. 
The  Praetorians  also  became  convinced,  especially  after  the  Flavian 
victory  in  the  second  battle  of  Bedriacum,  that  many  of  their 
officers  were,  at  best,  lukewarm  in  their  commitment  to  the 
Vitellian  cause  or,  at  worst,  actively  conspiring  with  the  Flavians 
both  in  Rome  and  on  the  battlefront. 
126 
These  suspicions  hardened 
when  Julius  Priscus  and  Alfenus  Varus,  the  Praetorian  prefects, 
halted  the  14  Praetorian  cohorts  and  cavalry,  which  Vitellius  had 
given  them  to  counter  the  Flavian  thrust  down  the  Adriatic  coast, 
on  the  western  side  of  the  Appennines  at  Mevania,  before  withdrawing 
20  miles  to  Narnia.  Although  these  moves  were  justifiable  and  even 
sensible  on  purely  military  grounds,  they  had  a  disastrous  effect  on 
the  / 134. 
the  confidence  of  the  Praetorians  in  their  officers  who  they  now 
believed  were  colluding  with  the  Flavians. 
127 
It  is  against  this 
background  that  we  should  judge  the  desertions  of  a  considerable 
number  of  tribunes  and  centurions  from  the  Praetorian  army  at 
Narnia. 
128 
Although  it  is  possible  that  these  men  defected  to  the 
Flavians  as  a  result  of  some  prior  arrangement,  it  seems  more  likely 
that  the  desertions  were  prompted  by  the  increasing  hostility  which 
they,  as  officers,  faced  from  their  own  troops  as  the  likelihood  of 
a  Flavian  victory  increased. 
On  the  15th  of  December  the  Vitellian  troops  at  Narnia  capitulated129 
On  the  following  day  Antonius  Primus  moved  from  Narnia  to  Ocriculum, 
while  Petilius  Cerialis  advanced  'per  agrum  Sabinum'  to  approach 
Rome  from  the  north-east. 
130 
The  situation  in  the  south  where 
Lucius  Vitellius  was  attempting  with  6  Praetorian  cohorts  and  500 
cavalry  to  take  Terracina  was  unclear. 
131 
Both  Primus  and 
Mucianus  had  written  to  Vitellius  urging  him  to  abdicate  and 
guaranteeing  his  safety  and  that  of  his  family. 
132 
On  the  18th, 
Vitellius,  in  despair,  attempted  to  deposit  the  imperial  insignia  in 
the  temple  of  Concordia,  but  his  troops  refused  to  let  him  pass  and 
he  was  compelled  to  return  to  his  palace. 
133 
His  own  vacillation 
was  matched  by  the  Praetorians'  intransigence.  It  was  to  prove  a 
disastrous  combination. 
On  the  evening  of  the  17th  Flavius  Sabinus,  despite  his  initial 
reluctance  to  mobilise  the  Flavian  supporters  within  Rome, 
134 
called 
a  meeting  of  leading  senators  and  equites,  together  with  the  officers 
of  the  urban  cohorts  and  the  Vigiles. 
135 
He  had  already,  in  his 
capacity  as  praefectus  urbi,  written  to  the  tribunes  of  the 
Praetorian  / 135. 
Praetorian  Guard  urging  them  to  keep  a  right  control  over  their  men 
in  the  period  between  Vitellius'  abdication  and  the  arrival  of  the 
main  Flavian  force  under  Primus. 
136 
His  aim  was  probably  to 
confine  the  Praetorians  to  their  barracks  while  using  the  3  urban 
cohorts  at  his  disposal  to  police  the  city  and  to  prevent  any 
resistance  by  Vitellian  hardliners.  But  what  seemed  to  Sabinus  a 
sensible  precaution,  was  perceived  by  the  3  Praetorian  cohorts  as 
the  culmination  of  the  treachery  whose  existence,  however  latent, 
they  had  long  suspected. 
137 
Vitellius'  failure  to  abdicate  frustrated  Sabinus'  hopes  for  a 
peaceful  handover  of  power,  since  it  gave  encouragement  to  the 
diehards,  the  'promptissimi  Vitellianorum'. 
138 
On  the  other  hand, 
Sabinus'  plans  were  too  far  advanced  and  his  own  involvement  in  the 
affair  too  conspicuous  for  him  to  contemplate  postponement  or 
cancellation.  The  inevitable  clash  occurred. 
139 
Sabinus  and  a 
mixed  group  of  Flavian  adherents  took  refuge  on  the  south-western 
height  of  the  Capitoline  hill  on  which  stood  the  temple  of  Jupiter 
Capitolinus.  A  besieging  force  of  sorts  took  up  positions  around 
them.  But  these  soldiers  were  indisciplined  and  careless,  perhaps 
deliberately,  since,  the  Praetorians'  fanaticism  notwithstanding,  a 
Flavian  victory  now  appeared  certain.  Sabinus  took  advantage  of 
the  gaps  in  the  Vitellian  cordon  to  get  potential  hostages  into  the 
Capitol  and  to  send  a  messenger  to  Antonius  Primus  at  Ocriculum 
outlining  his  position  and  asking  for  immediate  help. 
140 
Yet  there 
was  no  real  sense  of  desperation  at  this  time  and  Sabinus  still  hoped 
that  what  he  regarded  as  a  misunderstanding  could  be  cleared  up  by 
re-opening  / 136. 
re-opening  negotiations  with  Vitellius. 
On  the  following  morning,  the  19th  of  December,  he  therefore  sent 
his  representative,  Cornelius  Martialis,  to  Vitellius  on  the 
Palatine. 
141 
Vitellius'  position  had  by  this  time  improved 
considerably,  due  largely  to  the  efforts  of  his  Praetorians. 
News  had  reached  him  of  the  capture  of  Terracina  by  his  brother 
Lucius. 
142 
The  6  Praetorian  cohorts  which  had  crushed  the 
rebellion  in  Campania  were  therefore,  available  to  reinforce  the 
limited  forces  which  Vitellius  had  at  his  disposal  in  Rome.  More 
importantly,  at  least  in  the  short  term,  that  very  morning  an 
attack  launched  by  Cerialis  on  the  north-eastern  suburbs  of  Rome 
with  1000  cavalry  had  been  repulsed,  probably  by  Vitellius' 
Praetorians. 
143 
These  victories  not  only  increased  the  morale  of 
the  Vitellians  generally  but,  as  far  as  the  defeat  of  the  Flavian 
force  at  the  Colline  Gate  was  concerned,  confirmed  the  Praetorians' 
suspicions  that  Sabinus  had  colluded  with  Petilius  Cerialis  and  was, 
despite  his  protestations  to  the  contrary,  a  flagrant  coupist. 
Vitellius,  only  too  aware  of  his  inability  to  control  his  by  now 
frenzied  and  officerless  Praetorians,  advised  Martialis  to  leave 
the  palace  secretly  to  avoid  being  killed  by  the  Praetorians  as 
'internuntius  invisae  pacis'. 
144 
No  sooner  had  Martialis  returned 
to  the  Capitol  than  the  initial  assult  on  the  Flavians  was  launched 
by  the  cavalry  component  of  at  least  some  of  the  3  Praetorian 
cohorts. 
145 
The  outcome  was  hardly  in  doubt.  The  Flavians  were 
crushed.  Sabinus,  numbed  by  the  extent  of  the  catastrophe  which  his 
actions  / 137. 
actions  had  provoked,  was  arrested 
146 
and  led  in  chains  to  Vitellius 
whose  impotence  in  this  situation  was  most  clearly  signalled  by  his 
inability  to  save  the  prefect.  He  was  stabbed,  possibly  by  a 
Praetorian,  and  hacked  to  death  by  the  mob.  His  head  was  cut  off 
and  the  decapitated  body  dragged  to  the  Gemonian  steps. 
147 
It  was 
murder  and  was  not  to  be  forgiven. 
The  Praetorians  now  prepared  to  meet  the  assault  which  they  knew  that 
they  must  face  from  the  main  Flavian  force  under  Antonius  Primus. 
The  people,  more  excitable  than  loyal,  demanded  weapons.  These  they 
were  given  together  with  their  emperor's  blessing  and  the  vaguest  of 
instructions. 
148 
From  such  levies  little  could  be  expected. 
Vitellius'  hopes,  such  as  they  were,  lay  elsewhere.  Representatives 
of  the  Senate  were  sent  to  try  to  negotiate  with  Primus.  So  too 
were  the  Vestals.  But  the  time  for  compromise  was  past,  as  dead  as 
Vespasian's  brother.  The  priestesses  were  listened  to,  then 
dismissed  with  honour.  Other  delegates  were  handled  more  roughly, 
especially  by  Petilius  Cerialis'  troops. 
149 
Honour  demanded  that 
their  humiliation  by  the  Praetorians  on  the  previous  day  be  avenged. 
Rome  was  to  be  spared  nothing. 
The  Flavian  attack,  in  three  columns,  on  the  20th  encountered  sturdy 
resistance.  But  the  advance  was  relentless. 
150 
The  most  bitter 
fighting  occurred  at  the  Praetorian  camp  where  the  Vitellians,  out- 
numbered  and  without  hope,  fought  determinedly  from  the  battlements 
and  towers  until,  after  the  gates  had  been  broken  down  by  the 
Flavians,  professional  pride  demanded  a  final,  suicidal  charge. 
151 
Their  / 138. 
Their  emperor,  irresolute  to  the  last,  died  with  less  honour. 
152 
The  victory  of  the  Flavians,  signalled  by  the  salutation  of 
Domitian  as  Caesar,  brought  the  fighting  to  an  end. 
153 
The  6 
remaining  cohorts  of  Vitellius'  Praetorians  surrendered,  bitterly 
and  reluctantly,  at  Bovillae,  ten  miles  south  of  Rome. 
154 
Antonius  Primus  appointed  the  popular  Arrius  Varus  as  Praetorian 
prefect  but,  realising  the  extent  of  the  problem,  preferred  to 
postpone  any  general  reorganisation  of  the  Guard  until  Mucianus 
arrived  in  Rome. 
155 
There  were  two  main  difficulties  to  be  overcome.  Firstly,  the 
Praetorian  Guard  was  seriously  over-subscribed.  Many  of  the 
Praetorians  of  Vitellius,  who,  even  allowing  for  desertions  and 
casualties,  may  have  numbered  well  over  10,000  men,  were  unwilling 
to  give  up  their  membership  of  this  corps.  Those  Othonians,  who 
had  fought  with  Primus  at  Bedriacum156  and  had  taken  part  in  the 
storming  of  the  Praetorian  camp, 
157 
had  been  drawn  to  Vespasian's 
cause  partly  by  the  prospect  of  reinstatement. 
158 
Moreover, 
those  promises  of  transfer  to  the  Praetorian  Guard  which  had  been 
made,  or  half-made,  to  a  number  of  legionaries  in  the  Flavian  armies 
could  not  easily  be  overlooked. 
159 
Secondly,  quite  apart  from  the 
actual  number  of  soldiers,  it  was  clear  that  the  loyalty  of  many 
Vitellians  was,  at  best,  questionable  and  that  a  purge  of  suspect 
elements  was  both  essential  and  urgent. 
160 
Mucianus'  first  attempt,  however,  in  a  selection  ceremony  at  the 
Praetorian  / 139. 
Praetorian  camp,  to  dismiss  those  Vitellians  who  had  been  captured 
in  Rome  or  had  surrendered  at  Bovillae  provoked  such  an  uproar  that 
he  thought  it  expedient  to  postpone  the  process. 
161 
A  few  days 
later  Domitian  addressed  this  same  group  of  Vitellians  and  offered 
land  to  any  who  withdrew  from  the  Guard.  There  were  few  takers. 
The  leaders  of  the  Flavian  party  took  a  realistic  view  of  this 
rejection  and  accepted  all  applicants.  Honourable  discharges, 
however,  were  granted  to  those  who  had  completed  their  full  term  of 
service.  Those  of  the  others  who  failed  to  appreciate  the  limits 
of  Flavian  generosity  were  weeded  out  later  on  an  individual  basis 
as  pretexts  arose. 
162 
The  new  Praetorian  Guard,  an  amalgam  of  Othonians,  Vitellians  and 
Flavians,  became,  as  Mucianus  hoped,  soldiers  'eiusdem  sacramenti, 
eiusdem  imperatoris'. 
163 
To  emphasise  that  the  days  of 
factionalism  were  at  an  end  and  to  stress  the  regard  in  which  the 
Praetorians  were  held  they  were  given  as  prefects,  firstly, 
Arrecinus  Clemens,  related  to  the  new  emperor  by  marriage, 
164 
and 
later,  Titus,  Vespasian's  son  and  heir. 
165 
It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  assume  that  the  function  of  the 
Praetorian  Guard  changed  under  the  Flavians.  The  Praetorians  were 
used,  as  they  had  been  from  their  inception,  to  suppress  ruthlessly 
political  dissent.  That  the  rewards  for  such  loyalty  were  less 
excessive  than  in  the  past  was  probably  a  reflection  of  Vespasian's 
belief  in  the  virtues  of  frugality  and  of  strong  discipline. 
166 
Under  his  firm  hand  any  pretensions  which  the  Praetorians  might  have 
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had  to  a  greater  role  within  the  state  were  firmly  controlled. 
But  these  men  had  in  eighteen  months  made  and  unmade  four  emperors. 
They  had  seized  the  opportunities  offered  to  them  and  had  defended 
ferociously  what  they  had  gained.  The  taste  of  power  had  been 
sweet.  But  costly.  Their  defeats  had  been  chastening  and  the 
subsequent  humiliations  mortifying.  But  humility  had  never  been 
a  Praetorian  virtue.  The  old  arrogance  was  never  far  from  the 
surface.  There  would  be  other  emperors  needing  Praetorian  support 
and  willing  to  pay  for  it.  And  the  price  would,  as  ever,  be  high. CHAPTER  VII 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  AS  A  POLITICAL  FORCE 
The  Praetorians  have  not  enjoyed  a  good  history.  They  are  convention- 
ally  portrayed  as  vicious,  venal  and  riotous,  every  ready  to  intervene 
in  politics  and  matters  of  state  when  they  perceive  their  interests  to 
be  threatened,  or  even  when  their  fancy  dictates. 
1 
In  18th  century 
Austria  it  was  the  proud  boast  of  the  Hapsburgs  that  the  strength  of 
the  monarchy  meant  that  there  were  'no  Mamelukes,  no  Praetorians,  no 
Janissaries.  '2  The  chancellor  of  Prussia,  Hardenberg,  when  threatened 
in  1815  by  officers  opposed  to  the  mild  peace  demands  of  Frederick 
William  III,  could  write  that  he  felt  himself  'in  the  midst  of 
Praetorian  bands'. 
3 
Lachouque,  the  biographer  of  Napoleon's  Garde 
Imperiale,  after  describing  how  the  'Grenadiers  of  the  National 
Representatives',  a  unit  founded  in  1794  to  guard  the  Convention, 
became  contaminated  by  politics  and  lost  its  discipline,  damns  it  as 
'a  veritable  Praetorian  Guard'. 
4 
Historians  of  more  recent  events 
have  hardly  been  kinder.  The  Praetorians  have  regularly  been 
compared  to,  or  even  held  to  have  been  the  inspiration  of  such  a 
notorious  and  ideologically-motivated  militia  as  the  Nazi  S.  S.. 
5 
In  all  of  this  we  may  detect  two  separate  indictments  against  the 
Guard.  The  first  is  that  it  was  ill-disciplined  and  insubordinate. 
There  is  an  element  of  truth  in  such  a  charge.  Certainly  we  have 
examples  of  disorderly  behaviour  by  the  Praetorians.  They  rioted 
after  Seianus  was  executed. 
6 
Chaerea's  cohort  went  on  the  rampage 
following  Gaius'  assassination.?  Otho's  Praetorians  appear  to  have 
acted  at  times  very  much  as  they  wished  without  reference  to  their 
tribunes  or  centurions. 
8 
But  we  must  be  careful  not  to  allow  the 
scandalous  / 142. 
scandalous  to  beguile  us  or  the  exceptional  to  mislead  us.  Very 
occasionally  the  conduct  of  the  Praetorian  Guard  may  have  been  poorer 
than  that  expected  of  an  Imperial  Guard.  One  hundred  years  of 
devoted  and  effective  service  should  not,  however,  be  defamed  because 
of  a  few  isolated  incidents.  Throughout  most  of  the  Julio-Claudian 
period  the  Guard  displayed  exemplary  conduct  and  maintained  standards 
of  discipline  reflecting  those  of  the  Roman  army  of  which  it'was  an 
integral  part. 
As  to  the  more  important  accusation  that  the  Praetorians  were  in  some 
sense  political  soldiers,  it  is  clear  that  they  were  regarded  by  the 
Julio-Claudians  as  not  only  their  personal  protectors  but  the  power- 
base  of  the  imperial  court  and  the  tool  of  the  emperor  and  his 
advisers.  Although  this  aspect  of  their  duties  evolved  as  the 
principate  itself  became  increasingly  despotic  and  coercive,  we  would 
be  wise  to  be  wary  either  of  overstating  the  pace  of  this  development 
or  of  making  simplistic  assumptions  as  to  its  importance  in  our 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  principate.  Political  terror  is, 
in  every  age,  the  inevitable  concomitant  of  tyranny.  Only  the  degree 
to  which  that  terror  is  imposed  varies,  since  it  is  dependent  on  the 
level  of  control  desired  by  the  ruler  and  the  extent  to  which  he  feels 
it  wise  to  tolerate  dissent.  Political  intimidation,  for  example, 
has  a  timeless  quality  that  requires  no  ideological  commitment  from 
its  perpetrators.  Tacitus  provides  us  with  an  example  from  the 
principate  of  Nero.  During  the  prosecution  of  Thrasea  Paetus  in 
AD.  66  armed  Praetorians  successfully  inspired  fear  among  the  members 
of  the  Senate  as  they  entered  the  temple  of  Venus  Genetrix  to  debate 
the  issue. 
9 
Over  100  years  earlier,  in  43  BC.,  the  law  providing 
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for  the  Triumvirate  was  passed  by  a  public  assembly  surrounded  by 
the  Praetorian  cohorts  of  Octavian,  Antony  and  Lepidus. 
10 
The 
similarity  is  obvious  -  and  instructive.  Although  such  measures 
may  be  considered  political  acts,  there  is  no  evidence  which  might 
entitle  us  to  describe  those  who  carry  them  out  as  politically 
motivated.  The  soldiers  of  Octavian  obey  orders;  likewise  Nero's 
cohorts.  The  nature  of  the  commands  is  only  of  relative  importance. 
The  execution  of  a  distinguished  senator  is  as  willingly  undertaken 
as  the  dispersal  of  a  hostile  crowd.  Unquestioning  obedience 
rather  than  political  commitment  was  the  drumbeat  to  which  the 
Praetorians  marched. 
It  is  important,  moreover,  to  avoid  giving  the  impression  that  Rome, 
or  indeed  Italy,  was',  under  the  Julio-Claudians  a  police  state  held 
in  subjugation  by  an  all-pervading  Praetorian  terror.  Such  a  notion 
is  as  risible  as  it  is  misleading.  The  establishment,  at  the  end  of 
the  1st  century  AD.,  of  frumentarii,  based  in  the  castra  peregrina, 
provided  Rome  with  a  political  police  of  sorts. 
11 
But  it  was  not 
until  the  great  civil  wars  between  AD.  193  and  197,  when  a 
proliferation  of  deserters  and  robbers  had  brought  about  a  rapid 
deterioration  in  the  socio-economic  base  in  Italy,  that  the  activities 
of  imperial  spies  and  military  police  intensified. 
12 
It  may  also  be  worthwhile  to  consider  why  the  Praetorians  are  given 
such  prominence  in  our  sources,  especially  Tacitus.  The  obvious 
answer,  of  course,  is  because  they  were  the  largest  military  unit  in 
the  vicinity  of  Rome  and  because  they  were  used  by  the  Julio-Claudian 
emperors  for  non-military,  political  purposes.  But  is  it  not  also 
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possible  that  the  power  of  the  Praetorians  was  exaggerated  by 
Tacitus  because  it  provided  an  alibi  for  the  senatorial  class.  If 
the  Praetorians  had  really  been  the  emperor's  Gestapo,  if  they  really 
had  the  power  to  threaten  or  execute  without  reference  to  any 
authority  other  than  the  emperor  and,  on  occasions,  not  even  to  him, 
then  obviously  to  criticise  the  emperor's  behaviour  or  disapprove 
publicly  of  his  crimes  would  have  been  little  more  than  suicide. 
Tacitus  writes  candidly  of  his  own  ambiguous  position  under  Domitian13 
and,  although  it  is  easy  to  understand  his  outrage  at  those  like  the 
Praetorians  whom  he  believed  conspired  in  degradation  of  the  Senate, 
it  is  equally  easy  to  appreciate  his  sense  of  relief  at  the  availability 
of  the  concept  of  a  tyranny  supported  by  Praetorian  strength  which 
provided  him  with  a  small  loophole  for  escape  from  a  past  with  which 
he  was  unable  to  come  to  terms.  The  creation  of  such  a  myth  meant 
that  the  absence  of  any  serious  senatorial  resistance  could  be  excused 
by  alluding  to  the  overwhelming  and  highly  visible  strength  of  the 
Guard. 
I  am  aware  how  oddly  the  suggestion  that  Tacitus  uses  the  Praetorians 
as  a  shield  to  protect  the  reputation  of  the  Senate  must  ring  when  we 
remember  how  vehement  is  his  condemnation  of  senatorial  compliance  in 
the  Annals  and  Agricola. 
14 
But  the  Senate  was,  undeniably,  for  the 
most  part  acquiescent  and  servile,  and  Tacitus  is  too  honest  a  historian 
to  pervert  a  manifest  truth.  I  would  argue,  however,  that,  through 
the  selectivity  of  his  reporting,  he  focuses  the  spotlight  of  history 
rather  too  brightly  on,  as  he  perceives  it,  the  ruthless  eradication 
of  senatorial  liberty  during  the,  principate  and,  rather  more  directly, 
on  the  Praetorian  Guard  as  the  main  agent  of  such  measures. 
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It  would  be  unwise  to  attempt  to  deny  that  Praetorian  involvement  in 
the  suppression  of  political  dissent  did  increase,  especially  during 
the  principates  of  emperors  like  Gaius  and  Nero  who  adopted  a 
monarchico-absolutist  position  in  contrast  to  the  aristocratic 
principate  envisaged  by  Augustus  and  Tiberius. 
15 
But  there  are,  I 
believe,  in  this  regard  two  factors  worthy  of  serious  consideration. 
Firstly,  there  are  few  grounds  for  suggesting  that  the  Praetorians 
participated  in  the  suppression  of  dissident  opinion  to  a  substantially 
greater  degree  in  the  last  years  of  Nero's  principate  than  they  did 
during  the  first  years  of  Augustus'.  Such  tasks  were  ever  within  the 
province  of  the  Praetorians.  Secondly,  the  Praetorians  themselves  do 
not  seem  to  have  sought  to  increase  their  involvement  in  such 
activities.  Indeed,  their  unwillingness  to  prevent  Seianus'  fall  in 
AD.  31  could  be  interpreted  as  indicating  both  a  desire  to  maintain 
their  traditional  role  as  the  emperor's  bodyguard  and  a  distaste  for 
their  prefect's  political  ambitions. 
16 
How  does  such  a  notion  of  Praetorian  disinterest  in  the  political 
enmities  of  their  emperors  square  with  their  role  in  both  the  accession 
of  Claudius  and  the  deposition  of  Nero?  Does  not  their  behaviour  on 
these  occasions  presume  a  keen  political  awareness  and  a  commitment  to 
the  concept  of  the  principate?  While  the  actions  of  the  Praetorians 
in  AD.  41  might  support  such  a  thesis,  their  abandonment  in  AD.  68  of 
a  populist  like  Nero  in  favour  of  the  aristocratic  Galba  would  seem 
to  suggest  that  expediency  was  the  principal  factor  in  prompting  the 
Guard  to  intervene  in  the  political  process.  Was  self-interest,  then, 
the  dominant  stimulus  of  Praetorian  fidelity?  Perhaps,  in  truth, 
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they  had  little  choice  but  to  elevate  Claudius  whose  tenure  of  the 
principate  at  least  guaranteed  their  future  employment.  The 
alternative  of  senatorial  control  and  censure  held  no  appeal.  But 
it  was  the  promise  of  a  donative  of  15000  sesterces  per  man  which 
secured  their  loyalty. 
17 
Likewise  in  AD.  68  the  prospect  of  being 
isolated  in  preserving  in  power  an  emperor  who  had  managed  to  alienate 
almost  every  section  of  the  community,  even  those  which  had  once 
enthusiastically  supported  him,  may  have  induced  the  Praetorians  to 
listen  to  their  prefect's  lies,  but  they  would  hardly  have  judged 
them  believable  had  Nymphidius  not  cunningly  and  ruinously  committed 
Galba  to  presenting  30,000  sesterces  to  each  of  the  soldiers. 
18 
Luck  too  seems  to  have  played  a  part.  If  Gratus  had  not  found 
Claudius  hiding  behind  a  curtain, 
19 
would  the  Praetorians  have  acted 
so  resolutely  to  crush  the  Senate's  hopes  of  a  restored  Republic? 
If  Nero  had  not  been  so  quick  in  his  despair  to  commit  suicide, 
20 
would  the  Praetorians,  despite  their  acclamations  for  Galba21  and  the 
death-sentence  of  the  Senate, 
22 
really  have  abandoned  Germanicus' 
grandson? 
The  soldier  who  misuses  his  position  at  the  hub  of  power  to  extract 
extra  rewards  and  privileges  for  himself  may  well  be  damned  for 
acting  greedily  and  selfishly.  His  behaviour  can  rightly  be 
considered  costly  to  the  state  in  its  immediate  consequences  and 
calamitous  in  the  precedent  it  creates.  But  it  tells  us  nothing  of 
the  political  convictions  of  that  soldier,  either  as  to  their 
nature  or  whether  indeed  they  exist  at  all. 
If  neither  their  occasional  meddling  in  politics  nor  their  regular 
involvement  / 147. 
involvement  in  internal  security  justify  *calling  the  Praetorians 
political  soldiers,  it  is  undoubtedly  important  at  this  stage  to 
determine  a  definition  of  that  term  precise  enough  to  exclude  those 
who,  under  the  motivation  of  non-political  factors,  commit  political 
acts  and  yet  sufficiently  broad  to  avoid  an  overly  rigid  specification 
and  to  allow  some  licence  in  our  interpretation  of  political 
consciousness.  We  must,  therefore,  try  to  focus  our  attention  on  the 
motive  rather  than  the  effect.  Such  an  exercise  is  not  without  its 
difficulties.  Quite  apart  from  the  dubious  validity  of  drawing  a 
distinction  between  the  actor  and  the  act,  there  is  clearly  inherent 
in  this  approach  the  danger  of  subjectivity.  Yet  while  caution  is 
advisable  and  essential,  timidity  should  be  eschewed.  We  must  try, 
using  the  evidence  both  literary  and  epigraphic  as  our  base,  to  build 
up  a  clearer  picture  of  the  Praetorians'  political  soul. 
It  is  questionable,  however,  whether  it  is  possible,  given  its 
structure,  to  assume  that  there  existed  within  the  Praetorian  Guard 
any  consensus  of  political  opinion.  The  absence  of  such  homogeneity 
can  be  held  to  reflect,  and  perhaps  even  originate  from,  the  different 
terms  of  service  of,  on  the  one  hand,  the  ordinary  Praetorians23  and, 
on  the  other,  their  centurions  and  tribunes.  As  far  as  the  latter 
group  is  concerned,  their  advancement,  from  the  principate  of  Claudius 
onwards,  by  promotion  through  the  three  corps  of  the  garrison  of  Rome  - 
from  the  Vigiles  to  the  urban  cohorts  and  finally  to  the  Praetorian 
Guard  -  is  not  only  common,  but  regular  to  the  point  of  inflexibility.  24 
Such  systemised  rotation, 
25 
involving  tours  of  duty  of  perhaps  one  year 
in  each  post, 
26 
prevented  the  dangers  of  fraternisation  27 
and  provided 
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a  breadth  of  experience,  demanding  and  necessary,  for  those  who 
aspired  to  higher  posts  such  as  procuratorships. 
28 
It  was  to  this  group  of  men,  ambitious  for  themselves  and  their 
descendants,  that  Otho  held  out  the  prospect  of  promotion  to  the 
Senate. 
29 
The  exaggeration  was  shameless,  prompted  in  large  degree 
by  his  need  on  that  occasion  to  win  the  support  of  his  sorely-tried 
officers  in  order  to  convert  the  riotous  Praetorians  into  a  semblance 
of  good  order.  Yet  Otho's  listeners  were  not  starry-eyed  recruits 
gullibly  accepting  a  patent  fiction  and  the  expectation  of  such 
advancement  was  not  illusory.  Under  the  principate  tenure  of  the 
primipilate,  a  necessary  step  in  the  cursus,  automatically  elevated 
the  holder  into  the  equestrian  order.  It  was  not  unreasonable  for 
the  sons  and  grandsons  of  those  who  went  from  the  primipilate  to  a 
tribunate  in  Rome  to  hope  for  admission  to  the  Senate. 
30 
But  the 
evidence  suggests  that  such  promotion  was  gradual  and  attainable 
over  several  generations  rather  than  in  one  lifetime. 
Moreover,  while  it  is  clear  that  service  either  as  a  centurion  or  a 
tribune  in  the  cohorts  in  Rome  both  presupposes  the  prior  support  of 
an  influential  friend  at  court  and  provided  increased  opportunities 
of  future  patronage  from  the  Praetorian  prefects,  the  imperial  freedmen 
or  even  the  emperor  himself, 
31 
it  is  difficult  to  accept  Durry's  thesis 
that  there  existed  'une  classe  inconnue'  of  'equestrian-praetorians'  - 
men  who  won  equestrian  status  as  they  rose  through  the  cursus  -  who 
enjoyed  preference  over  those  who  were  knights  by  birth  in  the  matter 
of  procuratorships  and  the  high  prefectures. 
32 
Although  it  is 
certainly  / 149. 
certainly  true  that  careers  of  this  type.  "occurred33  and  that 
Praetorians  had  a  good  chance  of  promotion  once  they  had  been  chosen 
for  the  centurionate,  it  is  a  quantum  leap  to  argue  that  men  who 
began  in  the  ranks  of  the  Guard  commanded  such  a  clearly  defined 
superiority  in  prospects  of  promotion. 
34 
A  'curriculum  typique'35  in  Durry's  view  is  that  of  M.  Vettius  Valens 
who  began  as  a  soldier  in  the  8th  Praetorian  cohort  and  rose  through 
the  centurionates  and  tribunates  of  the  urban  militias  to  end  his 
career  as  imperial  procurator  in  Lusitania. 
36 
But  it  is  surely 
relevant  that  this  man  came  from  a  respectable  family  in  Arminium 
and  was  possibly  related  to  the  Vettius  Valens  who  was  Claudius' 
doctor. 
37 
Pompeius  Longinus,  the  tribune  in  the  Guard,  who  was 
roughly  handled  by  Otho's  supporters  at  the  Praetorian  camp  during 
the  coup  against  Galba,  suffered  not  because  of  his  rank  -  two 
other  tribunes  with  him  were  merely  detained  by  the  guardsmen  -  but 
because  he  was  a  close  friend  of  Galba. 
38 
We  may  plausibly  attribute 
his  military  position  to  imperial  favour.  Individual  patronage 
rather  than  collective  privilege  was  the  hallmark  and  basis  of 
promotion  within  the  Praetorian  Guard. 
Although  it  may  be  possible  to  interpret  the  upward  mobility 
exemplified  by  the  Praetorian  officer  corps  as  the  result  of  a  general 
policy  by  innately  autocratic  emperors  to  limit  aristocratic  power 
which  they  viewed  as  a  threat  to  their  supremacy, 
39 
it  is  clear  that 
those  promoted  in  this  way  did  not  see  themselves  as  the  nucleus  of 
a  revolutionary  party  or  as  part  of  a  scheme  to  replace  the  old 
nobility.  / 150. 
nobility.  While  Praetorian  centurions  and  tribunes  did  not  perhaps 
share  the  same  social  background, 
40 
they  were  united  by  a  common 
outlook  in  matters  political  which  was  both  conservative  and 
bourgeois.  And,  as  Hopkins  notes  'there  was  no  possibility  of 
revolution  based  upon  a  professional  bourgeoisie'. 
41 
Assimilation 
into  the  upper  class  rather  than  its  destruction  is  the  aim  of  the 
upwardly  mobile. 
This  is  not  to  imply  that  the  officers  of  the  Guard  were  fundamentally 
or  regularly  disloyal  to  their  emperors.  The  memories  of  the  horrors 
of  the  civil  wars  were  too  vivid  and  the  benefits  cf  the  peace  which 
the  principate  had  brought  were  too  apparent  to  all  sections  of  Roman 
society.  More  especially,  the  bestowal  of  honours  and  promotion  was 
ultimately  within  the  emperor's  gift.  Such  privileges  were  not  to 
be  sacrificed  lightly.  It  was  when  the  delicately  balanced 
relationship  between  the  emperor  and  the  aristocracy  broke  down  that 
the  fidelity  of  the  Praetorian  officers  came  under  stress.  When  the 
aristocrats,  through  fear  of  disgrace  or  assassination,  plotted 
against  the  emperor,  or  when  the  emperor,  judging  rebellion  imminent, 
anticipated  such  conspiracies  by  executing  aristocrats  or  confiscating 
their  property,  the  centurions  and  tribunes  of  the  Guard  had  to  decide 
where  in  the  final  analysis  their  loyalties  lay.  It  is  only  when  we 
bear  in  mind  this  dilemma  that  we  can  understand  the  involvement  of 
Cassius  Chaerea,  Cornelius  Sabinus,  Aquila  and  Lupus  in  the  murder  of 
Gaius,  42 
and  of  Subrius  Flavus  and  Sulpicius  Asper  in  the  Pisonian 
conspiracy. 
43  ` 
We  should  display  similar  caution  in  considering  those  factors  which 
dictated  / 151. 
dictated  or  influenced  the  political  temper  of  the  ordinary 
Praetorian  guardsmen.  If  we  examine  their  origins,  it  is  clear 
that  some  were  from  a  bourgeois  background. 
44 
We  know  of  a  recruit 
from  Noricum  who  belonged  to  a  magistrate's  family  from  Virunum.  45 
Such  men  will  have  shared  the  ambitions  and  political  opinions  of 
their  class.  But  Claudius'  Guard  also  contained  men  from  the  tribe 
of  the  Anauni,  attributed  to  Tridentum. 
46 
Just  as  diverse,  one  may  suppose,  were  their  reasons  for  enlisting. 
Durry  writes  'je  devine  en  eux,  selon  une  regle  permanente,  des 
desoeuvres  de  petite  ville  qui  voulaient  voir  la  grande  ou  des 
pauvres  de  la  campagne  qui  craignaient  le  travail  penible  et  ingrat 
de  la  terre'. 
47 
True,  of  course,  but  higher  motives,  family 
tradition  for  example,  will  sometimes  have  played  a  part. 
48 
What 
is  certain,  however,  is  that  all  those  joining  the  Guard  were  aware, 
sometimes  no  doubt  rather  hazily,  that  not  only  were  they  becoming 
part  of  a  corps  whose  pay  and  terms  of  service  were  exceedingly 
attractive,  but  that  their  membership  of  the  Guard  provided 
opportunities  to  win  the  favour  of  the  rich  and  powerful  and  to  gain 
a  foothold  on  the  ladder  of  social  advancement. 
We  have  dealt  so  far  with  the  social  origins  of  the  Praetorians. 
Equally  important  is  the  birthplace  of  these  soldiers. 
49  Tacitus, 
with  reference  to  AD.  23,  tells  us  that  the  Praetorian  cohorts  were 
'Etruria  ferme  Umbriaque  delectae  auf  vetere  Latio  et  coloniis 
antiquitus  Romanis'. 
50 
Some  have  chosen  to  misinterpret  this 
information  to  support  their  own  simplistic  view  of  the  Roman  army 
as  / 152. 
as  an  organisation  inflexibly  and  rigidly  structured.  So  Durry: 
'la  loi  la  plus  generale  est  celle  du  parallelisme  du  recrutement 
de  la  garde  avec  celui  des  legions,  qui  nous  fait  assister  a 
un 
glissement  qui  a  quelque  chose  d'implacable.  Quand  les  legions  sont 
i 
formees  d'Italiens,  les  pretoriens  sont  romains;  quand  les  legionaires 
sont  provincaux,  les  pretoriens  sont  Italiens;  quand  les  legionaires 
sont  des  soldats  des  frontieres,  tout  ensemble  paysans  et  soldats, 
les  pretoriens  sont  choisis  dans  les  meilleures  troupes  de  l'Empire'. 
51 
The  balance  is  polished  and  impressive,  but  quite  misleading. 
Continual  difficulties  in  attracting  recruits  at  this  time52  ensured 
that,  if  a  potential  recruit  was  not  unsuitable,  then  he  was  accepted. 
This  was  one  of  the  factors  which  led  to  a  rise  in  the  number  of 
recruits  from  outside  the  areas  mentioned  by  Tacitus.  We  have 
already  noted  the  presence  of  the  Anauni  from  north  Italy  in  the 
Praetorian  Guard  during  Claudius'  principate.  Likewise  the  Norican. 
We  also  know  of  two  Narbonensians,  one  from  Vienne,  the  other  from 
Carpentorate,  53 
and  two  Spaniards,  one  of  whom,  according  to  the  elder 
Pliny,  participated  in  a  military  operation  in  northeast  Spain. 
54 
Most  intriguing  of  all  the  epigraphic  evidence  are  the  inscriptions 
of  two  Macedonians  whose  service  was  probably  under  Gaius. 
Although  Macedonia  was  by  this  time  a  highly  romanised  province,  it 
is  notable  that  these  two  men  did  not  come  from  a  Roman  veteran 
colony  but  as  their  fathers'  names  show,  were  native  Macedonians  and 
first-generation  citizens  from  Heraclea  Sintica. 
55 
But  what  does  all  of  this  tell  us  about  the  political  instincts  of  the 
Praetorian  / 153. 
Praetorian  Guard?  Very  little,  it  must-be  admitted.  We  can  state 
with  some  confidence  that  the  origins,  both  social  and  geographical, 
of  the  guardsmen  were  less  uniform  and  more  varied  than  has  sometimes 
been  assumed.  Moreover,  the  absence  of  any  Praetorian  stereotype 
would  suggest  that  we  should  view  with  considerable  caution  the  idea 
that  the  Praetorian  Guard  was  used  by  the  emperors  as  a  vehicle  to 
promote  the  social  advancement  of  the  Italian  middle-class. 
56 
However  the  notion  that  the  Praetorians  were  as  heterogeneous  in  their 
political  opinions  as  in  their  origins  is  contradicted  by  Tacitus' 
account  of  their  behaviour  during  and  after  the  coup  against  Galba  in 
January  of  AD.  69.  Here  is  apparently  solid  and  authoritative 
evidence  of  class  awareness.  Not  only  did  the  Praetorians  warn  Otho 
not  to  trust  their  tribunes  and  centurions, 
57 
they  actually  killed 
some  whom  they  suspected  of  disloyalty. 
58 
Furthermore,  they  were 
sufficiently  well  organised  to  undertake  covert  surveillance  of  the 
homes  of  certain  rich  senators  who  they  believed  were  intriguing 
with  their  officers  against  the  interests  of  the  Othonian  cause. 
59 
Are  we  to  suppose  then  that  within  the  Praetorian  Guard  there  existed 
a  movement  as  subversive  and  sectional  as,  for  example,  the  Levellers 
were  during  Cromwell's  Protectorate? 
60 
Before  we  could  make  such  an 
assumption  we  would  firstly  have  to  find  evidence  of  similar  political 
feelings  and  alignments  over  a  longer  historical  period.  The  year 
AD.  69  was  clearly  unique  in  many  ways.  Although  the  solidarity  and 
commitment  which  characterise  the  Praetorians'  involvement  in  the 
events  of  that  year  may  be  interpreted  as  the  product  of  an  awareness 
among  the  soldiers  of  class  distinctions,  it  is  equally  possible  to 
see  / 154. 
see  the  origins  of  their  actions  in  a  sense  of  collective  guilt 
resulting  from  their  part  in  Galba's  murder..  In  the  latter  case 
one  may  suppose  that  fear  of  a  comprehensive,  retribution  rather  than 
a  desire  to  change  society  was  the  Praetorians'  motivation. 
It  is  also  evident  that  if  the  Praetorians  had  desired  to  be  regarded 
as  a  real  political  force  or  even  as  a  pressure-group, 
61 
then  one 
might  reasonably  expect  to  find  indications  of  some  attempt  on  their 
part  to  develop  a  political  creed  and  to  expand  it  beyond  the  rather 
narrow  confines  of  the  Guard  itself  into  Roman  society  in  general 
and,  more  particularly,  among  the  urban  prolztariat.  Yet,  apart  from 
a  pervasive  lack  of  faith  in  their  officers,  there  is  no  evidence  of 
any  grander  Praetorian  doctrine.  As  for  political  links  with  the 
masses  of  Rome,  it  is  clear,  even  allowing  for  bias  against  the  common 
people  on  the  part  of  upper-class  historians, 
62 
that  ideological 
considerations  were  not,  in  general,  an  influential  or  determining 
factor  in  the  mobilisation  of  that  social  group. 
63 
Moreover,  there 
is  a  substantial  body  of  evidence  which  suggests  that  a  considerable 
degree  of  mutual  antipathy  existed  between  the  people  of  Rome  and  the 
urban  militia.  Whether  acting  to  control  disorder  in  the  theatre 
64 
or  dispersing  a  mob  which  wished  to  protest  at  some  unpopular 
political  decision  or  administrative  failure, 
65 
the'Praetorian  Guard 
was  undoubtedly  viewed  by  the  urban  plebs  as  an  essentially  oppressive 
force.  The  suspicions  which  the  people  felt  can  be  judged  from  the 
speed  with  which  they  blamed  the  soldiers  as  they  reacted  to  a  rumour 
during  Claudius'  principate  that  the  emperor  had  been  murdered  on  his 
way  to  Ostia. 
66 
Although  we  have  proof,  natural  and  expected,  of 
former  / 155. 
former  members  of  the  Guard  settling  in  Rome, 
67 
it  is  quite  evident 
that  there  was  no  common  ground  between  the  plebs  and  the  Guard 
beyond  a  selfish  desire  to  obtain  for  themselves  the  maximum,  both 
in  terms  of  money  and  privileges,  which  the  state  could  afford. 
The  Praetorian  Guard  was  clearly  not  a  party  militia  of  the  type  to 
which  Hitler's  SS,  Mussolini's  MVSN,  and  even  Saddam's  Republican 
Guard  belong.  In  vain  does  one  search  for  any  hint  of  a  populist 
philosophy  among  the  Praetorians.  It  is  impossible  to  detect  a 
consistent  ideological  motive  for  joining  or  any  attempt  to  impose  a 
political  orthodoxy  during  service.  In  truth,  the  Praetorians  were 
not  really  interested  in  the  political  manoeuvrings  of  the  emperor 
and  his  court  except  where  their  privileges  were  affected. 
Praetorian  approbation  was  accorded  to  an  emperor  not  on  the  basis  of 
his  political  programme  but  rather  on  the  size  of  the  donative  which 
he  offered  them.  The  Guard  was,  in  political  terms,  essentially  a 
reactive  force.  Lust  for  power  was  the  concern  and  prerogative  of 
the  rich  and  ambitious.  To  the  Praetorians,  another  country.  They 
took  what  timorous  emperors  offered  and  demanded  what  a  treacherous 
prefect  promised.  Nothing  suggests  that  they  sought  more  than  this. 
Augustus  gave  an  unambiguous  message  as  to  his  view  of  the  nature  of 
the  relationship  between  the  princeps  and  his  soldiers  when,  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  civil  wars,  he  dropped  the  salutation  'comrades' 
when  addressing  his  troops. 
68 
The  revolution  was  over.  Actium 
removed  the  need  for  any  further  nods  towards  populism.  It  was  time 
for  traditional,  more  hierarchial  values  to  reassert  themselves. 
69 
Under  / 156. 
Under  the  direction  of  Seianus  the  Guard-as  a  whole  gained  a  much 
higher  profile  than  Augustus  had  allowed  it,  and  it  is  hardly 
overstating  the  case  to  suggest  that  it  developed  at  this  time 
into  a  more  autonomous  power-base.  Thereafter  the  history  of  the 
Praetorians  varied  according  to  the  degree  of  control  imposed  by  the 
emperor  and  his  advisers,  and  according  to  the  personalities  and 
ambitions  of  the  individuals  concerned.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a 
manifest  truth  that  throughout  the  entire  Julio-Claudian  period  we 
find,  if  we  can  turn  aside  from  the  more  sensational  and  well-known 
episodes,  a  fine  record  of  service  and  loyalty. CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  AS  A  MILITARY  FORCE 
Passerini  insists,  despite  the  evidence,  that  the  main  importance  of 
the  cohorts  was  military,  not  political.  'I  pretoriani  costituirono 
una  originale,  poderosa  formazione  bellica,  e  la  milizia  piu 
efficiente  e  gloriosa  dell'  armata  imperiale'. 
1 
While  such  a 
description  might  reasonably  be  applied  to,  for  example,  Napoleon's 
Garde  Imperiale,  the  arguments  for  its  application  to  the 
Praetorian  Guard  are,  especially  under  the  Julio-Claudians,  less  than 
compelling. 
2 
Although  it  is  certainly  true  that,  from  the  time  of 
the  Flavians,  the  Praetorians  were  utilised  rather  more  often  as  a 
combat  unit,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that,  even  at  this  time, 
their  role  was  to  spearhead  the  assault  or  try  out  new  military 
tactics.  Indeed  Augustus  and  his  successors  deliberately  avoided 
drafting  select  men  from  the  frontiers  to  serve  in  Rome  -  the  one 
method  of  recruitment  by  which  the  Praetorians  might  justifiably 
have  been  considered  as  the  cream  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  microcosm 
of  the  Roman  army. 
But  the  military  dimension  cannot  yet  be  dismissed.  Another  role  is 
suggested:  the  Praetorians  were  a  'corps  for  the  defence  of  Rome  and 
Italy'3  -a  sort  of  strategic  reserve  if  things  went  wrong  on  the 
frontiers.  This  is  a  patent  falsehood,  easily  exposed.  It  is 
evident  that  the  concept  of  such  a  reserve  was  quite  alien  to  the 
Romans  of  that  period  and  out  of  tune  with  Augustus'  general  military 
policy  which  acknowledged  the  primacy  of  the  legions  in  the  defence 
of  the  empire. 
4 
There  are  also  several  practical  reasons  why  we 
should  reject  this  notion.  Firstly,  there  were  in  Augustus'  time 
under  5000  men  in  the  Praetorian  corps.  There  were  hardly  more 
than  / 158. 
than  6000  at  any  time  during  the  Julio-Claudian  period.  If  we 
allow  for  the  other  duties  which  they  had  to  perform,  it  is 
scarcely  credible  that  such  a  small  number  of  men  would  have  been 
sufficient  to  provide  a  defence  for  Italy  in  the  event  of  an  attack 
by  an  external  enemy.  When  such  a  threat  did  arise  in  AD.  6  in 
Pannonia  and  Dalmatia  and  again  in  AD.  9  after  Varus'  defeat  in  the 
Teutonburger  Wald,  Augustus  was  allegedly,  in  one  case,  forced  to 
raise  an  army  made  up  in  part  of  ex-slaves  whose  freedom  he  had 
bought5  and,  in  the  other,  to  compel  reluctant  young  men  of 
military  age  to  draw  lots  to  see  who  should  serve  in  the  legions.  6 
So,  from  a  purely  numerical  point  of  view,  it  is  not  feasible  to 
regard  the  Praetorians  as  a  strategic  reserve.  Besides,  the 
Praetorians,  based  as  they  were  in  or  near  Rome,  were  in  the  wrong 
position  to  act  as  a  reserve  for  the  troubled  areas  of  the  Rhine- 
Danube  line,  Dalmatia  and  Pannonia,  or  north-west  Spain.  If  they 
really  were  a  reserve,  then,  surely  they  would  have  been  largely 
based  in  the  north  of  Italy  where  they  could  have  controlled  the 
Alpine  passes  and  provided  timely  help  to  any  hard-pressed  army. 
Dessau  believed  that  there  were  3  Praetorian  cohorts  at  Rome, 
3  at  Aquileia,  and  another  3  at  an  unidentified  town  in  the  north 
of  Italy. 
7 
It  would  be  quite  wrong  to  write  off  Aquileia  as  a 
possible  station  for  the  Praetorians.  We  have  20  or  more 
Praetorian  inscriptions  from  there  of  Augustan  date,  but  only  one 
or  two  from  Rome.  From  the  epigraphic  evidence  alone  we  would 
conclude  that  most  of  the  Praetorians  were  based  at  Aquileia,  and 
only  a  few  in  the  capital  city.  I  would  prefer,  however,  to  follow 
Suetonius  who  is  quite  clear;  Augustus  kept  3  cohorts  'in  urbe'  and 
the  rest  'circa  finitima  o8  ppida'. 
If  / 159. 
If  the  common  soldier  in  the  legions  was  envious  of  his  Praetorian 
counterpart,  it  was  only  because  of  the  latter's  pay  and  privileges, 
not  because  he  regarded  them  as  in  any  way  militarily  superior. 
9 
Indeed  misgivings  are  frequently  expressed  in  our  sources  over  the 
Praetorians'  ability  to  endure  the  hardships  of  actual  campaigning. 
Tacitus,  referring  to  the  situation  in  AD.  69,  specifically  states 
that  it  was  unusual  for  the  Praetorians  to  take  the  fieldl0  and 
comments  on  the  adverse  reaction  of  the  Praetorians  to  the  hardships 
of  campaigning. 
11 
Plutarch  too  mentions  the  disorderly  and 
arrogant  spirit  of  Otho's  Praetorians  and,  probably  reflecting  the 
general  opinion  as  to  their  fighting  ability,  writes  - 
'They  were  soft,  owing  to  their  lack  of  employment  and 
their  unwarlike  mode  of  life,  having  spent  most  of 
their  time  at  spectacles  and  festivals  and  plays,  and 
they  wished  to  cloak  their  weakness  with  insolence 
and  boasting,  disdaining  to  perform  the  services  laid 
upon  them  because  they  were  above  the  work,  not 
because  they  were  unable  to  do  it'. 
12 
These  are  clearly  failings  which  we  would  expect  fo  find  in  public 
duties  and  internal  security  troops  concerned  with  policing  rather 
than  in  an  elite  formation  of  soldiers. 
13 
But  some  caution  is  needed  here.  Many  of  the  legions,  although 
based  on  the  frontiers,  had  very  limited  experience  of  combat 
between  31  BC.  and  AD.  69.  Furthermore  the  actual  performance  of 
the  Praetorians  on  the  battlefield  on  Otho's  behalf  was,  although 
characterised  / 160. 
characterised  by  malignant  indiscipline,  -in  no  way  disgraceful  or 
unworthy.  Yet  it  is  very  difficult  to  argue  that  our  sources  do 
not  mean  exactly  what  they  say.  We  have,  I  think,  no  choice  but 
to  accept  that,  leaving  aside  the  special  circumstances  of  AD.  69, 
the  Praetorians  appeared  on  the  battlefield  only  as  a  bodyguard 
accompanying  their  emperor  or  an  important  member  of  the  imperial 
family  when  they  went  campaigning. 
14 
To  summarise,  the  Praetorians  began  as  an  elite  force,  but  ceased 
to  be  so  at  quite  an  early  date,  possibly  after  Actium,  perhaps  even 
earlier.  Although  the  tribunes  were  always  very  experienced 
soldiers  who  must  have  attempted  to  train  the  Praetorians 
properly,  the  Guard  itself,  recruited  directly  from  the  civil 
population,  quickly  evolved  from  its  original  role  as  a 
specialised  military  unit  into  a  political  instrument  whose  main 
purpose  was  to  guarantee  the  stability  of  the  principate. 
15 CHAPTER  IX 
PREFECTS  AND  PREFECTURE 
Although  the  principal  concern  of  this  thesis  is  to  assess  the 
political  commitment  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts,  the  work  would  be 
deficient  if  it  failed  to  consider  both  the  role  of  the  Praetorian 
prefects  and  the  development  of  the  prefecture.  The  latter 
especially  has  been  less  thoroughly  treated  than  its  importance 
merits. 
1 
It  is  apparent  that  from  quite  early  on,  the  praefectus  praetorio 
was  more  than  just  a  commander  of  the,  Praetorian  Guard.  Once 
appointed,  he  became  part  of  the  emperor's  consilium  with  not  only 
formal  responsibilities  but  also  much  informal  contact  with  the 
emperor.  But  a  further  truth  deserves  to  be  acknowledged  -  that 
the  prefecture  was  not  merely  a  succession  of  prefects  but  was,  from 
its  inception,  an  office  of  great  potentiality.  The  ambitious  were 
quick  to  appreciate  this.  Seianus,  alert  to  his  own  advantage, 
sought  the  prefecture.  In  turn,  the  enormous  range  of 
responsibilities  undertaken  by  that  prefect  had  an  immense  effect  on 
the  manner  in  which  his  successors  viewed  their  duties. 
We  can  learn  much  about  the  nature  of  the  post  from  a  consideration 
of  its  origins.  It  was  no  sinecure,  designed  to  bestow  a  hollow 
honour  upon  an  imperial  favourite.  On  the  contrary,  Augustus  did 
not  appoint  prefects  for  his  Guard  until  2  BC. 
2 
The  date  is 
revealing.  In  that  year  occurred  the  exile  of  Julia  and  the 
execution  of  Iullus  Antonius. 
3 
Whether  they  were  genuine 
conspirators  or  the  victims  of  court  politics  is  unimportant.  The 
"  effect  / 162. 
effect  of  the  scandal  was  traumatic.  The  confidence  of  the  ageing 
princeps  was  shaken,  the  security  of  the  regime  compromised.  The 
plot  as  much  as  its  suppression  will  have  been  noted.  An 
initiative  was  needed,  to  restore  confidence  in,  the  regime,  and  to 
ensure  that  personal  frailty  was  not  mistaken  for  public  weakness. 
And  so  an  innovation,  momentous  but  fraught  with  potential  dangers. 
The  creation  of  the  prefecture  established  a  barrier  and  lengthened 
the  line  of  authority  between  the  emperor  and  his  Guard.  We  have 
already  noted  the  paramount  importance  which  Augustus  attached  to 
his  personal  contacts  with  the  people. 
4 
He  cannot  have  relished  an 
institution  capable  of  impeding  and  undermining  his  direct  links  with 
such  a  vital  body  of  troops. 
5 
Hence  a  precaution,  one  of  several. 
The  first  pair  of  prefects  was  hardly  notable6  and,  as  such,  wholly 
dependent  upon  and  loyal  to  the  emperor,  the  bestower  of  power. 
But  the  distinction  of  the  post  could  not  be  hidden.  A  prefect, 
otherwise  unknown,  attained  conspicuous  honours. 
7 
The  prospect  of 
imperial  favour  and  of  the  concomitant  rewards  made  the  office 
alluring  and  attractive  even  to  the  highest  within  the  equestrian 
order. 
8 
Although  Augustus  had,  by  the  creation  of  the  prefecture,  yielded 
many  of  the  practical  aspects  of  directing  the  Praetorian  cohorts 
to  his  prefects,  he  retained  titular  command  of  the  Guard  and 
regarded  the  prefects  as  no  more  than  his  lieutenants. 
9 
Wherever 
possible,  the  direct  links  between  emperor  and  Guard  were  maintained. 
We  know,  for  example,  that  it  was  the  emperor  himself  who  gave  the 
watchword  to  the  tribune  of  the  cohort  on  guard  at  the  palace. 
10 
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High  was  the  penalty  paid  by  the  emperor  who  failed  to  appreciate  the 
importance  of  such  symbolism. 
11 
The  desire  of  the  emperor  to  emphasise  the  closeness  of  his  personal 
attachment  to  the  Guard  can  also  be  seen  in  Claudius'  declaration  on 
the  status  of  the  Anauni12  and,  more  generally,  in  the  terminology 
used  in  the  diplomas  granting  the  right  of  marriage  to  Praetorian 
veterans. 
13 
The  force  is  quite  clear;  the  emperor's  Guard,  the 
emperor's  dispensation.  Strikingly  absent  is  any  mention  of  the 
prefects.  But  such  an  omission  is  hardly  unexpected.  Practical 
necessity  may  have  demanded  the  existence  of  the  prefecture,  but  the 
emperor's  most  vital  interests  dictated  that  his  own  role  as 
commander  of  the  Praetorian  corps  should  not  be  thereby  diminished 
either  in  the  eyes  of  the  soldiers  or  the  wider  public. 
Although  at  a  later  date  Praetorian  prefects  may  possibly  have  been 
appointed  for  life14  and  were  allegedly  free  from  the  threat  of 
dismissal, 
15 
such  privileges  were  certainly  not  accorded  to  those  of 
the  Julio-Claudian  period.  Of  all  the  prefects  between  2  BC.  and 
AD.  68  whose  names  and  fates  are  known  to  us,  Sextus  Afranius  Burrus 
is  the  only  one  who  died  of  natural  causes  while  in  office. 
16 
Of 
the  rest  seven  were  executed  either  during  or  shortly  after  their 
tenure  of  the  prefecture. 
17 
Such  evidence  must  lead  us  to  two  main 
conclusions,  firstly,  the  power  of  the  emperor  during  the  period  in 
question  remained  supreme  and  absolute;  and  secondly,  the  increased 
powers  of  the  prefecture,  though  freely  granted  by  a  succession  of 
emperors,  were  mirrored,  almost  contradictorily,  by  a  rise  in  the 
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level  of  suspicion,  whether  justified  or  not,  which  those  same  emperors 
felt  towards  their  prefects. 
Before  examining  the  office  itself 
Sand 
the  reasons  why  so  many  powers 
were  devolved  to  it,  some  consideration  may  appropriately  be  given  to 
the  basis  on  which  appointments  to  the  prefecture  were  made.  Firstly, 
a  firm  rejection.  Severus  Alexander,  who  became  emperor  in  AD.  222, 
may  have  allowed  the  Senate  the  right  of  veto  over  his  choice  of 
Praetorian  prefects. 
18 
Nothing,  however,  suggests  that  the  prospect 
of  senatorial  disapproval  in  this  area  had  any  weight  during  the  Julio- 
Claudian  era,  even  among  those  emperors,  like  Augustus  and  Tiberius 
who  claimed  that  they  wished  to  encourage  the  involvement  of  their 
aristocratic  peers  in  the  process  of  government.  Whatever  the  truth 
of  such  professions,  the  appointment  of  Praetorian  prefects  was, 
throughout  the  period,  most  distinctly  the  personal  perogative  of  the 
emperor. 
But  what  factors  did  influence  the  emperor  in  his  choice  of  prefects? 
Syme  wanders  dangerously  into  the  sphere  of  psychology  in  his 
suggestions  as  to  Tiberius'  motives  in  appointing  Seianus. 
19 
Even 
here,  however,  an  evident  truth  emerges.  Personal  influence  with  the 
emperor  was  a  pre-requisite  for  prospective  prefects  of  the  Guard. 
Seianus  is  an  obvious  example.  But  there  were  others  too.  Would  a 
Narbonensian  have  attained  the  Praetorian  prefecture,  had  he  not  served 
as  procurator  to  three  generations  of  the  imperial  family  and  enjoyed 
the  confidence  of  an  emperor's  wife? 
20 
Would  the  son  of  a  nurse  have 
been  nominated  as  Praetorian  prefect,  if  his  mother  had  not  been  the 
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wet-nurse  of  a  future  emperor? 
21 
Would  a  convicted  adulterer, 
reduced  to  fishing  for  a  living,  have  contributed  to  the  fall  of  a 
dynasty  had  he  not  shared  an  emperor's  interest  in  the  business  of 
breeding  horses? 
22 
Would  a  provincial  assessor,  arrogant,  indolent 
and  fatally  addicted  to  intrigue,  have  become  prefect  of  the  Guard, 
if  he  had  not  enthusiastically  espoused  the  cause  of  his  aged 
governor? 
23 
But  there  is  more.  Proven  competence  and  administrative  ability 
were  also  required.  The  willingness  of  the  imperial  family  to 
entrust  the  running  of  their  estates  to  Burrus  over  a  long  period 
suggests  that  his  organisational  capabilities  matched  his  inter- 
personal  skills.  Faenius  Rufus  may  have  become  prefect  of  the  corn 
supply  through  the  partisanship  of  Agrippina,  but  it  was  his 
scrupulous  honesty  and  manifest  success  in  that  post  which  won  him  the 
Praetorian  prefecture. 
24 
Even  blackguards  like  Macro  and  Tigellinus 
had  commanded  the  Vigiles,  without  conspicuous  failure,  before  rising 
to  the  prefecture  of  the  Guard. 
25 
It  would,  therefore,  be  quite  wrong  to  imply  that  the  sole  determinant 
in  the  selection  of  Praetorian  prefects  was  imperial  favour. 
26 
it 
was  undeniably  the  major  influence,  with  the  possible  exceptions  of 
AD.  41,  when  the  manner  in  which  the  prefects  were  chosen  after  Gaius' 
assassination  is  unclear,  and  of  AD.  69,  when  Tacitus  tells  us  that 
Otho  allowed  the  Praetorians  to  select  their  own  prefects. 
27 
But  the 
emperor's  choice  was  rarely  uninformed.  Talent  clearly  had  its  role. 
No  emperor  could  afford  to  have  an  incompetent  in  charge  of  his  Guard. 
It  seems,  therefore,  reasonable  to  assume  that,  in  most  cases,  it  was 
a  prefect's  ability  which  initially  attracted  the  interest  of  the 
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emperor  and  this  in  turn  led  to  subsequent  promotion. 
As  for  the  prefecture  itself,  it  is  evident  that  Augustus  did  not, 
in  2  BC.,  foresee  that  it  would  develop  in  the  way  that  it  did,  nor 
did  he  intend  that  it  should  acquire  a  range  of  powers  only  slightly 
inferior  to  those  held  by  the  emperor.  On  the  other  hand,  Stein  is 
at  least  partly  correct  in  his  premise  that  Augustus  envisaged  the 
contribution  of  the  Praetorian  prefects  as  rather  more  than  might  be 
expected  from  commanders  of  the  Guard.  Whether  this,  as  he  suggests, 
is  implicit  in  the  title  -  praefectus  praetorio  -  must  be  considered 
more  doubtful. 
28 
Moreover  he  appears  to  misunderstand  in  the  most 
fundamental  way  the  nature  of  the  prefecture  in  that  he  does  not 
appreciate  that  it  was  Augustus'  failure  to  define  precisely  the 
duties  of  the  office  which  gave  it  its  greatest  strength  and 
permitted  its  subsequent  development.  What  was  important  in  2  BC. 
was  not  the  power  of  the  prefecture  but  its  potential  to  acquire 
power. 
De  Laet  is  forceful  in  his  rejection  of  Stein's  thesis, 
29 
but  his  own 
explanation  is,  I  believe,  deeply  flawed  in  several  important  aspects. 
He  notes  two  instances  in  which  Tacitus  does  not  use  his  normal 
term  -  praefectus  praetorio  -  for  the  Praetorian  prefect  and  argues 
that  these  exceptions  -  in  one  of  which  Seius  Strabo  is  referred  to  as 
praetoriarum  cohortium  praefectus,  while  in'the  other  Seianus  is 
called  cohortibus  praetoriis  praefectus  -  are  deliberate  and 
indicative  of  the  historian's  wish  to  show  that  Strabo  and  Seianus,  at 
least  at  the  beginning  of  his  tenure  of  the  prefecture,  were  solely 
commanders  of  the  Guard.  30 
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There  are,  it  seems  to  me,  two  points  which  require  elaboration. 
Firstly,  De  Laet,  like  Stein,  attaches  undue  importance  to  the  title. 
I  would  dispute  whether  such  weight  should  be  given  to  Tacitus' 
terminology  and  would  oppose  the  suggestion  that  the  title  of  the 
office  was  directly  related  to  the  growth  in  the  number  of  its 
functions. 
31 
Would  it  not  be  preferable  to  regard  praefectus  praetorio 
and  praetoriarum  cohortium  praefectus  as  synonymous  and  interchangeable, 
with  the  former  the  more  common  usage? 
32 
Secondly,  although  I  like 
De  Laet's  view  of  the  prefecture  as  a  developing  institution  better 
than  Stein's  more  rigid  analysis,  I  would  challenge  vigorously  his 
attempt  to  limit  the  initial  responsibilities  of  the  prefects  to  the 
control  of  the  Guard.  It  is  clear  that  from  the  inception  of  the 
prefecture  the  prefects  not  only  commanded  the  Praetorian  cohorts  but, 
more  momentously,  assumed  sole  responsibility  within  the  imperial 
circle  for  the  direction  of  force  and  undertook  at  a  more  general  level 
the  supervision  of  all  aspects  of  the  emperor's  security. 
If  then  we  seek  reasons  for  the  extension  in  the  powers  associated 
with  the  prefecture,  part  of  the  answer,  at  least,  must  lie  in  the 
intrinsic  flexibility  of  the  post  which  distinguished  it  from  those 
other  offices  of  state  instituted  by  Augustus. 
33 
The  prefectures  of 
the  Vigiles  and  the  corn  supply  were  established  to  carry  out  specific 
tasks  -  to  prevent  Rome  from  burning  down34  and  its  people  from 
starving. 
35 
But  the  concept  of  security  -  the  province  of  the  Praetorian 
prefecture  -  is  much  harder  to  define.  Is  it  limited  to  remaining 
vigilant  and  protecting  the  ruler  from  an  assassin's  attack?  Or  does 
it  necessitate  a  more  aggressive  posture  involving  the  detection  and 
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suppression  of  plots  before  they  can  properly  develop?  Or,  again, 
can  we  go  further  and  equate  security  with  the  elimination  of  those 
elements  within  society  which  are  considered  to  be  hostile  to  or 
threaten  the  state?  If  no  clear  definition  is  provided  and  no  firm 
limits  set,  then  the  expectation  must  be  that  a  security  apparatus 
will  continue  to  seek  new  roles  and  attract  new  functions  until  it 
attains  a  dominating  position  in  the  structure  of  power.  When, 
therefore,  we  consider  these  factors  against  the  background  of  growing 
absolutism  and  autocracy  which  characterise  the  progression  of  the 
Julio-Claudian  dynasty,  we  can  hardly  be  surprised  that  the 
Praetorian  prefecture  acquired  a  range  of  responsibilities  encompassing 
not  only  all  matters  relating  to  the  emperor's  security  but  also 
involving  it  in  judicial,  administrative  and  military  spheres  of 
activity. 
But  flexibility  can  scarcely  be  the  whole  explanation.  The  operation 
of  the  post  too  facilitated  its  enhancement.  The  appointment 
presumed  loyalty  -a  sound  bedrock  from  which  expansion  might  readily 
develop.  But  a  greater  influence  still  was  the  daily  contact  between 
emperor  and  prefect. 
36 
Although  it  is  unclear  whether  the  prefect  was 
constantly  at  the  emperor's  side, 
37 
such  contact  was  not  limited  to 
that  part  of  the  day  given  over  to  official  business.  The  evidence 
suggests  that  it  may  well  have  been  usual  for  the  prefect  to  dine  with 
the  emperor.  Seianus  saved  Tiberius'  life  in  AD.  26  when  the  roof  of 
a  cavern  at  a  villa  named  Speluncae  fell  on  them  while  they  were 
dining. 
38 
It  was  during  a  dinner  party  that  Burrus  was  dismissed  from 
the  prefecture  by  a  drunken  Nero. 
39 
Tigellinus  was  a  predictable 
participant  / 169. 
participant  in  Nero's  orgies40  and  gave  Sporus  away  during  Nero's 
'wedding'  in  Greece  in  AD.  67.41  Otho's  prefects  were  at  the  dinner 
party  broken  up  by  a  Praetorian  riot. 
42 
From  association  came 
familiarity,  even  friendship.  Macrobius  paints  us  a  vivid  picture  of 
Augustus  and  Seius  Strabo  discussing  political  philosophy. 
43 
And  so 
compatability  combined  with  convenience,  and  intimacy  with  proximity 
to  ensure  a  continual  increase  in  the  competence  of  the  prefecture. 
It  seems  probable  that  the  Praetorian  prefect,  as  the  official 
responsible  for  the  emperor's  security,  was,  from  a  very  early  date, 
a  member  of  the  consilium  which  the  emperor  used  both  as  a  consultative 
body  and  a  court  of  law. 
44 
Suetonius  tells  us  that  Augustus  set  up  a 
series  of  consilia  drawn  by  lot  from  members  of  the  Senate  and  serving 
for  six  months,  but  says  nothing  about  whether  the  Praetorian  prefect 
was  a  member. 
45 
However,  the  same  author  specifically  mentions 
Seianus  as  one  of  a  number  of  consiliarii  murdered  by  Tiberius. 
46 
Although  this,  by  itself,  is  hardly  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  claim 
that  the  Praetorian  prefect  was  always  a  member  of  the  consilium,  a 
better  source  provides  confirmation.  Tacitus  reports  that  Burrus, 
accused  together  with  Pallas  of  sponsoring  a  rival  to  Nero  in  AD.  55, 
was  present  as  an  assessor  at  his  own  trial. 
47 
Although  this  is 
probably  a  distortion,  it  is  explicable  if  Burrus  was  a  regular  member 
of  Nero's  consilium.  Indeed  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that 
the  prefect  may  have  served  on  the  consilium  during  Pallas'  trial  or 
when  the  accuser  was  tried  later  for  calumnia. 
The  juridical  involvement  of  the  prefect  was  not,  however,  limited  to 
membership  / 
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membership  of  the  emperor's  consilium.  Seneca  describes  Nero's 
reluctance  to  sign  a  death  warrant  presented  to  him  by  Burrus. 
43 
The  clear  implication  is  that  by  this  time  the  Praetorian  prefect  had 
a  firm  foothold  in  the  administration  of  justice.  De  Laet  tries  to 
date  the  development  of  this  function  to  the  principate  of  Tiberius. 
49 
The  vigour  of  Seianus,  well-attested,  lends  credence  to  such  a 
suggestion.  And  indeed  this  approach,  as  I  have  previously  noted, 
does  contain  an  element  of  truth.  The  scope  of  the  prefecture 
undeniably  changed  during  the  tenure  of  that  most  ambitious  prefect. 
But  I  would  suggest  that  this  wider  juridical  function  should  be 
regarded  not  solely  as  the  product  of  one  prefect's  ambition  but 
rather  as  an  enhancement  of  the  basic  role  of  the  prefect  as  the 
guardian  of  the  emperor  and  commander  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts. 
50 
The  path  of  this  progression  runs  thus.  '  The  prefect,  as  the  emperor's 
protector,  was  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  for  the  arrest  of 
alleged  offenders  of  a  certain  distinction.  So  we  find  Claudius' 
prefect  Rufrius  Crispinus  personally  leading  the  unit  to  apprehend 
Valerius  Asiaticus  at  Baiae  in  AD.  47.51  The  place  of  custody  for 
prominenti,  among  whom  we  can  include  Herod  Agrippa52  and  the  apostle 
Paul, 
53 
was  often  the  Praetorian  camp.  None  of  this  is,  of  course, 
in  any  way  surprising.  The  preventive  detention  of  those  who  threaten, 
or  are  alleged  to  threaten,  the  security  of  the  state  is  indisputably 
the  function  of  those  who  are  charged  with  maintaining  that  same  security. 
But  the  prefect's  involvement  was  not  limited  to  the  detention  of 
suspects.  He  also  appears  to  have  been  responsible  for  the  gathering 
of  evidence  and  the  examination  of  witnesses.  Since  this  involved 
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torture  which  was,  especially  in  the  case.  of  slaves,  an  accepted, 
indeed  intrinsic,  part  of  the  process  of  interrogation,  it  was  not  an 
exercise  for  the  fastidious.  Tacitus  gives  us  corrupt  and  brutal 
monsters  -  Macro  in  the  aftermath  of  Seianus'  execution 
54 
and 
Tigellinus  at  the  brutal  questioning  of  Pythias,  Octavia's  maid,  in 
AD.  62 
55 
and  Epicharis  during  the  Pisonian  conspiracy  three  years 
later. 
56 
We  should  not  be  misled.  This  was  not  a  divertissement 
for  the  sadistic.  From  the  particular  we  may  assume  a  more  general 
principle  -  that  it  was,  in  certain  cases,  the  recognised  duty  of 
the  Praetorian  prefect  to  conduct  the  interrogation. 
But  we  must  not  take  our  assumptions  too  far.  Burrus'  role  as  Nero's 
assessor  is  significant.  But  it  foreshadows  only  dimly  the 
independent  jurisdiction  of  Hadrian's  prefect  Marcius  Turbo. 
57 
Likewise,  the  personal  involvement  of  the  prefect  in  the  arresting  and 
questioning  of  suspects,  and  even  in  the  presenting  of  evidence  to  the 
Senate  or  emperor,  although  considerable  extensions  of  his  original 
role,  scarcely  explain  the  enormous  civil  powers  which  the  prefecture 
had  acquired  by  the  early  3rd  century. 
58 
We  may,  therefore,  rightly 
conclude  that  the  prefect's  juridical  role  was  gradually  developing 
throughout  the  Julio-Claudian  period  and  that  the  foundations 
of  its  later  growth  were  firmly  laid  at  this  time.  Nothing  in  the 
evidence  indicates  that  we  can  further  extend  our  conclusions. 
Moreover,  although  it  may  be  possible  to  comprehend  the  impetus  behind 
this  development  and  to  see  it  in  the  context  of  the  general  increase 
in  the  duties  of  the  prefect,  the  precise  manner  and  timing  of  such 
changes  remain  a  matter  of  speculation. 
59 
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The  enhancement  of  the  prefecture  was  not  limited  to  legal 
administration.  By  the  end  of  the  2nd  century  Perennis  was  acting 
as  chief  of  staff  to  the  entire  Roman  army  and  was  directing  the 
appointments  of  legionary  commanders. 
60 
It  may  rightly  be  argued 
that  the  powers  which  Commodus  granted  to  his  prefect  were  exceptional, 
but  the  appointment  of  the  Praetorian  prefect  to  the  command  of  a 
field  army  was  not  an  innovation  on  his  part  but  rather  the 
continuation  of  a  regular  practice  of  Marcus  Aurelius. 
61 
Even 
closer  to  the  Julio-Claudian  period,  Cornelius  Fuscus,  who  attained 
the  prefecture  under  Domitian,  commanded  an  expeditionary  force  to 
Dacia  in  AD.  88.62  It  would,  however,  be  quite  wrong  to  assume  that 
the  prefecture  acquired  a  permanent  military  competence  beyond  the 
direction  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  from  the  principate  of  Domitian. 
It  is  at  least  partly  correct  to  regard  these  appointments  as 
special  delegations  to  individual  prefects. 
63 
On  the  other  hand  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  distinction  between  a  special  delegation, 
regularly  granted,  and  a  permanent  competence  is  a  thin  one  and 
perhaps  more  apparent  in  retrospect  than  it  was  at  the  time. 
A  different  interpretation  also  suggests  itself.  Is  it  not  possible 
to  regard  the  practice  of  placing  the  prefect  at  the  head  of  a  field 
army  as  a  natural  extension  of  his  role  as  the  emperor's  security 
adviser?  We  have  already  noted  the  presumption  of  loyalty  implicit 
both  in  the  appointment  to  and  operation  of  the  prefecture.  To  whom, 
therefore,  could  the  emperor  more  reliably  turn  in  times  of  crisis 
than  to  his  most  trusted  subordinate?  But  fidelity  alone  hardly 
explains  the  imposition  of  the  Praetorian  prefect  as  a  commander  of 
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field  armies.  Another  factor  merits  consideration.  The  maintenance 
of  the  security  of  the  empire's  borders  was  seen  as  the  personal 
responsibility  of  the  emperor  himself.  Augustus'  anguish  on  hearing 
of  the  slaughter  of  Varus'  legions  in  the  Teutoburg  Forest  was 
prompted,  to  some  extent,  by  the  loss  which  the  disaster  caused  to  his 
own  prestige. 
64  After  Augustus  the  level  of  autocracy  increased.  So 
too  did  its  concomitant  vices,  especially  vanity.  No-one  was  more 
receptive  to  imperial  propaganda,  or  more  gullibly  deceived  by  it, 
than  the  emperors  themselves.  Louis  the  XIVth  was  neither  the  first 
nor  last  despot  to  be  beguiled  by  the  cult  of  personality  which  he 
himself  had  created. 
65 
And  so  a  threat  to  the  stability  of  the  state, 
whether  from  an  internal  or  external  source,  was  viewed  as  an  assault 
on  the  dignity  of  the  emperor  and,  in  the  final  analysis,  a  possible 
menace  to  his  survival.  In  what  better  way  then  could  the  emperor 
express  his  personal  concern  and  determination  to  counter  such  a 
challenge  than  by  despatching  the  commander  of  his  own  bodyguard  to 
the  battlefront? 
The  pattern  of  this  development,  however,  remains,  like  that  of  the 
prefecture's  juridical  role,  a  matter  of  some  contention.  Durry 
regards  Fuscus  as  the  first  Praetorian  prefect  to  command  a  field  army 
66 
with  a  degree  of  independence.  De  Laet  denounces  this  view  as  'une 
erreur  flagrante'67  and  cites  examples  of  military  missions  undertaken 
at  earlier  dates  by  the  Praetorian  prefect. 
68 
But  the  incidents 
which  he  selects  either  do  not  convince  -  Seianus  participated  in  the 
suppression  of  the  mutiny  in  Pannonia  in  AD.  14,  but  his  role  was 
certainly  less  important  and  less  sinister  than  Tacitus  suggests69  - 
or  / 174. 
or  are  of  doubtful  relevance  -  the  Praetorian  prefect,  in  this  case 
Seianus,  is  not  mentioned  as  being  involved  in  any  way  with  the  cohorts 
who  fought  with  Germanicus  in  AD.  16  or  with  the  arrangements  four 
years  later  for  the  escorting  of  his  ashes  from  Brundisium  to  Rome. 
7° 
He  also  claims  to  see  similarities  in  the  type  of  command  held  by 
Rufrius  Pollio, 
71 
who  received  a  triumphal  statue  after  the 
successful  invasion  of  Britain  in  AD.  43,  and  that  of  Fuscus.  Yet 
their  roles  were  quite  different.  Fuscus  was  in  complete  charge  of 
the  Dacian  expedition.  Suetonius  is  definite  on  this  point  and  his 
words  -  cui  belli  summam  commiserat72  -  leave  no  room  for  doubt. 
Pollio's  presence  in  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  clearly  relates  to 
his  responsibilities  for  the  emperor's  security  and  to  his  command 
of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  who  accompanied  their  emperor  during  that 
campaign.  His  role  was  clearly,  despite  his  subsequent  award,  that 
of  a  subordinate,  with  the  overall  direction  of  the  campaign  firmly 
in  the  hands  of  Aulus  Plautius.  We  do  not  know  whether  Pollio  had 
tactical  command  even  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  or,  indeed,  whether 
the  cohorts  were  utilised  during  the  fighting. 
Yet  De  Laet's  misconceptions  do  not  mean  that  Durry  is  correct.  In 
fact,  he  is  wrong.  He  ignores  the  year  AD.  69  which  provides  us 
with  the  first  examples  of  prefects  holding  field  commands. 
73 
We 
should  note  the  date  -a  year  of  invasion  and  bloody  civil  war. 
The  coincidence  should  not  amaze  us.  Although  the  prefecture  was 
created  in  response  to  a  political  problem,  the  potential  had  always 
existed  for  the  Praetorian  prefect  -  the  commander  of  an  elite  unit 
of  around  5,000  men  -  to  become  involved  in  military  matters. 
Hence  / 175. 
Hence  Seianus  in  Pannonia,  Rufrius  Pollio  in  Britain.  But  this  was 
command  without  control,  responsibility  without  power.  It  might  well 
have  continued  in  this  fashion  with  the  prefects  slowly  developing  a 
military  profile  and  occasionally  obtaining  a  battlefield  command. 
The  cataclysm  of  AD.  69  completely  changed  the  pace  of  this 
development.  Nor  was  this  solely  related  to  the  involvement  of  the 
Praetorian  cohorts  in  the  fighting.  The  uncertainties  of  that  year 
led  emperors  like  Otho  and  Vitellius  to  value  fidelity  above  efficiency. 
Indeed  incompetence,  provided  it  was  artfully  shrouded  in  a  cloak  of 
specious  loyalty,  was  not  only  tolerated  but,  in  fact,  preferred  to 
that  honest  ability  which  is  unassertive  and  cares  nothing  for 
expediency.  And  so  field  commands  were  turned  over  to  Praetorian 
prefects,  with,  it  must  be  said,  a  notable  lack  of  success.  Licinius 
Proculus,  who  acted  as  Otho's  chief-of-staff  during  the  fighting  in 
north  Italy,  devoted  most  of  his  time  to  the  slandering  of  better 
generals. 
74 
Julius  Priscus  and  Alfenus  Varus  watched  the 
Praetorian  cohorts  entrusted  to  them  by  Vitellius  disintegrate  in  the 
face  of  the  Flavian  advance. 
75 
This  is,  of  course,  a  universal 
truth  -  that  the  nature  and  values  of  any  society  cannot  survive  the 
disruption  of  a  major  war  unchanged.  We  may,  therefore,  conclude  that 
the  internal  peace,  which  existed  for  100  years  after  the  battle  of 
Actium  and  was,  to  some  extent,  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  Julio-Claudian 
dynasty,  was  instrumental  in  restricting  the  military  involvement  of 
the  Praetorian  prefect.  We  can  discern  before  AD.  69  the  roots  of 
its  later  development,  but  no  more. 
There  was  never  any  shortage  of  candidates  for  the  prefecture  even 
during  / 176. 
during  the  period  after  Perennis'  death  when  Cleander,  the  imperial 
chamberlain,  orchestrated  the  elevation  to  the  post,  then  the 
removal  from  it,  of  a  whole  succession  of  hapless  pawns. 
76 
Such  was 
the  allure  of  power,  of  even  the  semblance  of  power.  The  rewards 
could,  of  course,  be  substantial.  Three  Praetorian  prefects  - 
Seius  Strabo,  Macro  and  Lusius  Geta  -  were  promoted  to  the 
prefecture  of  Egypt. 
77 
Seianus,  Rufrius  Crispinus,  Burrus  and 
Nymphidius  Sabinus  all  gained  ornamenta  consularia. 
78 
Macro  was 
offered  ornamenta  praetoria,  as  was  Arrius  Varus  after  the  Flavian 
victory. 
79 
Valerius  Ligur  was  granted  a  seat  when  he  accompanied 
Augustus  to  the  Senate.  A  similar  concession  was  given  to  RufrºUS 
Pollio  who  was  also  awarded  ornamenta  triumphalia  and  a  statue  in 
AD.  43  after  the  British  campaign. 
80 
Yet  if  the  opportunities  for  advancement  were  great,  so  too  were  the 
risks  associated  with  the  post.  Imperial  favour  was  ever  fickle  and 
arbitrary.  Suspicion  was  easily  roused,  sometimes,  as  in  the  cases 
of  Faenius  Rufus 
81 
and  Nymphidius  Sabinus, 
82 
with  justification,  but 
more  often  because,  like  Seianus83  and  Macro, 
84 
the  ambitions  of  the 
prefects  were  judged  to  be  dangerous  to  their  emperors,  or  because, 
like  Catonius  Justus 
85 
and  Rufrius  Pollio, 
86 
they  failed  to  adapt  to 
the  machiavellian  intriguing  that  was  court  politics.  But  the  very 
fact  that  these  emperors  thought  it  expedient  to  execute  their  prefects 
is  also  a  sign  of  the  growing  power  of  the  prefecture.  The  despot 
does  not  fear,  and  so  has  no  need  to  eliminate,  the  insignificant. 
But  the  prefecture  carried  with  it  such  a  high  profile  that  even  the 
inconspicuous  gained  prominence  through  tenure.  And  Seianus' 
prefecture  / 177. 
,  prefecture  stood  as  an  object  lesson  on  the  danger  of  appointing 
someone  of  eminence. 
Since,  however,  it  was  the  emperors  themselves  who  made  the 
appointments  and  set  out  the  conditions  of  service,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  they  got  the  prefects  they  deserved. 
The  morals  of  the  prefects  tend  to  mirror  those  of  the  emperors 
they  served  and  of  the  society  of  which  they  were  part.  So  Seianus 
and  Macro  under  Tiberius,  Tigellinus  and  Nymphidius  Sabinus  under 
Nero.  But  such  an  approach  ignores  the  developing  nature  of  the 
prefecture  itself.  It  was  increasingly  difficult  for  any  emperor 
to  impose  limits  on  the  scope  of  that  office.  He  could  rid  himself 
of  a  prefect  easily  -  Seianus'  fall  shows  us  that  much  -  but  his 
need  for  security  compelled  him  to  appoint  another.  Emperor  and 
prefect  were  bound  quite  inextricably  together  and  if  the  dependency 
in  the  relationship  was  unequal,  it  was  undoubtedly  mutual. 178. 
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CHAPTER  I  THE  AUGUSTAN  GUARD  AND  ITS  PREDECESSORS 
1.  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  Augustus  was  a  reactionary,  although  he 
clearly  shared  with  Romans  of  all  classes  'agespecial  veneration 
for  authority,  precedent  and  tradition  .....  a  rooted  distaste  of 
change,  unless  change  could  be  shown  to  be  in  harmony  with  ancestral 
custom'  R.  Syme,  The  Roman  Revolution  (Oxford  1939)  p.  315. 
For  Augustus'  own  attitude  to  change  see  Macrobius  2.4.18  where, 
asked  by  Seius  Strabo  for  his  opinion  of  Cato,  he  is  alleged  to 
have  replied  - 
'quisquis  praesentem  statum  civitatis  commutari  non  volet,  et  civis 
et  vir  bonus  est'. 
2.  Durry  p.  67. 
3.  We  know  from  Polyyius  (6.31.1-4)  that  both  cavalry  and  infantry 
detachments,  a  (oAEK1bc  SSW  Etr(AEg1Z  y  sometimes  escorted 
or  camped  beside  the  consul. 
4.  Livy  2.20.2.  I  think  that  it  could  be  argued  that  this  example 
is  anachronistic,  worked  into  the  bare  records  by  a  1st  century 
historian  thinking  of  exempla  recentiora. 
5.  Livy  29.1.2  trecentos  iuvenes,  florentes  aetate  et  virium 
robore  insignes,  inermes  circa  se  habebat. 
6.  Festus  1.7.  Praetoria  cohors  est  dicta,  quod  a  praetore  non 
discedebat.  Scipio  enim  Africanus  primus  fortissimum  quemque 
delegit,  qui  ab  eo  in  bello  non  discederent  et  cetero  munere 
militiae  vacarent  et  sesquiplex  stipendium  acciperent. 
This  too  (see  note  4)  could  be  anachronistic. 
7.  App.  Hisp.  84. 
Durry  p.  72  describes  such  a  unit  as'une  cohorte  panachee'. 
8.  Sall.  Iug.  98.1.  It  remained  common,  however,  for  young  nobles 
to  gain  military  experience  by  serving  on  the  staff  of  legionary 
commanders  (Sall.  Iug.  64.4);  Caesar  (BG  1.39.2)  did  not 
have  a  high  regard  for  thetrmilitary  abilities  ('non  magnum  in  re 
militari  usum  habebant'). 
9.  For  suggestions  as  to  the  origin  of  the  term  'cohors  praetoria' 
see  Durry  p.  69-71. 
10.  / 181. 
10.  Cic.  Verr.  2.2.30;  2.2.34;  2.2.  "  66;  2.3.70,  cp.  Durry 
p.  72  'eile  n'a  rien  de  militaire'. 
11.  Cic.  Ad  Quint.  Frat.  1.1.12. 
12.  Cic.  Cat.  2.23  scortorum  cohortem  praetoriam;  for  the 
translation  see  M.  Grant,  Cicero;  Selected  Political  Speeches 
(London  1969)  p.  106. 
13.  Catull.  10.9  -  13. 
respondi  id  quod  erat,  nihil  neque  ipsis 
nec  praetoribus  esse  nec  cohorti 
cur  quisquam  caput  unctius  referret 
praesertim  quibus  esset  irrumator 
praetor,  nec  faceret  pili  cohortem. 
It  had  long  been  the  practice  of  Roman  governors  to  include  in 
their  entourage  talented  writers  and  poets.  Lucilius,  for 
example,  was  with  Scipio  Aemilianus  at  Numantia  in  134  BC. 
By  such  methods  did  a  Roman  noble  advertise  his  patronage  of  the 
arts  and  indulge  his  hopes  of  immortality  for  his  achievements 
(Hor. 
,  Epist.  1.3.6-8;  1.8.2;  1.8.14;  Sat.  1.7.23-5; 
Tib.  1.3.1;  1.7).  This  entourage  of  personal  friends  (and 
not  just  literary  ones)  was  the  origin  of  the  cohors  amicorum 
during  the  Principate  (Tac.  Ann.  6.9.2)  by  which  time  the  force 
of  the  term  'cohors  praetoria'  was  purely  military. 
14.  Cic.  Ad  Fam.  15.4.7;  cp  Ad  Att.  7.1.6. 
15.  Cic.  Verr.  2.1.36. 
16.  Sall.  Cat.  60.5;  61.3. 
17.  Caes.  BG  1.40.15;  cp.  1.42.6. 
18.  Suetonius  (Aug.  10)  alleges  that  Octavian  tried  to  arrange  the 
murder  of  Antony. 
19.  App.  BC.  3.40;  Cic.  Phil.  8.35;  P.  A.  Brunt  (Italian 
Manpower  225  BC.  -  AD.  14  (Oxford  1971)  p.  320  note  4)  is  rightly 
sceptical  of  Appian's  claims  that  Antony's  bodyguard  consisted 
wholly  of  centurions;  that  they  were  paid  as  such  seems  much 
more  likely. 
2b.  App.  BC.  3.45;  3.52  (Antony's  cohort);  3.66  (Octavian's 
cohort).  Sulpicius  Galba  (Cic.  Ad.  Fam.  10.30.1)  mentions 
in  a  letter  of  the  20th  of  April  43  BC.  that  Antony  had 
2  praetorian  cohorts,  his  own  and  that  of  Silanus. 
21.  / 182. 
21.  App.  BC.  3.67. 
22.  App.  BC.  4.115. 
23.  App.  BC.  5.3;  Dio  Cass.  48.2.3. 
24.  App.  BC.  5.24;  5.34. 
25  App.  BC.  5.59. 
26.  Plut.  Ant.  53. 
27.  Plut.  Ant.  39. 
28.  H.  A.  Grueber,  Coins  of  the  Roman  Republic  in  the  British  Museum 
(London  1910)  vol.  2  p.  526  nos.  183  and  184  =  M.  H.  Crawford, 
Roman  Republican  Coinage  (Cambridge  1975)  544/1. 
29.  Grueber,  op.  cit.  p.  527  nos.  185  and  186  =  Crawford,  op.  cit. 
544/12. 
30.  Grant  AOC  p.  91. 
31.  Oros.  '  6.19.6. 
32.  M.  Hammond,  'The  Significance  of  the  Speech  of  Maecenas  in  Dio 
Cassius,  Book  LII'  TAPA  63  (1932)  p.  88-102. 
33.  Suet.  Aug.  17;  Dio  Cass.  51.3.4. 
34.  Suet.  Aug.  32.  It  is  tempting  to  link  this  passage  with 
Maecenas'  warning  to  Augustus  (Dio  Cass.  52.27.5)  on  the 
dangers  of  brigandage  if  he  fails  to  recruit  Italians  into  his 
army.  F.  Millar  (A  Study  of  Cassio  Dio  (Oxford  1964)  p.  109) 
argues  convincingly  that  this  passage  relates  to  the  situation 
in  Di  's  own  time  when  Septimius  Severus  stopped  recruitment  of 
Italians  into  the  Praetorian  cohorts  (Dio  Cass.  74.2.5-6). 
35.  We  can  hardly  count  as  a  serious  rival  Lepidus'  son  who  in  30  BC. 
tried  to  suborn  some  of  the  legions,  possibly  those  originally 
under  his  father's  command,  which  were  returning  from  the  east 
(Livy,  Per.  133;  App.  BC.  4.50;  Vell.  Pat.  2.88; 
Dio  Cass.  51.3.1-4;  cp.  54.15.4). 
Nevertheless  it  was  largely  Maecenas'  suppression  of  this 
conspiracy  which  led  Passerini  (p.  275)  to  include  him  in  his  list 
of  Praetorian  prefects:  cp.  Durry  p.  157'si  Mecen',  par  le 
commandement  qu'il  exerp  sur  Rome  et  l'Italie  durant  les 
absences  de  son  prince  et  ami,  fut  le  chef  des  cohortes,  on  ne 
pourrait  sans  abus  l'appeler  le  premier  prefet  du  pretoire.  ' 
36.  / 183. 
36.  F.  Miller  and  E.  Segal,  Caesar  Augustus  -  Seven  Aspects  (Oxford 
1984)  I.  Z.  Yavetz,  The  Res  Gestae  and  Augustus'  Public  Image 
p.  17.  'But  the  old  traditions  died  slowly,  and  the  few 
aristocrats  and  their  sons  who  had  survived  the  civil  wars 
continued  to  believe  that  freedom  did  not  mean  serving  a  just 
master,  but  serving  no  master  at  all.  ' 
37.  Even  after  Actium,  when  he  was  pursuing  a  policy  of  reconciliation 
and  Clementia  was  about  to  become  his  political  watchword  (Res 
Gestae  3;  Vell.  Pat.  2.86.2),  Octavian  was  unwilling  to  show 
mercy  to  the  assassins  of  Caesar.  So  D.  Turullus  (Dio  Cass. 
51.8.2f)  and  Cassius  of  Parma  (Veil.  Pat.  2.87.3)  were  killed. 
There  were  other  victims  too;  Scribonius  Curio,  as  stubborn  and 
self-destructive  as  his  mother,  was  executed  (Dio  Cass.  -51.2.5). 
Aquillius  Florus  and  his  son  were  also  put  to  death  (Dio  Cass. 
51.2.5-6).  P.  Canidius  the  Antonian  general,  was  also  killed 
(Veil.  Pat.  2.87.3).  Political  necessity  was  invoked  to 
justify  these  killings  as  well  as  the  many  vicious  acts  which 
Suetonius  alleges  Octavian  committed  earlier  in  his  career  -  the 
murder  of  the  consul  Hirtius  in  43  BC.  (Aug.  11),  the  sacrificing 
of  300  prisoners  of  senatorial  or  equestrian  rank  in  40  BC.  after 
the  capture  of  Perusia  (Aug.  15),  as  well  as  the  killing  of  a 
Roman  knight  Pinarius,  enforcing  the  suicide  of  a  consul-elect 
Tedius  Afer,  and  the  blinding  of  a  praetor  named  Quintus  Gallius, 
(Aug.  27).  Whether  such  allegations  were  true  (and  some  were 
certainly  not:  see  Miller  and  Segal,  op.  cit.  p.  2-3)  is  not 
important;  their  existence  indicates  a  depth  of  opposition  to 
the  new  princeps  (cp.  Dio  Cass.  53.9.3). 
38.  Arist.  Fr.  516  (Periander);  Hdt.  1.59  (PiSistratus); 
cp.  Aesch.  Aga.  1651  (Aegisthus). 
39.  Livy  6.14.5;  cp.  Miller  and  Segal,  op.  cit.  p.  13-14  'Augustus 
refused  to  be  regarded  as  the  darling  of  the  plebs  only  -  some 
kind  of  parens  plebis  Romanae';  cp.  Pliny,  Ep.  9.5. 
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44.  cp.  Philostr.  VS  2.26  where  it  is  recorded  that  the  sophist 
Heracleides,  once  broke  down  in  an  oration  before  Septimius 
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45.  Syme  RR.  p.  481;  cp.  Suet.  Aug.  51. 
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47.  Dio  Cass.  -  55.14.,  1. 
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sed  detinet. 
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49. 
_ 
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Suetonius'  rather  brief  treatment  of  this  important  conspiracy 
see  A.  Wallace-Hadrill,  Suetonius  (London  1983)  p.  13. 
50.  Täc.  Ann  4.5;  Dio  Cassius  (56.24.3)  claims  that  there  were 
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the  10  bodyguard  units  of  Dio  with  the  9  Praetorian  cohorts  of 
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B.  Dobson,  'Praefectus  Castrorum  Aegyptii  -a  Reconsideration' 
Chronique  d'Egypte  57  (1982)  p.  322-37  (especially  p.  325-328). 
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56.  Dio  Cass.  56.24.6. 
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62.  Tac. 
_Ann. 
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Latio  et  coloniis  antiquitus  Romanis. 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  Strabo's  (5.1.12)  'fine  store  of  men'  also 
contributed  heavily  throughout  this  period  to  the  Praetorian 
Guard  (see  Passerini  p.  148). 
63.  Verg.  Aen.  8.678  hinc  Augustus  agens  Italos  in  proelia  Caesar. 
cp.  Syme,  RR  p.  287  'It  is  evident  that  the  most  confident  as  well 
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rather  than  preceded  the  War  of  Actium'. 
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65  Numerous  inscriptions,  especially  from  the  principate  of  Claudius 
onwards,  indicate  that  a  tour  of  duty  as  a  centurion  or  tribune 
in  the  urban  cohorts  was  usual  before  service  in  these  capacities 
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towards  the  end  of  his  principate  around  the  time  of  the  rising  in 
Pannonia  when  there  were  serious  grain  shortages  in  Rome  and  the 
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Pompey's  legate  in  49  BC.,  had  a  guard  of  Iberian  horsemen 
(Caesar,  BC.  1.75.2).  Decimus  Brutus  had  a  Celtic  bodyguard 
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placuisse,  cottidianum  ad  Marsyam  concursum,  cum  ex  adultera  in 
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Marsyan  litterae  illius  dei  gemunt. 
Tacitus  seems  to  accept  sexual  aberration  as  the  explanation  of 
Iullus'  death  in  two  places  (Ann.  3.18.1.  Iulli  Antonii,  qui 
domum  Augusti  violasset;  Ann.  4.44.3.  Iullo  Antonio  ob 
adulterium  Iuliae  morte  punito),  although  he  also  includes  Iullus 
in  the  list  of  those  put  to  death  for  plotting  against  Augustus 
(Ann.  1.10.4.  interfectos  Romae  Varrones  Egnatios  Iullos). 
Dio  Cassius  accepts  Julia's  dissolute  behaviour  (55.10.12)  but 
notes  that  political  ambition  was  the  official  cause  of  Iullus' 
death  (55.10.15). 
85.  R.  Syme,  'TheCrisis  of  2  BC.  '  Sitzungberichte  (Munich  1974)  p.  23. 
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Although  it  is  now  generally  accepted  that  the  offences  were 
political  (cp.  Syme,  RR  p.  432),  there  are  still  those  who  dissent 
from  this  view;  F.  Norwood  (The  Riddle  of  Ovid's  Relegatio' 
CP  58  (1963)  p.  150-62)  regards  the  scandal  of  2  BC.  as  purely 
sexual  in  nature. 
One  / 189. 
One  might  profitably  compare  the  official  Augustan  version  of  the 
whole  incident  with  the  similar  emphasis  on  sexual  decadence,  in 
this  case  homosexuality,  put  forward  by  Hitler's  government  after 
the  assassination  of  Ernst  Rohm,  the  S.  A.  leader,  on  the  30th  of 
June  1934. 
W.  H.  Shirer,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  (London  1960) 
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depraved  morals  of  Roehm  and  the  other  S.  A.  leaders  who  were 
shot.  Dietrich  (Hitler's  press  chief)  asserted  that  the  scene 
of  the  arrest  of  Heines,  who  was  caught  in  bed  at  Wiessee  with  a 
young  man,  'defied  description',  and  Hitler  in  addressing  the 
surviving  storm  troop  leaders  in  Munich  at  noon  on  June  30  ..... 
declared  that  for  their  corrupt  morals  alone  these  men  deserved 
to  die.  ' 
86.  B.  M.  Levick,  'The  Fall  of  Julia  the  Younger',  Latomus  34,  (1976) 
p.  301;  cp.  another  earlier  article  by  the  same  author  'Tiberius' 
Retirement  to  Rhodes  in  6  BC.  '  Latomus  31  (1972)  p.  779f. 
87.  Pliny,  HN  7.149  adulterium  filiae  et  parricidae  consilia  palam 
facta. 
88.  Durry,  p.  163. 
89.  Durry,  p.  158. 
90.  Grant,  AOC  p.  94.  If,  however,  we  accept  that  the  collegiate 
arrangement  of  the  republican  consulship  was  to  ensure  that  one 
consul  was  always  available  even  when  the  other  was  disloyal,  then 
it  is  possible  to  see  Mommsen's  point. 
91.  Tac.  Ann.  1.7;  Grant  (AOC  p.  94)  also  mentions  Valerius  Ligur  as 
a  single  holder  of  the  office,  but  there  is  nothing  to  support  this 
view  in  the  historian's  passing  mention  of  him  (Dio  Cass.  60.23.3.  ). 
92.  H.  Dessau,  Geschichte  der  römischen  Kaizerzeit  vol.  1  (Berlin  1924) 
p.  257. 
93.  B.  M.  Levick,  'Drusus  Caesar  and  the  Adoptions  of  AD.  4'  Latomus  25 
(1966)  p.  227-44. 
94.  Durry,  p.  157. 
95.  Dio  Cass.  78.4.1;  Hdn.  5.1.5.  The  Senate  did,  however, 
confirm  the  choice  of  the  army  since  Macrinus  was  not,  at  first, 
unpopular,  especially  in  comparison  with  his  despotic  predecessor, 
Caracall  (Hdn.  5.2.1;  SHA.  Macr.  7.1-4).  ac,, 
96.  / 190. 
96.  Jos.  AJ  19.186;  Luc.  7.691f;  Tap.  Agr.  3.1. 
97.  Augustus  was,  without  realising  it,  creating  a  precedent,  the 
logical  culmination  of  which  was  reached  in  the  middle  of  the 
3rd  century  with  the  formal  decree  of  the  emperor  Gallienus 
which  excluded  senators  from  serving  as  military  tribunes  or 
as  legionary  commanders. 
On  the  reforms  of  Gallienus,  see  H.  G.  Pflaum,  'Zur  Reform  des 
Kaisers  Gallienus',  Historia  25  (1976)  p.  109f. 
The  new  mobile  field  armies  were  also  commanded  by  equestrian 
army  officers  who  were  independent  of  any  provincial  governor. 
98.  The  exile  of  Julia  to  Pandateria  was  followed  later  by  that  of 
Julia  the  Younger,  her  mother's  daughter  both  in  promiscuity  and 
ambition.  (Tac.  Ann.  4.71;  cp.  3.24;  Scholiast  on  Juv. 
Sat.  6.157f.  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  political  aspects 
of  this  exile,  see  B.  M.  Levick,  The  Fall  of  Julia  the  Younger', 
op.  cit.  p.  301-339). 
Around  the  same  time  the  youngest  of  Augustus'  grandsons,  the 
allegedly  depraved  Agrippa  Postumus,  was  also  banished.,  (Tac. 
Ann.  1.3.5;  Vell.  Pat.  2.112.7;  Suet.  Aug.  65;  Dio 
Cass.  56.27.  lf;  55.32.  lf). 
Even  on  their  remote  island  prisons  this  group,  both  individually 
and  collectively,  was  a  potential  threat  to  Augustus.  There  were 
ambitious  rogues  ready,  in  their  desperation,  to  rescue  these 
imperial  outcasts  and  to  set  them  up  as  a  focus  for  all  those 
opposed  to  Augustus.  Suetonius  (Aug.  19)  tells  of  two  such  men, 
Lucius  Audasius,  a  feeble  old  man,  who  had  been  in  trouble  for 
forgery,  and  Asinius  Epicadius,  a  half-breed  of  Parthian  descent, 
who  developed  a  plot  to  kidnap  or  rescue  Agrippa  Postumus  and  his 
mother  Julia  from  their  island  prisons  and  take  them  'to  the 
armies'. 
99.  Suet.  Aug.  99;  Tac.  Ann.  1.8. 
100.  J.  F.  C.  Fuller  (The  Decisive  Battles  of  the  Western  World 
(London  1954)  vol.  1  p.  159)  has  no  doubts  on  this  matter. 
'The  Praetorians  were  an  ever-present  sanction  of  Augustus' 
authority  and  the  symbol  of  what  his  government  really  was,  a 
judiciously  organised  military  tyranny'. CHAPTER  II  THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  OF  TIBERIUS 
1.  Dio  Cass.  57.2.3. 
2.  M.  Grant,  Tacitus:  The  Annals  of  Imperial  Rome  (London  1956) 
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23.  Tac.  Ann.  1.77;  Suet.  Tib.  37;  see  also  Z.  Yavetz,  Plebs  and 
Princeps'  (Oxford  1969)  p.  11. 
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adopt  a  similar  plan  (Tac.  Ann.  2.39).  The  extent  to  which  the 
prince  himself  was  involved  in  these  adventures  is  unclear, 
although  A.  E.  Pappano  ('Agrippa  Postumus'  CP  35  (1941)  p.  30-45) 
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celeriter  ingratum  et  nova  molientem  oppressit. 
Suetonius  (Tib.  30)  tells  us  that  Tiberius  was  afraid  of  him  to 
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1'oreille'. 
41.  Tac.  Ann.  3.14. 
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lb-3). 
51.  Tac.  Ann.  4.67. 
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(Tac.  Ann.  3.29;  cp.  4.8). 
77.  Tac.  Ann.  4.2.  ut  ....  numeroque  et  robore  et  visu  inter  se 
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cp.  Dio  Cass.  57.19.6. 
78.  Tac.  Ann.  4.2.  et  severius  acturos,  si  vallum  statuatur  procul 
urbis  inlecebris. 
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There  can  be  little  doubt  that  from  AD.  20  onwards  Seianus' 
influence  grew  steadily.  In  AD.  21  his  uncle  Q.  Junius  Blaesus 
was  appointed,  in  preference  to  Manius  Lepidus,  to  command  the 
campaign  against  Tacfarinas  in  Africa  (Tac.  Ann.  3.35).  In 
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Boddington  (op.  cit.  p.  3)  regards  their  joint  consulship  as  an 
indication  that  Seianus  was  heir  apparent,  noting  that  his  two 
previous  consulships  during  his  principate  were  with  Germanicus 
in  AD.  18  and  Drusus  in  AD.  21. 
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For  the  political  significance  of  this  affair  see  R.  S.  Rogers 
'Lucius  Arruntius'  CP  26  (1931)  p.  31-45. 
115.  ILS  157  The  date  of  his  ruin  was  the  18th  of  October. 
116.  Dio  Cassius  58.8.2  Wý 
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Jos.  AJ  18.181;  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  4.2. 
117.  Dio  Cass.  58.13.1;  Suet.  Tib.  48. 
118.  Small.  254. 
119.  / 200. 
119.  For  the  importance  of  his  role  in  the  actions  against  Seianus 
see  F.  de  Visscher,  'Macro,  Prefet  des  Vigiles  et  ses  cohortes 
contre  la  tyrannje  de  Sejan'  Melanges  Andre  Piganiol  (Paris 
1966)  p.  761-8. 
120.  Dio  Cass.  58.9.5;  cp.  Philo,  Leg.  37. 
121.  Dio  Cass.  58.9.4. 
122.  Macro  had  informed  Regulus  and  Laco  of  what  was  expected  of  them 
only  on  the  previous  night  (Dio  Cass.  58.9.3).  Macro's  status 
as  a  former  prefect  of  the  Vigiles  was  clearly  an  important 
factor  in  ensuring  their  cooperation.  Whether  the  Lex  Visellia, 
which  in  AD.  24  had  granted  members  of  the  Vigiles  full 
citizenship  after  six  years'  service  in  the  corps,  was  quite  as 
influential  as  de  Visscher  believes  is  much  more  doubtful. 
123.  Dio  Cass.  58.9.6. 
124.  Tac.  Ann.  4.2. 
125.  Dio  Cassius  (58.9.5)  suggests  that  Macro  spoke  of  these  rewards 
earlier  when  he  dismissed  Seianus'  escort  outside  the  temple  of 
Apollo.  This  seems  improbable.  It  was  vital  at  that  stage  in 
the  operation  that  the  Praetorians  should  have  no  suspicions  that 
a  coup  against  Seianus  was  occurring.  The  order  to  return  to 
the  Viminal  camp  was  unusual  enough.  The  mention  of  rewards  at 
this  time  would  undoubtedly  have  alerted  and  alarmed  any 
partisans  of  Seianus  among  the  Praetorians.  Once  Macro  was  able 
to  present  the  action  against  the  prefect  as  successfully 
completed,  then  was  surely  the  time  to  pre-empt  any  rescue 
attempt  by  offering  rewards. 
126.  Dio  Cass.  58.10.8. 
127.  Dio  Cass.  58.11.1-3. 
128.  Dio  Cass.  58.11.4. 
129.  Levick,  Tib.  p.  178. 
130.  Dio  Cass.  58.11.5. 
131.  In  ILS  6044  Tiberius  (if  he  is  the  speaker;  cp.  Levick,  Tib. 
p.  120)  refers  to  himself  'debilis  inutilis  baculi  comes'. 
An  inscription  from  Interamna  in  Umbria  (ILS  157),  dated  to 
AD.  32  refers  to  Seianus  as  a  'perniciosissimus  hostis'. 
132.  / 201. 
132.  Dio  Cass.  58.11.3;  cp.  Juv.  Sat.  10.66-7. 
Seianus  ducitur  unco 
spectandus,  gaudent  omnes 
133.  Dio  Cass.  58.10.4. 
134.  Jos.  AJ  18.181. 
135.  Suet.  Tib.  65. 
136.  Tac.  Ann.  5.8. 
137.  Fulcinius  Trio,  the  consul,  provoked  his  loyalist  colleague 
Memmius  Regulus  into  attacking  him  for  involvement  in  the 
conspiracy.  Both  consuls  survived  the  allegations  (Tac.  Ann. 
5.11).  Less  fortunate  were  three  Roman  knights  who 
'cecidere  coniurationis  crimine'  (Tac.  Ann.  6.14). 
138.  Dio  Cass.  54.15.2. 
139.  Dio  Cass.  58.6.4;  58.8.2. 
140.  Dio  Cass.  58.14.1. 
141.  Dio  Cass.  76.3.3;  Syme,  Tac.  p.  753. 
142.  I  remain  unconvinced  by  the  suggestion  of  A.  N.  Sherwin-White 
in  his  review  of  Syme's  Tacitus  (JRS  (1959)  p.  142)  that  the 
charge  of  conspiracy  refers,  not  to  any  new  contrivings,  but 
to  the  past  actions  of  Seianus  against  the  Julian  house. 
143.  Dio  Cass.  58.  S.  3. 
144.  Tac.  Ann.  6.8. 
145.  Durry  (p.  154)  tries  to  play  down  the  political  aspect  of  the 
Seianus  affair.  Likewise  Passerini  who  writes  (p.  272)  'Questa 
poca  considerazione  del  nuovo  funzionario  fu  condivisa  anche 
da  Tiberio:  anzi  fu  la  causa  the  permise  a  Seiano  di  portare 
tanto  avanti  indisturbato  il  suo  folle  sogno'. 
146.  Suet.  Tib.  48;  Dio  Cass.  58.9.5;  58.18.2. 
147.  Publilius  Syrus  181. CHAPTER  III  :  THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  SEIANUS  TO 
THE  ASSASSINATION  OF  GAIUS 
1.  Tac.  Ann.  5.9;  Dio  Cass.  58.11.5;  cp.  Suet.  Tib.  61. 
For  the  dates  see  Braund  98. 
2.  Levick  (Tib.  p.  203)  writes  of  a  'witch-hunt'.  Seager  (op.  cit. 
p.  239-40)  also  argues  for  the  acceptance  of  the  fact  of  a  reign 
of  terror  on  the  basis  of  the  apparently  random  choice  of 
victims.  Marsh,  on  the  other  hand,  (op.  cit.  p.  220)  suggests, 
largely  because  Tacitus  mentions  only  a  small  number  of  trials, 
that  'the  whole  picture  of  the  Tiberian  terror  is  a  product  of 
imagination  and  rhetoric  quite  unsupported  by  the  evidence'. 
Even  he,  however,  is  forced  to  admit  that  'the  fall  of  Sejanus 
was  followed  by  a  period  of  gloom'. 
The  number  of  those  brought  to  trial  during  a  purge  bears  little 
relation  to  the  number  of  victims  killed  unlawfully.  During 
the  epuration  in  France  between  September  1944  and  the  end  of 
1949,2071  persons  were  sentenced  to  death;  of  these  only  768 
were  actually  executed  (D.  Littlejohn,  The  Patriotic  Traitors 
(London  1972)  p.  288).  On  the  other  hand,  Adrien  Tixier,  a 
post-war  minister  of  justice,  estimated  that  there  had  been 
105,000  summary  executions  between  June  1944  and  September  1945 
(D.  Pryce-Jones,  Paris  under  the  Third  Reich.  (London  1981) 
p.  206). 
3.  Tac.  Ann.  6.38. 
4.  Tac.  Ann.  6.  19;  cp.  Suet.  Tib.  61. 
5.  Dio  Cass.  58.  14.  1-5;  Suet.  Tib.  61. 
6.  Dio  Cass.  58.15.1-2;  Suet.  Tib.  61. 
7.  Modern  experience  suggests  that  coups  are  rarely  clinical  affairs. 
The  following  extract  from  H.  Hohne  (The  Order  of  the  Death's 
Head,  Hamburg  1966  p.  92)  serves  to  illustrate  this  point. 
'Drafting  death  lists  became  a  grisly  sport  for  those  in  the 
know.  Everyone  had  his  own  list;  Goering  drew  one  up;  Wagner, 
the  Gauleiter  of  Bavaria,  drew  one  up;  the  S.  S.,  the  S.  D.  and 
Gestapo  competed  in  their  choice  of  candidates.  Soon  they  were 
quarrelling  over  whether  this  man  or  that  really  merited  shooting'. 
8.  Dio  Cass.  58.12.2. 
9.  The  Jews  were  another  possible  target.  They  had  already  been 
expelled  once  during  Tiberius'  principate  for  proselytising 
(Jos.  AJ  18.81-85;  Suet.  Tib.  36;  Dio  Cass.  57.18.5a; 
cp.  also  W.  A.  Heidel  'Why  were  the  Jews  banished  from  Italy  in 
19  AD.?  '  AJP  41  (1920)  p.  38-47;  E.  M.  Smallwood  'Some  notes 
on  / 203. 
on  the  Jews  under  Tiberius'  Latomus  1'5  (1956)  p.  314-29).  They 
were  also  intended  victims  of  a  pogrom  by  Seianus  which  had  been 
forestalled  by  his  death  (Philo,  In  Flacc.  1;  Leg.  159-161). 
On  the  other  hand  neither  Philo  nor  Josephus  mentions  even  a 
small-scale  pogrom  in  the  aftermath  of  Seianus'  death.  Another 
factor  militating  against  this  theory  is  the  distance  of  the 
Jewish  quarter  (Trastevere)  from  the  Praetorian  camp. 
10.  Dio  Cass.  58.9.5;  58.18.2-3;  cp.  Suet.  Tib.  48. 
11.  Tac.  Ann.  6.1;  Suet.  Tib.  72;  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  4.57-8; 
Suet.  Tib.  40. 
12.  Tac.  Ann.  6.14. 
13.  cp.  Garzetti,  op.  cit.  p.  73. 
14.  He  asked  the  consul  Regulus  to  travel  south  in  order  to  ensure 
the  safety  of  his  journey  to  the  city  (Dio  Cassius  58.13.3). 
15.  Tac.  Ann.  6.2;  Dio  Cass.  58.17.3-4. 
16.  Tac.  Ann.  6.15;  Dio  Cass.  58.18.5. 
17.  Dio  Cass.  58.18.6.  The  resolution  was  a  gesture  of  obeisance 
to  Tiberius.  His  failure  to  attend  meetings  of  the  Senate  meant 
that  the  measure  was  not  put  into  effect. 
18.  Dio  Cass.  58.18.5. 
19.  Tac.  Ann.  6.3  an  potius  discordiam  et  seditionem  a  satellite  Seiani 
quaesitam,  qua  rudis  animos  nomine  honoris  ad  corrumpendum  militiae 
morem  propelleret? 
20.  Dio  Cass.  58.9.2. 
21.  Small.  254. 
22.  De  Visscher,  op.  cit.  (ch.  2  note  119)  p.  768. 
'En  somme,  tout  dans  nos  sources  et  en  particulier  le  regime 
special  reconnu  aux  Vigiles,  nous  laisse  1'impression  dune  lotte 
sourde  engagee  entre  Macro  et  Sejan  longtemps  avant  la  crise 
d'l'an  31:  lutte  sans  aucun  doute  entretenue  par  l'astuce  de 
Tibere,  qui  voyait  en  Macro  comme  une  supreme  defense  centre  les 
ambitions  de  Sejan'. 
H.  Dessau  (op.  cit.  vol.  2  p.  75)  suggests  that  Macro  may  have  won 
the  emperor's  favour  as  a  Praetorian  tribune  before  moving  to  the 
prefecture  of  the  Vigiles. 
23. 204. 
23.  He  was  succeeded  as  prefect  of  the  Vigiles  by  Graecinius  Laco 
(Dio  Cass.  58.9.3). 
24.  F  de  Visscher,  'L'  amphitheatre  d'Alba  Fucens  et  son  fondateur 
Q.  Naevius  Macro,  Prefet  du  Pretoire  de  Tibere'.  Rend. 
Linc.  ser.  8.12  (1957)  p.  46. 
A  similar  view  is  expressed  by  de  Visscher  in  another  article. 
'La  caduta  di  Seiano  e  il  suo  macchinatore  Macrone'  Rivista  di 
Cultura  Classica  e  Medieovale  2  (1960)  p.  248. 
25.  Tac.  Ann.  6.48  qui  ut  deterior  ad  opprimendum  Seianum  delectus 
plura  per  scelera  rem  publicam  conflictavisset?  The  words  are 
attributed  to  Lucius  Arruntius  but  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  they  reflect  Tacitus'  own  views. 
26.  Dio  Cass.  58.21.3;  58,24.2;  cp.  Seager,  op.  cit.  p.  235. 
27.  Tac.  Ann.  6.45;  Dio  Cass.  58.28.4. 
28.  Tac.  Ann.  6.47. 
29.  Tac.  Ann.  14.60;  15.57;  Dio  Cass.  62.13.3-4;  62.27.3. 
30.  Philo,  Leg.  39-40;  Suet.  Gaius  12. 
31.  Philo,  Leg.  35-38.  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  6.47;  Dio  Cass.  58.28.4. 
32.  C.  Cichorius,  Römische  Studien  (Berlin  1922)  p.  390f.  On  his 
association  with  Tiberius  see  Tac.  Ann.  4.20;  Suet.  Aug.  98; 
Tib.  14;  Tib.  62;  Dio  Cass.  57.15.7. 
33.  Dio  Cass.  58.273. 
Both  Tacitus  (Ann.  6.45)  and  Dio  Cassius  (58.28.4)  record  the 
affair  between  Ennia  and  Gaius  under  the  year  AD.  37,  but 
Levick  (Tib.  p.  215)  argues  convincingly  for  an  earlier  date. 
34.  Levick,  Tib.  p.  209-10. 
35.  Tac.  Ann.  6.29;  6.38;  Dio  Cass.  58.25.2. 
36.  Tac.  Ann.  6.47;  cp.  4.34. 
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37.  It  remained  a  convenient  charge  with  which  to  attack  political 
enemies.  Josephus  (AJ  18.250)  tells  us  that  Herod  Antipas  was 
accused  in  AD.  39  of  conspiring  with  Seianus.  We  also  know 
from  Suetonius  (Gaius  30)  that  Gaius  attacked  the  senators 
'ut  Seiani  clientis';  cp.  Dio  Cass.  59.16.4. 
38.  / 205. 
38.  Tac.  Ann.  6.46;  Suet.  Tib.  62;  Philo,  Leg.  33-5. 
39.  Tacitus'  account  (Ann.  6.47-8)  of  this  episode  is  hardly 
satisfactory  since  he  fails  to  tell  us  the  nature  of  the  treason 
involved.  He  sees  the  ruin  of  Lucius  Arruntius,  who  had  been 
consul  in  AD.  6,  as  Macro's  main  aim.  In  this  he  is  followed 
by  R.  S.  Rogers  ('Arruntius',  p.  43-44)  who  views  Arruntius  as  a 
bulwark  of  senatorial  independence  in  the  face  of  the  increasing 
encroachments  on  that  power  by  prefects  like  Seianus  and  Macro. 
Dio  Cassius,  on  the  other  hand,  (58.27.2f)  identifies  Gaius 
Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  consul  in  AD.  32  and  husband  of  Agrippina, 
as  the  target  of  Macro's  plotting.  He  is  followed  in  this  by 
P.  I.  Forsyth  ('A  Treason  Case  of  AD.  37'  Phoenix  23  (1969) 
p.  204-7)  who  argues  convincingly  that  Macro  was  acting  to  defend 
Gaius'  interests.  Levick  (Tib.  p.  216-7)  suggests  that  Macro 
was  trying  to  discredit  Ahenobarbus  and  Vibius  Marsus  not  because 
they  were  plotting  against  Gaius  but  because  they  were  rivals 
of  his  in  influence  over  Gaius. 
40.  Philo,  Leg.  41-51. 
41.  Tac.  Ann.  6.46  namque  Macroni  non  abdita  ambage  occidentem  ab  eo 
deseri,  orientem  spectari  exprobýavit.  cp.  Dio  Cass.  58.28.4. 
42.  Philo,  Leg.  37. 
43.  Dio  Cass.  58.12.7. 
44.  Jos.  AJ  18.168-204;  228-237. 
45.  Tac.  Ann.  6.50;  Suet.  Tib.  73;  Dio  Cass.  58.28.5. 
46.  Suet.  Tib.  73;  Gaius  12. 
47.  Tac.  Ann.  6.50;  Dio  Cassius  (58.28.3)  mentions  the  piling  of 
bed-clothes:  in  Suetonius'  account  a  pillow  is  put  over  the 
emperor's  face. 
48.  Tac.  Ann.  6.50.  Charicles  tarnen  labi  spiritum  nec  ultra  biduum 
duraturum  Macroni  firmavit. 
49.  Suet.  Tib.  72  statimque  latere  convulso  et,  ut  exaestuarat, 
afflatus  aura  in  graviorem  recidit  morbum. 
50.  Suet.  Tib.  73  ingravescente  vi  morbi  retentus. 
51.  Tac.  Ann.  6.50;  Suet.  Tib.  73;  Dio  Cass.  58.28.2. 
52.  / 206. 
52.  Suet.  Tib.  73. 
53.  The  pain  in  the  side,  the  respiratory  infection  and  the  rise  in 
body  temperature  are  all  classic  symptoms  of  pneumonia.  Cheyne- 
Stokes  breathing,  a  loud  wheezing  which  suddenly  stops  for  a 
time  before  re-commencing,  is  common  in  patients  during  the  final 
stages  of  pleurisy. 
54.  Tac.  Ann.  6.50. 
55.  The  suggestion  comes  from  J.  P.  V.  D.  Balsdon  (The  Emperor  Gaius 
(Oxford  1934)  p.  25),  although  it  does  not  appear  to  be  supported 
by  our  sources. 
56.  Dio  Cass.  59.1.3;  cp.  Suet.  Tib.  76;  Gaius  14. 
57.  Suet.  Gaius  23. 
58.  Philo,  Leg.  30-31;  Suet.  Gaius  23;  Dio  Cass.  59.8.1. 
59.  Philo,  Leg.  52-58;  in  Flacc.  15. 
60.  Philo,  Leg.  61;  in  Flacc.  14;  Suet.  Gaius  26;  Dio  Cass. 
59.10.6,. 
61.  Small.  436 
62.  Philo,  Leg.  175. 
63.  Philo,  in  Flacc.  9-11. 
64.  Dio  Cass.  59.11.2. 
65.  Suet.  Gaius  56;  Dio  Cass.  59.25.8. 
66.  Tac.  Hist.  4.68. 
67.  Dio  Cass.  59.2.1;  cp.  Suet.  Tib.  76. 
68.  RIC  p.  110  no.  32;  cp.  A.  A.  Barrett,  Caligula:  The  Corruption  of 
Power  (London  1989)  p.  248-9. 
69.  Philo,  in  Flacc.  109;  Flaccus'  support  for  Tiberius  Gemellus,  his 
involvement  in  the  prosecution  of  Agrippina  and  his  friendship  with 
Macro  combined  to  render  him  liable  to  charges  of  treason.  The 
original  charge  against  him,  however,  may  have  been  the  lesser  one 
of  maladministration  because  of  his  role  in  permitting  a  series  of 
anti-Jewish  actions  by  the  Alexandrian  'nationalist'  faction. 207. 
70.  Philo,  in  Flacc.  157;  161. 
71.  Philo,  in  Flacc.  185-90.  He  does  not  specifically  name  Praetorians 
as  Flaccus'  killers  but,  since  the  order  for  the  execution  came 
directly  from  the  emperor  himself,  it  seems  probable  that  a  reliable 
centurion  was  sent  from  Rome  to  kill  the  former  prefect.  Flaccus 
certainly  guessed  the  purpose  of  his  executioners  when  they  were 
still  some  distance  off  which  suggests  that  they  were  in  uniform. 
72.  There  has  been  considerable  speculation  about  the  nature  of  the 
illness  which  Gaius  suffered  during  the  autumn  of  AD.  37  and 
whether  his  character  changed  at  that  time  from  good  to  evil  as 
Philo  claims  (Leg.  22).  Philo  himself  suggests  (Leg.  14)  that 
the  transformation  came  about  as  a  result  of  over-indulgence  by 
the  new  emperor  in  both  food  and  sexual  activities.  We  know, 
however,  that  even  during  Tiberius'  principate  the  vices  of  Gaius 
were  evident  (Philo,  Leg.  34;  in  Flacc.  12;  Suet.  Gaius  11) 
though  he  was  adept  at  concealing  the  worst  of  them  (Tac.  Ann. 
6.20:  Suet.  Gaius  10). 
Modern  commentators  have  sought  a  medical  or  psychological  explan- 
ation  for  Gaius'  deviant  behaviour.  T.  S.  Jerome  (Aspects  of 
the  Study  of  Roman  History  (London  1923)  p.  381)  suggests  that 
Gaius'  excesses  may  have  been  the  result  of  alcoholism. 
J.  P.  V.  D.  Balsdon  (op.  cit.  p.  36)  favours  a  nervous  breakdown. 
J.  Lucas  ('Un  empereur  psychopathe:  Contribution  ä  la  psychologie 
du  Caligula  de  Suetone')  Ant.  Class.  36  (1967)  p.  159-89)  inclines 
to  the  view  that  Gaius  was  mentally  ill.  R.  S.  Katz  ('The 
Illness  of  Caligula'  CW  65  (1972)  p.  223-5)  argues  that  Gaius  was 
the  victim  of  hyperthyroidism,  a  glandular  disorder.  Finally, 
V.  Massaro  and  I.  Montgomery  ('Gaius  -  Mad,  Bad,  Ill  or  all 
three?  '  Latomus  36  (1978)  p.  894-9)'  regard  Gaius'  illness  as  a 
mixture  of  anxiety  and  mania. 
It  may,  however,  be  best  to  follow  M.  P.  Charlesworth  (CAH  Vol.  10 
p.  665-6)and  admit  that  the  precise  nature  of  Gaius'  illness  or 
disorder  may  never  be  determined. 
73.  Dio  Cass.  59.5.5;  Philo,  Leg.  78-9;  93f. 
74.  Jos.  AJ  19.42. 
75.  Dio  Cass.  55.10.2-3;  55.10.7. 
76.  Dio  Cass.  55.11.2;  Suetonius  (Gaius  24)  tells  us  that  whenever 
Gaius  took  an  oath  before  the  Praetorians,  he  did  so  by  the  godhead 
of  Drusilla. 
77.  Dio  Cass.  59.13.4. 
78.  Suet.  Gaius  26. 
79.  / 208. 
79.  Jos.  AJ  19.5-6;  Sen.  De  Brev.  Vit.  18.5-6;  Suet.  Gaius  19; 
Dio  Cass.  59.17.1-11. 
The  emperor  crossed  this  bridge,  which  was  three  and  a  half  Roman 
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that  the  phrase  is  used  proleptically  and  refers  to  Burrus'  part 
in  the  appointment  of  Corbulo,  but  this  begs  the  question  as  to 
why  Nero  consulted  Burrus  on  this  matter  in  the  first  place. 
M.  Griffin  (Seneca  -A  Philosopher  in  Politics  (Oxford  1976) 
p.  82-3  note  5)  suggests  that  the  phrase  signified  Burrus' 
popularity  with  the  Praetorians. 
17.  Tac.  Ann.  13.14. 
ý,  10  1 
18.  Dio  Cass.  61.7.3.,  EY+3  CrE  9(V%  aL1p4  GifibdE(ro(  cp.  McDermott 
op.  cit.  p.  237  'Agrippina's  idea  was  nt  to  depose  Nero  and 
substitute  Britannicus,  but  to  show  that,  if  he  were  endangered 
by  rivalry  with  his  step-brother,  Nero  could  better  depend  on  her 
than  Seneca  and  Burrus'. 
19.  It  is  worth  noting  that,  at  the  end  of  AD.  54,  an  attempt  to 
bring  a  charge  of  favouring  Britannicus  against  an  eques,  Julius 
Densus,  had  failed  due  to  Nero's  intervention  (Tac.  Ann.  13.10; 
cp.  B.  Baldwin  'Executions,  Trials  and  Punishment  in  the  Reign 
of  Nero'  PP  (1967)  p.  429). 
20.  Tac.  Ann.  13.15;  12.66;  Pflaum,  op.  cit.  vol.  1  no.  29 
p.  69-73.  Pollio  was  given  the  procuratorship  of  Sardinia.  This 
was  a  fairly  normal  progression,  though  his  role  in  this  murder 
perhaps  enhanced  his  prospects. 
21.  Tac.  Ann.  13.16;  Suet.  Nero  33;  Dio  Cass.  61.7.4; 
Jos.  AJ  20.153;  Grant,  AOC  p.  160. 
22.  Tac.  Ann.  13.16. 
23.  Tac.  Ann.  13.18. 
24.  Tac.  Ann.  13.19. 
25.  Tac.  Ann.  13.18.  Perhaps  this  was  the  cause  of  the  charge 
brought  later  against  Burrus  and  Pallas  (Tac.  Ann.  13.23)  see 
note  71). 
26.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Publius  Vitellius  was  forced  to  commit 
suicide  in  AD..  31  after  being  charged  with  offering  the  keys  of 
the  treasury  to  Seianus  (Tac.  Ann.  5.8).  In  AD.  41  the 
conspirators  were  quick  to  seize  control  of  public  funds  (Dio 
Cass.  59.30.3). 
27.  Tac.  Ann.  13.18.  Claudius  had  already  forbidden  the  officers 
of  the  Guard  to  visit  the  houses  of  senators  (Suet.  Cl.  25. 
cp.  Dio  Cass.  60.29.7a). 
28.  / 227. 
28.  Tac.  Ann.  13.18;  Suet.  Nero  34;  Dio  Cass.  61.  S.  3-6. 
29.  Tac.  Ann.  13.18. 
30.  Tac.  Ann.  13.19. 
31.  Tac.  Ann.  11.12;  6.20. 
32.  Tac.  Ann.  13.20. 
33.  Tac.  Ann.  13.20.  Of  this  incident  Gillis  (op.  cit.  p.  12-13) 
writes:  'All  that  Paris  advised  for  Burrus  was  removal  from 
command.  Can  this  reflect  fear  of  Burrus'  military  support, 
or  is  it  a  tacit  admission  both  by  Silana's  friends  and  Nero 
that  Burrus  was  too  valuable  a  figure  to  be  eliminated 
arbitrarily  and  that  he  could  be  won  over  from  Agrippina  and 
put  to  better  use,  namely  her  liquidation?  ' 
This  seems  to  me  to  be  a  serious  misinterpretation  of  the  events 
of  that  night.  Firstly,  there  is  no  suggestion  in  Tacitus'  text 
that  Paris  mentioned  Burrus,  let  alone  asked  for  his  removal. 
His  intended  target  was  Agrippina;  to  have  mentioned  Burrus  by 
name  in  his  allegations  would  have  been  a  serious  error  of 
judgement.  It  is  clear  that  it  was  to  be  left  to  Nero  to  draw 
his  own  conclusions  from  the  evidence  against  Agrippina  as  to 
Burrus'  culpability  in  this  matter. 
34.  Tacitus  (Ann.  13.20)  is  rightly  suspicious  of  this  account  which 
is  not  confirmed  by  other  sources  and  suggests  that  the  motive  of 
Fabius  Rusticus  was  to  enhance  the  role  in  this  incident  of  his 
friend  Seneca.  cp.  Syme,  Tac.  p.  289. 
On  Caecina  Tuscus,  see  Suet.  Nero  35;  Pflaum,  op.  cit.  vol.  1 
no.  16  p.  44-6. 
35.  Tac.  Ann.  13.20. 
36.  Tac.  Ann.  13.21;  cp.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  75. 
37.  Tac.  Ann.  13.21. 
38.  Tac.  Ann.  13.22  praefectura  annonae  Faenio  Rufo,  cura  ludorum, 
qui  a  Caesare  parabantur,  Arruntio  Stellae,  Aegyptus  Ti.  Barbillo 
permittuntur.  Suria  P.  Anteio  destinata  ..... 
39.  Syme  (Tac.  p.  623)  argues  against  this  view  'The  historian  is 
amicably  disposed  towards  Burrus  whose  role  in  counsel  and  government 
he  enhances  with  nowhere  so  much  as  a  hint  that  honest  Burrus  was 
flagrantly  lacking  in  'fides'  and  'pietas'  towards  Agrippina,  the 
author  of  his  elevation'.  cp.  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  p.  439. 
'Burrus  was  a  schemer  and  not  at  all  scrupulous,  especially  in  his 
relationship  with  Agrippina'. 
40.  / 228. 
40.  Griffin,  Sen.  p.  78.  cp.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  74  'It  was  not  the 
intention  of  Seneca  and  Burrus  that  Agrippina  should  be  removed 
from  the  scene.  Their  influence  over  Nero  depended  largely  on 
the  fact  that  they  provided  a  refuge  from  her  tactless  and 
arrogant  demands'. 
41.  Tac.  Ann.  13.22.  Dio  Cassius  (61.10.6)  wrongly  dates  this 
accusation  to  AD.  58. 
42.  S.  I.  Oost,  'The  Career  of  M.  Antonius  Pallas'  AJP  79  (1958)  p.  136. 
43.  Tac.  Ann.  13.23  Burrus  quamvis  reus  inter  iudices  sententiam 
dixit. 
J.  Crook,  Consilium  Principis  (Cambridge  1955)  p.  47. 
Griffin  (Nero  p.  75,254  note  39)  calls  Tacitus'  description  of 
Burrus'  presence  as  a  iudex  at  his  own  trial  a  'distortion'. 
44.  Tac.  Ann.  13.45.  She  had  been  the  wife  of  a  former  Praetorian 
prefect,  Rufrius  Crispinus,  by  whom  she  had  a  son,  but  had  been 
seduced  by  Otho  from  whom  she  was  taken  by  Nero  (Plut.  Galba  19). 
Tac.  Ann.  14.1;  Dio  Cass.  61.12.1. 
45.  Tac.  Ann.  14.3;  Suet.  Nero  34. 
46.  Tac.  Ann.  14.5;  Suet.  Nero  34;  Dio  Cass.  61.13.2-3. 
47.  Tac.  Ann.  14.7. 
48.  Tacitus'  reference.  to  Nero's  panic  (Ann.  14.7)  suggests  that  he 
would  have  been  unwilling  to  wait  for  them  to  journey  from  Rome. 
49.  Cp.  McDermott,  op.  cit.  p.  251.  'But  the  most  reasonable 
explanation  is  that  the  murder  of  Agrippina  in  59  was  planned  by 
Nero  with  the  knowledge  of  Seneca  and  Burrus'. 
50.  Tac.  Ann.  14.7.  The  validity  of  this  assertion  was  weakened  by 
the  execution  of  Octavia  three  years  later  (Tac.  Ann.  14.64). 
51.  The  emperor  would  certainly  have  had  guards  of  some  sort  with  him, 
but  it  seems  more  likely  that  on  a  visit  of  this  kind  they  would 
have  been  from  the  German  Guard  rather  than  the  Praetorian  cohorts. 
52.  Tac.  Ann.  14.7;  This  is  perhaps  the  basis  of  Dio  Cassius'  claim 
(61.12.1)  that  Seneca  urged  Nero  to  kill  his  mother. 
53.  Dio  Cassius  (61.13.5)  mentions  Nero's  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
Praetorians  at  this  time. 
54.  / 229. 
54.  Cp.  Gillis,  op.  cit.  p.  16  'Seneca  realised  first  that  the  survival 
of  Agrippina  now  would  not  only  be  the  death  of  Nero  but  his  own 
and  Burrus'  as  well. 
55.  Tac.  Ann.  14.8;  Dio  Cass.  61.13.45. 
56.  Baldwin,  op.  cit..  p.  432. 
57.  Grant,  AOC  p.  163.  cp.  B.  Walker,  The  Annals  of  Tacitus.  A  Study 
in  Historical  Writing  (Manchester  1952)  p.  222  'Seneca  and  Burrus 
assist  in  and  defend  Nero's  matricide'. 
58.  I.  S.  Ryberg,  'Tacitus'  Art  of  Innuendo',  TAPA  73  (1942)  p.  402. 
59.  Tac.  Ann.  14.10.  auctore  Burro. 
The  allegation  that  the  freedman  had  intended  to  kill  Nero 
provided  the  justification  for  Agrippina's  murder  (Tac.  Ann.  14.7; 
Dio  Cass.  61.13.4). 
60.  Tac.  Ann.  13.24;  Dio  Cass.  61.8.3. 
61.  Tac.  Ann.  13.25. 
62.  Suet.  Nero  26;  Tac.  Ann.  13.25 
63.  Tac.  Ann.  13.48. 
64.  Tac.  Ann.  14.17. 
65.  Tac.  Ann.  14.14;  Suet.  Nero  41,45;  Dio  Cass.  63.1..  1.; 
Dio  Chrys  .  71.5-9. 
Nero,  whose  entire  reign  may  be  regarded  as  a  continual  struggle 
for  greater  emancipation  from  the  constraints  imposed  on  him  by 
his  advisers,  was  resolved  to  use  his  freedom  to  develop  fully 
his  artistic  talents.  And  so,  as  part  of  an  attempt  to  maintain 
their  influence  over  Nero,  Burrus  and  Seneca  adopted  a  complaisant 
attitude  to  what  they  regarded  as  the  least  objectionable  of  the 
emperor's  whims  and  allowed  him  to  drive  his  chariot  in  a  private 
arena  in  the  Vatican  valley.  Given  Nero's  character,  it  is 
clear,  especially  in  retrospect,  that  such  indulgence  was  ultimately 
disastrous,  although  what  alternative  courses  of  action  were 
available  to  Burrus  and  Seneca  it  is  difficult  to  perceive,  for,  at 
the  very  time  they  were  trying  to  limit  Nero's  excesses,  he  himself 
was  becoming  increasingly  aware  that  there  was  no  limitations  of 
his  power.  Chariot-racing  did  not,  predictably,  satisfy  the 
emperor's  aspirations  and  in  his  determination  to  win  approval  for 
his  musical  skills  he  organised  the  Iuvenalia,  ostensibly  to 
celebrate  the  first  shaving  of  his  beard. 
Tac.  Ann.  14.14;  Suet  Nero  II;  Dio  Cass.  61.19.1;  61.21.1). 
66.  / 230. 
66.  Tac.  Ann.  14.15;  Dio  Cass.  61.20.  "1-2.  It  seems  improbable 
that  Burrus  stood  beside  Nero  prompting  him  (Dio  Cass.  61.20.3) 
cp.  McDermott,  op.  cit.  p.  241  note  2. 
Burrus  may  have  hoped  not  only  to  display  the  Praetorians' 
commitment  to  their  emperor,  but  also  perhaps,  by  taking  up  a 
large  number  of  seats,  to  limit  the  number  of  outsiders  who  could 
see  the  emperor  behaving  in  this  way. 
67.  Tac.  Ann.  15.33;  Suet.  Nero  20. 
68.  Tac.  Ann.  16.4;  Suet.  Nero  21. 
69.  Suet.  Nero  21. 
70.  Tac.  Ann.  16.5. 
71.  Tac.  Ann.  1.17;  Suet.  Tib.  25;  Vell.  Pat.  2.125.4; 
Plut.  Otho  5-6.  It  is  not  inappropriate  in  this  regard  to 
compare  the  reputation  of  the  Praetorians  with  that  of  Hitler's 
bodyguard  regiment,  the  Leibstandarte,  who  were  known  in  the 
1930's  as  the  'Asphalt  Soldiers'. 
72.  Tac.  Ann.  14.15;  Suet.  Nero  20;  Dio  Cass.  61.20.3-4. 
The  rhythmic  clapping  was  copied  from  a  group  of  Alexandrians  who 
attended  Nero's  first  public  performance  in  Naples  in  AD.  64. 
73.  Tac.  Ann.  14.15  et  maerens  Burrus  ac  laudans. 
74.  Tac.  Ann.  15.50. 
75.  Tac.  Ann.  15.67;  Dio  Cass.  62.24.2. 
76.  Plut.  Galba  14. 
77.  Suet.  Nero  25;  Dio  Cass.  63.  B.  3.  The  Augustiani  had  been 
with  Nero  during  his  tour  of  Greece.  The  lyre-player  Diodorus 
shared  his  chariot  as  he  entered  Rome  (Dio  Cass.  63.20.3). 
78.  Griffin,  Nero.  p.  163. 
79.  Gillis,  op.  cit.  p.  17  'We  see  .....  a  waning  of  Senecan  and 
Burran  influence'. 
80.  Tacitus  (Ann.  14.51)  is  uncertain,  but  Suetonius  (Nero  35)  and 
Dio  Cassius  (62.13.3)  accept  the  poisoning  as  a  fact. 
Waltz  (op.  cit  p.  220  note  1)  argues  that  modern  historians  are 
too  prone  to  doubt  poisonings  in  ancient  times. 
81.  / 231. 
81.  Burrus  gradually  asphyxiated  due  to  internal  neck  swelling 
(Tac.  Ann.  14.51).  It  is  almost  certain  that  this  was  due  to 
a  malignant  tumour  of  some  description  (Grant,  Nero  P.  137). 
There  are,  of  course,  many  different  tissues  in  the  neck  any  of 
which  may  undergo  malignant  change  and  grow  to  form  a  mass  which 
could  obstruct  their  air  passages  and  lead  to  death.  Although 
this  case  was  probably  due  to  a  laryngeal  carcinoma  (cancer  of 
the  larynx  or  voice  box),  the  neck  tumour  could  also  have  been 
due  to  thyroid  carcinoma,  lymphoma  (cancer  of  the  lymph  nodes  or 
neck)  and  legion  other  causes.  McDermott  (op.  cit.  p.  252)  keeps 
a  foot  firmly  in  each  camp.  'There  is  nothing  inconsistent  in 
the  assumption  that  Nero  and  his  new  advisers,  Poppaea  and 
Tigellinus,  planned  the  death  of  Burrus  and  seized  a  genuine 
illness  as  an  excellent  opportunity  to  make  his  death  seem 
natural'. 
82.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  69. 
83.  Tac.  Ann.  14.57. 
84.  Gillis,  op.  cit.  p.  22  note  22. 
85.  Tac.  Ann.  13.2;  Dio  Cass.  62.13.2. 
86.  Sen.  Clem.  2.1.2;  cp.  Suet.  Nero  10. 
87.  Tac.  Ann.  14.51;  Ann.  12.42  (Agrippina's  arguments); 
Hist.  1.72  (Tigellinus);  Ann.  13.22  (Faenius  Rufus). 
88.  Tac.  Ann.  14.57. 
89.  Tac.  Ann.  16.18. 
90.  Tac.  Ann.  16.20.  cp.  Juv.  Sat.  1.155f.  For  a  different 
interpretation  of  these  lines  see  B.  Baldwin  'Cover-names  and 
Dead  Victims  in  Juvenal',  Athenaeum  45-6  (1967-8)  p.  308. 
91.  Dio  Cass.  62.13.3-4. 
92.  Dio  Cass.  62.27.3;  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  15.57. 
93.  Tac.  Ann.  14.57;  15.50;  Dio  Cass.  62.13.3. 
94.  Dio  Cass.  62.28.4. 
95.  Tac.  Ann.  15.40;  cp.  Suet.  Nero  38;  Dio  Cass.  62.16.2; 
62.17.1. 
96.  / 232. 
96.  Juv.  Sat.  I.  155f;  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  15.44. 
97.  Tac.  Ann.  15.37;  Dio  Cass.  62.15.1-6. 
98.  Dio  Cass.  63.13.1. 
99.  Tac.  Ann.  16.17;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  63.11.2.  where  there  is  mention 
of  similar  behaviour  by  Tigellinus  during  Nero's  tour  of  Greece, 
and  Tac.  Ann.  16.14  where  no-one  is  willing  to  witness  the  will 
of  Publius  Anteius  until  Tigellinus  gives  his  sanction. 
100.  Dio  Cass.  63.21.2. 
101.  Tac.  Ann.  16.21;  14.48;  cp.  13.33. 
102.  Plut.  Galba  17. 
103.  Dio  Cass.  63.13.3;  Griffin,  Nero  p.  260  note  5. 
104.  B.  W.  Henderson,  The  Life  and  Principate  of  the  Emperor  Nero 
(London  1903)  p.  47  'Even  an  advocate  with  a  novelist's  imagination 
and  without  a  vestige  of  historic  scruple  could  do  little  with 
such  a  client'. 
105.  T.  K.  Roper,  'Nero,  Seneca  and  Tigellinus',  Historia  28  (1979) 
p.  354;  cp.  Syme,  Tac.  p.  552. 
106.  Garzetti,  op.  cit.  p.  160. 
107.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  104. 
108.  Dio  Cass.  59.23.9;  scholiast  on  Juv.  Sat.  1.155; 
Plut.  Galba  17;  Otho  2. 
109.  Roper,  op.  cit.  p.  354. 
110.  Griffin,  Sen.  p.  67-76;  E.  Cizek,  L'Epoque  de  Neron  et  ses 
Controverses  Ideologiques  (Leiden  1972)  p.  160. 
111.  R.  Syme,  'Partisans  of  Galba',  Historia  31  (1982)  p.  462. 
112.  Sen.  Oct.  1.870f. 
113.  Roper,  op.  cit.  p.  353. 
114.  Syme,  Tac.  p.  263. 
115.  / t  233. 
115.  Syme,  Tac.  p.  387;  Roper  (op.  cit.  p.  346-57)  argues  wrongly  that 
Seneca  and  Tigellinus  were,  in  fact,  political  allies. 
116.  Griffin,  Sen.  p.  133-5. 
117.  R.  S.  Rogers  ('Five  Over-Crowded  Months?  AD.  62',  Studies  in 
Honour  of  B.  L.  Ullman  (Rome  1964)  vol.  1,  p.  217-22)  suggests  that 
Tacitus  manipulated  the  chronology  of  this  period  to  try  to  show 
that  it  was  the  malice  of  Tigellinus  that  convinced  Nero  of  the 
necessity  of  executing  Plautus  and  Sulla. 
118.  Baldwin,  op.  cit.  p.  425-439. 
119.  Tac.  Ann.  13.23;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  61.10.6;  Tac.  Ann.  13.47. 
120.  Tac.  Ann.  13.22;  14.22. 
121.  Tac.  Ann.  14.57. 
122.  Plut.  Galba  17. 
123.  Tac.  Ann.  15.44. 
124.  Tac.  Ann.  15.57. 
125.  Tac.  Ann.  14.58-9;  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  16.10. 
126.  Tac.  Ann.  15.60-1. 
127.  Tac.  Ann.  16.10-1. 
128.  Tac.  Ann.  16.9. 
129.  Tac.  Ann.  14.64;  cp.  Suet.  Nero  35. 
130.  Tac.  Ann.  15.67;  cp.  Plut.  Galba  14  where  Antonius  Honoratus 
also  mentions  Octavia's  execution  as  a  cause  of  resentment 
against  Nero  among  the  Praetorians. 
131.  We  should  be  cautious  here,  for  Nero  did  not  issue  any  bronze 
coins  in  the  first  ten  years  of  his  reign  and  suddenly  there  was 
a  great  deluge  of  issues  starting  in  AD.  64.  Often  these  coins 
relate  to  events  which  happened  some  years  earlier. 
132.  / 234. 
132.  BMC'  p.  226  no.  142;  there  are  lots  of  varieties  of  this  coin: 
no.  143  is  illustrated  as  plate  42.3. 
M.  Grant  (Nero  (London  1970)  p.  152)  states  as  a  fact  that  it  is 
the  Praetorian  cavalry  and  indeed  that  corps  enjoyed  a  high 
profile  during  Nero's  reign  (Dio  Cass.  61.9.1),  but  it  could 
quite  easily  be  one  of  the  German  Guard  bn  the  coin. 
133.  BMC'  p.  218  no.  122  plate  41.5;  cp.  Small.  292. 
134.  According  to  both  Tacitus  (Ann.  15.49)  and  Dio  Cassius  (62.24.1) 
the  tribune  Subrius  Flavus  and  the  centurion  Sulpicius  Asper  were 
the  main  driving  forces  behind  the  attempt.  Tacitus  (Ann  15.50) 
mentions  the  involvement  of  two  other  tribunes,  Gavius  Silvanus 
and  Statius  Proxumus,  and  two  centurions,  Maximus  Scaurus  and 
Venetus  Paulus. 
135.  Tac.  Ann.  15.50;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  62.24.1. 
136.  Tac.  Ann.  15.50;  cp.  14.57;  Dio  Cass.  62.13.3. 
137.  Dio  Cass.  59.23.9. 
138.  Griffin,  Sen.  p.  107-8;  A.  M.  Duff,  'Freedmen  in  the  Early  Roman 
Empire  (Oxford  1928)  p.  178  'The  reign  of  Nero  saw  no  abatement  in 
the  power  of  imperial  freedmen'. 
139.  According  to  Tacitus  (Ann.  14.65)  Piso's  involvement  in  anti- 
Neronian  intriques  dated  from  AD.  62  following  the  allegations  of 
Romanus.  Later,  however,  he  claims  that  Piso's  participation  in 
the  conspiracy  of  AD.  65  was  'non  a  cupidine  ipsius' 
(Tac.  Ann.  15.49). 
140.  In  this  regard  they  bear  a  considerable  resemblance  to  the  plotters 
against  Hitler  in  1944;  see  G.  Reitlinger,  The  SS;  Alibi  of  a 
Nation  (London  1956)  p.  289-313. 
141.  The  dates  of  the  Cerialia  were  April  the  12th  to  the  19th,  the 
games  being  circensian  on  the  opening  and  closing  days. 
142.  Tac.  Ann.  15.53.  Tacitus  mentions,  though  only  to  dismiss,  an 
allegation  by  Pliny  that  Antonia,  Claudius'  daughter,  was  to 
accompany  Piso  to  the  Praetorian  camp. 
143.  Tac.  Ann.  15.49:  Annaeus  Lucanus  whose  poems  Nero  was  suppressing. 
144.  Tac.  Ann.  15.49:  Flavius  Scaevinus  and  Afranius  Quintianus. 
145.  / 235. 
145.  Tac.  Ann.  15.49:  Plautius  Lateranus:  He  had  been  involved  in 
the  scandal  of  Messalina  and  Silius  in  AD.  48,  but  had  been  spared 
out  of  consideration  for  his  uncle  Aulus  Plautius,  the  commander 
in  Britain  at  that  time  (Tac.  Ann.  11.36). 
146.  Tac.  Ann.  15..  50.  It  is  quite  clear  that  had  the  civilian 
conspirators  possessed  detailed  knowledge  of  the  extent  of 
Praetorian  involvement  in  the  plot  they  would  have,  after  their 
arrest,  revealed  it  far  sooner  than  they  did. 
147.  Tac.  Ann.  15.51. 
148.  Tac.  Ann.  15.57. 
149.  Praetorians  may  have  been  involved  in  the  undercover  operation, 
organised  by  Sallustius  Crispus,  which  resulted  in  the  arrest 
in  AD.  16  of  Clemens,  the  impersonator  of  Agrippa  Postumus  (Tac. 
Ann.  2.40;  Suet.  Tib.  25;  Dio  Cass.  57.16.4). 
Seianus,  according  to  Tacitus  (Ann.  4.67),  used  agents 
provocateurs  against  Agrippina  and  Nero  Caesar. 
150.  Tac.  Ann.  15.54. 
151.  Tac.  Ann.  15.55;  he  had  succeeded  to  this  position  on  the  death 
of  Doryphorus  (Tac.  Ann.  14.65). 
152.  Tac.  Ann.  15.56. 
153.  Tac.  Ann.  15.56:  Lucan  implicated  his  mother  Acilia,  while 
Quintianus  and  Senecio  betrayed  their  closest  friends.  cp.  Dio 
Cass.  62.24;  3-4. 
154.  Tac.  Ann.  15.48. 
155.  B.  H.  Warmington,  Nero  -  Reality  and  Legend  (London  1969)  p.  136. 
'He  did  not  parade  a  forbidding  morality'. 
156.  Syme,  Tac.  p.  575.  cp.  J.  Bishop,  Nero  -  The  Man  and  the  Legend 
(London  1964)  p.  98  'a  Nero  manque'. 
157.  Tac.  Ann.  15.65. 
158.  Tac.  Ann.  15.52.  Piso  refused  to  sanction  the  murder  of  Nero  in 
a  villa  owned  by  him  'invidiam  praetendens,  si  sacra  mensae  dique 
hospitales  caede  qualiscumque  principis  cruentarentur'.  According 
to  Tacitus,  the  real  reason  was  his  fear  of  what  Lucius  Silanus  and 
the  consul  Vestinus  might  do  in  Rome  while  he  was  in  Baiae  for  the 
assassination. 
4 
159.  / 236. 
159.  Tac.  Ann.  15.59. 
160.  Tac.  Ann.  15.58;  cp.  Small.  293:  the  German  Guard  was  disbanded 
by  Galba  (Suet.  Galba  12). 
161.  Tac.  Ann.  15.58  et  quo  fidem  inscitiae  pararet,  atrox  adversus 
socios. 
162.  Tac.  Ann.  15.60.  Plautius  Lateranus'  role  in  the  plot  was  to  have 
been  vital  for  he  was  to  approach  Nero  at  the  Circus  on  the 
pretext  of  petitioning  him  for  financial  help  and  seize  his  legs, 
while  the  Praetorians  stabbed  him  (Tac.  Ann.  15.53;  cp.  Epictetus 
1.1.20). 
163.  ILS  2701  =  Small.  282  =  Braund  517. 
164.  Tac.  Ann.  15.50. 
165.  Tac.  Ann.  15.60.  The  evidence  for  Seneca's  involvement  in  the 
plot  was,  at  least  according  to  Tacitus,  extremely  flimsy. 
cp.  Griffin,  Sen.  p.  96  note  2,  p.  367;  Griffin,  Nero  p.  174. 
According  to  Dio  Cassius  (62.24.1)  Seneca  was  a  leading 
participant. 
166.  Tac.  Ann.  15.61.  Silvanus  felt  unable  to  face  Seneca  himself 
and  sent  one  of  his  centurions:  cp.  Suet.  Nero  35.  For  Seneca's 
suicide  see  Tac.  Ann.  15.62-63;  Dio  Cass.  62.25.1-3; 
Griffin,  Sen.  p.  367-373,383. 
167.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  Rufus'  role  in  and  fate  after  this 
plot  with  that  of  the  German  general,  Fritz  Fromm,  during  and  after 
the  bomb  plot  of  the  20th  of  July  1944.  Both  were  in  command  of 
the  unit  to  which  the  conspirators  belonged,  both  gave  lukewarm 
support  to  the  coup,  both  were  arrested  and  executed,  despite  their 
attempts  to  conceal  their  involvement  (Reitlinger,  op.  cit.  p.  329-32). 
168.  Tac.  Ann.  15.59. 
169.  Tac.  Ann.  15.66.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  Scaevinus' 
denunciation  merely  confirmed  Nero's  previous  suspicions  of 
Faenius  Rufus. 
170.  Tac.  Ann.  15.67;  Dio  Cass.  62.24.2. 
171.  Tac.  Ann.  15.68;  Dio  Cass.  62.24.2. 
172.  Tac.  Ann.  15.68. 
173.  / 237. 
173.  Tac. 
_Ann. 
15.72;  Suet.  Nero  10;  Dio  Cass.  62.27.4. 
174.  Tac.  Ann.  15.71.  Their  names  were  Pompeius,  Cornelius 
Martialis,  Flavius  Nepos  and  Statius  Domitius. 
175.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  168. 
176.  Tac.  Ann.  15.71.  Silvanus  certainly  committed  suicide,  but 
the  exact  manner  of  Proxumus'  death  is  less  clear. 
(A.  J.  Church  and  W.  J.  Brodribb,  Annals  of  Tacitus  (London  1879) 
p.  376.  ). 
177.  Tac.  Ann.  15.69. 
178.  Tac.  Ann.  15.71;  16.17.  As  a  former  husband  of  Poppaea  he 
was  particularly  hated  by  Nero. 
179.  Tac.  Ann.  16.12.  Publius  Gallus,  a  friend  of  Faenius  Rufus. 
180.  Tac.  Ann.  15.72. 
181.  ILS  9919;  Pflaum,  op.  cit.  vol.  1  p.  85-87  no.  36;  L.  Jalabert, 
R.  Mouterde,  C.  Mondesert,  J.  P.  Coquais,  Bibliotheque 
Archeologique  et  Historique,  vol.  78,  Inscriptions  Grecques  et 
Latines  de  La  Syrie,  vol.  6  Baalbek  et  Bequa  (Paris  1967) 
p.  99-101  no.  2781. 
Naso  was,  according  to  the  inscription,  a  tribune  in  the  legion  1 
Italica  formed  by  Nero  in  AD.  66,  so  he  may  not  have  achieved  his 
Praetorian  tribunate  until  a  later  date. 
182.  Tac.  Hist.  1.20  exauctorati  per  eos  dies  tribuni,  e  praetorio 
Antonius  Taurus  et  Antonius  Naso,  ex  urbanis  cohortibus 
Aemilius  Pacensis,  e  vigilibus  Iulius  Fronto. 
Pflaum,  op.  cit.  vol.  1,  p.  87-88  no.  36a. 
Jalabert,  op.  cit.  p.  100  (referring  to  Naso)  on  attachement 
ä  la 
dynastie  julio-claudienne  vaut  ä  Naso  d'etre  mis  ä  la  retraite  par 
Galba'. 
183.  We  can  perhaps  detect  a  similar  prejudice  among  Otho's  Praetorians 
in  AD.  69  (Tac.  Hist.  1.84). 
184.  Tac.  Ann.  15.69.  The  evidence  for  his  eastern  origin  is  slight. 
The  same  name,  or  at  least  a  feminine  form  of  it,  is  employed  in 
a  Greek  inscription. 
CIG  2259  EP  ....  AEITOCON 
nEPAAf1OAAQNIOYTOY 
EPMANDEIM  IAOCTHNE 
AYTOYI"YNAI  KArEPEAAA 
5  NHNMONIMEINKAITHNEAY 
TOYMHTEPAI'EP  EAAA 
185.  /  NHNAfATHNHPOINAI 
XAI  PETE 238. 
185.  G.  Schumann,  Hellenistische  und  griechische  Elemente  in  der 
Regierung  Neros  (Leipzig  1930)  p.  34-49;  M.  Griffin, 
Nero  p.  211-3. 
186.  Tac.  Ann.  15.59.  nam  vetus  miles  timebatur  tamquam  favore 
inbutus. 
187.  Durry,  p.  370  'Faut-il  croire  que  Neron  a  eu  maille  a  partir  avec 
lea  officiers  de  sa  garde,  mais  qu'il  avait  pour  lui  lea  hommes? 
Pas  meme.  Au  moment  oü  il  terrasse  lea  conjures  de  65,  il  se 
11  fie  du  vetus  miles,  äme  du  pretoire.  de 
188.  Dio  Cass.  63.4.2-3;  Suet.  Nero  13. 
189.  Thrasea  Paetus:  Tac.  Ann.  16.21;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  62.26.1. 
The  main  charge  was  that  his  failure  to  attend  the  Senate  was  a 
calculated  act  of  disloyalty  to  the  emperor.  Nero  had  disliked 
him  personally,  quite  apart  from  his  adherence  to  Stoicism,  for 
many  years  (Tac.  Ann.  13.49;  14.12;  14.48;  15.20-21). 
Barea  Soranus:  Tac.  Ann.  16.23;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  62.26.1. 
190.  Tac.  Ann.  16.27-8.  cp.  the  description  by  Shirer,  op.  cit. 
p.  248  of  the  scene  in  the  Kroll  Opera  House,  Berlin,  on  the  23rd 
of  March  1933  when  the  Reichstag  convened  to  hear  Hitler  speak  on 
the  Enabling  Act  which  paved  they  way  for  a  Nazi  dictatorship. 
'The  aisles  were  now  lined  with  brown-shirted  storm  troopers  whose 
scarred  bully  faces  indicated  that  no  nonsense  would  be  tolerated 
from  the  representatives  of  the  people'. 
191.  Tac.  Ann.  15.36. 
192.  Suet.  Nero  36.  His  contempt  for  the  senatorial  aristocracy  was 
now  considerable  (Suet.  Nero  37)  as  his  cronies  were  quick  to 
recognise  and  use  to  their  advantage  (Tac.  Hist.  4.42; 
Dio  Cass.  63.13.2;  Pliny,  Ep.  1.5.3). 
193.  Dio  Cass.  63.11.2;  Small.  26. 
194.  Dio  Cass.  63.8.3.  For  Nero's  entourage  see  K.  R.  Bradley, 
'Nero's  Retinue  in  Greece  AD.  66/67'  Illinois  Classical 
Studies  IV,  (1979)  p.  152f. 
195.  As  does  his  choice  of  Helius  as  his  plenipotentiary  in  Rome  during 
his  absence  (Dio  Cass.  63.12.1).  According  to  Tacitus 
(Ann.  13.1)  the  freedman  had  been  involved  in  the  death  of 
Junius  Silanus  in  AD.  54. 
196.  / 239. 
196.  Tac.  Ann.  15.72;  Plut.  Galba  9.  Although  Tacitus  does  not 
totally  dismiss  the  possibility,  he  is  clearly  sceptical. 
Plutarch  mentions  the  rumour  that  his  father  was  a  gladiator 
named  Martianus.  His  mother  was  Nymphidia,  the  daughter  of 
Callistus. 
197.  ILS  1322  =  Small.  269. 
198.  Tac.  Ann.  15.72. 
199.  Griffin,  Sen.  p.  95;  cp.  Pflaum,  op.  cit.  p.  206  where  he  argues 
for  an  earlier  period  of  eastern  dominance  initiated  by 
Agrippina  and  Pallas  in  AD.  49. 
200.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  180. 
201.  Grant  (Nero  p.  216)  suggests  that  Tacitus  may  be  biased  against 
Nymphidius  Sabinus  because  of  his  humble  origins. 
202.  Dio  Cass.  63.19.1. 
203.  The  senators  had  to  endure  the  mismanagement  of  Rome  by  Helius. 
(Dio  Cass.  63.18.2-3)  while  Nero  insulted  their  honour  in 
Greece  (Suet.  Nero  37). 
The  enforced  suicides  of  Corbulo,  Sulpicius  Rufus  and  Sulpicius 
Proculus  cannot  have  been  popular  (Dio  Cass.  63.17.2).  Arrears 
of  pay  (Suet.  Nero  32)  may  also  have  been  a  cause  of  discontent, 
although  RJA  Talbert(  'Some  Causes  of  Disorder  in  AD.  68-69' 
AJAH  I,  vol.  2  (1977)  p.  72)denies  this  and  writes  of  the  charge  as 
'a  stock  accusation  levelled  against  any  bad  emperor'.  The  people 
may  have  blamed  Nero  for  the  corn  shortage,  especially  when 
rumours  were  circulating  that  he  was  using  corn  ships  to  import 
sand  for  his  court  wrestlers  (Suet.  Nero  45).  Nero  in  fact,  had 
always  been  especially  solicitous  about  the  corn  supply  (Tac. 
Ann.  15.36;  15.39;  Suet.  Nero  19)  and  the  corn  shortage  in 
the  spring  of  AD.  68  was  probably  due  to  the  revolt  of  Clodius 
Macer  in  Africa;  see  K.  R.  Bradley,  'A  Publics  Fames  in  AD.  68', 
AJP  93  (1972)  p.  451-8. 
204.  Dio  Cass.  63.20.4. 
205.  Tac.  Ann.  14.45;  14.61. 
206.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  180  'Nero  was  insulated  from  unappreciative 
audiences  and  candid  advisers'. 
207.  Dio  Cass.  63.10.2.  where  a  soldier  is  said  to  have  released  a 
prisoner  on  his  own  initiative. 
208.  / 240. 
208.  Suet.  Nero  19;  Dio  Cass.  63.16.1-2;  cp.  Yavetz,  op.  cit. 
p.  129  'The  pampered  Praetorians  did  not  forgive  him  for  this'. 
209.  Dio  Cass.  63.13.1-3;  cp.  Suet.  Nero  28-29. 
210.  Suet.  Nero  25. 
211.  Tac.  Hist.  1.89. 
212.  Grant,  Nero  p.  246. 
213.  Suet.  Nero  40;  Dio  Cass.  63.22.2-6:  Vindex's  revolt  occurred 
in  the  middle  of  March  AD.  68.  Nero  may  well,  as  Griffin 
(Nero  p.  181)  suggests,  have  at  first  regarded  it  as  a  minor 
nationalist  uprising.  cp.,  Syme,  Tac.  p.  46  'a  native 
insurrection  against  Roman  power'. 
For  the  view  that  Vindex  was  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Roman 
Senate  see  P.  A.  Brunt,  'The  Revolt  of  Vindex  and  the  Fall  of 
Nero',  Latomus  18  (1959)  p.  531-59  and  C.  M.  Kraay,  'The  Coinage 
of  Vindex  and  Galba  AD.  68  and  the  Continuity  of  the  Augustan 
Principate'  Num.  Chron.  ser.  6,  vol.  9  (1949)  p.  129-49. 
214.  Suet.  Nero  42;  47;  Dio  Cass.  63.27.1;  Plut.  Galba  5.  He 
fainted  on  hearing  the  news,  then  spoke  ominously  of  a  wholesale 
massacre  of  senators. 
215.  Galba  was  reluctant  at  first  to  become  involved  but  when  intercepted 
despatches  proved  that  Nero  had  ordered  his  death  (Suet.  Galba  9), 
he  felt  compelled,  under  pressure  from  Titus  Vinius  (Plut.  Galba  4; 
cp.  Tac.  Hist.  1.6.  )  to  declare  against  Nero,  which  he  did  in 
early  April  (Dio  Cassius  64.6.52;  cp.  Griffin,  Nero  p.  181  -  the 
3rd  of  April;  Grant,  AOC.  p.  178  -  the  2nd  of  April;  Blunt,  op. 
cit.  p.  534  -  the  6th  of  April)  professing  to  be  the  legate  of 
the  Senate  and  the  people  of  Rome  (Plut.  Galba  5). 
Nero  was  not  totally  indolent,  for  he  now  assumed  the  consulship 
(Suet.  Nero  43;  Pliny,  Pan.  57.2)  and  had  Galba  declared  a  public 
enemy  (Plut.  Galba  5).  He  also  summoned  home  units  on  their  way 
to  the  east  (Tac.  Hist.  1.6;  1.9;  1.31;  1.70)  and  recruited 
a  legion  from  the  fleet  at  Misenum  and  other  units  in  Rome,  all  of 
whom  were  organised  into  an  army  group  under  the  loyalist  general 
Petronius  Turpilianus  (Tac.  Ann.  15.72;  Dio  Cass.  63.27  la). 
Another  general,  Rubrius  Gallus,  was  also  sent  to  this  group, 
possibly  after  Vesontio  (Dio  Cass.  63.27.1).  Galba  received 
support  from  Otho,  the  governor  of  Lusitania  (Plut.  Galba  20;  Tac. 
Hist.  1.13),  from  Caecina,  the  quaestor  in  Baetica  (Tac.  Hist. 
1.53)  and  more  ambiguous  backing  from  Clodius  Macer  in  Africa 
(Plut.  Galba  6;  13;  Tac.  Hist.  1.7;  1.73). 
216.  The  battle  of  Vesontio  which  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  Vindex's 
revolt  by  the  legions  of  upper  Germany  under  Verginius  Rufus 
(Tac.  / 241. 
(Tac.  Hist.  1.51;  Pliny,  Ep.  9.19.5;  Plut.  Galba  6; 
Dio  Cass.  63.25.4)  was  followed  by  the  offer  of  the  legions  to 
make  their  commander  emperor  (Plut.  Galba  6;  cp.  Tac.  Hist. 
1.8;  Dio  Cass.  63.27.1). 
For  more  detailed  examinations  of  these  incidents,  see  Brunt,  op. 
cit.  p.  537-43;  J.  B.  Hainsworth,  'Verginus  and  Vindex'  Historia  II 
(1962)  p.  86-96;  D.  C.  A.  Shotter,  'Tacitus  and  Verginius  Rufus' 
CQ  17  (1967)  p.  370-81. 
217.  Suet.  Nero  47;  cp.  Hohne,  op.  cit.  p.  534  (describing  Heinrich 
Himmler's  mental  state  in  May  1945). 
'He  imagined  himself  founding  a  new  Nazi  party  to  be 
known  as  the  'Party  of  National  Union'.  He  planned 
a  post-war  Government  in  which  one  of  the  Ministers 
was  to  be  Otto  Ohlendorf,  the  head  of  the  Inland  S.  D., 
with  whom  he  had  so  long  been  at  loggerheads.  He 
drew  up  a  new  Government  programme.  But  as  the  Great 
German  Reich  disintegrated  under  the  Allies'  armoured 
thrusts,  so  Himmler's  hopes  and  hallucinations  shrank 
to  a  more  modest  scale.  He  started  determined  to  be 
the  Fuhrer  of  post-war  Germany.  Then  he  coveted  the 
position  of  No.  2  to  Karl'Dbnitz,  Hitler's 
successor,  and  fled  to  his  headquarters  in  Flensburg. 
Finally  the  job  of  Minister-President  of  Schleswig- 
Holstein  seemed  adequate.  ' 
218.  The  significance  of  the  Praetorians'  desertion  may  have  been  over- 
stated  by  G.  E.  F.  Chilver,  'The  Army  in  Politics  AD.  68-70' 
JRS  47  (1957)  p.  31.  'Yet  it  was  his  Praetorians  who  finally 
destroyed  Nero'.  It  is  quite  clear  that  by  early  June  AD.  68 
Nero's  fall  was  imminent  and  the  defection  of  the  Praetorians 
was  no  more  than  a  recognition  of  this  fact. 
219.  Brunt,  op.  cit.  p.  541-42.  Nymphidius  Sabinus  probably  made 
contact  with  senatorial  supporters  of  Galba  (Grant,  AOC  p.  180). 
220.  Plut.  Galba  2.  Even  Plutarch,  who  is  hostile  to  Nymphidius 
Sabinus,  admits  that  his  approach  to  the  Praetorians  on  Galba's 
behalf  took  place  only  after  it  had  become  clear  that  Nero 
intended  to  flee  to  Egypt. 
221.  Despite  the  later  claims  of  the  Praetorians  that  they  were  duped 
by  Nymphidius  Sabinus  into  deserting  Nero  (Plut.  Galba  14;  Tac. 
Hist.  1.5)  it  is  evident  that  they  saw  it  in  their  own  interests 
to  desert  Nero  at  this  time. 
cp.  Durry,  p.  370  'Les  pretoriens  ont  commence  d'aimer  Neron  le  jour 
ou  ils  ont  ete  sous  la  ferule  du  vieil  avare  qu'etait  Galba'. 
222.  Bishop,  op.  cit.  p.  163-4.  There  is  no  textual  evidence  to 
support  such  a  view. 
223.  / 242. 
223.  Plut.  Otho  2;  Galba  8. 
224.  Tac.  Hist.  1.72;  cp.  Plut.  Galba  17. 
225.  Dio  Cass.  63.27.  la-2;  Suet.  Nero  47;  Plut.  Galba  2. 
226.  Suet.  Nero  35;  Tac.  Ann.  15.36;  Dio  Cass.  63.18.1.  This 
interest  had  led  him  to  send  out,  between  AD.  62  and  AD.  64,  a 
party  of  Praetorians  led  by  two  centurions  to  search  for  the 
source  of  the  Nile.  (Pliny,  HN  6.181;  184;  Sen.  QNat  6.8.3). 
According  to  Dio  Cassius  (63.8.1)  he  also  considered 
campaigning  in  Ethiopia. 
227.  The  prefect  of  Egypt,  Tiberius  Julius  Alexander  (Pflaum,  op.  cit. 
vol.  1,  no.  17,  p.  46-49)  issued  an  edict  (Small.  391  =  Braund  600) 
proclaiming  support  for  Galba  on  the  6th  of  July,  only  a  week  or 
so  after  he  could  have  received  news  of  Galba's  elevation  by  the 
Senate.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  edict  was  drafted 
earlier. 
228.  Suet.  Nero  47.  uno  vero  etiam  proclamante,  'Usque  adeone  mori 
miserum  est?  ' 
229.  Suet.  Nero  47;  Dio  Cass.  63.27.2b-3. 
230.  Suet.  Nero  47. 
231.  Suet.  Nero  57;  Dio  Cass.  63.29.3. 
232.  Suet.  Nero  48;  Dio  Cass.  63.27.3. 
233.  Suet.  Nero  48;  cp.  Plut.  Galba  7. 
234.  Suet.  Nero  48;  Dio  Cass.  63.38.1. 
235.  Suet.  Nero  48;  Dio  Cass.  63.28.2-5. 
236.  Suet.  Nero  49;  Dio  Cass.  63.29.2. 
237.  Suet.  Nero  49;  cp.  Suet.  Cl.  34;  Suet.  Dom.  11;  Livy  1.26.6. 
238.  Suet.  Nero  49;  Dio  Cass.  63.29.1-2. 
239.  Suet.  Nero  49.  'haec  est  fides'. CHAPTER  VI  :  THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  NERO  TO 
THE  ACCESSION  OF  VESPASIAN 
1.  Plut.  Galba  2;  cp.  Suet.  Nero  47. 
2.  Tac.  Hist.  1.5. 
3.  Tac.  Hist.  1.30. 
4.  Plut.  Galba  14. 
5.  Tac.  Hist.  1.72.  Tigellinus  enjoyed  the  protection  of  both 
Galba  (Suet.  Galba  15)  and  Titus  Vinius  (Plut.  Galba  17)  despite 
widespread  demands  for  his  punishment  (Dio  Cass.  64.3.3).  He 
was  eventually  forced  to  suicide  by  Otho  (Tac.  Hist.  1.72; 
Plut.  Otho  2). 
6.  Nymphidius  emphasised,  in  a  misplaced  effort  to  impress  Galba,  his 
role  in  the  fall  of  Nero  (Plut.  Galba  9).  Such  a  claim  did  not 
entirely  displease  the  Praetorians  since  it  appeared,  to  some 
extent,  to  exculpate  them. 
7.  Plut.  Galba  8. 
8.  Plut.  Galba  8. 
9.  Tac 
ol  -0 
.  Ann.  15.72;  Plut.  Galba  9.  ft  T7lj/J46»i￿'  T4V6`% 
TIs  trý'°rds  I 
10.  Plut.  Galba  11;  13. 
11.  Plut.  Galba  9. 
12.  Plut.  Galba  13;  Suet.  Galba  14;  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  1.6. 
13.  G.  Manfre  ('I1  tentativo  imperiale  di  Gaio  Ninfidio  Sabino'  Riv. 
Fil.  19  (1941)  p.  118-20)  wrongly  views  Nymphidius  as  the 
representative  of  the  whole  military-provincial  world  opposed  to 
the  Senate.  p.  119.  'Ninfidio,  abbattuto  Nero,  tents  di 
assicurarsi  per  l'avvenire,  l'autoritä  the  la  classe  militare,  di 
cui  era  l'esponente,  aveva  acquistato  nell'  elezione  dell' 
imperatore  attraverso  la  rivoluzione.  ' 
14.  The  corruption  of  Galba's  main  advisers,  Vinius,  Laco  and  Icelus, 
was  ruinous  to  the  reputation  of  his  principate.  R.  Syme 
('Partisans  of  Galba'  Historia  31  (1982)  p.  460)  describes  Galba 
as  'dominated  by  a  camarilla,  narrow,  nasty  and  discordant'. 
For  Galba's  physical  condition,  see  Suet.  Galba  21. 
15.  / 244. 
15.  Plut.  Galba  13;  Suet.  Galba  11;  Tac.  Hist.  1.5.  Dio 
Cass.  (64.2.3)  seems  uncertain  as  to  Nymphidius'  culpability. 
16.  Syme,  op.  cit.  (see  note  14)  p.  476  links  him  with  Verginius  Rufus 
(cos.  63)  and  Silius  Italicus  (cos.  68)  as  Transpadane  consuls 
emergent  in  the  later  part  of  Nero's  principate.  His  speech- 
writing  cost  him  dearly.  He  was  put  to  death  during  Galba's 
journey  to  Rome  (Plut.  Galba  15;  Tac.  Hist.  1.6;  1.37.  ). 
17.  Plut.  Galba  14. 
18.  Durry  p.  371  les  pretoriens  ont  encore  le  respect  de  la  maison 
imperiale  et  de  l'aristocratie  qui  l'approche. 
19.  Plut.  Galba  14  Tia  CA/  rzýwýý 
L  d1L  &c  M(  rrz  .C 
wlýev. 
20.  Plut.  Galba  14. 
/ 
21.  Suet.  Galba  6  (in  Germany);  7  (in  Africa);  9  (in  Spain). 
22.  Tac.  Hist.  1.5;  Plut.  Galba  18;  Suet.  Galba  16;  Dio  Cass. 
64.3.3.  cp.  A.  Massie,  The  Caesars  (London  1983)  p.  175  'an 
expression  better  suited  to  the  theatre  than  to  the  world  of  real 
politics':  in  contrast  P.  A.  L.  Greenhalgh  (The  Year  of  the  Four 
Emperors  (London  1975)  p.  26)  describes  Galba's  words  as  'a  fine 
sentiment  and  spoken  like  a  great  emperor'. 
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24.  Suet.  Galba  20;  Tac.  Hist.  1.41. 
25.  Tac.  Hist.  1.18;  Plut.  Galba  23;  Suet.  Galba  17. 
26.  Tac.  Hist.  1.25. 
27.  Tac.  Hist.  1.25;  Plut  Galba  15;  Suet.  Galba  16. 
28.  Tac.  Hist.  1.20. 
29.  ILS  9919;  see  also  A.  von  Domaszewski,  'Beiträge  zur  Kaisergeschichte' 
Philologus  66  (1907)  p.  161-173. 
30.  Tac.  Hist.  1.13. 
31.  / 245. 
31.  Laco  is  rightly  rebuked  by  Tacitus  for  his  failure  to  prevent  the 
plot  (Hist.  1.24;  1.26).  His  entire  prefecture  is  condemned 
by  commentators  both  ancient  (Tac.  Hist.  1.6;  Suet.  Galba  14) 
and  modern  (Garzetti  op.  cit.  p.  196  referring  to  Laco's 
appointment,  'the  error  is  manifest';  Syme,  Tac.  p.  151  'A  person 
destitute  of  military  experience.  Previously  a  petty  law 
officer  he  had  only  arrogance  and  obstinacy  to  supplement  his 
ignorance'.  ) 
32.  Pflaum  op.  cit.  p.  85-87  no.  36;  Jalabert  op.  cit.  p.  99-101 
no.  2781;  cp.  L.  Keppie  'Colonisation  and  Veteran  Settlement  in 
Italy  in  the  First  Century  AD.  '  PBSR  52  (1984)  p.  92. 
33.  Suet.  Nero  47. 
34.  Pflaum  op.  cit.  p.  87-88  no.  36a  has  a  full  note  on  Antonius  Taurus. 
35.  Suet.  Galba  10. 
36.  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  1.84.  Italiae  alumni  et  Romana  vere  iuventus. 
37.  Garzetti  (op.  cit.  p.  195)  writes  of  the  'fundamental  error'  made 
by  Galba  in  believing  that  senatorial  approval  guaranteed  the 
security  of  his  principate. 
38.  Otho,  born  in  AD.  32,  the  second  son  of  a  proconsul  of  Africa,  was 
in  AD.  58  appointed  governor  of  Lusitania  by  Nero  who  desired  his 
wife  Poppaea  (Tac.  Ann.  13.46;  Hist.  1.13;  Plut.  Galba  20; 
Suet.  Otho  3). 
Despite  later  accusations  of  effeminacy  and  homosexuality  (Suet. 
Otho  2;  Juv.  Sat.  2.99-101;  Mart.  Epigr.  6.32.2),  he  displayed 
considerable  energy  and  competence  both  during  his  governorship 
and  later  as  princeps. 
39.  Tac.  Hist.  1.23.  It  remains  a  matter  of  some  debate  whether  a 
Praetorian  cohort  did,  in  fact,  escort  Galba  from  Spain  to  Rome. 
Tacitus,  describing  the  unpopularity  of  Galba's  attempts  to 
impose  discipline  on  the  Praetorians,  writes  'cum  Campaniae  lacus 
et  Achaiae  urbes  classibus  adire  soliti  Pyrenaeum  et  Alpes  et 
immensa  viarum  spatia  aegre  sub  armis  eniterentur'. 
A.  L.  Irvine  (Tacitus:  Histories  1  and  2  (London  1952)  p.  121)  has 
the  following  comment  on  that  passage  'But  the  rhetoric  goes 
astray  here;  the  troops  from  Spain  had  not  escorted  Nero,  and  the 
Praetorians  had  not  marched  from  Spain'.  Chilver  (op.  cit.  p.  33) 
suggests  that  the  only  troops  which  escorted  Galba  from  Spain 
were  legionaries  of  the  VII  Hispana.  On  the  other  hand  both 
K.  Wellesley  (The  Long  Year  AD.  69  (London  1975)  p.  6-7)  and 
Talbert  (op.  cit.  p.  74)  argue  that  a  detachment  of  Praetorians  had 
been  sent  out  from  Rome  by  sea  as  a  sovereign's  escort.  It  is, 
however,  equally  possible  that  Galba  himself  raised  a  Praetorian 
cohort  in  Spain.  He  certainly  had  a  bodyguard  of  equites  in  Spain 
(Suet.  Galba  10),  possibly  commanded  by  Titus  Vinius  (Plut.  Galba  4). 
40.  / 246. 
40.  Tac.  Hist.  1.23.  Throughout  history  ordinary  soldiers  have 
rewarded  with  great  devotion  commanders  who  have  taken  the  trouble 
to  learn  their  names.  The  following  example,  though  rather 
florid,  is  instructive  in  this  regard.  In  End  Kampf  um  Berlin 
(Buenos  Aires  1947)  p.  77  (translated  from  the  Swedish  Ragnaroek, 
(Stockholm  1946))  Wiking  Jerk,  a  Swedish  volunteer  in  the  Waffen 
S.  S.,  describes  an  inspection  at  Schwedt  on  the  Oder  front  in 
March  1945  by  S.  S.  General  Felix  Steiner. 
'As  he  approached  me,  his  stern  features  brightened  into  a  beaming 
smile.  He  had  recognised  me.  And  yet  it  was  almost  a  year 
since  I  had  taken  part  in  a  deputation  from  all  ranks  of  the 
division  which  greeted  him  at  Narva  on  his  birthday.  Since  then 
he  had  seen  innumerable  new  faces  and  yet  he  recognised  mine. 
He  called  me  by  my  name.  I  no  longer  stood  on  the  ground  but 
swam  in  a  rosy  cloud  of  happiness'. 
41.  Tac.  Hist.  1.23.  Since  Otho  had  been  in  Lusitania  since  AD.  58, 
it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  reminiscences  must  have  been 
of  the  most  general  kind. 
42.  Plut.  Galba  20;  Tac.  Hist.  1.23. 
43.  Plut.  Galba  21;  Suet.  Otho  5;  Tac.  Hist.  1.21. 
44.  Tac.  Hist.  1.23. 
45.  Tac.  Hist.  1.23;  Suet.  Otho  4. 
46.  Tact.  Hist.  1.23. 
47.  Plut.  Galba  23. 
48.  Tac.  Hist.  1.24.  According  to  Plutarch  (Galba  20)  and  Suetonius 
(Otho.  4)  Otho  himself  presented  a  gold  piece  to  each  member  of 
the  cohort. 
49.  Tac.  Hist.  1.25;  Plut.  Galba  24;  Suet.  Otho  5;  Dio  Cass. 
64.5.3.  Suetonius  (Otho  5)  alleges  that  Otho  extorted  1,000,000 
sesterces  from  one  of  the  emperor's  slaves  to  finance  this  coup. 
50.  Tac.  Hist.  1.26. 
51.  Tac.  Hist.  1.27;  Plut.  Galba  25.  Suetonius  (Otho  5)  mentions 
fifteen  speculatores,  each  paid  10,000  sesterces  and  promised 
50,000  more. 
52.  Tac.  Hist.  1.27;  Plut.  Galba  24f;  Suet.  Otho  6. 
53.  / 247. 
53.  Tac.  Hist.  1.27;  Plut.  Galba  25;  "Suet.  Otho  6. 
54.  Tac.  Hist.  1.27  ibi  tres  et  viginti  speculatores  consalutatum 
imperatorem  ac  paucitate  salutantium  trepidum  et  sellae 
festinanter  impositum  strictis  mucronibus  rapiunt.  Totidem 
ferme  milites  in  itinere  adgregantur.  Plutarch  (Galba  25)  is 
vague  as  to  the  actual  number  of  soldiers  with  Otho  when  he 
reached  the  camp.  ￿ 
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55.  Tac.  Hist.  1.28;  Plut.  Galba  25;  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  1.82. 
56.  Tac.  Hist.  1.29;  Plut.  Galba  25. 
57.  Tac.  Hist.  1.31. 
58.  Tac.  Hist.  1.31;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  64.6.1. 
59.  Tac.  Hist.  1.34. 
60.  Tac.  Hist.  1.31;  Plut.  Galba  25;  Suet.  Galba  19. 
61.  Tac.  Hist.  1.31.  Syme  (op.  cit.  (see  note  14)  p.  474)  suggests 
that  'the  tribune  may  well  be  that  Cn.  Pompeius  Longinus  who, 
legate  of  Judaea  in  86  and  consul  suffect  in  90,  advanced  to  the 
governorships  of  Moesia  Superior  and  Pannonia'.  Subrius  Dexter 
too  gained  later  promotion,  though  of  a  more  modest  kind.  In 
74  he  was  procurator  in  Sardinia  (CIL  10.8023f). 
62.  Tac.  Hist.  1.39. 
63.  Tac.  Hist.  1.31.  The  Germans  had  been  well-treated  by  Galba 
after  a  useless  and  dangerous  voyage,  in  preparation  for  Nero's 
planned  Caspian  campaign,  to  Alexandria  and  back  (Suet.  Galba  20). 
64.  Tac.  Hist.  1.31;  1.34;  cp.  Plut.  Galba  15;  Suet.  Galba  13; 
Dio  Cass.  64.3.1-2. 
65.  Tac.  Hist.  1.33;  1.39;  Plut.  Galba  26. 
66.  Tac.  Hist.  1.35;  Suet.  Galba  19;  Plut.  Galba  26;  Dio  Cass. 
64.6.2. 
Wellesley  (op.  cit.  p.  25)  describes  Atticus  as  'obviously 
acting  a  part'. 
67.  Tac.  Hist.  1.36. 
68.  / 248. 
68.  Tac.  Hist.  1.38;  Suet.  Galba  19;  Otho  6. 
69.  Tac.  Hist.  1.41;  Plut.  Galba  26.  The  gesture  was  perhaps 
pre-arranged:  see  Tac.  Hist.  1.38. 
70.  Tac.  Hist.  1.41. 
71.  Tac.  Hist.  1.41;  Plut.  Galba  27;  Suet.  Galba  20;  Dio  Cass. 
64.6.3.  Tacitus  names  3  alleged  killers,  Plutarch  4; 
none  are  specifically  mentioned  as  Praetorians;  indeed  Camurius, 
the  most  probable  killer,  was  a  legionary  of  legio  XV  Primigenia. 
72.  Tac.  Hist.  1.42;  Plut.  Galba  27.  His  killer  was  a  legionary 
named  Julius  Carus. 
His  arch-rival  Laco,  the  Praetorian  prefect,  did  not  long  survive 
him.  He  was  first  banished  to  an  island  and  later  put  to  death. 
(Tac.  Hist.  1.46).  Plutarch  (Galba  27)  appears  to  believe  that 
Laco  was  killed  at  the  same  time  as  Vinius. 
73.  Tac.  Hist.  1.43.  According  to  Plutarch  (Galba  26)  and  Dio  Cass. 
(64.6.4)  Sempronius  Densus  defended  Galba  himself. 
74.  Tac.  Hist.  1.43;  Plut.  Galba  27;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  64.6.51. 
Tacitus  names  his  killers  as  Sulpicius  Florus,  a  British 
auxiliary  and  Statius  Murcus,  a  speculator.  Plutarch  mentions 
only  the  latter. 
75.  Tac.  Hist.  1.44;  Plut.  Galba  27;  Suet.  Galba  20;  Dio  Cass. 
64.6.5a. 
76.  Tac.  Hist.  1.46.  omnia  deinde  arbitrio  militum  acta. 
77.  Suet.  Otho  7;  Dio  Cass.  64.8.1.  As  evidence  of  this  he  could 
cite  his  treatment  of  Marius  Celsus  (Tac.  Hist.  1.45;  1.71). 
78.  Tac.  Hist.  1.46.  cp.  Howe,  op.  cit.  p.  41-2. 
'The  short  reign  of  Julianus  is  remarkable  in  the  history  of  the 
prefecture  chiefly  for  the  single  known  example  of  prefects 
chosen  by  the  Praetorians  themselves  and  merely  ratified  in  their 
appointment  by  the  emperor'. 
79.  Dio  Cass.  64.8.22;  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  1.77;  1.81. 
The  allegiance  of  the  Senate  guaranteed  the  loyalty  of  many 
provinces  according  to  Tacitus  (Hist.  1.76). 
80.  Tac.  Hist.  1.74.  Suetonius  (Galba  16)  tells  us  that  the  legions 
of  Upper  Germany,  after  smashing  the  imagines  of  Galba  and  taking 
their  oath  in  the  names  of  the  Senate  and  the  People  of  Rome  on 
the  / 249. 
the  1st  of  January  AD.  69,  also  decided  to  send  a  deputation  to 
the  Praetorians  in  Rome  to  say  that  the  emperor  created  in  Spain 
was  unacceptable  to  them  and  that  the  Praetorians  should  choose 
a  candidate  acceptable  to  all  the  armies-.  This  seems  highly 
improbable. 
81.  There  are  two  types  of  coin  with  these  inscriptions  from  about 
this  date  -  one  specific  to  Vitellius  and  minted  at  Tarraco 
(BMC"  p.  384  no.  80)  and  a  more  general  military  class  as  detailed 
in  the  introduction  to  the  BM  catalogue  p.  CXCV111f;  see  also 
p.  306. 
82.  C.  Kraay  ('Revolt  and  Subversion:  The  So-Called  'Military' 
Coinage  of  AD.  69  Re-examined'  Num.  Chron.  (1952)  p.  78-86) 
argues  correctly  that  these  coins  were  issued  after  Otho's 
accession  rather  than,  as  Mattingly  suggests,  at  the  end  of 
AD.  68. 
83.  Tac.  Hist.  1.74. 
84.  Kraay  (op.  cit.  p.  84)  suggests  that  these  coins  might  have  been 
carried  back  to  Rome  by  the  Praetorians  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  embassy  to  the  Vitellians  in  Germany  to  be  distributed  among 
their  fellow-soldiers  there. 
85.  According  to  Suetonius  (Claudius  25)  this  unit  had  been  stationed 
by  Claudius  at  Ostia  as  a  fire-brigade. 
86.  Tac.  Hist.  1.80f;  Plut.  Otho  3;  Suet.  Otho  8;  cp.  Dio  Cass. 
64.9.2-3. 
The  3  main  accounts  vary.  Plutarch  seems  to  think  that  the 
incident  occurred  in  Ostia,  though  it  is  clear  from  Tacitus' 
mention  of  an  armoury  that  the  location  was  the  Praetorian  camp. 
87.  E.  G.  Hardy  (Plutarch's  Lives  of  Galba  and  Otho  (London  1890) 
p.  216)  believes  that  Otho  sent  for  the  17th  cohort  in  order  to 
enrol  it  among  the  Praetorians. 
E.  Hohl  ('Der  Prätorianeraufstand  unter  Otho'  Klio  22  (1939) 
P"307-24)  more  plausibly  views  this  episode  as  an  attempt  by  Otho 
to  equip  the  naval  expedition  to  Liguria  which  he  was  organising 
and  which  was  to  be  commanded  by  a  tribune  from  the  urban  cohorts. 
H.  Heubner  ('Der  Prätorianertumult  vom  Jahre  69  n.  Chr.  '  Rh. 
Mus.  101  (1958)  p.  339-53)  suggests  that  Hohl  has  misinterpreted 
Plutarch  and  has  placed  too  much  faith  in  Suetonius'  version,  but 
his  own  explanation  is  not  convincing. 
88"  Tac.  Hist.  1.81;  Plut.  Otho  3;  Dio  Cass.  64.9.3. 
89.  Tac.  Hist.  1.82. 
90.  / 250. 
90.  Tac.  Hist.  1.82.  Suetonius'  account  (Otho  8)  seems  wrongly  to 
suggest  that  some  tribunes  were  killed  at  the  palace;  cp.  Heubner. 
op.  cit.  p.  349. 
91.  Tac.  Hist.  1.82;  Plut.  Otho  3;  Dio  Cass.  64.9.3. 
Wellesley  (op.  cit.  p.  59)  writes  of  'a  douceur  of  5000  sesterces'. 
92.  ?  ac.  Hist.  1.82. 
93.  Tac.  Hist.  1.83f;  Plut.  Otho  3. 
94.  Tac.  Hist.  1. 
y 
83;  cp.  Plut.  Otho  3.  JUL  1 
(#s  n  jos  QU,  2r  J  vw  l*  c  nPelu  fOV' 
95.  Tac.  Hist.  1.85. 
96.  Tac.  Hist.  2.23;  Plut.  Otho  5. 
97.  Tac.  Hist.  1.87  is  urbanae  militiae  impiger,  bellorum  insolens. 
cp.  Plut.  Otho  7. 
The  replacement  for  political  reasons  of  experienced  soldiers  by 
police  generals  has  rarely  produced  a  happy  outcome.  The 
reality  of  front-line  command  almost  inevitably  debilitates  their 
much-vaunted  loyalty,  while  their  lack  of  experience  in  military 
command  can,  as  in  Proculus'  case,  prove  disastrous.  Another 
notable  feature  of  such  appointees  is  that  they  tend  to  spend 
much  of  their  time  in  machiavellian  manoeuvrings  to  maintain  their 
influence  at  court. 
We  have  a  modern  example  of  all  these  failings  in  Heinrich  Himmler, 
Hitler's  police  chief,  who  in  January  1945  was  appointed  to  the 
command  of  Army  Group  Vistula  which  was  being  relentlessly  pounded 
by  vastly  superior  Soviet  forces.  Himmler's  lifestyle,  however, 
did  not  respond  to  this  critical  situation. 
'Himmler's  second  headquarters  on  the  Eastern  front  was  at  the 
luxurious  villa  owned  by  Robert  Ley,  head  of  the  German  Labour 
Front,  near  the  S.  S.  Ordensburg  Crossinsee  at  Falenburg.  Here  he 
lived,  in  effect,  the  life  of  a  civil  servant  who  happened  to  be 
administering  a  war.  He  got  up  between  eight  and  nine  o'clock, 
received  treatment  from  Kersten  (his  masseur)  if  he  were  there  or 
from  Gebhardt  (his  doctor),  whose  nursing  home  at  Mohenlychen  was 
in  fact  conveniently  near.  Between  ten  and  eleven  o'clock  he 
received  his  war  reports  and  took  his  decisions.  After  lunch 
he  rested  for  a  while,  then  conferred  again  with  his  staff 
officers.  In  the  evening  he  was  too  tired  to  concentrate,  and 
after  dinner  he  went  to  bed.  By  ten  o'clock  he  was  inaccessible'. 
(R.  Manvell  and  H.  Fraenkel,  Himmler  (London  1965)  p.  221). 
98.  lac.  Hist.  1.87. 
99.  / 251. 
99.  ?  ac.  Hist.  2.12-13;  Agr.  7. 
100.  Tac.  Hist.  2.12.  Aemilius  Pacensis  had  been  dismissed  from  his 
tribunate  in  the  urban  cohorts  by  Galba  (Tac.  Hist.  1.20).  He 
was  reinstated  by  Otho  and  put  in  command  of  this  expeditionary 
force  (Tac.  Hist.  1.87).  He  died  supporting  the  Flavian  cause 
during  the  Vitellian  assault  on  the  Capitol  (Tac.  Hist.  3.73). 
101.  Tac.  Hist.  2.14-15;  cp.  Suet.  Otho  9. 
102.  Tac.  Hist.  2.18;  cp.  Plut.  Otho  5;  Suet.  Otho  9. 
103.  Tac.  Hist.  2.19  is  labor  urbano  militi  insolitus  contundit 
animas:  cp.  Plut.  Otho  6. 
104.  Tac.  Hist.  2.19. 
105.  Tac.  Hist.  2.23. 
106.  Tac.  Hist.  2.44;  cp.  2.41  miles  ducibus  infensus. 
107.  Tac.  Hist.  2.52;  Plut.  Otho  16;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  64.15.26. 
108.  Tac.  Hist.  2.67. 
109.  Tac.  Hist.  2.66.  Wellesley  (op.  cit.  p.  99)  suggests  that  these 
were  the  two  Praetorian  cohorts  whose  tribunes  attempted  an 
armistice  with  Caecina  (Tac.  Hist.  2.41)  and  that  they  had  been 
retained  by  the  victors  to  form  the  basis  of  a  reconstituted 
Praetorian  Guard. 
110.  Tac.  Hist.  2.60;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  65.6.2.  Durry  (p.  374)  claims 
that  Vitellius  executed  Praetorian  centurions,  but  it  is  clear 
from  Tacitus  that  those  treated  in  this  way  were  from  the  Moesian 
legions. 
111.  cp.  Dio  Cass.  55.23.  if. 
112.  Wellesley  (op.  cit.  p.  99)  suggests  these  locations,  presumably 
because  of  the  role  of  veterans  'exauctorati  a  Vitellio'  in 
repulsing  Valens  from  Forum  Julii  (Tac.  Hist.  3.43)  and  the 
presence  in  the  Flavian  army  at  Cremona  of  ex-Praetorians 
(Tac.  Hist.  3.21). 
113.  Tac.  Hist.  2.67;  2.82;  cp.  2.96. 
114.  Dio  Cass.  65.5.2. 
115.  / 252. 
115.  Dio  Cass.  65.7.2. 
116.  Tac.  Hist.  2.93.  It  was  carried  through  by  Fabius  Valens: 
cp.  Tac.  Hist.  3.62  where  the  sight  of  Valens'  head  was  partly 
responsible  for  the  surrender  of  the  Praetorian  cohorts  at 
Narnia. 
117.  P.  Fabia  'Les  Pretoriens  de  Vitellius'  Rev.  Phil.  38  (1914) 
p.  39. 
118.  Tac.  Hist.  2.93.  The  legionaries  were  allegedly  given  a  free 
choice  as  to  which  unit  they  joined  (Tac.  Hist.  2.94). 
119.  Suet.  Vit.  10  nihilque  cunctatus,  quicquid  praetorianarum 
cohortium  fuit,  ut  pessimi  exempli,  uno  exauctoravit  edicto 
iussas  tribunis  tradere  arena. 
120.  Tacitus  (Hist.  2.94)  mentions  20,000  men  which  seems  to  imply 
that  both  the  Praetorian  cohorts  and  the  urban  cohorts  were 
corpletely  renewed.  There  is  no  indication  that  the  urban 
cohorts  of  Otho  were  dismissed  by  Vitellius  and  it  may  well  be 
that  500  Vitellians  were  added  to  each  of  the  existing  units. 
121.  Carzetti,  op.  cit.  p.  214. 
122.  Keppie,  op.  Cit.  p.  242  note  20. 
123.  Tac.  Hist.  2.93;  3.9;  3.13;  3.31;  Dio  Cass.  65.10.2-4. 
124.  Tac.  Hist.  3.40. 
125.  Tac.  Hist.  3.56.  The  prefect  of  the  Adriatic  fleet  at  Ravenna, 
Lucilius  Bassus,  disappointed  in  his  hopes  of  a  Praetorian 
prefecture,  also  defected  to  the  Vitellians  (Tac.  Hist.  2.100; 
3.12;  3.36;  cp.  4.3). 
125.  Tac.  Hist.  3.12  ne  in  Vitellii  quidem  partibus  quietae  mentes: 
exitiosiore  discordia  non  suspicionibus  vulgi,  sed  perfidia 
ducum  turbabantur.  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  2.100;  3.13;  3.31. 
127.  Tac.  Hist.  3,55  tot  milia  armatorum,  lecta  equis  virisque,  si 
dux  alius  foret,  inferendo  quoque  bello  satis  pollebant. 
cp.  Wellesley.  op.  cit.  p.  162. 
128.  Tac.  Hist.  3.61. 
129.  I 253. 
129.  There  were  16  Praetorian  cohorts  during  Vitellius'  reign  (Tac. 
Hist.  2.93).  After  the  defeat  of  the  main  Vitellian  army  in 
the  second  battle  of  Bedriacum  Vitellius  sent  the  Praetorian 
prefects  to  guard  the  Appennine  passes  with  14  cohorts  and  the 
Praetorian  cavalry  (Tac.  Hist.  3.55).  After  the  defection  of 
the  fleet  at  Misenum  Lucius  Vitellius  was  sent  to  Campania  with 
6  Praetorian  cohorts  as  well  as  500  of  the  cavalry.  (Tac.  Hist. 
3.58).  These  units  eventually  surrendered  at  Bovillae  (Tac. 
Hist.  4.2).  We  know  that  there  were  3  cohorts  in  Rome  when 
Sabinus  seized  the  Capitol  (Tac.  Hist.  3.78).  If  we  accept 
that  these  were  Praetorian  cohorts,  this  means  that  7  cohorts 
must  have  surrendered  at  Narnia  (Tac.  Hist  3.63).  It  is 
possible  that  one  cohort  returned  to  Rome  either  with  Vitellius 
himself  (Tac.  Hist.  3.56)  or  with  the  Praetorian  prefects 
(Tac.  Hist.  3.61). 
With  regard  to  the  actual  dating  of  this  and  subsequent  events 
I  accept  the  suggestions  of  K.  Wellesley  'What  happened  in  the 
Capitol  in  December  AD.  69'  (=  Wellesley,  Capitol)  AJAR  vol.  6 
no.  2  (1981)  p.  166-90. 
130.  Tac.  Hist.  3.78. 
131.  Tac.  Hist.  3.58;  Suet.  Vit.  15;  Dio  Cass.  65.16.2. 
132.  Tac.  Hist.  3.63. 
133.  Tac.  Hist.  3.68;  Suet.  Vit.  15;  Dio  Cass.  65.16.3. 
134.  Tac.  Hist.  3.59;  3.64. 
135.  The.  Hist.  3.69.  Wellesley  (Capitol  p.  173-4)rightly  points 
out  that  Sabinus'  house  could  scarcely  have  held  4,000  urbaniciani 
and  7,000  Vigiles  together  with  leading  senators  and  equites.  He 
is,  however,  on  less  certain  ground  in  claiming  that  'the 
representatives  of  the  urban  cohorts  were  all  ex-Othonian  officers 
having  no  particular  attachment  to  Vitellius.  Although  this  was 
certainly  true  of  Aemilius  Pacensis(Tac.  Hist.  2.12)  it  is  a 
dangerous  generalisation.  Furthermore  it  was  surely  expediency 
rather  than  political  motivation  which  led  these  men  to  Sabinus' 
houses  for  they  perceived  that  Vitellius  had  lost  the  war  and  was 
on  the  point  of  abdication. 
136.  The.  Hist.  3.69. 
137.  Sabinus'  actions  were  later  condemned  by  Primus  and  Mucianus 
The.  Hist.  3.78  sed  cuncta  festinatione,  deinde  ignavia  Sabini 
corrupta,  qui  sumptis  temere  armis  munitissimam  Capitolii 
arcern  et  ne  magnis  quidem  exercitibus  expugnabilem  adversus  tris 
cohortis  tueri  nequivisset.  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  3.75. 
138.  Tac.  Hist.  3.69. 
139.  / 254. 
139.  Tac.  Hist.  3.69;  Dio  Cass.  65.17.1-2.  As  Sabinus  and  a 
small  group  of  supporters  were  heading  from  his  house  to  the 
Forum,  they  were  set  at  the  Basin  of  Fundanus  on  the  slope 
leading  down  to  the  centre  of  the  city  by  a  group  of  Vitellians, 
possibly  Praetorians,  and  worsted  in  the  ensuing  skirmish. 
Suetonius  (Vit.  15)  implies  that  Vitellius  was  directly  responsible 
for  the  attack  on  Sabinus'  group. 
140.  Tac.  Hist.  3.69;  Dio  Cass.  65.18.1-2.  Greenhalgh  op.  cit. 
p.  181  '....  the  Vitellian  soldiers,  ready  enough  to  face  danger 
in  battle,  had  little  patience  for  conscientious  picketing  in 
the  torrential  rain  which  continued  through  the  night'. 
141.  Tac.  Hist.  3.70. 
142.  Tac.  Hist.  3.77. 
143.  Tac.  Hist.  3.79;  Dio  Cass.  65.18.3.  It  is  not  specifically 
stated  that  the  Flavian  cavalry  were  driven  back  by  Praetorians, 
but  Wellesley  (Capitol  p.  177)  argues  convincingly  that  the 
defending  force  were  members  of  the  Guard. 
144.  Tac.  Hist.  3.70. 
145.  Tac.  Hist.  3.71;  Dio  Cass.  65.17.3. 
T.  P.  Wiseman  ('Flavians  on  the  Capitol'  AJAH  3  (1978)  p.  166) 
suggests  that  the  Vitellians  who  assaulted  the  Capitol,  although 
Praetorians,  did  not  come  from  the  castra  praetoria,  but  from 
the  Palatiu  where  a  cohort  of  the  Guard  was  normally  based. 
Wellesley  (Capitol  p.  179-84)  dismisses  this  view. 
146.  Sac.  Hist.  3.73;  Dio  Cass.  65.17.3. 
147.  Tac.  Hist.  3.74. 
148.  ?  ac.  Hist.  3.80. 
149.  Tac.  Hist.  3  80f;  Suet.  Vit.  16;  Dio  Cass.  65.18.3f. 
150.  ?  ac.  Hist.  3.82;  Dio  Cassius  (65.19.2-3)  claims  that  50,000 
died  during  the  fighting. 
151.  Tac.  Hist.  3.84. 
152.  ?  ac.  Hist.  3.85;  Suet.  Vit.  17;  Dio  Cass.  65.20.2f. 
153.  / 255. 
153.  Tac.  Hist.  3.86;  cp.  Tac.  Hist.  4;  2;  Dio  Cass.  66.1.1. 
154.  Tac.  Hist.  4.2.  Lucius  Vitellius  was  executed:  cp.  Dio 
Cass.  65.22.1. 
155.  Tac.  Hist.  4.2;  cp.  Tac.  Ann.  13.9;  Hist.  3.6.  Of  the 
Vitellian  prefects  Julius  Priscus  committed  suicide,  Afenus 
Varus  was  allowed  to  regain  alive  (Tac.  Hist.  4.11). 
156.  Tac.  Hist.  3.21.  Wellesley  (op.  cit.  p.  148)  believes  that  the 
two  Flavian  soldiers  who  were  killed  sabotaging  a  huge 
Vitellian  ballista  were  'probably  Praetorians'  (Tac.  Hist.  3.23; 
Dio  Cass.  65.14.2). 
157.  Tac.  Hist.  3.84. 
158.  See  note  101. 
159.  Tac.  Hist.  4.46. 
160.  Quite  apart  from  the  reluctance  with  which  some  of  Vitellius' 
Praetorians  surrendered  there  were  still  Vitellian  sympathisers 
at  large  in  Rome  (Tac.  Hist.  4.38). 
161.  lac.  Hist.  4.46. 
162.  ?  ac.  Hist.  4.46;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  65.22.2. 
163.  Tac.  Hist.  4.46.  Keppie  (see  note  32)  (p.  92  note  100)  details 
epigraphic  evidence  showing  that  some  of  Vitellius'  Praetorians 
did  retain  their  positions. 
164.  The.  Hist.  4.68;  cp.  Suet.  Dom  11;  see  also  A.  Passerini  'M. 
Arrecino  Clemente'  Athenaeum  18  (1940)  p.  145-63. 
165.  Suet.  Ti.  6. 
166.  Kucianus  presented  the  soldiers  with  100  sesterces  (Dio  Cass. 
65.22.2).  Vespasian  provided  a  further  donative  on  his 
arrival  in  Rome  (Dio  Cass.  66.10.  la). 
For  his  attitude  to  discipline  within  the  army  see  Suet.  Vesp.  8. CHAPTER  VII  :  THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  AS  A  POLITICAL  FORCE 
1.  Sy--e,  Tac.  p.  10  'In  the  Annals  of  the  empire  a  constant 
indictnent  stands  against  the  Praetorians  for  turbulence  and 
rapacity.  It  was  not  always  deserved'. 
2.  C.  Duffy.  The  Army  of  Maria-Theresa  (Vancouver  1977)  p.  68. 
3.  C.  K.  Webster.  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Castlereagh  1812-15 
(London  1931)  p.  469. 
4"  H.  Lachouque  and  A.  S.  K.  Bronn,  The  Anatomy  of  Glory 
(London  1978)  p.  4. 
5.  Reitlinger,  op.  cit.  p.  2  '(The  S.  S.  )  had  ceased  to  be  the 
Praetorian  Guard  of  a  dictator;  and  it  had  spread  its  net  far 
beyond  the  function  of  an  inner  political  police  in  a  one-party 
state  like  the  KKVD  in  Russia'. 
G.  H.  Stein,  The  Waffen  S.  S.  (New  York  1966)  p.  5  'Hitler  had  in 
fact  established  a  Praetorian  Guard  which  stood  above  both 
Party  and  State*.  B.  Quarrie,  Hitler's  Samurai:  The  Waffen 
S.  S.  in  Action  (Cambridge  1983)  p.  23.  'The  creation  of  an  elite 
force,  which  was  and  is  often  compared  to  the  Roman  Praetorian 
Guard  or  Napoleon's  Imperial  Guard,  began  to  attract  increasing 
nuabers  of  recruits'. 
6.  Dio  Cass.  58.12.2. 
7"  Jos.  AJ  19.214;  Dio  Cass.  59.30.2. 
8.  lac.  Hist.  1.36;  1.80f;  2.12;  2.16;  Plut.  Otho  3;  5; 
Suet.  Ocho  8-9;  Dio  Cass.  64.9.2. 
9.  Tac.  Ann.  16.27  inter  quorum  aspectus  et  minas  ingressi  curiam 
senatores. 
10.  App.  BC.  4.7  c 
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11.  V.  J.  Sinnigen.  'The  Roman  Secret  Service'  CJ  57  (1961) 
P"65-72;  cp.  P.  K.  Baillie-Reynolds  'The  Troops  quartered  in  the 
castra  peregrinorum'  JRS  13  (1923)  p-168-89- 
For  evidence  of  frumentarii  under  Trajan;  see  S.  H.  A.  Hadrian 
11.6.  Professional  torturers  and  executioners  may  have  been 
attached  to  the  same  camp  (scholiast  on  Juv.  Sat.  6.480; 
Codex  Theodostanus  16.12.3). 
12.  / 257. 
12.  Dio  Cass.  78.17.1. 
13.  He  was  praetor  in  AD.  88  (Tac.  Hist.  1.1).  His  justification 
for  collaborating  with  a  tyrant  can  be  found  in  Agr.  42. 
14.  Tac.  Ann.  1.2.  ceteri  nobilium,  quanto  quis  servitio 
pro=-ptior,  cpibus  e*  honoribus  extollerentur  ac  novis  ex  rebus 
aucti,  tuta  et  praesentia  quam  vetera  et  periculosa  mallent; 
cp.  Agr.  2. 
15.  N.  Pani,  "I1  circolo  di  Germanico'  Ann.  Fac.  Mag.  Bari  7  (1968) 
p.  109-27. 
16.  Dio  Cassus'  allegation  (58.8.2)  that  the  Praetorians  were 
ready  to  support  a  coup  by  Seianus  but  backed  down  when  they 
discovered  that  such  an  action  was  opposed  by  the  sro5 
seems  highly  improbable. 
17.  Suet.  Cl.  10;  Jos.  AJ  19.247. 
18.  Plut.  Galba  2. 
19.  Jos.  AJ  19.217;  cp.  Suet.  Cl.  10;  Dio  Cass.  60.1.2. 
20.  Suet.  Nero  49;  Dio  Cass.  63.29.1-2. 
21.  Suet.  Hero  48;  cp.  Plut.  Galba  7. 
22.  Suet.  Hero  49. 
23.  The  period  of  service  in  the  Praetorian  Guard  was  16  years, 
cocpared  with  25  for  legionaries. 
24.  Durry,  p.  140f.  191;  Watson,  op.  Cit.  p.  99;  191  note  253. 
25.  cp.  A.  N.  Sherrin-Uhite.  "Procurator  Augusti'  PBSR  15  (1939)  p.  13. 
26.  cp.  Keppie,  op.  cit  p.  179. 
27.  H.  K.  D.  Parker.  The  Rowan  Legions  (Oxford  1928)  p.  201. 
28.  B.  Dobson.  'The  Centurionate  and  Social  Mobility  during  the 
Principate'  in  C.  Nicolet  (ed.  )  Recherches  sur  les  structures 
sociales  dang  l'antiquite  classique  (Paris  1970)  p.  99. 
2).  Tac.  Hist.  1.84  narr  ut  ex  vobis  senatores,  ita  ex  senatoribus 
principes  nascuntur. 
30.  / 258. 
30.  A.  Stein,  Der  r&ische  Ritterstand  (Munich  1927)  p.  175,214; 
cp.  Dobson,  op.  cit.  p.  99f. 
31.  B.  Dobson  and  D.  J.  Breeze,  'The  Rome  Cohorts  and  the  Legionary 
Centurionate'  Epig.  Stud.  8  (1969)  p.  100f. 
32.  Durry.  p.  3  alors  que  les  chevaliers  d'origine,  par  le  triple 
echelon  de  la  nilice  fquestre,  se  hätent  ver  les  procurateres 
inferieures,  une  carriere  tout  autre  attend  les  chevaliers- 
pretoriens.  Plus  lente  en  apparence  au  debut,  eile  finit  en 
beaute.  A  l'arcee:  soldats  et  sous-officiers  successivement 
daps  les  trots  corps  urbains  principaux  (vigiles,  cohortes 
urbaines  et  pretoriennes),  ils  partent  comme  centurions  dans  une 
legion;  it  quoi  succedent  le  triple  centurionat  urbain,  le 
prinipilat  legionnaire  et  -  troisil!  me  retour  ä  Rome  avant  les 
e  loss  superieurs  -  le  triple  tribunat  urbain.  Dans 
i'ad  inistration:  il  wont  des  hautes  prefectures  provinciales 
aux  Oinisteres  du  Palatin  et  aux  hautes  prefectures  urbaines. 
cp.  A.  von  Donaszewski,  op.  cit.  p.  105,195. 
33.  Stein.  op.  cit.  p.  169. 
34.  E.  Birley,  Roman  Britain  and  the  Roman  Army  (Kendal  1953) 
P.  104-122.  especially  p.  117;  cp.  Dobson  and  Breeze, 
op.  cit.  p.  117. 
35.  Durry,  p.  133;  for  a  contrasting  view  see  Syme,  Tac.  p.  183, 
note  4  'it  as  not  common  for  a  soldier  to  go  so  far'. 
36"  ILS  2648  (a  S,.  wa11.283  =  Braund  518). 
37.  Tac.  Ann.  11.30;  11.35. 
38.  Tae.  Hist.  1.31. 
39.  Dobson,  op.  cit.  p.  99. 
°"  Soeae  centurions  were  promoted  from  the  ranks,  others  were 
directly  coaissioned. 
41.  K.  Hopkins,  'Elite  Mobility  in  the  Roman  Empire',  Past  and 
Present  32  (1965)  p.  18. 
42.  Jos  AJ  19.111-3;  19.46;  19.110;  19.190. 
43.  Tac.  Ann.  15.65;  15.67;  15.68. 
44.  / 259. 
44.  Scranuzza,  op.  cit.  p.  54  'this  representative  body  of  Italian 
bourgeois'.  Passerini  (p.  V1)  claims  to  reject  this  view, 
although  he  appears  to  contradict  himself  on  p.  164. 
45.  ILS  2033. 
46.  ILS  206. 
47.  Durry,  p.  253-4;  cp.  Passerini,  p.  166. 
48.  Passerini.  p.  168. 
49.  See  especially  0.  Bohn.  Ueber  die  Heimat  der  Prätorianer 
(Berlin  1883). 
SO.  Tac.  Ann.  4.  S. 
51.  Durry,  p.  256;  cp.  RE.  XX11.2,1627  where  the  language  is  almost 
identical,  'nenn  die  Legionäre  Italiener  sind,  gehoren  die 
Pratorianer  den  ältesten  Kolonien  an;  wenn  die  Legionäre 
Provincialen  sind,  sind  die  Prätorianer  Italiener;  wenn  die 
Legionäre  Soldaten  aus  den  Grenzgebieten  sind,  werden  die 
Prätorianer,  aus  den  besten  Legionen  ausgewählt,  denen  des 
Donaugebietes'.  Fabia  (op.  cit.  p.  38)  also  accepts  Tacitus' 
stateaent  and  argues  that  this  tradition  was  not  broken  until 
Vitellius  enrolled  his  legionaries  into  the  Guard  in  AD.  69 
(Tac.  Hist.  2.93). 
52.  Tac.  Ann  4.4.  non  eadem  virtute  ac  modestia  agere,  quia  plerumque 
mopes  ac  vagi  sponte  militiam  sumant.  Durry  (p.  241)  believes 
the  increase  in  the  number  of  cohorts  from  nine  to  twelve 
necessitated  an  extention  of  the  area  of  recruitment. 
Paiserini  (p.  159)  mentions  the  falling  population  in  southern 
Italy  as  a  source  of  difficulties  in  recruitment. 
53.  CIL  6.2763;  ILS  2023. 
54"  I1.5  2027;  Pliny,  MN  25.17  nuper  cuiusdam  militantis  in  praetorio 
eater  vidit  in  quiete  ut  radicem  silvestris  rosae  quam 
cynorrhodon  vocant  blanditam  sibi  aspectu  pridie  in  frutecto 
mitteret  filio  bibendam. 
55.  ILS  2030;  2032.  Gaius  Julius  Montanus,  the  subject  of  the 
latter  inscription,  served  in  the  12th  Praetorian  cohort.  For 
the  dating  of  this  inscription  to  the  principate  of  Gaius,  see 
Bohn  op.  cit.  p.  6;  cp.  Durry  p.  79. 
It  is  also  worth  noting  that,  according  to  Aurelius  Victor 
(do  Caes.  3.16),  the  centurion  of  the  Guard  who  discovered  Claudius 
in  the  palace  after  the  murder  of  Gaius  came  from  Epirus. 
56.  / 260. 
`.  4.  There  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  membership  of  the  Praetorian 
Guard  was  used  as  a  means  of  restructuring  Roman  society.  By 
way  of  contrast  the  following  passage  is  of  interest. 
`Before  1938.40  per  cent  of  the  S.  S.  officer-cadets  had  only 
received  elementary  school  education  and  whereas  in  the  armed 
forces  49  per  cent  of  the  officers  were  of  military  families, 
the  proportion  was  only  5  per  cent  in  the  armed  formations  of 
the  S.  S.  (S.  S.  -  V.  T.  ).  Likewise,  in  the  Army  less  than  2  per 
cent  were  of  peasant  stock,  whereas  90  per  cent  of  S.  S.  -  V.  T. 
Coe=-anders  had  been  brought  up  on  the  land.  This  reflects  the 
high  proportion  of  recruits  which  came  from  the  countryside  rather 
than  the  towns  -  in  some  parts  of  Germany  as  many  as  a  third  of 
the  farmers'  sons  joined  the  ranks  of  the  armed  S.  S.  -  the  same 
areas  which  gave  the  greatest  support  to  the  NSDAP'. 
J.  Lucas  and  X.  Cooper,  Hitler's  Elite  -  Leibstandarte  S.  S. 
(London  1975)  p.  37. 
57.  Tac.  Hist.  1.35  nec  tribunis  auf  centurionibus  adeundi  locus; 
cp.  1.46;  1.84;  2.18;  2.39;  2.41. 
58.  Tac.  Hist.  1.80;  cp.  2.12. 
59.  The.  Hist.  1.85  ita  sparsis  per  domos  occulto  habitu  et  maligna 
cure  in  omnis.  quos  nobilitas  auf  opes  auf  aliqua  insignis 
claritudo  rumoribus  obiecerat. 
60.  C.  B.  Kacpherson,  The  Political  Theory  of  Possessive 
Individualises  (Oxford  1962)  p.  107-54. 
61.  C.  W.  Cassinelli,  'The  Totalitarian  Party'  Journal  of  Politics  24 
(1962)  p.  113  note  3. 
62.  Tac.  Ann.  2.41  brevis  et  infaustos  po  uli  Romani  amores;  Cicero, 
Don.  4  inconstantia  plebis;  App.  BC.  'M$  dVc 
.  txlýos  ;  cp.  Juv. 
Sat.  10.80-81.1 
Rostovtzeff  (SEHRE2  p.  80)  is  not  alone  among  modern  commentators 
in  accepting  these  jaundiced  views  rather  too  readily. 
63.  Cic.  Planc.  9  non  est  consilium  in  vulgo,  non  ratio,  non 
discriaen.  non  diligentia;  cp.  Yavetz,  op.  cit.  p.  35. 
64.  Tac.  Mn.  1.77;  Dio  Cass.  57.14.2;  cp.  Suet.  Tib.  37. 
65.  There  were  substantial  riots  the  suppression  of  which  required 
Praetorian  intervention  during  Nero's  principate  after  his 
murder  of  Agrippina  (Tac.  Ann.  14.8)  and  his  banishment  of 
Octavia  (Tac.  Ann.  14.60;  Suet.  Nero  35).  There  were  popular 
protests  during  Piso's  trial  after  the  death  of  Germanicus 
(Tac.  Ann.  3.14)  and  in  AD.  61  after  the  murder  of  Pedanius 
Secundus  (Tac.  Ann.  14.45). 
T'  he  / 261. 
The  most  serious  disorders,  however,  were  prompted  by  breakdowns 
in  the  supply  of  food.  In  38  BC.  many  people  were  killed  by 
Antony's  soldiers  after  Octavian  had  been  stoned  in  the  Forum 
(App.  BC.  5.68.  Vell.  Pat.  2.77;  cp.  Dio  Cass.  48.31.6). 
The  plebs  stormed  the  Senate  during  a  famine  in  22  BC.  (Dio 
Cass.  54.1.1-3;  cp.  Suet.  Aug.  52;  Vell.  Pat.  2.89). 
In  AD.  51  the  Praetorians  had  to  rescue  Claudius  after  he  was 
attacked  by  a  hungry  mob  in  the  Forum  (Tac.  Ann.  12.4; 
Suet.  Cl.  12).  for  the  part  played  in  the  downfall  of  Nero 
by  the  adverse  public  reaction  to  a  shortage  of  food  see 
Bradley,  op.  cit.  p.  451-8. 
66.  Suet.  Cl.  12.  The  culmination  of  this  antagonism  was  reached 
in  AD.  238  when  the  Praetorians  set  fire  to  much  of  Rome  in 
revenge  for  an  assault  on  their  camp  by  the  people  who  had  been 
armed  by  the  Senate  (Hdn.  7.12.5). 
67.  EJ  251  (=  Braund  485).  This  is  perhaps  a  less  than  satisfactory 
example.  The  inscription  has  traditionally  been  dated  to 
AD.  29  because  of  the  phrase  Missus  duobus  Geminis,  although 
otherwise  there  is  nothing  to  suggest  that  it  is  earlier  than 
Flavian  in  date.  The  veteran  himself  is  not  from  Rome  and 
whether  he  even  married  Masuria  is  not  clear.  Obviously 
he  stayed  on  in  Rome  after  his  discharge,  but  there  is  no 
indication  as  to  Masuria's  origins. 
68.,  Suet.  Aug.  25. 
69.  Cp.  Cic.  Rep.  1.43  tarnen  ipsa  aequabilitas  est  iniqua  cum  habet 
nullos  gradus  dignitatis. CHAPTER  VIII  :  THE  PRAETORIAN  GUARD  AS  A  MILITARY  FORCE 
1.  Passerini  p.  VIII;  cp.  p.  133,168,197,202.  I  would 
respectfully  suggest  that  Passerini's  work  reflects  the  political 
situation  in  Italy  in  1939.  It  is  possible  to  detect  throughout 
his  work  echoes  of  Fascist  ideology.  Cp.  197  'sarebbe  non  solo 
ingenuo,  ma  antistorico,  negare  the  il  nuovo  governo  di  Roma 
volesse  essere  e  fosse  un  governo  forte:  ma  -  salvo  le  isolate 
eccezioni,  the  allo  storico  d'un  impero  non  dtbbono  interessare  - 
era  appunto  cib  the  i  milioni  di  sudditi  di  Roma  chiedevano  al 
principato,  the  esso  fosse,  cioe,  tanto  forte  da  assicurare, 
dopo  1'orribile  tragedia  in  cull  era  precipitato  il  vecchio  governo 
oligarchico,  la  pace  benefica  per  tutti:  all  'interno,  dove  pace 
significava  serenita  e  benessere,  verso  l'esterno,  dove  portava 
una  sicurezza  ed  un  prestigio  adequati  alla  grandessa  dello 
stato'. 
More  specifically,  I  believe  that  his  view  of  the  Guard's  role 
is  coloured  by  the  activities  of  Mussolini's  blackshirt  militia, 
the  MVSN,  which  provided  combat  units  for  the  Italian  forces  in 
Abyssinia  and  Spain. 
2.  Lachouque,  op.  cit.  p.  504  'This  was  no  palace  troop  or  political 
instrument,  but  a  corps  of  carefully  chosen  soldiers  who  won 
their  privileges  by  distinguished  service  in  the  army'. 
P.  Mansel,  Pillars  of  Monarchy  (London  1984)  p.  41  'The  'French' 
Imperial  Guard  -  which  now  contained  many  Italians  and  Germans  - 
in  the  campaign  of  1813  was  more  than  ever  the  elite  and  reserve 
of  the  army.  ' 
3.  R.  Humble,  Warfare  in  the  Ancient  World  (London  1980)  p.  226. 
4.  It  goes  beyond  the  evidence  even  to  argue  that  Septimius  used  the 
garrison  of  Rome  which  he  increased  almost  threefold  as  a  central 
reserve  or  as  a  mobile  field  army.  The  major  cavalry  corps 
which  Gallienus  created  at  Mediolanum  between  264  and  268  should 
be  regarded  as  the  first  reserve  of  this  kind. 
5.  Dio  Cass.  55.33.1. 
6.  Dio  Cass.  56.23  2. 
7.  Dessau,  op.  cit.  p.  257;  we  know  that  Augustus  used  Aquileia  as  a 
forward  headquarters  when  campaigning  in  the  north  (Suet.  Aug.  20). 
8.  Suet.  Aug.  49. 
9.  Tac.  Ann.  1.17;  Suet.  Tib.  25. 
10.  / 263. 
10.  Tac.  Hist.  1.89  quod  raro  alias,  pr'etorianus  urbanusque  miles 
in  aciem  deducti. 
11.  Tac.  Hist.  1.23;  2.19;  cp.  Suet.  Gaius  43. 
12.  Plut.  Otho  5. 
13.  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  Germany  the  Leibstandarte  Adolf  Hitler, 
the  bodyguard  division,  were  mocked  by  the  more  professional 
soldiers  of  the  German  Army  as  the  "Asphalt  Soldiers',  since  it 
was  believed  that  their  impressive  appearance  on  the  parade-ground 
had  been  developed  at  the  expense  of  military  skills.  There 
may  have  been  some  basis  for  this  view  since,  during  the 
campaigns  of  1939-40  in  Poland  and  France,  this  division  sustained 
a  disproportionately  high  level  of  casualties. 
Similarly,  the  relatively  poor  performance  of  the  Scots  and  Welsh 
Guards  during  the  Falklands  campaign  was  explained  by  military 
spokesmen  as  being  due  to  tae  fact  that  these  battalions  had  been 
on  public  duties  during  the  previous  months  and  so  were  at  a  low 
level  of  combat  readiness. 
14.  Tac.  Ann.  2.16;  Suet.  Gaius  43;  ILS  2701;  2648. 
15.  We  may  reasonably  compare  the  Praetorian  cohorts,  both  in  their 
principal  role  and  in  public  perception  of  their  function,  with 
the  Guard  regiments  of  Charles  II. 
In  1661  that  King's  Guard  numbered  3200  men  and  374  officers  -a 
total  not  dissimilar  to  the  5000  Praetorians  Augustus  had  at  his 
disposal.  A  country  which  had  endured  with  an  ill-grace  the 
interventions  in  politics  of  the  New  Model  Army  between  1647  and 
1660  was  understandably  apprehensive  that  the  soldiers  would  become 
unmanageable  and  that  Charles,  like  Cromwell,  would  be  willing  to 
use  such  troops,  either  directly  or  as  a  threat,  to  achieve  his 
political  aims  (L.  G.  Schwoerer,  'No  Standing  Armies!  '  The 
antiarmy  Ideology  in  Seventeenth-Century  England  (London  1974) 
p.  58,81-2).  This  fear  was,  to  some  extent,  justified  since 
Charles'  main  reason  for  maintaining  their  regiments  was  his  belief 
that  his  father's  difficulties  would  not  have  occurred  had  he  had 
such  a  force  under  his  direct  command.  Let  us  be  very  clear  on 
this.  Had  such  troops  been  available  to  Charles  I,  they  could  not 
have  turned  Marston  Moor  or  Naseby  from  defeats  into  victories  but 
they  could,  in  the  years  before  1641,  have  prevented,  through 
their  intimidatory  presence,  the  rise  of  the  parliamentary 
opposition  to  that  king. 
Such,  at  least,  was  the  view  of  his  son  -a  view  with  which 
Augustus  and  his  successors  would  surely  have  had  some  sympathy. 
They  maintained  the  Praetorian  Guard  for  a  similar  reason. CHAPTER  IX  :  PREFECTS  AND  PREFECTURE 
1.  Passerini  has  a  long  and  thoughtful  account  of  the  activities 
of  the  Praetorian  prefects  (p.  207f).  This  has  been  criticised 
by  S.  J.  De  Laet  ('Cohortes  Pretoriennes  et  Prefets  du 
Pretoire  au  Haut-Empire'.  Rev.  Belg.  Phil.  Hist.  23  (1944)  who 
condemns  it  as  being  'unilaterale  et  souvent  superficielle'. 
(p.  503).  Passerini  is  not,  however,  without  his  supporters. 
Howe  (op.  cit.  p.  4)  writes  that  'it  is  a  great  merit  of 
Passerini's  work.  that  he  has  treated  the  prefecture  as  a 
developing  institution. 
2.  Dio  Cass.  55.10.10. 
3.  Although  Dio  Cassius  places  the  creation  of  the  prefecture  before 
the  downfall  of  Julia,  it  is,  more  probably,  one  of  the  results 
of  that  scandal. 
4.  Millar,  ERW  p.  465f. 
5.  The  maintenance  of  the  closest  contacts  with  his  Guard  is  a 
necessity,  not  an  indulgence,  for  a  despot.  In  the  final 
analysis,  they  are  the  guarantors  of  his  survival.  A  recent 
example  confirms  this  point.  After  the  military  coup  against 
his  regime,  General  Alfredo  Stroessner  of  Paraguay  fled  to  the 
barracks  of  his  Presidential  Guard,  on  which  he  had  lavished 
considerable  attention.  With  the  support  of  these  troops  he 
was  able  to  negotiate  for  himself  a  comfortable  exile  in  Brazil. 
6.  The  origin  of  Q.  Ostorius  Scapula  is  uncertain.  Amiternum  is 
suggested  by  A.  M.  Hansen  'Publius  Ostorius  Scapula  -  Augustan 
Prefect  of  Egypt'  ZPE  47  (1982)  p.  247.  We  also  know  from 
Tacitus  that  the  family  had  estates  in  Liguria  (Ann.  16.15). 
As  far  as  concerns  P.  Salvius  Aper,,  Syme  (A.  A.  p.  301)  denies 
any  connection  with  the  Salvii  Othones  from  Ferentum  in  Etruria. 
Levick  (Tib.  p.  43)  is  more  circumspect,  merely  noting  that 
'relationship  with  the  Salvii  Othones  is  not  established'.  There 
is  undoubtedly  much  to  commend  in  Syme's  suggestion,  based  on 
ILS  4902,  that  the  prefect  came  from  Brixia  in  Transpadane  Italy. 
7.  For  the  honours  bestowed  on  Valerius  Ligur  see  Dio  Cass.  60.23.2-3. 
PIR'  V.  189  suggests  that  he  may  have  been  the  father  of  Varius 
Ligur  (Tac.  Ann.  4.42;  6.30);  cp.  also  ILS  171. 
8.  L.  Seius  Strabo,  described  by  Velleius  Paterculus  as  'princeps 
equestris  ordinis'  was  prefect  in  AD.  14  at  the  time  of  Augustus' 
death  (Tac.  Ann.  1.7.2;  1.24.2). 
cp.  Juvenal's  description  of  Crispinus  (Sat.  4.32)  as  'princeps 
equitum'. 
9.  / 265. 
9.  S.  J.  De  Laet,  'Les  Pouvoirs  Militaires  des  Prefets  du  Pretoire 
et  leur  developpment  progressif'  Rev.  Belg.  Phil.  Hist.  25 
(1946-7)  p.  515.  cp.  Howe,  op.  cit.  p.  10f. 
10.  Tac.  Ann.  1.7  (Tiberius)  signum  praetoriis  cohortibus  ut 
imperator  dederat;  13.2.  (Nero)  signum  more  militiae  petenti 
tribuno  dedit  optimae  matris. 
We  should  note  the  political  importance  of  this  ceremonial  act, 
especially  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  reigns:  cp.  SHA  Vita 
Pii  12.6  and  Vita  Marci.  7.3  which  refer  to  the  final  hours 
of  Antoninus  Pius  and  emphasise  how  his  final  watchword 
'Aequanimitas'  helped  smooth  the  accession  of  Marcus  Aurelius. 
11.  Suet.  Cal.  56  primas  sibi  partes  Cassius  Chaerea  tribunus 
cohortis  praetoriae  depoposcit,  quem  Gaius  seniorem  iam  et 
mollem  et  effeminatum  denotare  omni  probro  consuerat  et  modo 
signum  petenti  'Priapum'  auf  'Venerem'  dare. 
12.  ILS  206  quod  plerique  ex  eo  genere  hominum  etiam  militare  in 
praetorio  meo  dicuntur. 
13.  CIL  M.  21  (from  Vespasian's  principate)  nomina  speculatorum, 
qui  in  praetorio  meo  militaverunt,  item  militum,  qui  in 
cohortibus  novem  et  quattuor  urbanis,  subieci,  quibus  fortiter 
et  pie  militia  functis  ius  tribuo  conubi  .... 
cp.  CIL  XVl  95;  98. 
14.  Dio  Cass.  52.24.6  (Maecenas'  apocryphal  speech  of  advice  to 
Augustus);  cp.  Dio  Cassius  75.14.2;  see  also  M.  Hammond 
'The  significance  of  the  Speech  of  Maecenas  in  Dio  Cassius, 
Book  Lil  TAPA  63  (1932)  p.  89-102,  esp.  p.  94. 
15.  SHA  Vita  Had.  9.4  cui  cum  successorem  dare  non  posset,  quia 
non  petebat,  id  egit  ut  peteret,  atque  ubi  primum  petiit,  in 
Turbonem  transtulit  potestatem. 
16.  See  ch.  5  note  81. 
17.  Aelius  Seianus,  Naevius  Sestorius  Macro,  Rufrius  Pollio, 
Catonius  Justus,  Faenius  Rufus,  Ofonius  Tigellinus  and 
Nymphidius  Sabinus. 
18.  SHA  Vita.  Alex.  19.1  praefectum  praetorii  sibi  ex  senatus 
auctoritate  constituit. 
This  was  part  of  a  general  policy  of  granting  the  Senate  a 
larger  share  in  the  administration  of  the  empire  and  increasing 
its  prestige. 
19.  / 266. 
19.  See  ch.  2  note  80. 
20.  ILS  1321. 
21.  Tac.  Ann.  13.20;  Suet.  Nero  35. 
22.  Schol.  on  Juv.  Sat.  1.155. 
23.  Suet.  Galba  14;  Tac.  Hist.  1.6;  1.13;  1.14;  1.33; 
Plut  Galba  13. 
24.  Tac.  Ann  13.22;  14.51. 
25.  Small.  254;  Tac.  Hist.  1.72. 
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